**UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS**

KYIV

POLITICAL THOUGHT

1996

*It's terrible to lie in chains*

*And rot in dungy deep,*

*But it's still worse,*

*when you are free,*

*To sleep, and sleep, and sleep...*

*Taras SHEVCHENKO*

***Contents***

[A Word to the Reader](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/conts.htm#aword) . . . . . . . . . . xi

**Section I. Ukrainian Statehood: Ideas, Concepts, and Models, 1900-1990** . . . . . . . . . . 1

*Chapter 1.* [Socialist and Communist Models](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e01.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 3

*1.* Socialism in Modern Ukrainian Political Thought . . . . . . . . . . 3

*2.* Nineteenth Century Origins; The Socialism of Mykhailo Drahomanov . . . . . . . . . . 6

*3.* Models of Ukrainian Statehood During the Revolution . . . . . . . . . . 11

*4.* European Socialism and the Ukrainian Question . . . . . . . . . . 14

*5.* Mykhailo Hrushevsky: What Kind of Ukraine Do We Want? . . . . . . . . . . 18

*6.* The Directory: Dead-End of Ukrainian Socialism . . . . . . . . . . 24

*7.* National Cultural Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . 25

*8.* The Leninist Model . . . . . . . . . . 27

*9.* The Schismatics of the Ukrainian Revolution . . . . . . . . . . 28

*10.* "A Model Soviet Republic" . . . . . . . . . . 32

*11.* The Stalinist Variant of Proletarian Internationalism . . . . . . . . . . 36

*Chapter 2.* [Ethnocratic Concepts](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e02.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 39

*1.* Mykola Mikhnovsky — Romantic of the Ukrainian Idea . . . . . . . . . . 39

*2.* The Main Ideas of Dmytro Dontsov's Active Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . 42

*3.* Active Nationalism as the Ideological Basis of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) . . . . . . . . . . 45

*4.* The Ethnocratic State of Mykola Stsiborsky . . . . . . . . . . 47

*5.* The Transformations of Integral Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . 49

*Chapter 3.* [Classocratic View](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e03.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 53

*1.* The Nation and the State . . . . . . . . . . 54

*2.* The Hetman, the Elite, and the Class of Farmers . . . . . . . . . . 55

*3.* The Peasant with Sword and Plow . . . . . . . . . . 59

*4.* Territorial Awareness as State Ideology . . . . . . . . . . 61

*5.* A Philosopher of Ukrainian Politics . . . . . . . . . . 62

*6.* Lypynsky on the Threats to Ukrainian Statehood . . . . . . . . . . 63

*Chapter 4.* [The Liberal Idea in Ukraine](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e04.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 71

*1.* Dissemination of Liberal Ideas in Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 72

*2.* The Priority of Individual Rights . . . . . . . . . . 75

*3.* The Priority of Law . . . . . . . . . . 76

*4.* Self-Government . . . . . . . . . . 77

*5.* The National Idea . . . . . . . . . . 77

*6.* Basic Characteristics of the Present-Day Ukrainian Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . 78

*Chapter 5.* [The Geopolitical Component of Ukrainian Nation-Building Thought (First Half of the Twentieth Century)](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e05.htm) . . . . . 83

*1.* Origins of Ukrainian Political Geography . . . . . . . . . . 83

*2.* Russia as a Geopolitical Problem . . . . . . . . . . 87

*3.* Plans for the Future . . . . . . . . . . 89

*4.* The Eastern Vector of Ukraine's Interests . . . . . . . . . . 91

*Chapter 6.* [The Idea of Statehood in Sociopolitical Thought, 1940-1990](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e06.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 95

*1.* Thought About Statehood in the Underground . . . . . . . . . . 95

*2.* Ideas of the Sixties Generation . . . . . . . . . . 100

*3.* Universal Human Values in the Uncensored Thought . . . . . . . . . . 105

*4.* Totalitarian Institution Against Ukrainian Informal Groups . . . . . . . . . . 111

*5.* The National Idea and the Democratic Platform in the Communist Party . . . . . . . . . . 114

**Section II. Ukraine in Foreign Strategies and Doctrines** . . . . . . . . . . 119

*Chapter 1.* [Ukraine in Geopolitical Concepts in the First Third of the Twentieth Century](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e07.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 121

*1.* Rudolf Kjellen: Ukraine in World War I . . . . . . . . . . 122

*2.* Halford John Macinder: Euro-Asia and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 124

*3.* "Middle Europe" and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 128

*4.* Ukraine in the Geopolitical Thinking of Max Weber . . . . . . . . . . 135

*5.* The "New Europe" of Robert William Seton-Watson . . . . . . . . . . 138

*6.* Eastern Europe as the Green International . . . . . . . . . . 140

*Chapter 2.* [Ukraine in Polish Foreign-Policy Doctrines](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e08.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 143

*1.* Ukrainian Independence as a Threat to Polish Integrity . . . . . . . . . . 145

*2.* "Poland for the Poles" and the Project of a "Greater Ukraine" . . . . . . . . . . 147

*3.* Polish-Ukrainian Relations During World War II . . . . . . . . . . 149

*4.* "Proletarian Internationalism" as a Method of Ethnic Assimilation . . . . . . . . . . 151

*5.* Pro-Ukrainian Attitudes in Polish Society . . . . . . . . . . 152

*6.* The Making of International Relations . . . . . . . . . . 154

*Chapter 3.* [Ukraine in Hungarian Plans and Doctrines](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e09.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 157

*1.* Hungarian Statehood and the Ukrainian Question in the First Third of the Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . 158

*2.* Hungarian Geopolitical Strategy During the World War II . . . . . . . . . . 164

*3.* Hungary's Policy Toward Independent Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 169

*Chapter 4.* [Ukraine and the Ukrainian Question in Czechoslovak Policy](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e10.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 171

*1.* The Establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Ukrainian Question . . . . . . . . . . 172

*2.* The Development of Bilateral Relations . . . . . . . . . . 175

*3.* Ukrainians in the CSR, the Problems of Transcarpathian Rus . . . . . . . . . . 179

*4.* Transcarpathian Ukraine During World War II . . . . . . . . . . 182

*5.* The Ukrainian Issue in Communist Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . 187

*6.* Independent Ukraine in Czech and Slovak Foreign Policies . . . . . . . . . . 190

*Chapter 5.* [Ukraine in Rumanian Foreign-Policy Concepts](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e11.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 193

*1.* Rumanian Policy on Northern Bukovyna During World War I . . . . . . . . . . 193

*2.* "Rumania for Rumanians" and Ethnically Ukrainian Territories . . . . . . . . . . 196

*3.* Bucharest's Wartime Geopolitical Projects and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 198

*4.* "National Patriotism" as a Method of Assimilating Ethnic Minorities . . . . . . . . . . 200

*5.* Current Complications in Rumanian-Ukrainian Relations . . . . . . . . . . 202

*Chapter 6.* [Ukraine in Turkish Foreign Policy](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e12.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 207

*1.* Turkish-Ukrainian Contacts During World War I . . . . . . . . . . 207

*2.* Turkish-Ukrainian Relations in 1918-1921 . . . . . . . . . . 210

*3.* Soviet Ukraine in Turkish Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . 212

*4.* Restoration and Development of Bilateral Relations at the Present Stage . . . . . . . . . . 214

*Chapter 7.* [Ukraine in German Strategic Plans](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e13.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 219

*1.* Ukraine in German Eastern Strategy in the Early Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . 219

*2.* Austro-German Bloc and the Ukrainian Question . . . . . . . . . . 222

*3.* Hitler's Concept of *Lebensraum* and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 229

*4.* General Plan *Ost* . . . . . . . . . . 236

*5.* German Policy Toward the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists . . . . . . . . . . 239

*6. Ostpolitic* FRG in 1949-1989 and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 243

*7.* Independent Ukraine in the Foreign Policy of Reunified Germany . . . . . . . . . . 244

*Chapter 8.* [Ukraine in US Foreign Policy Doctrines](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e14.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 249

*1. Terra incognita* . . . . . . . . . . 249

*2.* On the Fringe of Interests . . . . . . . . . . 252

*3.* The Ukrainian Question and the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . 254

*4.* Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Challenge for the United States . . . . . . . . . . 260

*5.* A Breakthrough in Bilateral Relations . . . . . . . . . . 265

*Chapter 9.* [The Ukrainian Question in Russian Political Strategy](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e15.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 267

*1.* The Ukrainian Question in the State Duma . . . . . . . . . . 267

*2.* The Autocracy's Ukrainian Policy During World War I . . . . . . . . . . 270

*3.* The Provisional Government and Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 272

*4.* Lenin's Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia . . . . . . . . . . 277

*5.* Military-Political Alliance as a Form of Reviving the Empire . . . . . . . . . . 281

*6.* The Period of Contractual Relations . . . . . . . . . . 286

*7.* "Voluntary Unification" — Doctrine and Practice . . . . . . . . . . 289

*8.* Ukraine in Modern Russian Strategy . . . . . . . . . . 290

**Section III. The Ukrainian State and Society at the End of the Century** . . . . . . . . . . 297

*Chapter 1.* [The Metamorphoses of Postcommunist Power](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e16.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 299

*1.* Totalitarianism and Power: The Need for Rethinking . . . . . . . . . . 299

*2.* Postcommunist Neototalitarianism: Its Genesis and Special Features . . . . . . . . . . 301

*3.* The Geopolitical "Genes" of Postcommunist Power . . . . . . . . . . 305

*4.* The Neototalitarian Paradigm of State-Building in Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 307

*Chapter 2.* [State-Building in Ukraine: Ways of Legitimation](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e17.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 315

*1.* The Problem of Legitimation . . . . . . . . . . 316

*2.* Ideology and Utopia in Postcommunist Transformations . . . . . . . . . . 318

*3.* The National Idea, Civil Society, and Political Nation . . . . . . . . . . 323

*4.* Extricable Etatism . . . . . . . . . . 329

*5.* The Legacy of the Authoritarian Personality . . . . . . . . . . 332

*6.* The Secondary Nature of Geopolitical Legitimation . . . . . . . . . . 337

*Chapter 3.* [The Ethnopolitical Dimension of Statehood](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e18.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 343

*1.* Ethnic Minorities as a Factor of Geopolitics . . . . . . . . . . 343

*2.* The Ethnopolitical Reality of Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . 344

*Chapter 4.* [In Search of a Model of Economic Development](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e19.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 353

*1.* Strategies of Economic Transformations . . . . . . . . . . 353

*2.* The Starting Conditions of a Transformation Process . . . . . . . . . . 357

*3.* The Formation of a Postcommunist Economic System . . . . . . . . . . 359

*Chapter 5.* [Post-Soviet Forms of Social Changes](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e20.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 367

*1. Homo Corporaticus* . . . . . . . . . . 368

*2.* The Soviet Guild . . . . . . . . . . 370

*3.* The Post-Soviet Fratry . . . . . . . . . . 373

*Chapter 6.* [The Uninvested Fifth World](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e21.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 381

*1.* On the Non-Problematic Nature of the Fifth World . . . . . . . . . . 381

*2. Orbis Quintus* . . . . . . . . . . 384

*3.* Space and Time . . . . . . . . . . 385

*4.* The Factual Nature of Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . 389

*References* . . . . . . . . . . 397

[*Index of Names*](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/e22.htm) . . . . . . . . . . 423

[*About the Authors*](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/conts.htm#auth) . . . . . . . . . . 429

A Word to the Reader

The new Ukrainian state has celebrated its fifth anniversary. But Ukraine has still failed to acquire the distinct features of a civilized country. A deep crisis gripping all spheres of life might well be regarded as the singular specificity of its current national development. This crisis originates in the lack of state strategy, conceptual helplessness, and ill-defined tactics of nation-building. The ship state is sailing the stormy waters of independence without any coherent political philosophy adequate to current realities

The power superstructure towering above the society — the Leviathan of a state — evolves in Ukraine outside both twentieth century traditions of the national state-building thought, on the one hand, and the historical and current experience of the European democracies, on the other. The construction of the Ukrainian state takes place by secret, private means closed to the public and far from society as a whole. In doing so, the top leadership relies primarily on its own former narrow group activities devoid of any state-building experience and marked by a corporative understanding of the national interests.

Unfortunately, the authors of available publications on problems of Ukrainian state-building, which have appeared in the past several years, are primarily concerned with trying to prove to the world community, Ukrainian society, and sometimes even to themselves the historical inevitability and significance of the very fact of independent Ukraine's emergence on the world political map. Such books can be easily recognized by their style: they arc weighted down with what **/xii/** might be called "historical-philological romanticism" and solemn epic intonations. The state is thus made sacred, and the rhetoric of self-organizing is all pervasive. Such modern concepts as civil society, democracy, self-government, legitimacy, and human rights are shunned.

But then, is it really possible to "build" a state only on the basis of abstractly grounded patriotic feelings? Is it enough to be satisfied with publicizing one's patriotism at home while suffering fiascoes in solving burning domestic problems and defending its national interests on the international arena?

For centuries a principal method of the Ukrainian liberation struggle has been to seek outside allies and adapt to alien interests and geopolitical scenarios. Ukrainian leadership elites have been incapable of uniting on the basis of a general state- and nation-building vision, the desire and capability to become cognizant of Ukraine's objective national interests, and to understand societal expectations in order to steer the nation's development into a course of normal life befitting the dignity of man.

The present group of authors have attempted to make an analysis that would be free from propagandists pathos and excessive descriptive detail and to examine both the achievements of Ukrainian state-building thought and the special features of the Ukrainian struggle for independence as well as the weight and role of its inner and external factors.

The volume is a logical continuation of the scholarly quest of researchers grouped around the *Political Thought* (Kyiv) journal. Its major aim is to contribute to the forming of a truly democratic Ukrainian society and to stimulate its will to building its own future full-fledged nation. There can be no doubt that the cause of nation-building cannot be farmed out to those who weild power and chimeras of an "objective course oi history."

*Kyiv, August 1996*

*Oleksandr Dergachov. editor*

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**Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century**: Historical and Political Analysis / Oleksandr Dergachov (editor). — Kyiv: Political Thought, 1996. — 448 p. — ISBN 966-543-03-51 (Engl) "WAKLER"

The volume is prepared for publication by the Editorial Board of the Ukrainian scientific journal *Political Thought* (Kyiv) and the Institute of Postcommunist Society. It contains a comprehensive complex historical, political, and socio-philosophical analysis of issues in Ukrainian statehood in the twentieth century. The theoretical heritage of the national statehood-making thought is described in detail. Considerable attention is paid to the geopolitical parameters of Ukraine's becoming independent as well as the current problems of nation- and state-making and social development.

The book is designed for scholars, university instructors, graduate students, and students, and can be used as a textbook in modern Ukrainian history, political science, history of international relations, and social and political philosophy.

The volume is also published in [Ukrainian](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxx/zmist.htm) and [Russian](http://litopys.org.ua/ukrxxr/zmist.htm) editions.

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Socialist and Communist Models

## *James E. MACE*

*1. Socialism in Modem Ukrainian Political Thought*

Be it for good or ill, socialism has been the most influential ideology in twentieth-century Ukraine. From the first attempts to create political parties in Dnipro Ukraine at the turn of the century, through the national liberation struggle of 1917-1921, up to the very break-up of the USSR and later, all Ukrainian (and pseudo-Ukrainian) governments in Dnipro Ukraine were socialist. In his homeland conservative Viacheslav Lypynsky was but a lone voice in the wilderness. Dontsov's integral nationalism never had any significant influence outside Western Ukraine. The problem of "bourgeois" ministers, which so vexed Russia's Provisional Government during the first half of its existence, simply did not exist for the Ukrainian Central Rada, for Kyiv was practically bereft of nonsocialist Ukrainian politicians.

Socialism is not an attempt to model the state; it seeks to remold society itself aided by the state. In this sense the state was assigned the role of an instrument to break down old structures. The core ideology of socialism did not propose anything constructive in terms of modeling the future state. Classical socialism viewed the army and police primarily as instruments of class oppression and believed it sufficient to smash the old state structures for all social problems to disappear. This was a classic nineteenth century ideological system. **/4/**

The cult of socialist internationalism in Ukraine produced a situation where many Ukrainian socialists felt under constant internal and external pressure and feared to even think about modeling a future Ukrainian state. The positions of Ukrainian and Russian socialists differed in principle. For Ukraine its colonial status was the cause of its national oppression. This is why Ukrainian socialist parties gave such a prominent place in their programs to demands for national territorial autonomy. And it was these very demands which outraged their Russian comrades, accustomed as they were to thinking of Ukraine as an inalienable part of Russia. Thus it became so easy to dismiss Ukrainians as counterrevolutionaries, petty bourgeois, and suchlike. As a result Ukrainians began to protest their innocence of such sins as separatism, nationalism, and feared even the shadow of an independent Ukrainian state.

Even such a radically nationalistic Ukrainian leader as Mykola Mikhnovsky wrote in his proposed program for the Ukrainian People's Party, a proposal which in 1917 was to become the ideological basis of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Independentists about the "the clean, bright cathedral of the socialist order" and declared Ukrainians' solidarity with "all oppressed peoples."1

Symptomatically, the student group, which adopted Mikhnovsky's radical nationalist pamphlet *Independent Ukraine* as its first ideological platform, evolved to orthodox Marxism, and after the split of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) in 1904, the majority dropped all national demands and entered the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDRP) as an autonomous section called the Ukrainian Social Democratic Spilka (Union), retaining an internal organizational structure but without a program of its own.

The more "nationalistic" remainder, which in 1905 was . reorganized as the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party (USDRP) also in 1906 requested admission into the RSDRP, offering a proposal in which it agreed with all points **/5/** of the RSDRP program, inserting only a final amendment, a footnote, expressing the weak and ill-defined Ukrainian Social Democratic demand of not even Ukrainian autonomy, merely the right to discuss it, to raise the question within the empirewide political movement.2 This, in turn, called forth categorical opposition from Lenin's Bolshevik center. No merger took place because of the party's "petty bourgeois character," as Lenin's *Complete Collected Works* would have it,3 for only the complete rejection of all national demands ("petty bourgeois consciousness") would do for the Bolsheviks.4

Ukrainians at the turn of the century were a classic example of a sociologically incomplete people, that is, a people for whom foreign domination assumed a structural character such that even where members of the given group constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, almost all roles in the social division of labor, except for the least prestigious ones, are occupied by members of other groups.5 After the Valuyev Circular of 1863 and Ems Ukaz of 1876, Russia's Ukrainians lacked schools and literature in their native tongue. And even in small towns where in 1870 the local citizens spoke local Ukrainian dialects, by the turn of the century they had adopted "primarily the Russian language or a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian."6 Even in 1917 Ukrainians remained an overwhelmingly peasant folk, little affected by the industrial development of their country. The trade unions and working class were overwhelmingly linguistically Russian, as were the town store and landlord's manor. One key word appears over and over in early twentieth-century. Ukrainian political thought, bourgeoislessness. In 1909, for example, one Ukrainian activist attributed the weakness of the Ukrainian national movement to precisely this lack of a Ukrainian national bourgeoisie.7 By contrast, in 1917 Volodymyr Vynnychenko praised Ukrainian "bourgeoislessness" as a factor promoting national unity in the struggle for national and social justice.8 All Ukrainian politicians recognized it for a fact. Only Lenin **/6/** could maintain that every nation has proletarian and bourgeois *(i.e.,* hostile, those whom socialists had to fight) elements. In essence, this Leninist thesis was mere political chicanery. He reserved unto himself the right to define what was "bourgeois," even among other peoples, and thereby justify interference in their internal affairs and unbridled force against such elements.

Naturally, for a nation of tens of millions of peasants, a few thousand intellectuals, and a sprinkling of individuals in other classes, no ideology stood a chance of gaining mass support unless it could articulate both the social and national grievances of a peasantry which still bore vestiges of serfdom. Moreover, the growth of mass socialist movements in Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth century endowed its ideology with an aura of being both progressive and fashionable, one in which the oppressed could expect to find allies in their common quest for freedom and justice.

*2. Nineteenth Century Origins: The Socialism of Mykhailo Drahomanov*

Since twentieth-century Ukrainian thought long remained under the shadow of Mykhailo Drahomanov as Marxism's most important socialist competitor, to understand twentieth-century Ukrainian socialism, one simply cannot avoid Drahomanov. Although Drahomanov once wrote in a letter to his daughter that "for peoples to develop in the right way, they need political independence,"9 publicly he always advocated a federation of Slavic peoples in which each had equal rights. Obviously, given the complete absence of Ukrainian public schools, any idea of Ukrainian independence was bound to seem hopelessly Utopian.

For Drahomanov the national and social problems were of absolutely equal importance. In 1880 together with Mykhailo Pavlyk and Serhiy Podolynsky he published in *Hromada* a wonderfully clear and concise program which contains a model of future Ukrainian statehood, a model **/7/** which retained its influence to the end of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). It was precisely this program, which gave the UNR its ideological grounding, conditioned its early success, and in large measure led to its failure,10

As was recognized by the late Ivan L. Rudnytsky, a scholar who generally accented the liberal over the radical and socialistic in Drahomanov's political theory, the anarcho-socialism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon lay at the center of Drahomanov's vision. For Drahomanov every individual, every association, every community had to be free from the dictates of higher instances. His slogan: "This goal is called anarchy *(beznachal'stvo), i.e.,* the autonomy of each individual and the free cooperation of men and groups."11

Two problems arise from this vision. A free association without fixed structure is nonviable, for it lacks the authority to arbitrate among regions and cannot mobilize resources for common defense against other strong political entities. As to federalism, this is an old theory, largely shaped by the American model. As early as 1823 a Society of United Slavs was created in the Russian Empire, hoping to unite all Slavic peoples into a federation.12 However, as Lenin wrote about federalism, any association is possible only when ail parties want the same thing. And Ukrainian and Russian socialists understood federalism very differently, and behind the back of Great Russians always lurked the shadow of the chauvinist *Derzhimorda,* and Russians constantly seemed ready, as Drahomanov put. it, to go "from a democratic federalist position to an official chauvinist one."13

Drahomanov believed that Ukraine should be a federation of free communities within an international federation of similar communities on the basis of agrarian socialism, without a standing army, with a people's militia, where every citizen had his own arms.

This position would later play a crucial role in the downfall of the Ukrainian Peoples Republic. The breakdown of conventional state structures, adoption of Drahomanov's general socialist demands, the disintegration of the army and **/8/** creation of "people's militias," and the universal possession of weapons led directly to the Vynnychenko-Shapoval doctrine of 1917 that Ukraine did not need an army, a doctrine that led to the tragedy of Kruty where only a small band of military cadets stood between Kyiv and Muravev's Red Guards from Russia. For a state which depends exclusively on the good will of its citizens to defend its national security will always be weaker that a state capable of forcing its citizens to fight for it.

Up to the revolution of 1917 the socialism of Drahomanov, where everything begins with self-organization from below, and Marxism, with its national indifference and bias in favor of large states, were the only serious competitors among Ukrainian socialists. Drahomanov himself was highly critical of Marx's centralism, blaming the "German Karl Marx" for the fact that in the First International and especially in its Council states, not peoples, were represented. "Thus," wrote Drahomanov, "it had a section for Russia, although in Russia there are dozens of countries and peoples very different from one another." This was for Drahomanov evidence of the deadliest sin: "In other words, this 'Association' started to work not from the bottom up but from the top down."14

From Switzerland Drahomanov maintained close contact with Ukrainian radicals, especially in Galicia and especially with two young men, Mykhailo Pavlyk and Ivan Franko. While Pavlyk quickly became and remained an orthodox adherent of Drahomanov, Franko had a flirtation with Marxism, returning to Drahomanov's tenet on the central role of the peasantry in building socialism in the mid1880s. Pavlyk, by contrast, looked on the Marxist Utopia as a program for creating a police state, believed that it could find support only among nations already in possession of their own states, and that the slogan "proletarians of the world, unite" really meant "nations of the Russian and Germans empires, Russify and Germanize yourselves." When in 1890 the first Ukrainian political party, the Ruthenian-**/9/**Ukrainian Radical Party, was formed in Lviv, it was in fact a coalition in which the older followers of Drahomanov -Franko, Pavlyk, and Severyn Danylovych — wrote the program minimum and young Marxists — Yevhen Levytsky, Mykola Hankevych, and Volodymyr Okhrymovych — wrote the program maximum. Observers of the day could not help but notice the contradiction between the program maximum's vague Marxist phraseology about scientific socialism and the program minimum's detailed reforms designed to prevent the pauperization of most peasants, a development which Marxism held to be both inevitable and progressive.15 When at the Radical Party's first congress Marxist Viacheslav Budzynovsky and young Yulian Bachynsky (the future author of *Ukranna Irredenta),* argued for independence, Franko and Pavlyk rose in opposition. And even after the Radicals adopted a program calling for independence in 1895, Franko adopted the awkward stance that Ukrainian independence need not necessarily mean complete separation from Russia, should the latter adopt a federal system.16

Within the context of socialist models of Ukrainian statehood, it must be emphasized that the most outspoken critic of the creation in 1914 of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) as an embryo government in exile was not the Bolsheviks or even Lenin, but came from among the Ukrainian socialists themselves. The sharpest critic of the SVU was Lev Yurkevych, who explained that he and like-minded Ukrainians were "not enemies of the idea of Ukraine's independence," but that "our Russian comrades will behave like real internationalists only when their organizations and press in Ukraine together with us recognize the necessity of the struggle for the liberation of our people and together with us to combat at every opportunity all manifestations of national oppression." Thus, for Yurkevych Ukraine's very existence as a state was directly dependent upon how blindly and submissively Ukrainian revolutionary forces supported the Russian revolution. He had such faith in the fairness of international socialism, **/10/** above all in its Russian variant, that he even turned to Trotsky with the idea of creating an international socialist tribunal to read the SVU members out of the socialist movement.17

Yurkevych's logic is understandable only within the context of how he viewed future Ukraine. For, although one cannot even suspect Yurkevych of harboring Russophile sympathies, he saw the SVU's very creation in Austrian surroundings, its negotiations with the "bourgeois" Central Powers, *i.e.,* with the "imperialists," and even its membership, which consisted not of "representatives of the toilers" but of patriotically inclined declasse gentry elements as a betrayal of socialist ideals and the idea of Ukraine's "living peasant people."18

The very idea of a "living peasant people" is Utopian. Such a socially homogeneous society is possible only under colonial conditions, where all other places in the social division of labor arc taken by members of other national groups. Otherwise, there simply is no nor can there be a "peasant people," because even the village from time to time needs industrial goods beyond the capabilities of village manufacture. And when the town, where such goods are produced, looks down on the village, when town and country speak different tongues and the town has a colonial relationship with the countryside, contradictions arise inevitably. Without authoritative arbitration between them the possibility arises of those very conflicts which occurred in Ukraine during its struggle for national liberation.

To be sure, Trotsky supported Yurkevych's struggle against the SVU. But in his epistolary response, he wrote that a revolutionary tribunal would hardly deter such "adventurists... who meet with the Austrian police and ride in Austrian cars to the office of the Turkish vizier."19 Why did the SVU so raise Trotsky's ire? Was it not that in Turkey the SVU achieved its greatest success, official recognition of the need to create a future independent Ukrainian state and the promise of support for it? Returning to that most revo-**/11/**lutionary and most socialist of Ukrainians, Lev Yurkevych, who actively fought any attempt to organize in independent Ukrainian state nucleus, it must be said that his constant attempts to cooperate with Lenin, Trotsky, and Manuïlsky proved fruitless. Lenin above all received his ideas with suspicion and hostility, rejecting categorically all proposals for joint action made by Yurkevych, on whom Ukrainian patriots had turned their back.

*3. Models of Ukrainian Statehood During the Revolution*

In 1917, in conformity with the socialist project, the upper classes in Russia lost their political role, giving way to self-consecrated representatives of the "toiling masses." These "toilers" in Ukraine actually consisted of two groups who little understood each other: a Ukrainian-speaking peasantry (then 80% of the population) and an overwhelmingly Russian-speaking urban proletariat and army. In Ukraine there were in essence two coterminous revolutions which, under very similar social slogans, remained essentially distinct. For the Russian-speaking working class the revolution in Ukraine had all the traits of the Russian Revolution: Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and local organizations of the main Russian political parties. But in the village, thanks to its self-organization through the Peasant Union and cooperative network led by a Central Ukrainian Cooperative Committee,20 Ukrainian socialists could always mobilize thousands of peasants for urban demonstrations. And this was the key to the strength of the Ukrainian movement and its organ, the Ukrainian Central Rada in Kyiv.

Three political parties dominated the organized Ukrainian movement, the Central Rada, and later Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic: the above-mentioned Ukrainian Social Democrats (USDRP), the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR), and the scmilibcral Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists (UPSF). The USDRP had the most experienced party activists, but it **/12/** claimed to represent an extremely small social constituency, Ukrainian-speaking proletarians. The party with the largest membership, the UPSR, traced its genealogy to a small group formed in 1903 to reconcile the teachings of Marx and Drahomanov. But as a mass movement it really took shape only in 1917 on the basis of the rural cooperative movement.21 The UPSF was organized on the basis of the liberal Society of Ukrainian Progressives mainly from older cultural and scholarly figures and constituted the most pragmatic wing of the Ukrainian movement.

Ukrainian socialists, like socialists generally, believed that socialism was merely the extension of democracy to the economic sphere. First civil rights had to be gained according to the so-called "bourgeois democratic" model, and then with the support of the toiling majority of the population secure the interests of working people by means of a redistribution of wealth from the wealthy minority to the poor and socialization of the means of production. They hated "exploiters," considered inevitable the latter's action against such a revolution, and were ready to suppress "non-toiling" elements of the population, but as socialists they simply could not admit the possibility of serious disagreements and blood-letting between the toilers of different nations and their socialist representatives. They deeply believed that there neither were nor could there be enemies on the Left. This political culture rendered Ukrainian socialists exceedingly vulnerable both internally and to attack from Russian revolutionaries. Such a political culture played into the hands of imperially-inclined Russian radicals in their struggle with national movements in general. Moreover, within the Ukrainian movement already lurked the specter of endless quarrels, splits, and battle for the image of being real socialists according to the principle, the more one demands for "the masses," the more revolutionary he is. Anyone could at any moment be denounced as a nationalist, reactionary, someone whom "real" socialists had to combat.

USDRP adherents, like Russian Mensheviks and Euro-**/13/**pean Social Democrats generally, believed in the complete socialization (state ownership) of industry and the evolution of agriculture in the direction of huge, productive, socialized farms. Like all orthodox Marxists, they viewed the peasantry as a petty-bourgeois stratum inevitably doomed to extinction by the spread of capitalist agribusiness and believed that redistributing land from more economically developed gentry farms to individual small-holders would be a dangerously reactionary step. This is quite clear from the very name of an article appearing in the USDRP newspaper, dated November 1917, "What Does the Ukrainian Petty Bourgeoisie Want?"22 The butt of the article's criticism, the UPSR, was, by contrast, a party of class conscious peasants and figures of the rural cooperative movement for whom agrarian reform in favor of the peasantry was a core demand. Like their Russian counterparts, they looked forward to the elimination of private property in land and the creation of a Land Reserve, which would be controlled by the peasants themselves and distribute state, church, and gentry-held land as peasants saw fit. They viewed as desirable the creation of large model farms as a stimulus to the creation of future socialist farming, but at they simultaneously announced that "All lands in Ukraine (the Ukrainian Land Reserve) shall be transferred without compensation to the entire toiling people, which is to redistribute them through village, county (povit), regional, and national land committees elected by the toiling people on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot."23 The USDRP was for some months able to block this project, which was adopted only in the Central Rada's Fourth Universal.

Thus, the main internal Ukrainian political battles of 1917 were not over the model of a future state, about which no one thought seriously because all assumed that the socialist revolution would in one fell swoop transform the empire into a family of fraternal and equal nations; they concerned problems of the socialist transformation of Ukrainian society. **/14/**

To the very end of 1917 not one leading Ukrainian figure seriously thought in terms of Ukraine's complete separation from Russia. Here we need not trace in detail the evolution of various parties' views on how they thought a future federation ought to be organized. Suffice it to realize that to the last possible moment they wanted to transform the empire into a federation in which Ukraine would have complete internal sovereignty and a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, separate from the All-Russian one, which would resolve all internal Ukrainian political issues.

Throughout 1917 the slogan of virtually all Ukrainian socialists was "national territorial autonomy for Ukraine with safeguards of the rights of national minorities." Here they had in mind the Austro-Marxist of national cultural autonomy to which Lenin was irreconcilably opposed.

*4. European Socialism and the Ukrainian Question*

The then dominant European political model was either constitutional monarchy or parliamentary democracy. In both cases Parliament played a dominant role and formed the government. Deputies were elected on a territorial winner-take-all basis; proportional representation came only later. In parliamentary democracies presidents were most often relegated to the largely ceremonial role kings played in a constitutional monarchies and had little real power.

In the postwar chaos socialists came to power in Germany, Austria, Poland, and Hungary. In the first three they themselves curbed their social demands in the interests of democracy and preserving their state's independence. In Hungary, Bela Kun's communist revolution lasted but three months, supplanted by the military dictatorship (regency) of Admiral Horthy.

Socialists successfully created three new regimes: Germany's Weimar Republic, post-imperial Austria, and the Second Polish Republic. In Germany and Austria (where Austro-Marxist theorist of the national question Karl **/15/** Renner became president), socialists wrote liberal constitutions of the parliamentary type and refrained from any attempt to immediately build "socialism," aware that this would have provoked social conflicts that could destroy their new democracies. They were quite aware that they had to save whatever they could from such vengeful victor states as France.

Becoming ruler of Poland, Polish Socialist leader J6zef Pilsudski left his party voluntarily, explaining to his erstwhile comrades that they had traveled in the same train, but he had decided to get off at the station called "Independence." He told those who wanted to travel farther to the station called "Socialism" that he wished them well, but he had to stay behind to build a Polish state for all Poles. Pilsudski reconciled diametrically opposed political forces around the idea that statehood was the primary goal, the starting point from which all else flowed. And this idea proved quite effective even under the complex conditions of reintegrating the three segments of the new state inherited from three separate empires (Germany, Austria, and Russia). Certainly, the logic of Poland's political evolution was strongly influenced by the general situation on the troubled continent of Europe, the European powers' hope that Poland would constitute a *cordon sanitaire* against Bolshevik Russia, and France's wish to use Poland as a barrier against Germany.

Thus, among the postwar victors there was a consensus regarding Polish independence and Poland's place and role in the new world. Regarding Ukraine — a traditional source of territorial tidbits for Austria-Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey — such a consensus failed to materialize not only among Western leaders but even among European socialists, although thanks to lobbying by former UNR President Mykhailo Hrushevsky in August 1919 the Lucerne Conference of the Second International did go on record in favor of Ukrainian independence. Up to that time European socialists had no position on the Ukrainian question. **/16/**

But, most importantly, Ukraine at; that juncture lacked any influential political force (only the relatively weak Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Indcpendentists) capable of rising above their purely socialist inclinations and adopting Ukrainian independence as their main goal. Political battles, as we have seen, took place over the ways and means of the socialist transformation of society, not over how to build a Ukrainian state. Looking far ahead, this same tradition reasserted itself even in 1991 during the session when Ukraine's parliament discussed the declaration of independence. Many patriotically-inclined deputies made Ukraine's declaration of independence dependent upon the political question of banning the CPSU's activities, failing to understand that such windows of opportunity as the anti-Gorbachev putsch can close with amazing speed and that at such moments any delay whatever can have catastrophic and irrevocable consequences. Fortunately, some had studied the lessons of history, and clearer heads prevailed, although it cannot be forgotten that history, especially in Russia, has a fatal tendency to return to type, with rather bloody consequences for regions Russia considers its own. On this should ponder those Ukrainians who remain committed to independence but have failed to find a common political platform to coordinate their efforts.

European socialists of the early twentieth century for the sake of statehood made every possible compromise and, as a result, preserved their position in political structures, their authority with the people, and, finally, played an important role in securing citizens those social and national rights which they had sought to secure from the start.

But the developed European countries had a literate population, which imperial Russia lacked. The classic problem which had troubled nineteenth century conservative critics of democracy, how to keep the poor majority from looting the wealthy minority into extinction and thus destroying the very values of civilization, was solved in the West, bv the growth of education and rise in living stan-**/17/**dards assisted by means of various social programs to aid the needy. Imperial Russia had neither. It also lacked official structures capable of carrying out evolutionary programs; its bureaucracy had been trained to live by the twin imperatives of servility and, when in doubt, forbid. Democracy came to peoples simply not ready to accept it and, as in many countries of the Third World, was stillborn.

Another model is offered by Czechoslovakia, where the President *de facto* played a central role as arbiter among and above, parties, but this was the product of Tomas Masaryk's unique role as father of his nation and its state. There were various coalitions, almost always consisting of five parties, and, for example, German Social Democrats always knew that they would have their turn at the helm of state ministries. Up to the creation of a Nazi movement among the Sudeten Germans, the system was quite effective and stable. And it must be admitted that by the mid-1930s of all the new European states only Czechoslovakia remained democratic, and even there deep flaws existed in the political structure. Czechoslovakia's appearance on the political map took place under conditions very similar to Ukraine's. But there was one huge difference. Most of Ukraine had been governed by Russia, where such things as the Valuyev Circular and Ems Ukase were possible, while Czechoslovakia had been governed by the Habsburgs, a dynasty which never tried to create a nation-state and for whom banning a language from schools and bookstores would have been unthinkable. Czech deputies constituted an influential fraction in the Viennese imperial *Reichsrat.* Czechs had become a majority of Bohemia's urban population, and Czech political parties (socialist and nonsocialist) were already politically dominant among the Czech people, and had already evolved into a sociologically complete nation with a Czechophone local bureaucracy and national cultural elite. In Ukraine a role similar to Masaryk's as father of the state and nation was played by Mykhailo Hrushevskv. a man whose fate was tragic due both to per-**/18/**sonal circumstances and the fact that, the cause for which he fought was foredoomed by its external isolation and internal political culture. Ukrainian socialists, and perhaps Hrushevsky above all, simply did not understand what a state is. The state is not only, as Marxists affirmed and Leninists built, an instrument of class oppression, it is above all an instrument of national self-defense.

5. *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: What Kind of Ukraine Do We Want?*

Mykhailo Hrushevsky was not only the symbol of Ukrainian statehood; in the critical year of 1917 he was the absolute embodiment of the Ukrainian national idea. Head of the Central Rada, first President of the UNR, a man of exceptional intellect and indefatigability, he had no equal in terms of importance and authority in early twentieth-century Ukraine. Scholar, philosopher, historian, literary and art critic, writer, and ethnographer, he took it upon himself to decide practically all issues connected with the birth and existence of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Like most Ukrainian socialists, Hrushevsky viewed Ukraine primarily as a country of peasants. For him, the words Ukrainian and peasant were virtually synonymous. He considered that the social basis of the revolution in Ukraine so differed from that in both Russia and the West, that it would develop along different lines and resolve social problems differently, and that in Ukraine the social and political role of the peasantry would be decisive for a very long time, if not forever. And, since "future generations of peasants will have the great mission of representing to the world the Ukrainian People's Republic, Greater Ukraine, so far the only state of the working people, which must serve as an example for other democracies, which will in turn one day send their children to us — to study, to live, to work, and to lead the state with the participation of working people," the Ukrainian state's first task was to guarantee com-**/19/**pulsory education for rural children, universally establish schools of agronomy, spread publicistic and literary works, and agitate in order to inculcate in the peasantry pride and bring them up to be real "masters of the land."

Hrushevsky believed that the Ukrainian movement had to extinguish or neutralize all mutual hostility and do everything possible to promote the development of various cultures in Ukraine, not to exacerbate ethnic relations by forced Ukrainization but also not to retreat from the principle of Ukrainian statehood and the establishment of Ukrainian as its official language.

At the same time, however, Hrushevsky posed Ukraine a "grandiose task," stipulating that "we reject the police-bureaucratic order and want to base our administration on broad self-administration, leaving to ministerial administrations only the functions of general oversight, coordination, and the filling in of those gaps which might appear in the operations of self-administration. In this way, the bureaucracy's influence will be very limited." Thus Hrushevsky, albeit unknowingly, at the very beginning of the state's existence limited its capabilities as an instrument of taxation, redistribution of social benefits, and implementer of social programs. This position could and did lead to universal anarchy, the rise of various "independent republics," and finally to utter chaos in the newly-created state.

Hrushevsky did not completely reject the role of the army, but he viewed a universal militia as the normal form of national defense. He viewed the army as something temporary and was ready at any moment to go from a standing army to a militia system. He considered the maintenance of a standing army "a waste of time" and thought it necessary to do everything possible to concentrate into the briefest possible span of time military "technical training, adequate for current conditions, and then further develop it through training sessions organized at various times of the year so that they drain from the country's vital forces the minimum possible productive labor."24 **/20/**

Hrushevsky gave much attention to Ukraine's future territorial structure. A convinced federalist, he thought about what kind of territorial structure could provide the best opportunities for real democratic self-administration. He considered the extant division into *povits* and *guberniyas* unsuitable in this area, the povit being too small to organize wide-ranging social activities and the guberniya too mechanistic, artificial, and large to avoid being divided up. Hrushevsky stated that the best option might be the creation of *okruhs,* each with a population just short of a million, able to organize "affairs relating to sanitation, roads, agriculture, national resources, industry, and culture. Each would be able to locally organize and set up high schools, a good museum, and a competent theater — everything that a povit town is unable to do on its own." Such a territorial structure would make it possible for every okruh to send no fewer than ten deputies to Ukraine's general assemblies, thus making proportional representation of political parties possible. In addition, the sufficiently small size of these entities would mean that all its parts would be interconnected with each other and with its center. All community, political, and cultural forces would be visible to all, and social projects would be carried out with the immediate participation and under the oversight of the community. Hrushevsky proposed a plan for such a territorial structure, based on historical, economic, and cultural regions, using historical names, the neglect of which he considered dangerous, for they had been created "not by the caprice of diplomats or politicians but grew out of geographical and natural conditions, which are not so easily changed."25

Hrushevsky, as this document shows, had no fear of local identities; on the contrary, he believed that stimulating the consciousness of all branches of the Ukrainian nation like vestiges of such historic Ukrainian tribes as Derevlyanians, Polyanians, Siverians, Volhynians, *etc.,* along with its cultural heterogeneity and the spirit of local patriotism would give a strong impulse to regional development. **/21/**

Hrushevsky considered himself a convinced federalist, completely in the spirit of socialist ideology as he understood it. He firmly rejected all charges of separatism and nationalism but believed that the future Ukrainian state should be based on the demographically dominant Ukrainian national element. 26

Hrushevsky and his allies thought in global terms. As convinced socialists they took upon themselves responsibility not only for Ukraine but for the entire Russian state and all its peoples. In accordance with a resolution of the April Ukrainian People's Congress on relations with other peoples of Russia demanding, *inter alia,* the restructuring of Russia on a federal basis, on September 21-28, 1917, the Central Rada hosted a so-called Congress of Peoples in Kyiv. Tatar, Georgian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Belarusian, Estonian, Moldavian, Buriat, and Don Cossack representatives took part along with a representative of the Provisional Government.

The Congress recognized that the idea of federalism had deeply penetrated society among numerous nations of Russia and that only on a federal basis could the former Russian prison of peoples continue to exist. The Congress adopted a special resolution calling for Russia's fundamental restructuring according to the principles of decentralization, federalism, democracy, recognition of the equal rights of all peoples, and that in cases where a nationality was spread over the entire empire, like the Jews, they should be accorded extraterritorial personal autonomy. The Congress also went on record in favor of the equality of all languages and of democratically electing territorial constituent assemblies.

The Congress also elected a Council of Peoples to which was entrusted the task of leading the struggle of all nations for "the cathedral of liberty of peoples," a Russian federation. Hrushevsky was elected its head. Federalist traditions remained alive and well in Ukrainian political thought of the day. Ukrainian socialists were fated to travel a long and tragic road of disillusionment concerning the real possibility of independent self-government and democratic **/22/** home rule within the bounds of a single Russian state. They overestimated the internationalist tendencies of socialist ideology and underestimated the Russian national myth's aggressiveness toward Ukraine. The Congress of Peoples could have no lasting results because there was little difference in practice between Lenin's one and indivisible Communist Party committed to the "internationalist" process of the "coming together and merger" of nations and the General Denikin's "Russia, one and indivisible."

All that remained for Hrushevsky to was one desperate gambit after the October coup in Petrograd.

The Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which he wrote personally, announced, "Without separating from Russia and maintaining her unity, we stand firmly on our own land in order to assist all Russia through our efforts so that Russia might become a federation of equal and free peoples."27 The Central Rada did not take action against the Bolshevik regime but refrained from officially recognizing as Russia's legitimate government, inasmuch as there were no grounds for so doing and also because of his and the Central Rada's strong commitment to federalism.

On December 6 the General Secretariat addressed a note to Lenin's Council of People's Commissars and the various bodies which represented Russia's regions, proposing a new Russian socialist government be created on the following platform:

"The conclusion of a universal democratic peace and the calling on schedule of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. If you agree, the General Secretariat asks that you not refuse to immediately and directly inform the leadership as to when your representatives could come to Kyiv for a congress called by the Central Rada for the above-mentioned purpose."28

Nothing came of this proposal, since Russia was already on the threshold of civil war, divided into hostile camps, brimming with mortal hatred for each other. For this starry eyed project to bear fruit the Rada would have had to rec-**/23/**oncile the irreconcilable, to bring together forces which could not be brought together, and it received practically no support. All the Rada accomplished was to call upon itself the wrath of Lenin's Red Guards.

Lenin's answer was an ultimatum on December 19, and six days later a Bolshevik-led group formed a "UNR People's Secretariat" in Kharkiv, which in its turn received "fraternal military assistance" from "big brother." Within a month the Bolsheviks were in Kyiv and a defenseless Ukraine was forced to step out onto the world areas as an independent state, sign a peace treaty with the Central Powers, and ask the latter's assistance against the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the state created by the Fourth Universal was doomed from the outset, inasmuch as the document adopted SR-style agrarian reform, which rendered the Ukrainians incapable of carrying out its Brest-Litovsk commitment to sell the Germans grain. It was only natural that the Germans, as the only real military force in Ukraine, would orchestrate an April *coup d'etat,* installing a client regime (the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky). Later Hrushevsky would again place his socialist ideals ahead of Ukrainian statehood. In 1920, when Russian-speaking Bolsheviks were fighting Petliura's Directory of the UNR, he sent a letter to CP(b)U Secretary Kosior naively requesting that the Bolsheviks transfer power to Ukrainian parties which had adopted the Soviet platform.29

Today, in the fullness of time, when examining Hrushevsky's intellectual and theoretical legacy, one can only be amazed how Bolshevik "theoreticians" could so distort the views and content of the activity of this undoubtedly convinced socialist and democrat that his very name could be made to symbolize Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and counterrevolution. Hrushevsky's "guilt" resided in one thing: he took all too seriously the idea of a Ukrainian state within a federal Russia, believed too seriously in the internationalism of Russian politicians, and, unlike the Bolshevik leaders, viewed in too humanistic a light the state's role and **/24/** place. In other words, he took the idea of socialist internationalism too seriously.

*6. The Directory: Dead-End of Ukrainian Socialism*

The Directory of the revived UNR faced the same problems which had plagued Hrushevsky. On the one hand was strong pressure from the Entente, which had little sympathy for socialism, Ukrainian or otherwise, and on the other was Bolshevik Russia, which hoped to control Ukraine. And, finally, there was Denikin, who with Allied help sought to restore Russia "one and indivisible."

At such a juncture any hope of rescuing Ukrainian statehood depended upon uniting all pro-Ukrainian political forces, on their unconditional retreat from the principles dividing them and compromises among all political parties, movements, and leaders on the basis of independence as their overriding common goal. And for this it was already too late. Political schism in Ukraine had passed the point of no return. Exerting strong influence on the peasantry were the Borotbists, who supported the Soviet platform, while the Russophone workers largely remained indifferent or hostile to the Ukrainian movement.

The Hetman regime was ousted by a great jacquerie led by Petliura which also destroyed Skoropadsky's Ukrainian army. After the Hetman's fall, the armed peasants simply went home, leaving the UNR virtually defenseless. Petliura was forced to try to create an army from nil. Thus, reserving for himself the title of UNR Supreme Otaman, he began to recognize as otamans (generals) virtually anyone who could command the loyalty of armed followers and proclaimed their loyalty to the UNR. Vynnychenko little exaggerated when he wrote that literally anyone could become an otaman if he declared his readiness to combat the Bolsheviks, and Petliura would then send him a diploma *(hramota)* and a couple of million newly-printed Ukrainian karbovanets.30 Over the otamans there was no operational **/25/** control whatever, and this resulted in the period of the revolution known as the otaman regime. As early as November 1918, Otaman Bolbochan executed the leaders of the Kharkiv Soviet and in the summer of 1919 was shot by Petliura as a pogromist. In the chaos of the period, pogroms swept the country and the commanders who initiated them could deftly switched sides among the various forces pretending to be Ukraine's legitimate government.

The Directory held a Toilers' Congress, to which it might have handed over power, but the congress evolved into a political farce. The Ukrainian socialists who dominated the gathering proved incapable of finding a common language, and no common platform capable of creating a strong central authority and defending Ukrainian statehood was found. Patriotic speeches by Vynnychenko and his allies were delivered within earshot of Bolshevik cannons.

*7. National Cultural Autonomy*

The Austro-Marxist idea of national cultural (or personal) autonomy arose as an answer of how to preserve the unity of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire. Adopted in the Brunn Program of Austrian Social Democracy in 1899, it aimed at divorcing nationality from territoriality by according everyone a dual political identity, a territorial one based on place residence regardless of nationality and a separate identity based on one's national culture regardless of place of residence. All cultural questions were to fall into the sphere of extraterritorial national bodies, elected by all members of a given ethnic group throughout the state, while territorial bodies would have competence only over questions of a territorial, administrative nature not effecting culture and national identity. The budgetary allocations to national bodies would be based on the proportional size of the given group.31 Within the Russian Empire, Ukrainians and other groups seeking territorial home-rule faced the problem their relationship to other nations who **/26/** were dominant in cities and towns, and this made the project very interesting to them. As Yurkcvych had earlier hoped that a demonstration of fairness and internationalism might convince non-Ukrainian socialists in the justice of Ukrainian aspirations, leaders of the UNR hoped that a demonstration of their tolerance toward the aspirations of national minorities might win them support among non-Ukrainian strata of the population.

National cultural autonomy was effected not in Austria, where the successor states were nation-states, but in Ukraine and the three Baltic republics. The Third Universal — simultaneously published in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and Yiddish — promised, and the Fourth Universal was adopted simultaneously with a law on National Cultural Autonomy, later enshrined as Article Seven of the Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic, thus being placed at the center of the socialist model of Ukrainian statehood. This law gave Ukraine's Great Russian, Jewish, and Polish communities the right to form autonomous communities on the basis of the above mentioned Briinn model. Such bodies were accorded the right to elect their own national Constituent Assemblies and Councils, which would have the status of state organs as well as to levy supplementary taxes on their co-nationals for cultural purposes. The Ukrainian state was obliged to finance all such bodies according to the size of their relative population.

All other national groups were guaranteed the right to national cultural autonomy upon presentation to the Supreme Court of a petition signed by not less that 10,000 citizens.

*De facto,* among Ukraine's national minorities only the Jews organized national autonomy through an elected Soym (Diet). And the pogroms of the otaman period (for Petliura's military dependence on these independent warlords rendered him incapable of guaranteeing law and order) meant that from early 1919 the central focus of activity for the elected Jewish organs was to organize the self-defense of **/27/** the Jewish population. Still, the fact remains that Ukrainian socialists hoped above all to give everyone the right to their own cultural and national life.32

*8. The Leninist Model*

The true Bolshevik model of Ukrainian statehood might best be summed up in Lenin's "there can be no talk of and Stalin's "stop playing at republics." Bolshevik policies toward Ukraine were based on this above all else. On the eve of the first Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine in late 1917, the Central Committee (CC) in Moscow informed their Kyiv comrades that they considered the founding of a separate Bolshevik Party for Ukraine "undesirable." On the even of the second, on December 9, 1918, the Moscow CC sent a telegram to its Ukrainian counterpart in Kursk that the former would send its orders directly to various organs in the future Soviet Ukraine without going through the CP(b)U. And on December 24, 1918, *Izvestiya* in Moscow had published the laconic announcement that with the annulment of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk, the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars ceased to recognize the independence of Ukraine.33 At the beginning of the second invasion there was a pretense that the Bolshevik war against Petliura was really an internal Ukrainian civil war which one side was waging with the Russian Red Army.

But on January 16, 1919, when the Directory declared war on Bolshevik Russia, with whose army it was locked in battle, Lenin and his Bolsheviks dropped even the pretense that the campaign was anything but an attempt to extend Soviet Russia's borders. The best example of the Leninist model of Ukrainian statehood was the second Soviet Ukrainian regime of 1919. Except for Kyiv, there were no Soviets in Ukraine. Appointed urban revolutionary committees and village committees of poor peasants wielded power on the local level. This was wholly in the spirit of great Russian chauvinism. **/28/**

Later on the open nationalism of the Stalinist and postStalinist periods would not only gradually come to govern its actions but would assume overt aggressiveness. The old wine of the traditional Russian idea was simply poured into the new bottles of "proletarian internationalism," fermented a time, and ultimately exploded into aggression against Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan. In the final analysis, the current campaign in Chechnya is an indicator that even without communist ideology the Russian idea remains unchanged. Thus, the Russian peasant, significantly worse off than his counterparts in the nonRussian "borderlands," remained blindly convinced in his national superiority and ready to sacrifice mainly those of other nationalities to save, the latter from themselves. Directly resulting from this were three man-made famines in Ukraine (1921-23, 1932-33, 1946-47), the Stalinist terror, exile of whole nations, barbarous destruction of cultural monuments along with the deformation of the economic system and society in general. With the consequences of such events and processes we are still quite familiar. The essence of the Bolshevik model is a single, all-powerful, all-knowing Communist Party, which has total control over the state and a bureaucracy which consumes society in full.

*9. The Schismatics of the Ukrainian Revolution*

The political culture of Ukrainian socialism was based on the conviction there could be no reason why the toilers of different nations should fight each other. Radical Ukrainian socialists viewed such concessions to reality as diplomatic relations with "bourgeois" states, attempts to halt the chaos of peasants seizing whatever land they decided on, or self-defense against the Russian Red Guards as counterrevolution. First the UPSR, then the USDRP split when their left wings, the future Borotbists and Ukapists, adopted the "Soviet platform," *i.e.,* the idea of creating an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its own Red Army, **/29/** Ukrainian culture, and led by radical Ukrainian socialists. Among the Bolsheviks their views were shared by such individuals as Vasyl Shakhrai and Georg Lapchinsky. Both the Borotbists and Ukapists in 1920 sent the Comintern long memoranda. They hoped to create in Ukraine a Soviet system absolutely identical to that which supposedly existed in Lenin's Russia.

Lenin well understood that if Ukrainian communists had their own army, he would have to deal with them, from time to time negotiate, and (least acceptable for him) make certain compromises. Moreover, this would lead to the demarcation of borders, which could not avoid retarding the "progressive" process of small peoples (like, and perhaps above all, the Ukrainians) being assimilated by their "elder brother."

During the Ukrainian war for national liberation the Borotbists (former UPSR adherents who had substantial influence in the Ukrainian countryside) did everything possible to find a compromise with the Bolsheviks while at the same time attempting to convince their "comrades" of their error in treating the village like a source of resources without any right to political representation in a *de facto* Russophone state which in 1919 merely organized one Soviet in Kyiv and proclaimed it "Soviet power." After negotiations the Borotbists dropped their demand for a separate Ukrainian army and underwent "merger" with the CP(b)U, whereupon two of their leaders, Vasyl Ellan-Blakytny and Oleksandr Shumsky, were admitted to the Central Committee. Lenin himself called this political neutralization of the Borotbists "a victory worth some good battles."34

The Ukapists (Ukrainian Communist Party) continued to exist as a semi-legal opposition consisting of a few hundred former Ukrainian Social democrats under constant surveillance. Their views were similar to those of the Borotbists.

To silence them the CP(b)U first decided to ignore **/30/** their activities and not to engage in any polemics with them. A secret July 30, 1924 Central Committee decision on "the case of the Katerynoslav UKP" declared, "a) It is considered inexpedient to organize a political trial, b) The GPU (secret police — author) is directed to exile the most active elements from Ukraine in agreement with the Central Committee secretary."35 In an atmosphere of growing repressions in August 1924 the Ukapists again appealed to the Comintern. On November 13 of that year the CP(b)U Politburo adopted the following resolution:

On the UKP

1. Propositions for joint work with the UKP are to be rejected.

2. It is recognized that the UKP has come to the point where its truly communist elements must break with nationalistic ones.

3. A course shall be pursued toward the self-liquidation of the UKP or toward splitting it in order to divide its communists elements from the nationalistic ones.

Kviring36

How this decision was carried out is apparent from the UKP appeal to the Comintern, which described, "the extraordinary intensification of the repressions directed at our party, especially most recently, in the form of the exile of our members to Siberia and other parts of Russia, mass arrests leading to a nine-day hunger strike by a group of our comrades who had been dismissed from their posts, insane baiting in the press, *etc.37*

On December 17, 1924, a special session of the Comintern Executive Committee was held with the participation of the UKP representatives and those of the so-called UKP Left Fraction, which had been organized by the GPU and was excluded from the main body of the party in 1923. Mykola Skrypnyk presented the official CP(b)U position, blaming the UKP for anti-Russian propaganda and accusing its members of being hidden Petliura adherents. The Left Fraction representatives basically supported Skrypnyk. **/31/**Andriy Richytsky, the last head of the UKP, accused the Left Fraction of being GPU's agents provocateurs. He tried to demonstrate his loyalty to the Soviet regime and Communist ideals.

At the same session Oleksander Shumsky, the former Borotbist leader and then Ukrainian Commissar of Education, the same Shumsky who had five years earlier demanded the creation of a separate Ukrainian Red Army, explained the ban on the UKP precisely because of its activities to create support for an idea that was originally Shumsky's:

When you did not grow but were merely a figurative party of 20-30 members, we did not bother you, but when you started to go to the masses and organize them against us, we could not remain mere observers. Thus, for example, as an act of protect against the arrests of your members for trying to dismember the Red Army you collected among the workers 12 signatures and the villages 350-400 (Richytsky: among the workers several thousand).38

Shumsky's appearance provides a vivid example of the Bolshevik political culture then being fostered in the Party. To be a "real" Bolshevik, one had to be ready at any given moment to oppose anything he might have earlier stood for, against those who had been his colleagues and allies. This, in the language of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic, was called party discipline. And just as Shumsky chided Richytsky for adopting the former's former idea of a separate Ukrainian Red Army, two years later Richytsky would be the principle opponent of Mykhailo Volobuyev, whose basic economic ideas had been authored by Richytsky.

In the Comintern the Ukapists were accused of nationalism, being *petit bourgeois,* of betraying the interests of the working class, and of having played the role of a *provacateur* in their very act of appealing to the Comintern, for this conflicted with the Comintern statute that in the Comintern only one party per country could be represented. And no one was really ready to view Ukraine as a separate country. The Comintern ordered both the UKP and so-called **/32/** Left Fraction to dissolve themselves, and set up a joint commission to co-opt their members to the CP(b)U.

In January 1925 the UKP officially dissolved itself, the Left Fraction following suit in March.39 The Ukapists had always been numerically small and never posed any real threat to the Bolsheviks. After 1919 they did everything in their power to demonstrate their loyalty. This failed to rescue either their organization or, in the end, the lives of its members.

*10. "A Model Soviet Republic"*

The USSR began as a union of ostensibly equal states from which every member retained the right to secede from the Union, an adequate sphere of economic activity, and independence in developing its national culture. But. already at the VII Ukrainian Congress of Soviets a resolution was adopted "On the Fundamentals of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" which gave Moscow the ability to swallow up Ukraine's economic, political, and cultural prerogatives.

Finally, the very character of Bolshevik policy in and toward Ukraine bears witness that in planning their massive actions to transform the whole of society, the Bolshevik leadership was unwilling to halt in the face of any barriers, including, and perhaps above all, national ones. One cannot say that for every CP(b)U member without exception, the national interests of Ukraine were chimerical, but at decisive moments as true believers in their Party, built on the basis of extreme centralism, they did what the Center told them and served the dogma on the inevitability of world revolution which would create a world Communist entity with its center, of course, in Moscow.

Thus at the VII Congress, Mikhail Frunze made a speech, the main thesis of which was that, although of course all republics were equal, Russia was Ukraine's "elder sister." Mykola Skrypnyk called "Ukrainian nationalists" **/33/** who dreamed of an independent Ukraine "narrow-minded block-heads" *(vuzkymy i tupolobymy).* Still further went Volodymyr Zatonsky, who called members of the Central Rada who had voted for the IV Universal and Ukrainian independence "chauvinists and traitors to the working class." When foreign observers remarked on the lack of real independence and the fictitious nature of the republics, CP(b)U leader Emmanuil Kviring reacted by accusing them of organizing banditry in Ukraine. Lenin himself worked out the scheme: within the Bolshevik Party even the least deviation in thought led directly to the camp of the "enemies of the people." Thus, it became possible to adopt resolutions where the whole complex of state power was merely what the Center ostensibly voluntarily delegated.

In the Soviet Constitution of 1923 Moscow retained control of foreign relations; border questions; war and peace; state credits; international agreements; the entire system of foreign and domestic trade; foreign concessions; transportation; the post and telegraph services; monetary and financial system; taxation, including republic taxes; setting the rules of land ownership, land use, utilization of subsoil resources, forests, and water throughout the USSR; control over migration; the courts; general legislation governing law enforcement, education, and public health; the system of weights and measures; statistics; and relations with foreigners. And the main thing was that the Center reserved to itself the power to alter the decisions of republic congresses of Soviets, Central Executive Committees, and Councils of People's Commissars. This is especially important, because it rendered the much proffered right of Union republics to secede absolute juridical nonsense. For how could a republic exercise its *alleged right* to withdraw from the Union, if the Center could alter any decision made on the republic level if it violated the Union Treaty?

The founders of Ukrainian Soviet statehood under Moscow's wing seem not to have thought about, such questions. They believed that it was sufficient to declare the **/34/** equality of peoples and both chauvinists and Ukrainophobes would be silenced. Blinded by Marxist dogma, they did not realize that, by branding as traitors and enemies of the people all who had fought for Ukrainian independence, they had implicitly began a campaign against the nation's history along with its traditional, cultural, and spiritual underpinnings.

And from the moment when the last vestiges of the multiparty system were eliminated, a new stage in the history of national communism, complex and dramatic, began.

It should be recognized that despite the forcible imposition of the Soviet system on Ukraine, that system was not and could not be stable. Simply to carve Ukraine up, to proclaim it once again a number of guberniyas, was no longer possible. As a result of the national liberation struggle, national institutions in the spheres of culture, administration, economics, *etc.* had arisen. Peasants had gotten used to being addressed in Ukrainian.

After the official end of the civil war in Ukraine there were still many guerrilla bands, composed of Ukrainian peasants, who refused to accept the alien authority. In contrast to the situation in Russia, in Ukraine the much-detested committees of poor peasants were not abolished, merely renamed committees of *non-wealthy* peasants, mainly consisting of lumpenized opportunists.40

And in reality it was to placate the Ukrainian countryside that the Party proclaimed the policy of Ukrainization in 1923. This was a step well beyond formal equality of the Russian and Ukrainian languages and, as Zatonsky put it, a policy of actively fostering the development of Ukrainian culture, of Ukrainizing the Party and state bureaucracies, and of de-Russifying Russified Ukrainians.41 In the beginning Ukrainization was only a matter of culture. Many prominent Bolsheviks in Ukraine found even this hard to swallow. Many, like Central Committee Secretary Dmitri Lebed, believed that taking the side of the culture of the Ukrainian village over the more highly developed culture of **/35/**the Russophone city would be a step backward.42 Skrypnyk in particular used it as a polemical weapon with which to brand all whose views on the national question differed from his.

Almost immediately after the All Union CP(b) XII congress the party faced an acute problem of leadership. Kviring as CP(b)U First Secretary was, to put it mildly, less than an avid advocate of Ukrainization, but as a loyal Bolshevik he dutifully signed the decree of June 22, 1923 on the Ukrainization of the Party, which demanded that all Party and state functionaries learn to speak Ukrainian within one year. But he quickly edged away from such a demand. At the VIII Congress of Soviets he *ostensibly* supported Ukrainization while indicating that he thought it had gone quite far enough. Then, in 1925, he was replaced by an — at the time — apparently ardent Ukrainizer, one Lazar Kaganovich...

The proclamation of Ukrainization in 1923 may be understood as a consequence of the New Economic Policy, as a result of which private small scale production was tolerated. NEP was the ground from which the Ukrainian cultural revival of the 1920s arose led by Ukrainian national communists. Ukrainization (and indigenization in general) was but a step in the "domestic Brest-Litovsk" which began in 1921 with NEP'. It was a reaction to the problem of the peasantry and also an instrument of the intraparty struggle which at the time dominated Soviet politics.

But Ukrainization had two unforeseen consequences. It rapidly reached a point where the national question began to outgrow the peasant question and led to Soviet Ukraine's acting more and more like a nation state. In the first place, the adoption of the Ukrainian language and culture in the cities and in the Party/state apparatus created non-peasant centers of support for Ukrainian national aspirations. From 1926 to 1932 the proportion of Ukrainians in the industrial proletariat grew from 41 to 53%. At the beginning of 1933, that is, on the eve of the abandonment of Ukrainization **/36/** 88% of all factory newspapers in Ukraine were printed only in Ukrainian. This meant that the national question in Ukraine was outgrowing its traditional rural parameters and was becoming a question of the productive forces of the non-Russian republics and their industrialization.

Secondly, Ukrainization gave legitimacy to national self assertion by Ukrainian communists. The so-called national communism of Shumsky, Khvyliovy, Volobuyev, and Skrypnyk comprised only a portion of this activity. At a time when many European states did not recognize the rights of national minorities and even Galicia was subject to intense pressures of Polonization, the appearance in Ukraine of Ukrainian literature, schools, and institutions created the illusion of Soviet Ukraine's evolution into a real nation state. Ukrainization convinced many Ukrainian figures, especially in emigration, that Soviet Ukraine offered the last best hope of creating a real Ukrainian state. In this sense opposition to such a state seemed absurd, especially after peasant resistance began to wane. One by one such figures as Tiutiunyk, Hrushevsky, and Chechel began to return. In 1924 sixty-six prominent Ukrainian figures — among such former UNR ministers as Mykola Chechel, Pavlo Khrystiuk, and Mykola Shrah — published in the official newspaper *Visty VUTsVK* a "Declaration to the Ukrainian Soviet Intelligentsia and Soviet Society as a Whole," expressing their satisfaction with the policy of Ukrainization and their loyalty to the Soviet government.42

*11. The Stalinist Variant of Proletarian Internationalism*

"So long as the state exists, there will be no freedom. When there is freedom, there will be no state." This Leninist dictum, which long pretended to absolute truth, would not be so horrendous were it not for the Bolshevik tradition of turning thought into a dogma *cum* absolute postulate. The Stalinist reading of this pedestrian, off-hand remark was completely in the spirit of this tradition: while the **/37/** state exists, there will be no freedom of any kind. The Center's tendency to centralize and concentrate power, begun under Lenin, escalated sharply after the defeat of the United Opposition. The political monopoly on truth gave rise to intolerance toward any manifestation of thinking differently. Once Stalin gained absolute personal power, he ceased even to pretend that the national question was for him a question of fulfilling the principles of proletarian internationalism.

Indigenization and NEP made it possible to placate the regions. The militarization of the Party made it possible to transform it not only into an obedient apparatus of state administration, but also of the manipulation and administration of the human psyche, for, as the late E. H. Carr put it, the Party swallowed the state, then the state swallowed the Party,44 taking upon itself total control of the press and intellectual activity in general. The militarization of thought, the sowing in society of fear of real and imagined enemies, all those endless "fronts" — *cultural, ideological, historical, linguistic, grain procurement, etc.,* "battles" — with *hostile class elements, kulaks, kulak henchmen, subkulaks, nationalists, wreckers, spies, terrorists, fascists, and enemies of the people* actively created in mass consciousness an alternate reality. Throughout all this seemingly unsystematic, even insane bacchanalia, a certain logic and goal remained constant.

On February 10, 1929, *Pravda* published a review by Pavel Gorin of the textbook, *History of Ukraine in its Briefest Outline* by Academician and Chair of the History Section of the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism Matvyi Yavorsky, and institute chaired by Ukrainian Commissar of Education Mykola Skrypnyk. The reviewer, after brutally "exposing" the author's class hostile errors, openly wondered how the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education could have not only allowed such a pernicious work to be published but even recommended it to schoolchildren. Later reviewers "revealed" that the basic error from which all Yavorsky's other deviations flowed was his **/38/** insistence on treating Ukrainian history as a process distinct from Russian history. Here we may discern an indirect campaign against Ukrainization and its main implementer and supporter, Skrypnyk. The latter could deflect the blow, publishing an article on Yavorsky's various errors. Then came a campaign against Yurynets. Skrypnyk again duly criticized the head of his philosophy section in the press but could not save his institute. In June 1931 the CP(b)U Central Committee passed a resolution condemning Skrypnyk's institute for various nationalistic deviations and supplanted it with an All-Ukrainian Association of Marxist Leninist Institutes (VUAMLIN). This meant that Skrypnyk lost a podium from which he could voice his views.

In 1930 at the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine show trial the GPU "uncovered the wrecking" of linguists who had actively participated in standardizing Ukrainian spelling. In late 1930 the journal *Politfront,* where Khvyliovy worked with Skrypnyk's support, was shut down. The circle was closed. Stalin was preparing a general offensive against Ukraine, a war against peasanty and Ukrainian intelligentsia in order to break down some elements of Ukrainian self-sufficiency. In 1932 Moscow took control of higher education. In July of that year Skrypnyk spoke at the III All-Ukrainian Party Conference, taking a manly stand against the coming offensive against the Ukrainian village.

On February 28, 1933, Skrypnyk was transferred from the Commissariat of Education to the Ukrainian State Planning Committee. In March Moscow began a campaign against nationalist deviations in Ukraine and Belarus. In late April the CP(b)U Central Committee called an allUkrainian conference on questions of national policy. Soon the XII CP(b)U Congress resolved that, although there might still be some problem with Russian chauvinist, in Ukraine the main enemy was and remained Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. Ukraine embarked upon a tragic period of total Russification, where going over to Russian meant a demonstration of political loyalty to the regime. **/39/**

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3 V.I. Lenin, *Complete Collected Works* (hereinafter *PZT,* all references are to the Ukrainian edition), XII, p. 449.

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5 See Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London, 1985), pp. 1-45.

6 George Shevelov, *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century* (Munich, 1987: in Ukrainian), pp. 17-18.

*7 Ukrainska khata,* 1909, No 7, p. 383.

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17 Dmytro Doroshenko, from *the History of Ukrainian Political Thought During Word War I* (Prague, 1936: in Ukrainian), pp. 76-77.

18 *Ibid., p. 95.*

19 *Ibid,* pp. 79-80.

20 Krawchenko, *op. tit.,* p. 56. On the Central Ukrainian Cooperative Committee during the Revolution, cf. V.I. Marochko, *Ukrainian Peasant Cooperation: Historico-Theoretical Aspects, 1861-1929* (Kyiv, 1995: in Ukrainian), pp. 46-83).

21 On the UPSR see Ark. Zhyvotko, "On the History of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries," *Vilna spilka.* No 3, 1927-1929, pp. 128-132; Pavlo Khrystyuk, *Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution* (Vienna, 1921-1922: in Ukrainian), I, pp. 35125; Jury Borys, "Political Parties in Ukraine," *Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridhe, MA, 1977), p. 135.

22 *Robitnycha hazeta,* November 29, 1917.

23*Ukrainian Political Parties at the Turn of the Century: Programmatic and Informational Documents* (Kyiv, 1993: in Ukrainian), p. 123.

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26 "What Kind of Autonomy Do We Want," Hrushevsky, *Selected Works* (New York, 1960: in Ukrainian), pp. 142-149.

27 Pavlo Khrystyuk, *op. tit.,* II, p. 51.

28 *Ibid.,* p. 55.

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34 V.I. Lenin, *PZT,* XI, p. 254.

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36 *From the Archives of the AllUkrainian Cheka, GPU, NKVD, KGB,* 1994, No 1.

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38 *Ibid*., p. 94. **/399/**

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41 V.Zatonsky, *The National Problem in Ukraine* (Kharkiv, 1927: in Ukrainian), pp. 3-4.

42 E.F. Hirchak, *On Two Fronts in the Struggle Against Nationalism* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930: in Russian), p. 20.

43 *Visty VUTsVK,* May 18, 1924.

44 E.H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia* (Moscow, 1990; Russian translation), Book 1, p. 313.

Ethnocratic Concepts

## *Mykola HORELOV*

*1. Mykola Mikhnovsky — Romantic of the Ukrainian Idea*

Mykola Ivanovych Mikhnovsky, an attorney from Kharkiv, was the first Ukrainian to make a public statement concerning the colonial status of Ukraine in the Russian Empire and the right of its people to self-determination. In 1900 he made a speech entitled "Independent Ukraine" which in that same year was published in a pamphlet form in Lviv. For the first time in modern history the problems of Ukrainian-Russian relations were considered from the standpoint of Ukrainian statehood. The "Ukrainian dream," naturally in a form narrowed to the issue of the Ukrainian national liberation, was placed before the public. And though the publication begged more questions than it answered as to by what means Ukraine should employ in order to gain independence, the way the issue was posed won for its author a prominent place in the Ukrainian political pantheon.

Mykola Mikhnovsky emotionally described the oppression of Ukrainians in tsarist Russia. "By what right," he aksed, "does the Russian tsarist government treat us on our own territory as if we were its slaves? ... On the basis of what right have only Russian Moskals (corrupted Ukrainian for "Muscovite") of Russianized renegades been appointed to all the government posts in our country? On the foundation **/40/** of what right are our children brainwashed in school to become confirmed enemies and haters of our people? Why is only the language of our oppressor heard in our church? By what right does the Russian government spend money taken from us for the benefit of the Russian nation, nurturing and supporting its science, literature, industry, *etc.?* And finally, most importantly, does the tsarist government have the right at all to issue decrees, laws, and administrative regulations for us?".1

Answering these questions, he argued that Russia had violated nearly all the articles of the Pereyaslav Treaty (1654), reducing Ukrainian autonomy to nought. He came to the logical conclusion that the non-observance of the Treaty by one side rids the other of any legal obligation to observe it. And, hence, "one and indivisible Russia" did not exist for Ukraine.

In outlining the top priority tasks of the new Ukrainian intelligentsia, whom Mikhnovsky considered the driving force of the national revolution, he emphasized: "The times of embroidered shirts, *svytas* (a kind of Ukrainian overcoat), and *horilka* (Ukrainian vodka) are gone forever and will never return... The Ukrainian intelligentsia stands up to fight for its people, to fight fiercely, giving no quarter. It believes in its power and the power of its nation, and it will do its duty..."2

Of course, Mikhnovsky substituted wish for reality. For neither the Ukrainian people, which had not yet undergone social stratification and had a rather vague idea of its own interests, nor the intelligentsia, largely captivated by socialist ideas and accustomed to serving the imperial regime while considering itself a part of all-Russian democracy, were then ready to struggle politically for national rights. Moreover, the radicalism of the author of *Independent Ukraine* that sometimes bordered on chauvinism seemed to be an obstacle blocking widespread acceptance of his largely reasonable ideas. Statements of the type "anyone who in the whole of Ukraine is not for us is against us. Ukraine is for **/41/** Ukrainians and so long as there remains but one enemy alien on our territory we will have no right to lay down our arms"3 repelled other ethnic groups in the multiethnic Ukrainian society from the Ukrainian idea.

Mikhnovsky's booklet was the first attempt to harness the offended national feelings of Ukrainians to a political program. One can hardly call it, in fact, a program because issues of the tactics and strategy of political struggle were outlined in *Independent Ukraine* rather tangentially. Rather, we might consider Mikhnovsky's work as a sort of mirror of the passions that raged in the minds of young Ukrainians elated with ideas of the national liberation on the eve of revolutionary upheavals of the beginning of the twentieth century. This can explain the dominance of emotional factors, a certain failure to give an unbiased analysis, and its chauvinistic overtones. But these obvious shortcomings cannot prevent a generally positive assessment of posing unambiguously the question of an independent Ukrainian state. The greatest service rendered by Mikhnovsky for Ukrainian state-building is that he raised these issues by publicly stating the legitimate right of the Ukrainian people to solve its problems on its own.

Mikhnovsky saw Russia as Ukraine's main enemy. He warned his compatriots carried away by socialist ideas that even if autocracy were overthrown, Ukraine would still remain in a colonial status if it did not secede from the empire during the revolution. Mikhnovsky urged the Ukrainian people to keep to the beaten track of Western countries by making use of the creative potential of European-type nationalism.

However, he failed to take into account the fact that, say, in Germany or Italy nineteenth century nationalism generally went hand in hand with the struggle for universal human rights and freedoms. In addition, the population of these countries was largely monoethnic. But in the case in point, these essential factors were neglected, and Mikhnovsky's version of the national idea failed to be widely adopted by the **/42/** Ukrainian movement at the beginning of this century.

In mid-1920s these ideas were transformed into a movement in Western Ukraine, then under Poland. This movement adopted as its ideology the "integral" or "active" nationalism created by Dmytro Dontsov.

*2. The Main Ideas of Dmytro Dontsov's Active Nationalism*

At the beginning of his political and publicistic activities, Dontsov paid tribute to socialist ideas and was even a member of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party. But already before World War I, his works showed prominent anti-Russian traits which grew stronger as he grew more distant from his party comrades. He pointed to the threat of Ukraine's following the example of its northern neighbor and called on Ukrainians to fix their gaze on the West.

On the basis of this idea Dontsov advocated linking Ukraine's geopolitical future to Germany and AustriaHungary. Specifically, on the eve of the impending conflict of those nations with Russia and its allies, he called for establishing, in case of the latter being defeated, a Ukrainian crownland within the Austrian Empire. Dontsov always warned Ukrainian politicians against being carried away by the socialist ideas coming from pre-revolutionary Russia. "The equality of slaves before the powerful ruler and master," he wrote after the events of the 1917 revolution, "were passed off as the equality of free citizens, and the myth of "democratic Russia" was laid to waste by the vulgarly thinking mass. To this was added the new myth of Russia as the bearer of political and social progress. The impulsive play of forces in a barbarous ungovcrncd society, the natural outburst of dissatisfaction in the despotically ruled country was mistaken for a manifestation of colossal spiritual energy while the chaotic jabbering of a body infected by the disease of despotism was confused with its attributes of resistance **/43/** and great vital force."4 One might well argue that the picture painted by Dontsov can, in fact, be observed even now. Entering the third decade of the twentieth century, Ukraine found itself in a very complicated situation. Galicia was under Poland where the Pilsudski regime look a hard line toward its Ukrainian ethnic minority. Parts of Ukrainian territory went to Romania and Czechoslovakia. "Ukrainian statehood" in the guise in which we know it emerged in the form of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Understandably, we have no grounds to maintain that this pseudo-state could solve on its own the problem of molding a civil society and a full-fledged nation.

In the mid-1920s the idea of Ukrainian statehood underwent serious crisis. In Dontsov's opinion, the democratic model had been compromised by the incoherent and largely ruinous policy of the *Central Rada,* and the monarchist variant by objectively similar actions of Hetman Skoropadsky. It was necessary to find new impulses in order to reanimate the Ukrainian popular will to sovereignty. This drive had to be born under the conditions when totalitarian ideas were gaining momentum primarily thanks to the successes of Russian bolshevism, Italian fascism, and German Nazism. The political gains ot these radical movements made it possible to hope that introduction of their main postulates into the strategic designs of any national idea would lead to positive results. Dontsov who had lived since 1921 in Lviv bet on this also. Flis well-known work *Nationalism* 5became the quintessence of these theoretical quests.

As in earlier periods, by rhetorically applying ideas of philosophical irrationalism — of Schopenhauer, Hartmann and, especially, Nietzsche and others to Ukraine, Dontsov urged Ukrainians to discard once and for all a rationally cognizant interpretation of the world. Instead, the dominant position was to be occupied by the will to life.6 The manifestation of will, in. Dontsov's interpretation of the philosophy of will, "is nothing but a delight in expansion, in going beyond one's borders."7 For "expansion is not only a self-affirmation **/44/** of one's own will to life, but also a denial of it to others."8

From this, two bases of active nationalism were derived: to consolidate the will to life, to power, to expansion, and "striving for struggle and understanding of its imminence."

Dontsov outlined another imperative of volitional nationalism — romanticism and dogmatism in adopting the offered ideology. The former was "to be nourished by the myth of the final battle," by the denial of what is in fact a delightful picture of catastrophe that will bring about the New, while the latter is to emerge to the accompaniment of the categorical imperative and unhesitating submission.9

Uniting these two ideas, Dontsov remarked: "illusionism is a synthesis of both: it sets the irrational against the "meaningful"..., naked affirmation against argumentation..., it does not argue.., strives to realize the idea that is not existent and principally contradictory to the concrete one" — all this motivates "its militancy and anti-pacifism."10

Dontsov placed fanaticism and amorality among the principal demands active nationalism made of its adherents. The national idea, in his opinion, was to be "amoral," *i.e.,* it should not be guided by principles of universal human values. And this amoral policy has to be effected by a fanatic, who "takes his truth to be public, general, and accepted by others. Hence, his aggressiveness and intolerance of other views."11

The fifth "synthetic" requirement of the proclaimed doctrine lay in bringing the policy of imperialism up to the level of the state policy."Imperialism," Dontsov held, "is not only plundering but also the fulfilling of social functions in the public interests of nations with a mission and task to do just that. There are superior and inferior nations, those which know how to rule others (and themselves) and those which do not... The right of stronger races is to organize peoples and nations to consolidate extant culture and civilization."12

Dontsov suggested that the above right should be exercised by way of "creative violence of a minority showing ini-**/45/**tiative," which must subjugate its own people to itself and force it to undertake aggression against others. This is the sixth requirement underlying his theory. He was certain that "this means (violence) is not the one that may or may not be. The aggression due to which the new idea comes to life is not accidental, it. is immanent to any "theological" religious or national idea."13

Concluding his magnum opus, Dontsov stressed, following Nietzsche: "we must undertake a radical reassessment of values. "Fanaticism," "instinctive sensations," "emotionality" instead of "rationality," the spirit of "ethnic intolerance" — all that has been debased in us should be rehabilitated by a fresh and young Ukrainianism."14 And one has to admit that the slogans presented under the guise of struggle for a genuinely sacred goal, the liberation of Motherland, managed to attract Galician youth under Polish military dictatorship, put into the circumstances which, first, made it more difficult for Ukrainians to obtain higher education, a good job, limited their legal status, and, second, stimulated them to fight for their own national and universal human rights by violent means.

*3. Active Nationalism as the Ideological Basis of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)*

Totalitarianism, from the 1920s to the 1950s, held sway over much of Europe, and Dontsov tried in his book to bring the Ukrainian national movement to this ideology. One of the OUN leaders S. Lenkavsky, to my mind rightly, explained the phenomenon of success of Nationalism among Ukrainian youth. In his opinion, the task of politicians who tried to head the resistance movement in Galicia was to master the trends that "buzz with excitement in the souls of the generation in search of its own path. Dontsov sought to consolidate and substantiate theoretically those psychic processes which explode spontaneously as a denial of the extant reality and on that basis to transform the soul of a new **/46/** Ukrainian. The soil from which this ideology sprang up is entirely psychological."13 This "negation" was taken advantage of by those who in 1929 founded the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Never belonging formally to the OUN, Dontsov nevertheless became its leading ideologist.

While the political side of Dontsov's integral nationalism was based on the classical doctrine of fascism, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was, rather, closer to similar formations in countries of Eastern Europe. The late Ukrainian emigre historian Ivan Lysyak-Rudnytsky observed in this connection: "The closest relatives of Ukrainian (integral) nationalism should be sought not in German Nazism or in Italian Fascism, products of industrialized and urbanized societies, but rather among parties of this type in agrarian, economically backward nations of Eastern Europe, among the Croatian Ustashes, Rumanian "Iron Guard", Slovak Hlinkoites, Polish ONR... *etc.*"16

Dontsov also developed a theory of the OUN's organizational structure. It is to this problem that his prewar booklets was devoted (later collected under the title *By Cross and Sword* published in Toronto in 1967).

In one of his essays "Unification or Separation," the author called for imposing forcefully the will of the OUN upon all other trends of Ukrainian political life. In order to do this, it is necessary, in his opinion, "to sow the seeds of hatred toward our own kith and kin! To foster discord and mutual distrust! To bring discord to our native home! Yes, that's it! For without it there is no unity, no wielding together. No wonder that dim-witted democracy cannot grasp that."17 Dontsov also emphasized how that subjugated community should be consolidated: "First of all, by establishing a number of dogmas, a number of rules, and number of axioms in all spheres of common life, strictly regimented and clearly opposed to all others, uncompromising; proclaiming its own truth, unique and infallible... To hammer this faith and truth into heads dimmed by unstable times and alien regimes, overwhelming mercilessly all unbelievers... The **/47/** ever-increasing role of that unifying magnet is played by the minority, the circle. It imprints itself on the thinking and will of the masses. It is organized not in a party, not in an association, but in a punitive Order and it leads those masses."18

This Dontsovite credo dearly cost the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists which, at least until 1943, accepted his ideology unconditionally. Ukrainian political scientist Andry Bilynsky holds that in that period Dontsov's dogmas made up the "content which the OUN took over completely. In all its prewar writings the OUN gloritied Dontsov as the ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism... "Dontsovism" was proclaimed by the OUN its political religion."19

*4. The Ethnocratic State of Mykola Stsiborsky*

Dmytro Dontsov was not the only OUN ideologist. Mykola Stsiborsky, at that time the second figure in the OUN after Yevhen Konovalets, offered his own model, that of an ethnocratic Ukrainian state, in the mid-thirties. In 1935 he published in Paris his book *Ethnocracy* in which he put forward his vision of Ukrainian statehood.

In that work he criticized bitterly and sometimes reasonably democratic, socialist, communist, and monarchist social systems. At the same time, he praised fascism on the Italian model. For Stsiborsky, "fascism is first of all nationalism — love for one's own Motherland and patriotic feelings driven to self-sacrifice in a cult of sacrificial fanatism."20

And here Stsiborsky also explained what "ethnocracy" meant: "By ethnocracy we understand the regime of a nation ruling in its own country which is effected by the power of all socially useful strata, unified — according to their socioproductive functions — in representative bodies of public administration."21 This might seem to be quite a viable design and possible to implement. But under one condition, namely, that there is a real, rather than abstract political nation. And ethnocrats solved the problem very simply: with-**/48/** out argumentation they announced that "nation is eternity" and hence, they proclaimed the wish reality. From this flows their inability to discuss the feasibility of the social model they offered. "Decisive is the fact," writes Stsiborsky, "that nationalism is not a fuzzy sham of party theory; it is a universal and irreconcilable, in its inner sense, world outlook." "To reconcile" it with anybody by way of "congress discussions" and bargaining is just impossible... Combining the ideological lines of nationalism with the political tactics of "All-Ukrainian congresses" would be equivalent to the former's suicide."22

According to Stsiborsky's model, for ethnocracy state syndicalism is the proper form of social organization. Ethnocracy does not envisage the participation of political parties in public administration. It calls for dictatorship and organized nationalism as a militant shock detachment of the revolution to be its mainstay. And since Stsiborsky was one of the most influential members of the OUN leadership, one can easily understand what kind of organization he meant.

At the same time Stsiborsky stressed that, unlike the fascist doctrine which recognizes dictatorship as the sole form of social organization, in an ethnocratic state dictatorship would be but a transitional stage. "In assigning to dictatorship extraordinary historic tasks in the conviction that only it will be able to fulfill them," he wrote, "nationalism at the same time realizes the danger of its ceasing to develop and becoming outdated, when it becomes an aim in itself... In contrast to other authoritarian concepts, it recognizes that dictatorship is not an unchanging principle and can only be justified by its expediency for the time being."23

To be concise, Stsiborsky understood the cthnocratic Ukrainian state like this: the popular masses take part in social and political life through representation in bodies of local self-government and syndicalist organizations. Administratively the state must be subdivided into lands, districts, and communities governed by their own bodies of self-government. Elections to these bodies take place on the basis of **/49/** direct, universal, and equal voting by secret ballot. There arc also state, administrative, economic, and other institutions which will fulfill their missions under the immediate supervision of the national government. The legislative functions are to be fulfilled by a state *Rada* (Council) elected on the same principles as lower instances from candidates nominated by syndicates. The leader of the nation and of the state organization is the Head of State.

Thus we see a somewhat naive but quite plausible model of the state system. Incidentally, some of its elements (for example, Presidential representatives in the regions and districts) were borrowed by the previous regime of President Kravchuk, while the present administration seems to be dreaming about some others (a complete restriction of the prerogatives of the Supreme Rada, *i.e.,* the Ukrainian Parliament). The only thing that renders the plans of Stsiborsky obviously Utopian is its above-mentioned simplistic interpretation of Ukrainian nation-creating processes. Stsiborsky pointed out that the OUN was competing not for domination over the nation but "only for the domination of the nation itself — this is the mission that organized nationalism faces and will face."24 However, with time, when fascist regimes in European countries grew ever stronger, the OUN ceased to pay any lip service to its serving the people.

*5. The Transformations of Integral Nationalism*

A monoparty system and the totalitarianization of all state structures became the backbone of the OUN political program. At its Second Great Convention that took place in 1939 in Rome it was pointed out, *inter alia,* that in a new Ukraine built on the foundations of Dontsovism "political parties will be banned. The OUN will be the only form of the popular organizing, as the basis of the state order and the main factor of national education and organization of social life."25

It must be noted at once that integral nationalists failed **/50/** to create their own state. True, the Bandera branch of the OUN tried to proclaim the "restoration of Ukrainian statehood" in German-occupied Lviv on June 30, 1941. However, this "independence" was not to the liking of the new authorities. As an eyewitness to the events put it on the pages of the magazine *Samostiyna Ukraina* (Independent Ukraine) published in Chicago (U.S.A.) German Abwehr officer Koch present at the proclamation of independence meeting "did not greet those present," said something intimidating and at the end announced: "You will do whatever you arc told by the German government."26 Since the Banderites were in no hurry to fulfill the wishes of the occupation authorities and to dissolve the "government" instituted by them, the Germans simply did away with it in less than two weeks after its proclamation. Such was the sad end of the struggle of Dontsov's followers for statehood.

Thus it was not until August 1943, when the Banderites learned from experience that, in the first place, their orientation toward Hitler's fascism suffered defeat, and, in the second place, that an absolute majority of Ukrainians were not inclined to take the road chartered by the author of *Nationalism,* that they somewhat changed their bearings. It was then that the Third Extraordinary Convention of the Bandera faction of the OUN adopted a new program, radically different from Dontsov's postulates Significantly, Dontsov's alterations and amendments to the new program of the Banderite OUN were not even discussed at the Convention.

The document stated, among other things, that "the organized Ukrainian nationalists arc fighting for the interests of the Ukrainian people, and therefore, all ideas of their domination over the people are alien to them...

The OUN is fighting for freedoms of the press, speech, thought, religion, and world view, against any official imposition of ideological doctrines and dogmas upon society... For the absolute right of national minorities to develop their own, both in form and content, national culture... For **/51/** the equality of all citizens of Ukraine, irrespective of their nationality, in social and human rights and duties."27

Thus, the Ukrainian independence movement took an entirely new direction from that envisaged by Dontsov. At first this was just a declaration of intent, for people educated in the spirit of Nationalism were not in a position to change their views immediately. But the fundamental idea of the national-liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people radically changed. Instead of the totalitarian principles of integral nationalism, the principles of universal human rights and freedoms, including national ones as well, became its main essence. According to M.Sosnovsky, "the relationship between the ideology of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the ideology of "active" nationalism could be graphically shown in the form of two lines starting from different points, then nearly converging or crossing each other at some section in order to separate from each other. During the 1940s this relationship was eventually broken, the development of the Ukrainian nationalist thought taking its own peculiar path while the development of the ideology of "active" nationalism terminated and ceased to exist along with the writings of Dontsov himself. All nationalist authors, who wanted to remain within the limits defined by the Dontsov ideology, failed to make any truly original contribution to that ideology while those authors, who went beyond uncritically following Dontsov's lead, not only broke with him in the long run, but even took positions completely opposite to the ideology of active nationalism."28 These words are worth remembering for those of our fellow countrymen who strive to express their rightful dissatisfaction with everyday hardships by resorting to Dontsov's *integral* banners. Instead of creative ideas directed toward independent nation-creation, they are sure to find there only the tools for a new national ruin.

Ukrainian nationalists seem to have come to clearly understand this themselves. At least the materials of the Congress Convention of Ukrainian Nationalists that took **/52/** place on July 2-4, 1993, in Kyiv condemned the principles of dogmatism, fundamentalism, personality cult: of the leader, ideological stagnation, and phrase-mongering which undcrlied "intergal" nationalism.29

1 Mykola Mikhnovsky, *Independent Ukraine* (London, 1967: in Ukrainian), pp. 14-15.

2 *Ibid.,* pp. 26-27.

3 *Ibid.,* p. 29.

4 Dmytro Dontsov, *The Culture of Primitivism* (Cherkasy, 1918), p. 8.

5 Dmytro Dontsov., *Nationalism* (London-Toronto, 1966).

6 *Ibid.,* pp. 230-231.

7 *Ibid.,* p. 233.

8 *Ibid.,* p. 235.

9 *Ibid.,* pp.257, 263.

10 *Ibid.,* p. 258.

11 *Ibid.,* p. 263.

12 *Ibid.,* pp. 280,283.

13 *Ibid.,* p. 284.

14 *Ibid.,* p. 311.

15 *The Making of a Nation* (Prague, 1928: in Ukrainian), parts 7, 8, p. 273.

16 Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Between History and Politics* (Munich, 1973: in Ukrainian), pp. 239-240.

17 D.Dontsov, *By Cross and Sword* (Toronto, 1967: in Ukrainian), p. 123.

18*Ibid.,* pp. 129-130.

19 Andriy Bilynsky, *The World and We* (Munich, 1963: in Ukrainian), p. 148.

20 Mykola Stsiborsky, *Natiocracy* (2nd edition: Prague, 1942: in Ukrainian), pp. 72-73.

21 *Ibid.,* p.109.

22 *Ibid,* p. 138.

23 *Ibid.,* p. 141.

24*Ibid., p. 151.*

25 *The Program and Statute of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,* (1940, in Ukrainian), p. 34.

26*Samostiyna Ukraina,* 1981, No 7-8, p. 8.

27 *Suchasnist,* 1983, No 7, pp. 113-114, 127-128.

28 M. Sosnovsky, *Dm. Dontsov: A Profile* (New York-Toronto, 1974: in Ukrainian), pp. 23-24.

29 See: *Shliakh peremohy,* July 10, 1993 (in Ukrainian).

Classocratic View

## *Viktor BURLACHUK* (§§1-5), *Borys ANDRESYUK*(§6, co-author), *Mykola HORELOV* (§6, co-author)

The making of Ukrainian nation-statehood was the purpose and essence of life and the highest- political value for Vyacheslav Lypynsky as a man and political personality.

Lypynsky lived in a time when the idea of nation-making and nation-statehood was far beyond the range of the immediate political interests of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Educated on Marxism and inspired by the ideologies of populism and the Enlightenment (one can hardly imagine a social thinker of the turn of the twentieth century who was not carried away by socialism), the Ukrainian intelligentsia considered the state primarily an instrument of oppression, a corrupt and omnipotent bureaucratic machine that suppresses the people in every way possible. "Land and Freedom" was the dominant political slogan of the day.

Whereas others aspired and claimed to be federalists and socialists, Vyacheslav Lypynsky stood out as a champion of independence and monarchist. His political ideas and convictions ran counter the spirit of the age, assigning him the role of a romantic Utopian, a social outcast among politicians. He revived and defended such values as chivalrous honor and dignity when pragmatism and utilitarianism were the order of the day, he insisted on the expediency of a hierarchical structure of society while the spirit of freedom and egalitarianism was everywhere in the air.

This position of a chivalrous politician caused Lypynsky **/54/** to often find himself in political isolation, unable to find a common language with socialists, nationalists, of communists. He took very much to heart his incongruity with the widespread ideas of the political establishment, the relatively fanciful, illusory, and fantastic character of his ideals, and called himself a political Don Quixote.

*1. The Nation and the State*

In approaching the theoretical problems of the state system and order, Lypynsky proceeded from a universal premise, which identified the nation and the state. History, he held, knows no stateless nation or non-nation-state.

Lypynsky's thesis requires an immediate disclaimer. Current historians maintain that, unlike ethnic groups, the nation is a child of the French Revolution and matured in Western Europe during the nineteenth century. Historically, states formed without the aid of nation, and some nations formed without the blessings of their states. The empires which arose in the wake of the decline of the ancient world and during the Middle Ages had all the characteristics of states but were neither monoethnic or monocultural. On the other hand, city-states were seldom inhabited by people of only one culture, and the cultural domain of their inhabitants ran far beyond the borders of such small states. In other words, the ancient Greeks may have been a single nation but they did not have single state. Thus, Lypynsky's rule is nearly so universal as he claimed. We shall deal with this in greater detail below.

The problem of state-building cannot be solved in practice by any one politician, since a state must rest on a certain social basis. The building of a nation-state, Lypynsky argues, is feasible only if there are social forces, strata, and classes which are vitally interested in its existence. To such a stratum Lypynsky addressed his political magnum opus, *Letters to Brother Farmers:* "The landed class of farmers", he writes, "arc people organically connected with one another **/55/** by the very mode of their existence — they are the sole group in Ukraine whose very future depends on whether or not there is an independent Ukraine."1

Agricultural owner-producers are certainly interested in the existence of a state of their own which would guarantee their ownership of land. Vyacheslav Lypynsky was right in arguing that an agrarian society needs a state and thus creates it but was wrong when he refered to such a state as "national." In agrarian society everyone and everything — the widespread illiteracy, the gulf between the high and popular cultures, and differences between the colloquial and liturgical languages — seem to militate against drawing political borders in accordance with cultural ones, which is characteristic of the nation-state.

It is typical of stratified agrarian society that the upper class finds it advantageous to highlight, accentuate, emphasize, and play up in every possible way distinctive features of the privileged group.

The principle of social hierarchy which Lypynsky defended actually impeded, rather than facilitated, the consolidation of a single culture that would require a single national political organism on the basis of one culture — one state.

Ernest Gellner, a prominent British scholar of nationalism, once made the following cautionary remark: "Under an agrarian social system, it would be quite futile to seek to institute a single educational level for all strata and a homogeneous culture with predetermined norms codified in documents."2

*2. The Hetman, the Elite, and the Class of Farmers*

For Lypynsky, a social class was only the foundation on which nation- and state-building could be based, while their actual makers are small social groups — the national aristocracy and the elite. In Lypynsky's opinion, the nation and state are created by an active minority, not by the passive **/56/** majority. Any nation-state in a given historical period, he maintained, has a certain group of people in it who constitute the basis for its existence as a state.

In his doctrine of the elite, Lypynsky followed the Machiavellian tradition of European sociological thought which, in the persons of such sociologists as Pareto, Mosca, and Michels, stipulates that the uppermost privileged stratum is an inalienable inherent attribute of a social system.

Historically, the elite, Lypynsky believed, is molded by people or ethnic groups of alien tribes. In Ukraine Poles, rather than Ukrainians, were the bearers of the elite culture. By assimilating with the "Ukrainian popular mass," Poles stimulated the process of separating, alienating, and singling it out from other tribes of Rus'. It is precisely this process that "is actually Ukrainianness proper, Ukraine itself."

Lypynsky suggested his own typology of national aristocracies which differ among themselves by the methods according to which they organize their power: oligarchy, "classocracy", and democracy. To characterize democracy and oligarchy, Lypynsky finds rather precise formulas and definitions. But as to "classocracy", his brain child, he created a sociological phantom, and his sociological feeling (Gefuhl) failed him altogether. For Lypynsky, "classocracy" is the form of organization of the ruling elite most appropriate to Ukraine. In contrast to Marxism, which considers property relationships to be the major class-forming feature, Lypynsky, in his definition of the notion of class, had in mind a certain organic body united by common traditions, psychological feelings, and experiences as well as blood relations. In delineating the notion, Lypynsky seemed to imply quite a different social group, like a clan or tribe, rather than class proper.

Lypynsky's definition of social class may refer, with some adjustments, to a peasantry not yet corrupted by capitalism. If for Marx the working class was primarily the major, universal class, for Lypynsky, with his romantic mind set and World view, the peasantry was such a class, which **/57/** he referred to as the class of farmers. Farming for Lypynsky is an art, and it is precisely in this that it is different from modern mechanical mass production. Hired labor in farming is only a way of enhancing the individual skills of the farmer, while the hired farm hand is his employer's hand and help rather than just a necessary cog in the machine.

The industrial working class did not fit in any sense Lypynsky's notion of an "organic" class and undermined his agrarian Utopia. Lypynsky's derogatory attitude to the industrial class, which, he thought, included both workers and employers-capitalists, was governed by what he considered to be the insignificant place this class occupied in the social structure of the Ukrainian society of his day. For Lypynsky, Ukraine is, first and foremost, a mighty farming class in which there are internal contradictions between rich and poor farmers but not a struggle of two classes. Lypynsky regarded the farming class as the bearer of the national and state idea, and it was precisely to this class that he addressed his political platform.

It is reasonable to pose two questions here: was there actually a single class of farmers who might have served as the major instrument of nation- and state-building in Ukraine? Were the contradictions between landless peasants and latifundia indeed so ephemeral and negligible that they could well be ignored?

As is known, Lypynsky was a noble landowner himself, and his ideas of the peasant life and farming were not derived just from agricultural monographs. How, then, could he come to such an extreme idealization of the class of farmers? Here we seem to face a paradox: his political project was addressed to no one specifically or, to be more exact, its addressee was a Utopian one. It would appear that the task of political construction he had in mind could be carried out only by a new class. It was necessary "that a new leading Ukrainian stratum of farmers should arise from what was left of the land-owning nobility and farming peasantry," that "the most important crucial task of our class to-**/58/**day is to create such new leading, authoritative farming stratum," Lypynsky concluded.3

He saw the logical conclusion of his doctrine of the elite in the idea of a "superman," who could symbolize the state, crown the organic hierarchy of the social world, and personify the unity of the nation and the state. Lypynsky's idea of the Hetman is, beyond doubt, a direct reflection of his romantic-patriarchal feelings and beliefs. His vision of the state is one of a large farm, and just as a farm must have its steward, so too must the state. Quite aware of all the shortcomings of previous and extant monarchies (with his own eyes he saw the lawlessness and despotism of tsarist autocracy), Lypynsky wished to sec in Ukraine the embodiment of an ideal monarchy, the hetmanate.

In the history of the Ukrainian people, Lypynsky distinguished two periods in the reign of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, when there was an opportunity to make the office of Hetman hereditary. For Lypynsky, an elective Hetman was completely inconceivable, a democratic dictatorship, something like a Ukrainian Napoleon. By being elected, a Hetman would not be in a position to rise above inter-class and inter-party clashes, to remain uncommitted to and independent of group interests in his policies. In practical politics, Lypynsky invested his idea of the hetmanship in a real person. Pavlo Skoropadsky, a tsarist general and descendent of elected Hetman of the Left-Bank Ukraine Ivan Skoropadsky, was for Lypynsky such a man. The man on whom Lypynsky pinned his hopes for a national monarchy was hardly the best candidate for Ukrainian national leader.4 Pavlo Skoropadsky was born in Wiesbaden, studied at a military college, served with the Cavalry Guards regiment, a privileged detachment of the Russian Army, and may have known nothing until the age of 44 about the Ukrainian national movement. On 29 April 1918, Pavlo Skoropadsky did become the Hetman of Ukraine on taking power from the Central Rada (the then highest ruling body in Ukraine). But his authority rested on the bayonets of an **/59/** Austro-German army of occupation rather than on mass support, of the farming class and fell at along with the occupation.

Personal relations of the author of Ukrainian monarchism with the Hetman and his entourage were far from ideal, and in the last years of Lypynsky's life they ended in a complete break. If it were not for his early death, Lypynsky would, very likely, have reexamined his views on the Hetman in nation- and state-building. Perhaps this is the fate of any romantic idea which in coming to grips with reality turns into its opposite.

*3. The Peasant with Sword and Plow*

A nation-state owes its establishment to a certain type of individual — a "warrior-producer". For Lypynsky, this is a type of man who has equal capacities for both peaceful creation and making war. A landowner himself, Lypynsky served with the cavalry and was equally skilled at fencing and the agricultural sciences. This is why he did not find such a personality type implausible; he found it in history, when he attempted to sort out the origins of European statehood.

To take an example, the army of William the Conqueror laid, in Lypynsky's opinion, the foundation of English statehood. In Lypynsky's words, it "took root in the land," because it was composed of Normans who had settled in Northern France but not of their roving and plundering Viking ancestors. In this way the ex-warriors were transformed into farmers. A similar process took place in Ukraine. "Our Ukrainian classocracy was born later. They were the registered urban Cossacks of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. And precisely here there is a striking analogy between the sixty-thousand strong registered army of William the Conqueror and the sixty-thousand strong registered army of Bohdan the Great. Having won Ukraine by the chivalrous saber, it likewise settled down immediately **/60/** on the land, took root there and became an army of 'producer-knights' and landowners."

By identifying the notions of state and nation, Lypynsky avoids the problem of creating a nation-state by substituting for it that of establishing a state in general.

The laws of human life in society, in the sphere of production and politics, demand cultural uniformity. Hence, the need arises for an expensive comprehensive education system, financed mainly by the state and to which is assigned the function of socializing the individual. "In the final analysis, only the state (or a little broader sector, including also a part of 'society') can bear this burden of responsibility, simultaneously exercising control over the quality of the products in this crucial industry — the production of socially well-disposed human beings capable of performing functions and work, essential to society. This becomes one of the main tasks of the state. Society needs to be made homogeneous, and this operation can be managed only by the central authorities" of the state.

If the emergence of a standardized culture is the principal precondition for creating a nation-state, in order for this precondition to work a social agent is needed to translate the potential into reality. Is the "warrior-producer," as Lypynsky maintains, the .maker of the nation-state? It should be noted that there are several ways of forming a nation-state. Gellner distinguished three major ways: centralization, unification, and nation-making.

For example, centralization was achieved by dynastic states ruled from London, Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon, where local dialects not very different from the language of office workers were replaced by the language of state officials. The then existing state officialdom, rather than the agrarian stratum, was the prime mover of this process of nationalization. Moreover, the institutionalization of a centralized culture was directed against peasant culture, not based on it.

Unification as a way of creating a nation-state was carried out in areas where there already existed a highly stan-**/61/**dardized, uniform culture and the task was merely to grant this culture universal political status. This presupposed unifying small or medium-size states by means of war or diplomacy. Diplomats and soldiers, rather than thinkers and poets, led the process. As we can see, there were indeed opportunities for such a type of individual referred to by Lypynsky as a "producer-warrior" to emerge and carry out the task of creating a state.

Nation-building is carried out in areas where the need for a new nation is substantiated only by the cultural specificity of a territory. Here, there is not yet a culture with a definitely expressed formal basis and a state that protects this culture. To the fore comes the figure of an activist-propagandist, an intellectual who studies with enthusiasm and fervor the language, culture, and history of the oppressed nation. It is precisely this situation which is characteristic of the national movement in Ukraine. At the beginning and the close of the twentieth century, when opportunities arose for Ukrainians to form an independent nation-state of their own, individuals who received, as a rule, humanitarian-philological education (writers, poets, historians, and journalists), rather than "producer-warriors," became the most prominent figures on Ukraine's political scene.

*4. Territorial Awareness as State Ideology*

The notion of territory is central in Lypynsky's doctrine of what a nation is. Prior to Lypynsky, very popular was the idea, originating with Herder, that a nation was a certain linguistic community, and nationalism was considered only a linguistic political movement. Lypynsky, on the contrary, argued that one's awareness of one's own territory and a striving for establishing one's own state are the guiding factors for a national movement. Nationalism and socialism are ideologies of communities rather than territories, they are common feelings of people of the same class, the same religion, **/62/** even if they live on some other territory. This "extraterritorial" ideology is, in Lypynsky's opinion, ruinous for a nation which is creating a new statehood, since it fosters confrontations and struggles among various ethnic groups inhabiting the territory.

Ukraine, Lypynsky believed, has always been a nest of extraterritorial religious solidarity, no matter whether it was genuinely Rus'ian or Polish, whether it was called Orthodox Christianity or Catholicism, Communist or Socialist ideology — the essence has always been the same: to serve as a powerful weapon in the hands of the imperial nations.

*5. A Philosopher of Ukrainian Politics*

Nearly all Lypynsky's sociological ideas were the direct projection of his interests in political struggle onto the field of sociology. This is also true of his doctrine of territorial awareness as the crucial point of national ideology. From their very inception, Lypynsky's sociological concepts were not universal, and they acquire the status of sociological constructs only when considered from the viewpoint of their utility and applicability to certain political purposes.

Lypynsky set this forth as the cardinal task of sociology: "What must a social theory be like in order to make it possible to build an independent Ukrainian state?" This is why Dmytro Chyzhevsky erred in claiming that Lypynsky "suggests not only a philosophy of Ukrainian politics but a philosophy of politics in general".5 Lypynsky is a philosopher of specifically Ukrainian politics. He elaborated the notion of territory or territorial ideology as a crucial element in building Ukrainian statehood because no other idea could promise success in the political struggle, not objective universal rules, in order for him to conclude: "Territorial awareness is a necessary prerequisite for bringing about the unity of any nation."

To expand, the idea of nation popular with Germans or the French cannot be applied to Ukraine, because here we **/63/** are dealing with different cultural and political specifics and different forms of political struggle, rather than because that idea is objectively wrong. Germans explicate the notion of nation, Lypynsky maintains, proceeding from the notion of common racial origin, thereby reducing it to a "natural fact." This concept of nation is absolutely absurd in the colonial situation of Ukraine, with periodic migrations of people over its territory. It does not conform to the Ukrainian idea of nation, nor does the French one, which is based on "free national self-determination" and would eventually degenerate into anarchy.6

*6. Lypynsky on the Threats to Ukrainian Statehood*

In his *Letters to Brother Farmers* Lypynsky analyzed the reasons for the fall of Ukrainian statehood in the form of the UNR and hetmanate. Special attention was paid to identifying the role of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the state-building and destructive processes of the period and above all to evaluating the various forms of state structure practiced in Ukraine.

He emphasized, "The Ukrainian democratic intelligentsia, which comprised the main cadres of the so-called conscious Ukrainians in the prewar period and belonged to various so-called Russian liberal professions, could not possibly imagine themselves as builders of a Ukrainian state, and for this reason the idea of a state built by other Ukrainian classes was for them, if not hostile, at best, absolutely alien. Conversely, they wanted to take advantage of the only role they were able to play — that of an intermediary between the Russian state and the Ukrainian popular masses. They did their best to arrogate to themselves the first sprouts of the latter's national awareness."7

With historic sorrow he added, "We have beaten ourselves. The nation's leaders did not create any ideas, beliefs, or legends concerning a single, united, free, and independent Ukraine uniting all Ukrainians, did not fight for such an **/64/** idea, and a Ukraine like this could not, naturally, materialize and assume real living forms."8

In 1920 he gave a strikingly exact description of the general social-psychological atmosphere pervading the crisis of Ukrainian statehood during the national liberation struggle of 1917-1918. "A social proletarian revolution for building a new social system, or an all-national and all-class revolution for building a common state and nation catering to all classes," he rightly went on, "All in the middle is political and economic robbery and ideological pharisaicism and demoralization. It is only on an ideologically and morally clean basis that a new creative Ukrainian faith can emerge."9 This formula seems to hold good even today, for, unfortunately, Ukraine has again found herself right "in the middle."

What recipes for overcoming the permanent Ukrainian crisis of statehood did Lypynsky leave for us? First of all, he advised a change in the methods of state-building.

"Our history," wrote Lypynsky, "has taught us hundreds of times over that our democracy, all these clerks and pen-pushers by trade, demagogues by tactics and careerists in spirit... were only able to destroy their own Ukrainian state-building aristocracy and the Ukrainian state to boot... But Ukrainian democracy was never able to build anything new, of their own, in that empty space. Of course, not because there were no people among them worthy of replacing the old slaughtered aristocracy but because they were possessed by a destructive, envious, spiteful as well as ingratiating, lying, and slavish spirit; because all these at times good, gifted, and kind individuals together constituted a destructive body called democracy."10

These are the emotions of a committed state-builder over the destructive activities of home-grown democrats. Both Lypynsky and his sympathizers made futile attempts to cooperate with the Central Rada and help it build a new Ukraine. Moreover, Lypynsky thought it best for our people to make use of the ethno-political experience of the USA, a **/65/** truly democratic country. Warning against cultivating socialist and nationalist sentiments in society, he wrote in his *Letters,* "We want the local Ukrainian people in the struggle for their own state to be politically cemented together by patriotism, *i.e.,* love for a common Motherland, rather than your socialism, *i.e.,* by the hatred of the local poor for the local rich, or your nationalism, *i.e.,* by the hatred of local "Ukrainians" for local "non-Ukrainians." It is only when the champions of the Ukrainian state from all local classes and nations defeat the parent state agents also to be found in all local classes and nations (including the "Ukrainian nation"!) that the Ukrainian State can emerge. And it is only in the Ukrainian State — in the process of cohabitation of Ukrainian residents on a defined state territory — that a Ukrainian nation can be formed, the way we are witnessing the emergence of an American nation in the process of the cohabitation of diverse nations and classes on the territory of the United States."11

Lypynsky may be said to have been a democrat only insofar as national democracy served the interests of building an independent Ukraine. If we consider that playing at democracy resulted in the collapse of his etatist idea, this explains Lypynsky's negative attitude to the democratic model of statehood.

It is natural therefore that he assessed the activities of socialists and nationalists from the same standpoints, often putting the equality sign between them. Lypynsky thought that neither the former nor the latter would ever be able to build a sovereign Ukraine. He based his position in this way: "You socialists and nationalists want to create Ukraine... by horizontal division. You want to separate the "alien" upper strata from the "Ukrainian" masses and have the upper strata destroyed by those masses. Where you differ is in purely verbal, superficial slogans rather than in mentality, method, or temperament. The socialists want to have the upper strata in Ukraine destroyed by the masses under the social slogan 'Beat the lords, because they're **/66/** bourgeois/ and you, nationalists, want to do the same, but only under a tribal-ethnic slogan 'Beat the lords, because they're not Ukrainian.' And the goal is all too clear: seize power in Ukraine in your 'intellectual' hands with the aid of the 'socialist' or 'nationalist' people. This is why you turn so easily from socialists into nationalists and from nationalists into Sovietophiles *(Smena vekh* adherents, a reference to those emigres who reconciled themselves to Soviet rule on national grounds — *Ed.).* This is why you are both doomed to failure in Ukraine. All you think of is how to arouse the masses and surface on their backs. That is why you are being beaten and will always be. For this reason, you are not to see an independent socialist or nationalist Ukraine of your own. That will be gained not by your socialism or nationalism but by discipline, organization and, above all, by ennobling yourselves and your leaders."12

In this respect Lypynsky analyzed the role of Ukrainian foreign political orientations and their correlation with domestic policy. "Ukrainian politicians (irrespective of their ethnicity) regard orientation," he wrote, "as a way to find an ally outside Ukraine, assure him of their limitless devotion and, after thus securing his kind help, seize power over their fellow countrymen with this help."13

Having thus identified the main mistake of the Ukrainian political parties' foreign strategy, Lypynsky outlined his own views: "If we were not 40 million," we read in his *Letters,* "but 1 billion, and if we lived in some desert mountains or swamps and not on Europe's best soil, then we could set up our own state system and order after 'receiving' a certain amount of francs, marks, or pounds and some "ready-made" police. But, having, instead of a conscious and organized nation, a land fought for by those foreign forces which we want to use for this land's political liberation, having forty million nationally unaware individuals placed in political turmoil by various demagogues hating each other and any authority, broken down onto hundreds of hostile "parties" from above and into thousands of warring "re-**/67/**publics" from below, it is hardly possible that today's exhausted and sick Europe might find a force other than ourselves, which would build a state for us on our land and organize us as a modern European nation. Nobody will build us a state if we do not build it ourselves, and nobody will ever make us a nation unless we ourselves want to be one."14

We thus see a clearly expressed priority of domestic policy over foreign, a priority so habitual in the West and so incomprehensible in Ukraine.

"The unification and organization of the whole Ukrainian Nation," stressed Lypynsky, "depends on the unification and organization of the Ukrainian agricultural class."15 This thesis was well-grounded in the reality of those times. All other social strata of the Ukrainian population did not have enough force at the time to carry out a unifying mission. The author of the "Letters" also identified with extreme accuracy one of the main obstacles which might slow down such a course of events: "It is only the elimination of private ownership of land that can ruin the farming class," Lypynsky wrote, "taking the wind out of the farmer's sails, removing the creative element from the work of a farmer who is cultivating his own plot of land by means of his own individual effort. Only the socialization of land can destroy our present-day class consciousness..."16 It is quite easy to see that the Bolsheviks pulled exactly this end of the rope. However, Lypynsky saw the main threats to Ukrainian statehood in such forms as ochlocracy and democracy.

As noted above, Lypynsky attached decisive importance in the life of every state to the activities of the leading strata, the national aristocracy. He explained that he was using "the word aristocracy to define a stratum now actually ruling a given nation, be it an English lord, the Russian Council of People's Commissars, or some 'popularly elected' democrats."17 It is from this position that he interprets ochlocracy and democracy, referring in great measure to Plato. **/68/**

According to Lypynsky, *ochlocracy* is "a method of organizing a nation which, in the process of primitive material and racial development or influenced by an earlier material and racial situation, has not yet formed classes distinguishable by their means of material production or racial affinity, and which is only divided into a politically shapeless, economically and racially undifferentiated mob ("ochlos," hence ochlocracy) and those who rule this classless mob by means of their armed and closely-knit organization. This ruling ochlocratic aristocracy is recruited by training nomads from outside or the local déclassé, materially non-productive, racially and economically heterogeneous elements."18

Finally, fir him democracy "signifies a method of organizing the aristocracy of a nation which, under the influence of an inorganic and chaotic material development and of its own or alien colonial expansion, has become so mixed in terms of classes and races that natural groupings of the working people, who constitute physically, spiritually, and materially related classes, have already broken up; where the racially unstable and psychologically unbalanced type of a half-breeds has come to the fore, bringing on a chaotic conglomerate of democratically "equal" individuals (instead of organically cemented classes) alien to one other, hating each other, and bound up in one ethnic whole by those remnants of national and state organization which had been set up under the domination of a former classocratic or ochlocratic aristocracy disintegrated by democracy."19

No doubt, such generalizations in the *Letters* referred, above all, to Ukraine. Lypynsky was sufficiently bold to oppose for the first time the still-fashionable national patriotic legends about the alleged "eternity of the Ukrainian nation" and prove that, as far as the revival of the latter is concerned, it is all too dangerous to "boast of one's 'antiquity' and do nothing to create a nation and state attractive to the productive strata of society.

According to Lypynsky, Ukraine will be doomed forever to a dismal existence between the being and non-being **/69/** without a state of her own. It is this thesis that Rudnytsky singled out when assessing Lypynsky's legacy: "In the current conditions (the 1920s — *Author*) Ukraine is not only enslaved and occupied but also 'stateless,' *i.e.,* internally immature for independent existence. There is no Ukrainian nation in the full sense of the word: there is only the material for a future nation. Thus ctatist political action should be aimed, above all, at overcoming Ukrainians' own internal organic weaknesses. Lypynsky upheld the idea that "God created peoples capable of improving." Hence the supremacy of the domestic policy over foreign and of "organization" over "orientation."20

Ukraine's historic mission, Lypynsky believed, is to synthesize European and oriental Hellenic and Byzantine cultures. By fulfilling this extremely complex task, a Ukrainian state could then have ushered in a new historical epoch in Eastern Europe and provided a happier life not only for itself but also for all neighboring nations. He called this idea "Ukrainian messianism."21

Lypynsky was aware that the separation of states, above all the Slav ones, had no historical prospects. For example, Yevhen Pizyur, a researcher of his works, notes that Lypynsky had an idea of setting up a "Union of three Ruses" in Eastern Europe. However, this idea was not further developed and remains largely unclear for later students. As Pizyur thinks, a union of three nations — Russian, Ukrainian and Belorusian — was to have been based on complete independence of these states and would have been a sort of political bloc. Here, too, Lypynsky proceeded from his agrarian "conservative aristocratism" thinking that the alliance of the three peoples was necessary, for none of them was able to oppose either the "nomadic" influence (Islamic fundamentalism in modern parlance) or the domination of anonymous finance capital from the West.22 **/70/**

1 V. Lypynsky, *Letters to Brother Farmers. On the Idea and Organization of Ukrainian Monarchy. Written in 1919-1926* (Vienna, 1926: in Ukrainian), p. XII.

2 E. Gellner, "Nations and Nationalism," *Voprosy filosofii,* 1989, No 7, p. 131 (in Russian).

3 V. Lypynsky, "Letters to Brother Farmers, p. 192.

4 E. Gellner, "The Advent of Nationalism: The Myths of a Nation and Classes," *Put,* 1992, I, p. 22 (in Russian). **/400/**

5 D. Chyzhevsky, "Viacheslav Lypynsky as a Philosopher of History," *Filosofska i sotsiolohichna dumka,* 1991, No 10, pp. 51-52 (in Ukrainian).

6 V. Lypynsky, *Religion and Church in the History of Ukraine* (Philadelphia, 1925).

7 V. Lypynsky, *Letters to Brother Farmers,* (2nd edition: New York, Bulava, 1954), p. 36.

8 *Ibid.,* p. 16.

9 *Ibid,* p. 17.

10 *Ibid.,* p. 36.

11*Ibid., p.* 16.

12 *Ibid.,* pp. 16-17.

13 *Ibid.,* p. 65.

14*Ibid.,* pp. 66-67.

15 *Ibid.,* p. 72.

16*Ibid.,* p. 73.

17 *Ibid.,* p. 188.

18 *Ibid., pp.* 191-192.

19 *Ibid., p.* 192.

20 Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Between History and Politics,* p. 156.

21 Yevhen Pyziur, "Viacheslav Lypynsky's Idea of Nation Building," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* 1985, IX, p. 325.

The Liberal Idea in Ukraine

## *Mykola TOMENKO*

Today it has become fashionable to cite Francis Fukuyama's dictum that liberalism as a world view and political concept is "doomed" to triumph. Given the great influence of liberalism in the world (especially, in the Western world and in the sphere of immediate US influence), as well as the fact that liberal ideas have of late been disseminated and popularized in postcommunist Ukraine, the above claim has been accepted almost as an axiom by many Ukrainian politicians and run of the mill scholars.

By liberal ideas we have in mind commitments to freedom, democracy, and humanism. Liberalism is based on the recognition of the priority of individual rights as a higher value than the collective, society, and the state. This world view considers private property sacred and inviolable, while guaranteeing individual rights and liberties.

Liberalism as a politico-economic concept adds to this the need for a separation of powers and economic organization which accords first place to individual freedom and capabiilities.

In order to better understand the contemporary ideas of liberalism and democracy it is worthwhile to distinguish between these notions. Of course, the terms *liberalism* and *democracy* are interrelated. This is apparent from the very phrase "liberal democracy." But today, when not only liberal but also conservative and social democratic concepts are reviving, greater precision is required. **/72/**

*1. Dissemination of Liberal Ideas in Ukraine*

History bears witness to the fact that the liberal idea in the Ukrainian political context was, far from Fukuyama's optimistic prognoses, doomed sooner to failure than success. When, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian scholars and public and political figures only began to adapt liberal ideas to Ukrainian realities, liberal thought as such had already taken shape as a set of conceptual modifications, theoretical schools, and party ideologies.

In Ukrainian political thought, the liberal (democratic) idea was always subordinant to the social and national ideas. Attempts to formulate an essentially liberal model of Ukrainian state-building always ended in failure.

One can discern two attempts to adopt ideas of liberalism in Ukraine: the first was due to Mykhailo Drahomanov's efforts to transplant West European liberal concepts onto Ukrainian soil in the second half of the nineteenth century and to combine them with social and national ideas; the second derived from activities of representatives of the Russian liberal trend in Ukraine early in the twentieth century.

The first attempt failed largely because there was no organizational foundation for popularizing the idea. As for the twentieth century, the reasons are well-known: the rather powerful Party of Constitutional Democrats disappeared from the political scene after the Bolsheviks took power. Only certain members of the party, working in the system of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, remained for a time bearers of liberal ideas. At the same time, the liberal model has never assumed complete form in Ukraine.

Introduction of theoretical concepts of liberalism into Ukrainian political thinking is primarily connected with the forming of parties of liberal orientation. But inaccurate treatments of historical traditions of domestic liberalism are frequent.1 **/73/**

Ukrainian liberalism was formed by Mykhailo Drahomanov.2 Influenced by the Decembrists and representatives of English liberalism, Drahomanov elaborated a concept of society based on the idea of the association of harmoniously developed individuals. And the road to this, he believed, lay in federalism with maximum decentralization and self-government of local communities and regions. In his letter to Ivan Franko, Drahomanov presented his vision of a new Ukrainian state in these words: "The principles of modern world civilization most conducive to progress: liberalism in its most coherent form, federalism in state affairs, democracy in social life, with the firmest guarantee — association in economics, and rationalism — in literary and scientific matters."3 Drahomanov's approach emphasized the need to connect the Ukrainian national movement and its program with European liberal-democratic ideals. Some aspects of his approach had a conspicuously social-democratic coloring. In general, when analyzing the social and political life of the second half of the nineteenth century, one has to take into account the then fashionability of socialism.

Some of Drahomanov's ideas were later adopted by Mykhailo Pavlyk, Ivan Franko, and Bohdan Kistiakivsky. The late Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky wrote of young Ivan Franko: "In the first period, he was a socialist, but one of the bright Drahomanovian liberal and personalist type."4 From 1895 on, Franko's world view evolved, and already by 1905 he had formulated his own concept of Ukrainian democratic nationalism (national democracy).

The liberal doctrine was augmented and enriched with new insights in the period of the well-known debates during the Revolution of 1905, particularly in connection with the critique of the communist ideology in the *Vekhi* (Landmarks) anthology. Among the most remarkable Ukrainian public figures-liberal theoreticians, center stage is occupied by Bohdan Kistiakivsky, son of Oleksandr Kistiakivsky, who was a professor of law ar Kyiv University and an active member of the Old *Hromada* (Community) and frequent **/74/** contributor to the journal *Osnova* (Foundation).

While studying ar Kyiv University, Bohdan Kistiakivsky was greatly influenced by Drahomanov's ideas. A considerable portion of his scholarship was devoted to editing and publishing Drahomanov's multi-volume *Political Works.* Also prominent in Kistiakivsky's work was the problem of correlating of social and liberal ideas. In 1902 he published his article "The Russian Sociological School and the Category of Possibility," which marked his adoption of liberalism. Mykola Vasylenko characterized this change in Kistiakivsky's world view as a decisive turning point, for he discarded Marxism in favor of idealism.5 Kistiakivsky's *The Law-Governed and Socialist State* (1906) emphasized the need to merge social and liberal ideas. He analyzed law within the framework of the social sciences and formulated the principles of a law-governed state. Mykhailo TuhanBaranovsky and Maxym Slavynsky also expounded their versions of the liberal idea.

Founders of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Volodymyr Vernadsky, Bohdan Kistiakivsky, Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovsky, and Ahatanhel Krymsky contributed substantially to the shaping of the liberal idea in Ukraine. For instance, one of Tuhan-Baranovsky's important ideas was the centralpostulate of liberalism that science is capable of resolving social problems (c/ his brochure The Impact of Ideas of Political Economy Ideas on the Natural Sciences and Philosophy, Kyiv, 1922).

At the same time, rather conclusive were arguments for an important role of private property in the system of economic relations. Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovsky's position on this issue also differed from socialist approaches of various kind. "Modern mankind," he noted in this respect, "cannot do without this stimulus of economic energy... Thus a complete cessation of the functioning of the economic system based on private property would be tantamount to economic, cultural and, in general, social degradation."6 Tuhan-Baranovsky made an attempt to analyze the problem of the **/75/** individual's role in the context of political economy.

"It is true," he writes, "that interests of various social classes are different, and, on taking the position of each of these social interests, one must bring to the to fore different tasks of theoretical investigation. But it is possible to rise above the differences in interests and to find a perspective from which the practical conclusions of science would become obligatory for all social groups, no matter what their private interest might be."

The scholar argued that the individual was that determining factor. "The central idea of modern mind," he maintained, "is the idea of supreme value formulated by Immanuel Kant and, as a corollary, that of the equal value of each human personality. Any personality is the supreme goal *per se,* and this is why all people are equal as bearers of the sacred human personality. It is this that determines the supreme practical interest, from the viewpoint of which a single political economy can be construed: the interest of man in general rather than that of a worker, capitalist, or landowner, irrespective of their class affiliation."7

*2. The Priority of Individual Rights*

Following classical liberalism, the Ukrainian liberal concept emphasizes the supremacy of individual rights. In his Draft Constitution entitled "A Free Union", Drahomanov put in first place the idea of building the state on the basis of political freedom, interpreting it as a system of the rights of man and citizen, including the inviolability of the individual, life, private correspondence, and nationality (language); as freedom of conscience, publishing, association, bearing arms, choosing one's place of residence and profession, as well as the right to lodge a civil suit against an official or state body and to resist the illegal actions of bureaucrats. Drahomanov believed that the equality of all in their civil rights and duties must not be abrogated by legislative enact-**/76/**ment, except in case of the imposition of martial law in a national emergency.8

The idea of supremacy of the civil (personal) in the trio, citizen-society-state, was always present in all of Drahomanov's political writings. It is no accident that in order to affirm this principle he made extensive use of the experience of democratic nations (see especially\* his *Swiss Confederation).*

*3. The Priority of Law*

Bohdan Kistiakivsky, arguing uncompromisingly for the equal rights of all citizens and supremacy of individual rights, maintained that only these arc a prerequisite of firm and sound law and order. In his article *In Defense of Law* he wrote: "The prime and most essential principle of law is liberty." Certainly, this is an external and relative freedom determined by the social environment. But an inner, less relative, spiritual freedom is only possible when there is an external freedom, the latter being the best possible school for the former.9 In addition, in analyzing the Russian situation, the Ukrainian jurist noted: "The Russian intelligentsia has never respected law, has never seen in it an enduring value, and of all the values of culture it has depreciated law the most."10

State power should change from a power of coercion into a power of law; in this sense, judicial power, especially civil law, takes on great importance. Kistiakivsky formulated these ideas in a virtually complete model of a law-governed state. In his work *The Social Science and the Law,* he noted that the legal system is a sophisticated machinery where certain forces act absolutely mechanically. However, setting it in motion and its proper functioning require the uninterrupted spiritual and mental activity of all members of society. Each has to work constantly to make the law work. An extremely pressing and important problem of a society in transition, where supposedly the rights and freedoms can be **/77/** limited, was resolved by citizen Kistiakivsky, who argued conclusively the tragic consequences and impermissibility of such expedients.

*4. Self-Government*

Self-government, Drahomanov held, is the basis of democratic society. Thus, the institution of self-government is not only a form of decentralizing the state, but also a mechanism of social-political system. Drahomanov held that a key place is allotted to the citizen and community. Further organization of power is built: from the bottom up where all institutions are self-governed and function according to the pattern: citizen — community — volost' — povit — oblast' — national government (only the state bodies are not self-governed).

Thus, the underpinning of this pattern of local self-government was the so-called civic model, later to become the basis of the European Charter of Self-Government.

*5. The National Idea*

In his work "Rich Thoughts on the Ukrainian National Cause," Drahomanov confidently argued that the national idea cannot by itself lead mankind to universal freedom and truth. One must, seek something else — the universally human, which would be above all the nationalities and harmonize them with one another. But this idea of cosmopolitanism and humanity does not at all contradict the idea of nationality; on the contrary, it raises it to a higher level.11 Bohdan Kistiakivsky, Volodymyr Vernadsky, and Ahatanhel Krymsky also took a similar approach, as we can see from their ideas on how Ukrainian science ought to be organized. In this connection, suffice it to quote Vernadsky's congratulatory letter to Krymsky on his seventieth birthday, written early in 1941 (within the context of certain accusations about a non-Ukrainian position of President of the Ukra-**/78/**inian Academy of Sciences Vernadsky): "My scientific work is everything for me, and, as a matter of fact, for you, too... it is top priority, but the culture in Ukrainian of the Ukrainian people, its scientific endeavors and thinking in this language have united us in the tragic period of history. You and I have chosen ... the right path in the critical moment of the history of Ukrainian scientific work."12

A particular place in Ukrainian liberals' thinking is occupied by issues of morality and the balance between means and ends. In particular, Drahomanov made a great contribution in popularizing the ethical foundations of political activity. His famous phrase that politics requires clean hands became the guiding principle for part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A draft *Charter of Ukrainians' Brotherhood* co-authored by Drahomanov, noted: "The murder of any person (a murder that contradicts one of the tenets of the rights of man and citizen) shall never be a task of either the "Free association" as a whole or any of its subdivisions..."13

*6. Basic Characteristics of the Present-Day Ukrainian Liberalism*

Summing up the review of main characteristics of Ukrainian liberalism, one can conclude that, due to historical circumstances, the ideological concept of liberalism failed to acquire clear-cut and stable political and economic forms. Some parties, active in the period of 1907-1917 — the Ukrainian Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Republican Party, *etc.,* — were not representatives of the liberal program in its proper sense.

Later there were only few incidental proponents of liberal ideas, and the political climate in Ukraine was not favorable for setting up corresponding organizational structures. Among well-known figures, only Ivan Lysiak-Rudnitsky continued the traditions of the Ukrainian liberal idea in the modern period. His approach to Ukrainian history, political, and legal traditions included, alongside with a tra-**/79/**ditional account of nationalism and communism, an analysis of liberal ideas, which was made within the framework of universal human values.

A problem of Ukrainian liberalism in the past was that it underestimated the national element as part of the system of society's world view and the role of state in the system of sociopolitical institutions. At the same time, the central position was allotted to the conception of democracy, especially certain principles of direct democracy, in the organization of state power, and regional and local self-government. Liberal ideas seemed unrealistic and hardly the best option for Ukrainian lands under empires with a totalitarian political regime. Under such conditions, liberal ideas in Ukraine were perceived as something of a Utopia and consequently never enjoyed broad popular support.

In the current situation, liberalism is becoming a fashionable ideological and politico-economic concept in Ukraine. Today, around ten Ukrainian political organizations have added liberal ideas to their armory. However, the weakness of the present-day Ukrainian liberalism resides in its making use of the morally and politically outdated doctrines of classical liberalism, which have now come under severe criticism in the West. Characteristic of Ukraine and a number of other countries of the postcommunist world is a "syndrome of implanted political system." A certain segment of Ukraine's democratic forces, oriented toward Western liberal models, intentionally or unintentionally suggest that, these ideological foundations of donor-countries be transplanted in post-Soviet soil. The liberal literature, which are translated, published, and popularized in Ukraine, appear to be encyclopedic handbooks dating as far back as the early or mid-twentieth century.

As an example of the inadequacy of contemporary "liberal" structures and widely recognized liberal ideas in Ukraine, one can point to the newly formed liberal faction in the Ukrainian Parliament. Analyzing its documents, one can clearly see that most of its central notions have been **/80/** borrowed from the ideology of social democracy and they all are very far from the ideas of liberalism *par excellence.* This ideological hybrid is all the more clearly mirrored in the leaders and members of this faction. Among the leaders are Volodymyr Lanovyi and ex-President Leonid Kravchuk. Whereas the former can be perceived as a political figure of pro-liberal orientation, Kravchuk is known primarily as a theoretician of quite the opposite, — state-building as an end in itself — and simultaneously as the embodiment of classical nomenklatura interests. Among the rank-and-file members of the "liberal" faction one can also see former members of the communist and socialist factions in Parliament.14

It is quite clear that this is a time-serving structure motivated by the current political situation and capitalizing on its own name (in order to resolve problems of financing the party with the help of domestic and foreign industrial and financial circles). Such a state of affairs can be observed in the case of other structures of liberal orientation. To take an example, the Liberal Party of Ukraine declared about its intention to change its name to Labor Liberal Party, and the leaders of the Party of Ukraine's Democratic Revival and the Labor Congress of Ukraine have accommodated liberalism in their name, People's Democratic Party.

The implantation of the liberal idea in the political and economic life of present-day Ukraine is in substantial measure encouraged by domestic state structures. The government economic program is really based on a unique "liberalism for donors." This is why, for example, Viktor Pynzenyk retains the post of Deputy Premier, although he has no real influence on official decisions, but is used primarily as a symbol of Ukrainian monetarism. This economist is retained in the government only in order to convince the IMF and World Bank of the liberal character of Ukrainian economic character.

Meanwhile, government actions in the economy are highly unsystematic, their consequences unforeseen, and give **/81/** inadequate grounds to understand the logic of the program which the President has announced. The only thing obvious is that the overweening goal of economic reforms in Ukraine is not to raise people's living standards but to support the currency and control inflation in order to systematically receive Western economic aid.

The liberal phraseology of influential office-holders in contemporary Ukraine, along with the illusion of relative blamelessness and unfailingly monetarist approaches to economic reform, is merely for the consumption of international financial donor institutions, and in the absence of both a system of economic transformations and a tradition of economic liberalism can lead to serious and unforeseen results.

Thus, the immediate future of the liberal idea in Ukraine may well be largely connected with the national tradition and the chimeras of contemporary Ukrainian political life.

1 The historical traditions of Ukrainian liberalism are all too often wronly interpreted. For example, the Center of Socio-Economic Analysis of the Liberal Party of Ukraine refers to V. Antonovych, M. Hrushevsky and ideologues of the Cyril and Methodius Fraternity as outstanding representatives of the liberal trend. But these conclusions cannot be treated as scientifi-

cally correct (V.G. Voronkova, I.D. Yasir, *The Birth and Evolution of Liberalism in Ukraine at the turn of the twentieth Century* (Donetsk, 1993: in Russian) ).

2 It should be admitted that leaders of the Cyril and Methodius Fraternity and the *narodniky* did share some liberal ideas, but were not bearers of the liberal concept.

3 M. Drahomanov, *Letters to Ivan Franko* (Warsaw, 1937: in Ukrainian), I, p. 83.

4I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky, "Ivan Franko and His German Writings," *Between History and Politics, p.* 130.

5 N.P. Vasylenko, "Bohdan Oleksandrovych Kistyakivsky," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* 1984, No 2, 4, 5 (in Russian).

6 L.P. Horkin, "Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovsky: a Thinker, Scholar and Citizen," *MJ. Tuhan-Baranovsky, Political Economy* (Kyiv, 1994: in Ukrainian), p. 21.

7 *Ibid.*

8 M. Drahomanov, "A Free Union," A.G. Slyusarenko, M.V. Tomenko, *A History of the Ukrainian Constitution* (Kyiv, 1993: in Ukrainian), p. 53.

9 B. Kistyakivsky, "In Defense of Rights," *Milestones. De Profundis* (Moscow, 1991: in Russian), pp. 122, 123.

10 *Ibid.,* p. 110.

11 M.P. Drahomanov, *Selected Works* (Kyiv, 1991: in Ukrainian), p. 469.

12 O. Pritsak, "A Word about Ahatanhel Krymsky," *Vtsnyk Akademii Nauk Ukrainy,* 1991, No 6.

13 See M. Tomenko, "The Political Views of Mykhailo Drahomanov and Dmytro Dontsov From the **/401/** Viewpoint of Modern Ukrainian Statehood," *Slovo,* 1991, No 21 (in Ukrainian).

14If in the West a defection from the communist to socialist camp is treated as a political treason, in Ukraine a defection from the communists to the liberals is becoming a norm.

The Geopolitical Component of Ukrainian Nation-Building Thought
(First Half of the Twentieth Century)

## *Oleksandr SALTOVSKY*

Ukraine's geographical position, fertile lands, advantageous transport routes, and absence of insurmountable natural borders along the whole of its perimeter has made it a regular object of expansionism. The logic of international relations bears witness to the great influence of a country's geography factor in governing its fate and the destiny of its people. In 1923, Stepan Rudnytsky (1877-1937), a Ukrainian student of political geography, noted: "In failing to clarify for themselves even the size of Ukraine and her people, both our gray intellectuals and prominent political figures place the Ukrainian cause on the same footing with that of other "small peoples." It needs no great effort to demonstrate how this has damaged the ideology of Ukrainianism. In practical matters, insufficient geographical knowledge is fraught with simply fatal consequences. Suffice it to recall that in the past several years our politicians not only made light of Ukraine's borderlands, but, in their ignorance, even failed to lay claims on huge expanses of Ukrainian lands. Not one of them has known how to use and take advantage of the host of politico-geographical, economic-geographical, academic-geographical, and other arguments which speak for Ukrainian statehood in Southeast Europe."1

*1. Origins of Ukrainian Political Geography*

In Ukrainian political thought, interest in geopolitical issues grew when conditions ripened for the struggle for na-**/84/**tional liberation or when the results of such struggles were reviewed. As early as in Pylyp Orlyk's *Code of Ukraine's Rights,* one can find hints of independent Ukraine's geopolitical role as a unique barrier against Russian imperialist aggression in Europe. Early in the nineteenth century this theme was romantically addressed by poet Yevhen Hrebinka (1812-1937): "O, if only one could throw cordons of wide and deep seas and high mountains around Ukraine, then... we might be independent, but now she is like a willow on the roadside trampled by all who pass by."2

At the end of the nineteenth century, problems of Ukraine's geopolitical position were taken up by Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841-1895), who in his *Letters to Dnipro Ukraine* wrote: "Without the north coast of the Black Sea Ukraine is inconceivable as a culturally advanced country. We possessed this coast in the times of the Ugliches, Tiverians and Tmutarakan Rus'; we recovered some of it before the Turkish invasion in the fifteenth century and had to in one way or another fight and take them back later. Under Polish rule, we failed to do so, even with the aid of the Cossacks, but this was to happen under the rule of the Muscovite tsars. (Poland was, in fact, a country of the Baltic basin, and for that reason indifferent to Black Sea issues concerning Dnipro Ukrainians. Muscovy was a state of the Baltic and Caspian basins and thus also indifferent to them, but its annexations along the Don drew it to the Black Sea. Here lies the fatal cause why the pan-European and not specifically Ukrainian task of crushing Turkey of the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries was fulfilled in the seventeenth-nineteenth centuries by Muscovy rather than Poland...)."3 It was by this fact that Drahomanov explained the Zaporizhian Cossacks' orientation to the Russian state, for this very "Muscovite tsardom fulfilled Ukraine's elementary geographic-national task!"4

Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934), Stepan Rudnytsky, and Yuri Lypa (1900-1944) all pointed out that from time immemorial Ukrainians have inhabited a wide strip of **/85/** steppe and forest-steppe north of the Black Sea. As A. Syniavsky (1866-1951), one of Ukraine's best Ukrainian Orientalists of the first half of the twentieth century, noted: "Ukraine's territory, in the periods of river and Mediterranean cultures and later, especially after the Baghdad Khaliphate emerged in southwest Asia and the Cordoba Khaliphate was established in the far west of Europe in Spain, was at the crossroads of East and West. From then on it became a well-trod road for peoples who moved from the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea to the West,"5

Solving the Black Sea problem has been one of Ukraine's main geopolitical tasks. In outlining these tasks, Yuri Lypa emphasized that Ukraine's expansionist goal was to reach the Black Sea. Simultaneously, he explained that from ancient times Ukrainians inhabited the banks of the greatest, rivers which flow into the Black Sea from the Danube to the Kuban and alternatively retreated upstream under the pressure of nomads or went downstream if circumstances permitted.

While the Black Sea in the south, the Polissian marshes in the north and, in part, the Carpathian Mountains in the west were natural borders of the Ukrainian lands proper, there was no such border in the east and southeast. It was precisely along this steppe corridor that hordes of Asian nomads passed through the territory of Southern Ukraine, throwing our ancestors back from the Black Sea coast.

"Rivers," as Lypa formulated the elements of geopolitics, "these most convenient highways of old, played a great role in molding national communities: a river network forms a single territory, its trade, power, customs, and, eventually, language and religion."6 A network of navigable rivers with a quiet plain course facilitated not only the formation of the territory's internal integrity, but also consolidated its tics with the outside world. "The river system of Ukrainian transport terminates with its rivers' mouths. But this is not the end of this network, this is its development into a still greater system, that of seafaring. The Black Sea is linked or-**/86/**ganically to Ukraine's rivers by manifestations of both material and spiritual trends of the Ukrainian territory," Lypa argued.7 He held that it is precisely this system of interior waterways that forms the geopolitical axis of Ukraine: "Only the North/South axis serves as a real axis for the Ukrainian lands."8 The Dnipro "is the central nerve of Ukraine."9 The basic movements of huge numbers of people went in this direction practically up to the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Russian autocracy diverted the colonizing energies of Dnipro Ukrainians to Siberia, northern Kazakhstan, and the Far East, while Galician Ukrainians, due to the position of the Austro-Hungarian government, were channeled overseas. And the settlers never considered these new lands ethnically Ukrainian.

A great role in Ukrainian history was played by the fact that its territory was a crossroads of both trade and migration routes. While the river system formed relations along the North-South axis, land routes facilitated contacts between East and West through its territory: the shortest land route from Western Europe to India passes through Ukraine.10 From time immemorial important lines of commerce and communication between Baltic and Mediterranean countries, Western and Central Europe, on the one hand, and Central Asia and China, on the other, were on its territory.

Trade ties to a huge extent determined which outside cultural influence would predominate — Greek in ancient times, Byzantine and Norman in the days of Kyivan Rus', West European in the later Middle Ages. Taken together, they were also instrumental in defining Ukraine's geopolitical orientations. As Mykhailo Hrushevsky pointed out, one can argue for an overwhelming Western influence, beginning in the late twelfth century: "This began as early as the times of the Galician-Volhynian princes and was strengthened and augmented as these lands came under the Polish rule."11 Poland was a sort of way station for West European influence on Ukraine. Notably, while spiritual cultural relations **/87/** developed primarily with Italy and France, technocultural ones were mainly with Germany. "Wroclaw and Gdansk, these two major historical markets for Ukrainian exports (which were violently ruined by the Russian government in the eighteenth century) were the principal middlemen and sources of these Western and German influences."12

*2. Russia as a Geopolitical Problem*

The problem of Ukrainian-Russian relations, of Russia in general and as a factor governing its historical fate, is one of the most important problems in Ukrainian geopolitical thought.

A commonplace of Ukrainian independent social thought in the first half of the twentieth century was the idea that Ukraine's annexation by Muscovy led to a disruption of Ukraine's traditional ties with Western Europe and arbitrary change in its foreign trade priorities and geopolitical orientation. The tsarist government's conscious policy of centralization in social and cultural life led it to proscribe study abroad without special permission and was reflected in a series of official instructions restricting Ukrainian foreign trade only through northern ports of the empire. "Russian trade and customs policy stopped at nothing in order to disrupt and destroy Ukraine's trade ties with its historic Western markets, in order to ruin Ukraine's trade in general, hand it over to Muscovite merchants, and bind Ukraine economically to the northern centers of Great Russia, St. Petersburg and Moscow."13

Speaking of the of geopolitical orientations in Ukrainian and Russian history, Stepan Rudnytsky noted that "nature determined that Muscovy was allotted water routes completely different from those of Ukraine..."14 Lypa pointed out that while Ukrainians were formed as a nation on northern Black Sea littoral, the Russian nation was molded in the Volga river basin. In his book *The Partition of Russia,* Lypa argued that while Russians occupied and settled a huge area **/88/** over the centuries, they nevertheless failed to make many of these territories truly Russian. And this is not only an issue concerning areas where Russians never became an ethnic majority — Ukraine, the Baltic states, the Caucasus, Central Asia, *etc.* — but also that of the Siberia and the Far East. "Recent years in Russia's history have seen an increasingly harsh struggle of the central authorities with a variety of peoples and lands. Most tragic in the struggle was the fact that the centralist idea has proven ineffective on Russia's expanse. Each time it delivers ever harder blows on human life."15 These blows have cost millions of lives both of peoples subjugated by the empire and of ethnic Russians held hostage to the Russian imperial idea. In analyzing the geographical peculiarities of Russia proper, its areas of settlement, locations of industrial centers, and lines of communication, Lypa concluded that under condition of a democratic political system and free development of industry and economic ties, territories outside European Russia will begin to break away. The first among them will be the Siberia, which, "is, in fact, a Russian America located next to Russia itself and connected to it and Central Asia by railroad."16 Symptoms of this have been Siberian separatism and the numerous Siberian governments of the Civil War period. Siberian industry has had greater interest in economic lies outside Russia than within it. These trends become all the more apparent in the case of the Far East, whose range of economic interests lies in the Pacific zone: export of raw materials to the US, Japan, Australia, and South-East Asia; import of industrial and agricultural products from those areas are far more profitable than dealings with the rest of Russia. Lypa's conclusion on Russia's future is straightforward — partition. In his opinion, it was only a matter of when it will happen, how, and at the price of how many lives. A democratic future is possible for Russia only if it does not waste all the vital forces of the nation in trying to prolong the subjugation of others.

An analogous idea was expressed in Stepan Rudnytsky's **/89/** *Why We Want an Independent Ukraine:* "In a renovated democratic Russia, the Great Russian nature will certainly continue the foreign policy of tsarist Russia. This is why Ukrainians should, even if they fail to win complete independence, exert utmost vigilance never again to fall into Muscovite servitude, already no longer tsarist but progressive. If not the independence, then autonomy of Ukraine must be put forward so forcefully and defended so skillfully against any encroachment by Moscow centralists that Ukraine might profit from its advantageous geographical position rather than lose by it."17

*3. Plans for the Future*

Both the specifics of Ukraine's history and its prospects arc determined to a very great extent by the nature of the territory inhabited by Ukrainians: "The Ukrainian land appears as a distinct geographical unity independent of and separate from the neighboring lands of Moldova, Hungary, Poland, Belarus, and Muscovy. It rests on the Black Sea, the Carpathians and the Caucasus in the south, and Polissian marshes and forests in the north. While Ukraine does not have reliable natural borders in the west, southeast and east, as a littoral country north of the Black Sea it has important features of integrity... The Ukrainian people has a separate land of its own which is a distinct and single geographical unity."18 The advantage of this integrity, which under normal conditions could be an important prerequisite for the normal development of a state, was negated by another geographical feature of the Ukrainian territory: its lack in important directions of natural borders. In this connection "political borders have always had an unstable and incomplete character."19

Ukraine's lack of natural borders obstructed its gaining political independence. Its achieving independence creates preconditions for the accomplishment of its historic mission. Its geographical position and the specifics of its history **/90/** make plain the essence of this mission. After Russia, Ukraine has the second largest territory in Europe, with tremendous industrial potential, human resources, fertile soil, and moderate climate. "The Ukrainian people belongs to the Western, European, or, in short, the proper European domain not only due to its historical ties which for many centuries connected Ukraine's life with that of the Western world and also due to the nature of its national character."20 This is why it must first of all renew its traditional ties with European nations and above all with Germany.21

Contacts with Europe can help Ukraine overcome its technological gap and revive its cultural relationships, thus ensuring its national security. This was the point of departure for Hrushevsky, who argued Ukraine's need to orient itself toward the West and end its orientation toward Moscow.

Clearly, this idea could only be realized by an independent Ukraine. For example, in 1927 A. Syniavsky described Ukraine's geographical position within the Soviet Union as follows: "Ukraine is also a bridge between the eastern part of the Union, Asia, and Western Europe. Ukraine is a projection into the West, into the hostile environment of Western Europe."22

Contrary to Hrushevsky's ideas about orientation to the West, Ukrainian politician and monarchist Vyacheslav Lypynsky (1882-1931) maintained in the mid-1920s that "at present no one in Europe wants a strong and great Ukrainian State. On the contrary, there are many forces which are in fact interested in there being no Ukraine or that it be as weak as possible. This is why in restoring our traditions of nation, statehood, and Hetmanate we must not pin our hopes on receiving help because of our. orientation but, on the contrary, we should anticipate that various outside forces will hinder us in this as much as possible."23 Our historical experience shows that even if Ukraine should find some allies, they rather quickly become apprehensive of prospects of a strong Ukraine and begin to ruin with one **/91/**hand what the other hand helped to build. This was the case in the Khmelnytsky period and the fratricidal Ruin that succeeded it, when Ukrainian Hetmans alternatively sought outside support from Warsaw, Istanbul, Bakhchisaray, and Moscow, and all these "helpers" merely contributed to the ruin of our country. During the national liberation struggle of 1917-1920, we again paid too a high price for support from the Germans, Austrians, and Pilsudski's Poland. This is what convinced Lypynsky that outside support would, at best, help Ukraine become a buffer state between Europe and Russia.

Hrushevsky, being aware of the inadequacies of a onesided Western orientation noted that "while our nationality, the spirit of our people, draws us to the West, our country turns its energies and our efforts to the East and the South, to the domain of our sea, our communication center where our past leads us and where all our roads, as if they had been built by us, should lead us, and we do not embrace it as our goal, but, on the contrary, we struggle against this natural orientation of our economic and cultural life."24 In the south and the east lie countries which can supply Ukraine with raw materials for industry and become markets for goods whose quality renders them unsuitable for Western export. Extensive ties with Turkey, the Near East, and Central Asia along with the Mediterranean must create the external conditions for our country's economic stability.

*4. Ukraine's Eastern Vector*

In his studies of Ukrainian economy, Syniavsky also paid special attention to the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean countries. In his opinion, Ukraine is the segment of mankind and of the world's territory which can best form an integrated complex with nations of the Middle East on the basis of the most economically advantageous division of labor and exchange of products: "...The natural and geographic conditions and different levels of economic develop-**/92/**merit as well as a certain differentiation of the Middle East states and Ukraine constitute a firm basis for expanding trade relations. Their analysis and detailed evaluation should be one of the most urgent problems of our postrcvolutionary era."25 To Syniavsky's mind, while for Western countries Ukraine will long remain a supplier of raw materials and semi-finished industrial goods, for countries of the Middle East it could be a supplier of finished industrial products, agricultural produce, machinery, and equipment.

Ukraine's Black Sea orientation is, however, determined not only by economic but also geographical-political factors: "... The river system... along with the fact that the Black Sea, this only natural border of Ukraine, force our fatherland, with the finality of determinism, to seek its political geographical mainstay on the Black Sea coast: Polish and Muscovite political-geographical threats will demand that Ukraine shift its center of gravity to the Black Sea, rest permanently and firmly on its coastline, and seek relations and alliances with the powerful nations which dominate and have interests in Asia Minor," Rudnytsky wrote.26

The idea of Black Sea cooperation, so attractive to contemporary political figures, was popular with Ukrainian intellectuals even in the first half of our century. It was unequivocally embraced by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Stepan Rudnytsky, and Yuri Lypa. Assuming that in the future an independent Ukrainian state would become the greatest power in the Black Sea region, these politicians emphasized that Ukraine should not strive for domination over other Black Sea states either politically or economically.

A special place in future Black Sea cooperation belongs to the Crimea which is the key to naval communications in the Black Sea. He who controls the Crimea will control Ukraine's access to the sea and the oceans beyond. Rudnytsky once noted regarding Ukraine's Crimean policy in the time of the Ukrainian People's Republic: "The loss of the Crimea, which even then (in 1917) had a sizable Ukrainian majority, immediately doomed Ukrainian statehood. For **/93/** there can be no independent Ukraine without the Crimea: the latter breaks down the main support and mainstay of the former — the Black Sea coast."27 Rudnytsky did not limit the problem of Ukraine's strategic partners to countries of the Black Sea region and Western Europe. In his opinion, various other nations are natural allies of Ukraine. He considered a possibility of establishing a Baltic-Pontic Federation, with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine as members. Unlike today's proponents of the idea of a Baltic-Black Sea alliance, however, Rudnytsky excluded Poland from prospective membership in such a federation, arguing that "...Poland is a Central European country whose natural ties lie in Central Europe."28

Ukraine's foreign relations need not be directed against third countries, provided the latter do not threaten our nation. However, the Ukrainian "state is compelled by its position and basic idea to become a front-line against Russia and to cling as closely as possible to its single safe border, the Black Sea. Ukraine need only safeguard its independence against Russia in order to simultaneously defend the Mediterranean and Asia Minor against Russian expansionist encroachments.29

One of the founders of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine O. Zhuk published in the weekly *Deutsche Politik* (May 1918) an article entitled "What State Relations Should Ukraine Develop?"

According to him, in view of its great territory, population, and natural resources Ukraine is enough strong to live its own separate life and defend its borders. However, as its nation-making progresses, Ukraine will seek external relationships in order to have be able to exchange for its population and resources. Ukraine cannot achieve this through relations either with Poland or Lithuania, whatever form of statehood they could assume, for the two states incline and arc obliged to gravitate toward the North Sea, which Ukraine is not interested in and would clash with interests of many countries of the region. **/94/**

Ukraine also cannot develop relations with Moscow for political or economic reasons. Moscow's treachery and hard national oppression are still too fresh in the memory of the Ukrainian people to agree to such a relationship.

This is why Ukraine has to direct its attention eastward where new state formations arise. They include the Don and Kuban territories with adjacent regions, Tersk, Astrakhan, Orenburg, the Urals and Stavropol. Three districts of the Don territory — Taganrog, Rostov and Novocherkassk — were largely populated by ethnic Ukrainians. A narrow strip of land near the Don River mouth connects the Ukrainian population with the Near Caucasus, inhabited mainly by Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks, especially on the Black Sea coast, in Stavropol and, partly, Tersk provinces.

Ukraine should enter into close contact with these state formations in order to obtain access to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, first of all to Ural, Akmolinsk, Turgai, Semipalatinsk, Tomsk, Yeniseysk and Transcaspian regions and Turkestan, where several million Ukrainian settlers made their home.

Such a chain, in which Ukraine would be the main link, could be very advantageous. It would cut Moscow off from the Caucasus, open the way to Caucasian seaports, and establish close contacts with the Black Sea states.30

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For the above Ukrainian geopoliticians, the answer to the question of the importance of Ukraine in the present and future destiny of the world was quite clear: "Ukraine's political significance for the world lies in the fact that, due to its great and outstretched territory, it must block Russia's expansion toward the Adriatic and the Aegean Seas, Asia Minor and Egypt, and render impossible its expansion toward India."31 "The Ukrainian lands arc not in any case a God-forsaken peripheral area. Given its geopolitical position and trade opportunities, it is one of the most important parts of the world. In this respect, Ukraine's importance is sure to increase at present."32

1 S. Rudnytsky, *The Ukrainian Cause against the Background of Political Geography* (Berlin, 1923: in Ukrainian), pp. 3-4.

2 Y. Okhrymovych, *The Development of Ukrainian National Political Thought* (New York, 1968: in Ukrainian), p. 14.

3 M.P. Drahomanov, *Letters to Dnipro Ukraine. Literary and Political Works,* (Kyiv, 1970: in Ukrainian), I, p. 144.

4 *Ibid., p.* 446.

5 A. Synyavsky, "Soviet Ukraine and the Middle East in the Light of Geopolitics," A. Synyavsky, *Selected Works* (Kyiv, 1993: in Ukrainian), p. 192.

6 Y. Lypa, *The Vocation of Ukraine* (New York, 1953: in Ukrainian), p. 57.

7 *Ibid., p.* 58.

8 *Ibid, p. 286.*

9 L. Yurkevych, *What Kind of Ukraine Is This?* (Kamyanets-Podilsky, 1919: in Ukrainian), p. 7.

10 S. Rudnytsky, *op. cit.,* p. 50.

11 M. Hrushevsky, *On the Threshold of a New Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1991: in Ukrainian), p. 14.

12 *Ibid., p.* 15.

13 *Ibid, p.* 16.

14 S. Rudnytsky, *op. cit., p.* 72.

15 Y. Lypa, *The Partition of Russia* (New York, 1954: in Ukrainian), p.13.

16 *Ibid, p.* 88.

17 S. Rudnytsky, *Why Do We Want an Independent Ukraine?* (Lviv, 1994: in Ukrainian), p. 81.

18 *Ibid.,* pp. 78-79.

19 S. Rudnytsky, *The Ukrainian Cause...,* p. 53.

20 M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit., p.* 19.

21 *Ibid.,* p.21.

22 A. Synyavsky, *op. cit., p.* 194.

23 V. Lypynsky, *Letters to Brother Farmers* (Vienna, 1926: in Ukrainian), p. 98.

24 M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit., p.* 23.

25 A. Synyavsky, *op. cit., p.* 1%.

26 S. Rudnytsky, *The Ukrainian Cause..., p.* 72.

27 S. Rudnytsky, *Why Do We Want..., p.* 294.

28 S. Rudnytsky, *The Ukrainian Cause...,* p. 138.

29 *Ibid., p.* 205.

30 *Foreign Press Review,* No 12, 1918, May 24, pp. 1-2 (in Ukrainian).

31 S. Rudnytsky, *Why Do We Want..., p.* 294.

32 Y. Lypa, *The Vocation of Ukraine* (New York, 1953: in Ukrainian), p. 118.

The Idea of Statehood in the Sociopolitical Thought, 1940-1990

## *Anatoly RUSNACHENKO* (§§1-3), *Volodymyr KOVTUN* (§4), *Oleh BILYI* (§5, co-author), *Oleksandr DERGACHOV* (§5, co-author)

*1. Thought About Statehood in the Underground*

Under the conditions of Soviet totalitarianism, the idea of Ukrainian statehood took hold primarily as an idea of ruining neo-imperial structures. It manifested itself as a specific shade of uncensored sociopolitical thought by those who offered resistance to the regime. One could say that the visions of a future independent Ukrainian state, expounded in underground publications, took on apophatic overtones, and prospects for a future nation-making appeared mainly schematic and fraught with classical features of Utopian thinking.

Writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych became a sort of a spiritual inspiration to later censored publications. Several generations of dissidents were in fact brought up by his works "Death" and "With the Ukrainian Land" written in the 1920s, which became a particular guide and reference point for patriotically-minded fellow-citizens. Communicating and corresponding with Antonenko-Davydovych wielded great influence on the forming of world view of many outstanding representatives of the dissident movement in Ukraine.

The range of problems with which the Ukrainian political thought of the 1960-1980s and the present times has dealt originates in 1940s. In 1943, the Third Assembly of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) adopted **/96/** a program of sociocconomic and political transformations for a future Ukraine.1 Ideas of the program found their reflection in the underground publicistic works of the late 1940s-early 1950s.

The authors of those works took ideological positions more tolerant than many of those of later decades. To take an example, Yosyp Hornovy (Diakiv; wrote that the OUN granted all its members freedom to profess either philosophical idealism or materialism.2 All-round development of the Ukrainian nation in an independent unified Ukrainian state, creation of a truly national system of rule and harmonization of relations between free and absolutely equal states of all the peoples — these fundamental guiding lines of Ukrainian nationalism — do not depend, in Hornovy's opinion, on whether one recognizes centrality and priority of spirit or matter.3 This idea is also characteristic of political foundations of the then publicistic works. Their fundamental idea was one of nation (and through it, the concept of an independent Ukraine), illustrated, for example by Petro Poltava's work, "The Idea of an Independent Ukraine and the Major Trend of Political Development of Today's World." Using extensive material, the author analyzed the emergence of political nations, affirmation of the notion as well as interrelation of the idea of the national with two other factors of historical process, beginning in the nineteenth century: the idea of a constitutional parliamentary state and emergence of new social strata, the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which confronted each other. Analyzing these ideas and social forces on the basis of numerous historical facts, Poltava concluded, "The idea of nation is of dominant significance among all other factors influencing the course of history. It is the greatest force in the historical process, and, on confronting it, all other forces directed against it lose and surrender. This is why it determines also the major trend of development of historical process."4 Poltava believed that during World War I the idea of national self-determination found its expression in Wilson's **/97/** Fourteen Points, that the UN Charter marked a retreat from it, but that "the major trend of political development of the present-day world is a trend of creating national states for all peoples."5

The struggle for a Ukrainian state took place against the background of confrontation with two totalitarian regimes, and publicists wrote much about it, mainly on the basis of totalitarianism in the USSR, but in comparison with Germany. Best known are the articles "The Vampire of Fascism" by Yaroslav Starukh (Yarlan), "The Ideological and Political Guise of the Bolsheviks" by R. Duma, and "The USSR: a Land of the Most Merciless Oppression and Abuse of Workers" by Y. Hornovy. The authors were wellinformed about the Soviet history and realities, and they pointed to the identical nature of Bolshevism and fascism in their numerous manifestations. They saw Moscow's Bolshevism was a system of complete totalitarianism and state centralism, never before seen in such an absolute form. As is the case with any kind of totalitarianism, it was characterized by total terror.6

D. Shakhai (Yosyp Pozycheniuk) defined Soviet society as state capitalism with modernized serfdom and a totalitarian apparatus of exploitation, where the class of exploiters (Communist Party functionaries) ruled over the classless people. He equated the definition of this system of rule with that of state socialism.7 Then, he asked, how could this enemy of the Ukrainian people be defeated? What force could overcome this regime? What allies should be sought in this struggle? Those were the most burning questions of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the 1940s. Shakhai's work, "Tactics Regarding the Russian People," gave a rather original answer, foreshadowing certain later similar publications. He argued that in its struggle for independence the Ukrainian people should rely primarily on themselves. Historical experience shows that great powers repeatedly ignored the Ukrainian problem, and there was no point in believing that now they would change their ways. The **/98/** Ukrainian liberation movement itself had to clearly define its position in the struggle. The totalitarian imperial regime existing in the USSR cannot be defeated by the struggle of only one nation. It would fall due to its internal contradictions, as had prerevolutionary Russian and other empires.

Shakhai argued that the system, born primarily in the depths of the Russian people, but alien and hostile to them, would fall when Russians themselves fought it. Only then could the Russian movement become an ally of the Ukrainian liberation movement. And for this reason the latter had to clearly declare that it was fighting not against the Russian people (the work was written in 1943 — *Author),* but against the Bolshevik system and to fill this struggle with the corresponding content. Hence, one had to support by any means any attempt of democratization in the USSR, for it would objectively serve the cause of Ukrainianism. Thus, Shakhai argued that the Russian people should be urged to a sociopolitical revolution,8 which should be supported in every way by the Ukrainian movement. During such a revolution the Ukrainian and Russian movements should be allies. Shakhai also believed that it was absolutely necessary to take advantage of another contradiction within Bolshevism, the impossibility of reconciling irreconcilable internationalism with irreconcilable Russian nationalism.9 This contradiction gave rise to the idea of an absolutely expedient consolidation of the peoples, including the Russian one, subjugated by Bolsheviks, in the struggle against the Soviet totalitarian regime to win real, rather than only stated, sovereignty and equality of the peoples of the USSR. In fact, Shakhai suggested to conduct a tactical struggle for filling with real content the rights proclaimed in Soviet legislation for the country's peoples and social strata within the framework of the dominant ideology. The USSR, as a prison of the peoples, Shakhai argued, had to be utterly destroyed.

The Ukrainian movement went through the stage of the armed struggle in the underground and, later, through that **/99/** of simply the underground. It would be illusory to pin hopes on some other factors of liberation, on assistance of other forces, even in the case of World War III, without an experienced and adequately built Ukrainian organization, P. Poltava wrote.10

Such views marked a rather substantial evolution of a part of the participants of the then Ukrainian movement. One can also see that previous nationalist concepts were revised to some extent. This "revisionism" was an outcome of its clash with realities in Soviet Ukraine and ideological and social policies of the communist regime. One should agree with Ivan L. Rudnytsky that this evolution of outstanding underground publicists was not yet an evolution of the whole Bandera wing of the OUN or the Ukrainian movement as a whole,11 but the trend of social thought was rather evident, a classless society could be thought of only as a result of a victorious armed struggle, for experience showed that evolution could hardly be expected to such a result.

Attempts at developing the above ideas of the OUN can be found in the beginning of a new stage of the liberation struggle of the twentieth century in Ukraine — that of transitory underground groups. Nearly all these groups were of nationalist orientation. From a few individual program foundations (which survived and are available for researchers) of these groups, well-known is that of the *Obyednannya* (Association) group, which operated in the late 1950s in the Komi ASSR of Russia and Ukraine.12

One of the documents of the group, analyzing the 40 year long history of Bolshevism in the USSR, noted that for Ukraine it was a "history of unimaginable political cynicism, when colonialism is referred to as communism."13 The same document pointed to serious degradation of the extant system, called the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary a failure, and exposed Stalin's cult of personality and the feuds in his entourage for power. Proclaiming itself a successor to the OUN, the group tried to act in accordance with the new **/100/** domestic and international situation. A new element in the program is, first of all, the struggle against the regime "by means of propaganda and exposition methods, and only in the case of extreme emergency by individual terrorist acts."14 In its struggle, the Association group intended to rely primarily on youth. Thus it hoped to influence young people through legal sports organizations, which could later be militarized. Another new element was the fact that the group planned to found workers associations and initiate mass strikes to better people's lives.

*2. Ideas of the Sixties Generation*

Politically quite interesting is the Ukrainian National Front (UNF) organization founded in 1964 by Dmytro Kvetsko and Zinovy Krasivsky. Members of the UNF argued that economic exploitation and political oppression of the USSR's peoples was compounded by their being deprived of their own ethnic cultures and inculcated with a second-rate Russian provincial culture with certain elements of their own.15 For them the ideological apparatus of power at all levels remained an essential part of a mechanism of oppression. Only after the emergence of an independent Ukraine one can say that other peoples of Eastern Europe could become independent of Moscow.

They believed the Russian communist system hinged on three elements: etatism, tyranny, and dictatorship of the Communist Party. Khrushchev's policies had cracked the foundations of the Soviet regime and also compromised and undermined the communist world.

The totalitarian regime in Ukraine should be replaced with "people's socialism", based on the principles of independence, power of the people, prosperity, social justice, and freedom.16 It can be seen from the presented description of this socialism that it is a rather original vision of a new society, something of the kind of the then social-democratic world in the traditions of the evolved OUN. **/101/**

Politically, the UNF spoke for "breaking Ukraine away from Russia and creating an independent Ukrainian state within its ethnographic borders, including the lands occupied by the colonizers" (note that the latter demand disappears from program statements in the Ukrainian *samvydav* (Russian, *samizdat,* "self-publishing" — *Eds.)* beginning in the late 1960s — *Author*). Ukraine's separation was to be followed by replacement of the colonial administration with a new national power in the person of true peoples' representatives, freely elected by the people, and the dissolution of the party and propaganda organizations. Further points of the program are very specific. The program itself and other documents of the UNF contained detailed suggestions for solving cultural-ethnic problems and carefully elaborated socioeconomic proposals: complete gasification of towns and villages, free choice of place of residence and profession, free trade unions, solution of housing problems, higher education, *etc.* Land was to remain state property, with the collective farms liquidated.

In his "50 Years of the Soviet Power in Ukraine" Kuzma Dasiv gave a true picture of Ukraine's history for those years. That power brought hunger, terror, and Russification to Ukraine.17 Russian chauvinism is an enemy of the Ukrainian people — it buried two attempts of the struggle for Ukrainian statehood in the 1920s and 1940s-1950s.

Valentyn Moroz's essays stand out vividly among publicistic works of the 1960s. He was the first to describe the KGB system, its mechanisms of intimidation and harassment in his "A Report from the Bcria Reserve." Moroz gave an account (quite in the vein of Dmytro Dontsov, although he did not read his works) of the significance and role of morale and will-power in a movement of resistance to power. When a new generation arose, which had rid of or knew no fear of the system, it turned out that the authorities had nothing similarly strong in their ideology to confront dissidents but crude force. In his essay "In the Snows" Moroz **/102/** pointed to two trends in the Ukrainian national movement which differed from each other in degree of non-conformism to circumstances and devotion to one's ideals.18 These criteria, seemingly from the realm of philosophy or ethics rather than politics, were, in that situation, one could argue, most important for the functioning of the Ukrainian liberation movement and politically instrumental.

Analyzing Ukrainian reality and making social forecasts, some participants in the national liberation movement used Marxist ideology and methodology. Specifically, Levko Lukyanenko's 1959 draft program of the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants League (UWPL) was based on such principles. The strategic objective of the organization was to break Ukraine away from the USSR by resorting to the right to secede, stipulated by the USSR Constitution, and holding a nation-wide referendum. Lukyanenko regarded Ukraine as a colony within the USSR.19 In his critique of the regime he was more reserved than the nationalists, but at the same time he clearly pointed out that the Communist Party dictatorship reigned supreme in the country and the people was completely bereft of power. Workers were mercilessly exploited, and peasants turned into serfs.

In such a situation, Lukyanenko believed, open agitation for Ukraine's secession from the USSR was impossible, for at the first stage of the struggle for independence attention should be focused on expanding democratic rights and freedoms in the USSR and making the country more democratic. This work would have to be done by members of the group in the underground, combining both legal and clandestine forms.

At the same time, the UWPL draft program was not devoid of internal contradictions or *non-sequiturs.* For instance, he defined the struggle waged in Ukraine in the 1940s-1950s as a national liberation movement, but spoke against nationalism, although that movement had been clearly nationalist. Following OUN publicists, Lukyanenko argued that there were no antagonistic classes in Ukrainian **/103/** society, for it was allegedly composed of the Communist Party and bureaucratic *nomenklatura* and the workers of many nations. In other words, the ruling class was again excluded from Ukrainian society and its future fate, remained unclear. A similar approach to that class was present in all program documents of that period, possibly, for tactical reasons.

The UWPL draft program came very close to the ideas earlier expressed by Shakhai, and this seems to have reflected Lukyanenko's real convictions rather than tactical considerations. The project's author did not doubt, however, any of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, although in doing so he spoke for a revolutionary Marxism different from Leninist practices in the USSR.

The emergence of that Marxist trend was quite logical: most participants of the national movement were not familiar with anything other than Marxist ideology and had to move in that direction from nationalist communism, which was objectively represented by the trend, to its negation, which, in the long run, actually did happen. In fact, this was revision of Marxism in the specific Ukrainian situation.

A similar position was taken at that time by Ivan Dziuba in his famous *Internationalism or Russification?"20* Dziuba proceeded from the fact that the national and interethnic policies, declared and pursued by the Communist Party, did not conform to major theses of MarxismLeninism on the problems, which led to a critical situation in the development of the peoples, the Ukrainian one in particular. Dziuba's work was a peculiar ideological revision of Marxism-Leninism, for it gave lie to several official conceptions of the national question, specifically, the consistency in the Communist Party policy regarding the national problem, the idea of an imminent future merging of nations in a communist society, the "civilizing" mission of the Russian people with regard to other peoples of the USSR, the voluntary character of territorial "unification" under the aegis of Russia, and the equality of Ukrainians and Russians **/104/** in Ukraine itself.21 Dziuba's book also uncovered a number of gray areas in Ukrainian history, hitherto unknown to the Ukrainian reader of that generation.

There were various other works before and after Dziuba, published in the Ukrainian *samvydav,* where authors' approaches to history and politics could be identified with the Marxist one, although they spoke for Ukrainian independence.

Yuri Badzio's work "The Right to Live," took a position of democratic socialism, far removed from Marxism. Surveying a number of works on Ukrainian history, the author harshly criticized the methodological principles on which Russian and, later, Soviet historiography considered many issues in the history of Ukraine, which was denied any self-sustained independent historical process.22 Criticizing the theory of "the merging of nations," Badzio considered it Lenin's fabrication, who had, in fact, legitimized the assimilation of nations. Also underlying the theory was Russian great-power chauvinism.23 Writing on the future of the country, the author argued for ideological, cultural, and political pluralism. The working class and peasantry should have their class representation in bodies of power and there should be a multiparty system.

One cannot but note a tragic figure of Valery Marchenko, who lost his life in a Gulag camp in 1984. He saw the human rights movement through the prism of the people's religious self-purification and the reawakening in it of the feeling of personal dignity and willingness to abide by God's Commandments. One letter which he sent to his relatives 1980 reads: "Who but we, brought up from early childhood on materialism and atheism, should know why the ideas of Christ, Faith and Resurrection, sacred to 600 million Christians, are regarded in this country at best as some sort of elements of a legend. For, indeed, we have never heard servants of God, only the opposite side... The Realm of Spirit is still beyond our knowledge as something mysterious and only capable of evoking negative emotions in diehard agnostic skeptics. But for us it is a fertile field which will certainly give fruit, given only inspired devotion and self-denial... I want to reiterate: under any difficult situation you will have a feeling of peace and tranquillity once you sincerely pray to God."24 **/105/**

*3. Universal Human Values in the Uncensored Thought*

The leading place was occupied in the Ukrainian uncensored sociopolitical thought in that period by a trend that formed from rather different representatives, who gravitated toward universal human values of democracy and freedom. But, to admit, when analyzing most works of that trend, one should bear in mind that they were written for wide dissemination (applications, statements, complaints, *etc.).* Their authors were not (quite) familiar with theoretical studies in nationalism or, for tactical considerations, did not want to make their knowledge public, while a commonplace revision of Marxism seemed to them inadequate for the Ukrainian independent political movement.

Yevhen Proniuk's article "The State and Tasks of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement" (1965) was the first known document in that vein. The article gives a brief analysis of the situation in the USSR, discusses the future of Ukrainians as a nation, and, importantly, describes in great detail in what ways the tasks set can be fulfilled. Proniuk regarded the USSR as "a state of totalitarian oligarchy," socially an instrument of domination by the Communist Party ruling caste, whose core is composed of a large group of people employed in the sphere of government and management. The economic basis of this caste is the state ownership of the instruments and means of production.25

What, then, did the author propose for the Ukrainian national movement? Establishment of democracy and absolute sovereignty of Ukraine. In a sovereign Ukraine, state ownership and property were to be liquidated, supplanted by socialization of the means of production and work. (Though, it is not quite clear from the article what that meant). Democratic political freedoms and even self-government of production associations were to be introduced.

For the nearest future, the author thought it reasonable to demand the democratization of the USSR.26 Only then **/106/** could the Ukrainian liberation movement develop. Democratization would make it possible to solve all further tasks of the movement: doing away with the old state mechanism, building a new one, removing the ruling caste from power, and Ukrainizing the social, scientific, and political spheres.

Similar ideas were expressed in Anton Koval's (Vasyl Lisovy) "Open Letter to the Deputies to Soviets in the Ukrainian SSR)." He suggested actually carrying out the norms of the effective Constitutions of the USSR and Ukraine — first of all, to transform Soviets into bodies of real power and self-government, removing the Communist party from domination over them.27 In the economic sphere, he envisaged radical economic reform (transferring all enterprises located on Ukrainian territory to Ukrainian SSR jurisdiction), pay rises for all workers, and cutting the privileges of the Communist Party *nomenklatura.* The author of the letter also suggested adopting a new republic Constitution, which would definitely stipulate the state's sovereignty and confine Ukraine's relations with other republics of the USSR to those regulated by bilateral treaties and agreements. The new Constitution was also to guarantee a multiparty system, the republic's own Ministry of Defense, give peasants freedom of movement and the right to freely quit their collective farm job, end censorship and domicile registration, release all political prisoners, dissolve the KGB, *etc.* In the field of culture, Lisovy's proposals echoed those of the UNF, with special attention attached to raising the national awareness of Ukrainians.28

Lisovy was also the author of another *samvydav* publication — "An Open Letter to Members of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the USSR and Ukraine" written in 1972.29 Along with protests of the 1972 wave of arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals, it dealt with the various reasons for the dissidence and dissatisfaction in the country. He pointed to several factors and manifestations of a deep systemic crisis gripping Soviet society. On the national question, Lisovy argued that prospects of relations be-**/107/**tween the USSR peoples were officially interpreted in the spirit of flagrant genocide.30

Reprisals in the early 1970s forced the dissidents to review the tactics and certain ideas of their movement. Analyzing factors of emergence of the democratic movement of the sixties generation as a social phenomenon, Vasyl Ovsiyenko tracked down, in an unpublished paper, its evolution from its very origin. One of his conclusions was that in future life itself would demand the forming of an organized movement or even to go underground 31. The above ideas were developed primarily on the pages of the *samvydav Ukransky Visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald) edited by Vyacheslav Chornovil.

Ivan Hel's "Aspects of Culture" was another important historical document of uncensored sociopolitical thought. It contained both a theoretical analysis of the totalitarian system's origins and statements and appeals by its opponents — dissidents and participants in the national resistance movement. The author analyzed in detail the ways and means of ideological pressure on the subjugated peoples of the empire by means of science, education, and culture. He argued that the totalitarian regime was formed in the USSR largely due to Western appeasement, since new mechanisms of ethnocide as Moscow's major strategy were elaborated with the connivance of the Western world.32 Hel criticized the West for intentionally hushing up, over a rather long period of time, the empire's interethnic problems and said that only now was the West beginning to realize the real danger of the Soviet system.

From the mid-1970s the Ukrainian opposition movement shifted its emphasis to the protection of human rights, which was due to adoption of the Basket III human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords on Security and Cooperation in Europe and also to the regime's mounting reprisals against its critics. In 1976 well known writers and political prisoners Mykola Rudenko, Oksana Meshko, Oles Berdnyk, Levko Lukyanenko, Ivan Kandyba, Oleksiy Tykhy, **/108/** *et. al.* founded the Ukrainian Community Group to Foster the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group was concerned not only with human rights protection; it tried to combine, in the interests of resistance to the regime, the struggle of Ukrainians as a nation with the struggle of other nations and other forms of resistance. In the article "Our Tasks" the human rights movement of the late 1970s was, in fact, identified with the national liberation movement.33

Helsinki Group program documents were written by various people at various times, and at first seem rather vague. They failed to introduce something radically new to the social thought, but only confirmed the idea of "unity of universal human values and national rights of Ukrainian citizens." The group's orientation evolved from general democratic legal objectives, among which protection of national rights was mentioned in rather moderate terms, to renunciation of the totalitarian system and realization of top priority tasks of the Ukrainian liberation movement. For example, the group's 'Memorandum No. 1" argued that in Ukraine genocide had continued against the people since Stalin's time.34

In 1978-1979, documents of the Group, prepared both in Ukraine and Gulag camps, included, alongside with analyses of Ukrainian reality, conclusions on the necessity for Ukraine to secede from the USSR as an empire. "The Appeal of the Ukrainian National Liberation Movement for Ukraine's Independence" and certain other documents emphasized the Ukrainian movement's great importance in the destruction of the modern Russian empire,35 but, unfortunately, the ways and means by which it might do so remained undefined.

Vasyl Stus believed that one of the ways of breaking Ukraine away from the USSR could be a referendum initiated by the public, first of all by (former) political prisoners, and assisted and monitored by the UN and foreign governments.36 But such appeals for a referendum were more of a moral-propaganda nature. Interesting enough, similar docu-**/109/**ments first labeled the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic an occupation regime.

The ideas of the Ukrainian Helsinki watch group were developed in "The Declaration of Principles" of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, which succeeded the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1987. This Declaration may have been the last semi-clandestine document, of the Ukrainian liberation thought. Even given its transitory character, of which the authors were fully aware, the document is significant in that its first paragraph was identical with all the closing paragraphs of Helsinki Group documents of the late 1970 — early 1980s: "...the restoration of Ukrainian statehood, which today exists only on paper...".37

Thus, Ukrainian uncensored sociopolitical thought, represented here largely by program statements, existed and developed for nearly half a century and constituted an integral part of the Ukrainian national liberation movement of those times.

It is precisely this that can explain the fact that there were practically no substantial and voluminous works in sociopolitical problems of the USSR and Ukraine. In other words, Ukrainian political ideas were, as a matter of fact, subject to the current tasks of the movement or its immediate prospects. This determined a practical nature of such works and a certain narrowness in tackling social problems. After all, the fact that the materials were disseminated in the underground or semi-underground situation was not conducive to extended theorizing. At the same time, certain purely theoretical problems were simply beyond the scope of *samvydav.* Because of different conditions, the authors had sometimes to make insights already made public by their predecessors. Still, the development of the uncensored sociopolitical thought took place under the influence of Soviet reality and the continuity of the national movement in its various forms.

The fundamental problems of Ukrainianism, as it has been shown, were earlier developed by publicists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian **/110/** Insurgent Army. Their analyses of the totalitarian regime and strategic objectives of the Ukrainian movement, the choice of its allies and methods of dismantling the empire remain, on the whole, true for further generations of participants in the Ukrainian movement and its ideologists. These fundamental positions were later developed and made more precise. The invariability of some principal theses was determined by immutability of the historical epoch as a whole, in which the social thought evolved. However, both in theory and practice hopes for Western assistance in solving Ukrainian problems had to be given up. The unity of Ukrainian and universal human values became ever more evident, comprehensive criticism of the Soviet regime and its ideology mounted, and the understanding of the need for a mass movement grew. Another new element was that practically all spokespersons of the social thought were preoccupied with the ideas of the rule of law and human rights and freedoms.38 Taking into account the unawareness of or insufficient familiarity of many theoreticians with works of the 1940s, one should also regard as evidence of development the fact that the Ukrainian uncensored thought discarded as extremes both the pre-war postulates of nationalism and Marxism-Leninism.

The Ukrainian sociopolitical" thought evolved toward revision of both nationalism and Marxism. For practically all the underground publicistic works of the 1940s-1950s went beyond the boundary of well-established theories and practices of Dontsov's classic Ukrainian integral nationalism. The 1960s and 1970s also saw a certain measure of development of the nationalist idea. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that a considerable segment of the moderate or democratic trend of the movement and social thought is likewise a successor to the ideas of publicistic works of the OUN underground and the Third OUN (Banderite) Assembly. Some authors were rather close in their views to nationalism, while the authors of the best works in that vein directly called participants of the national liberation struggle, and hence themselves, nationalists. **/111/**

In Ukrainian social thought of the 1940s-1980s, prospects for socioeconomic and, in part, political development of present-day Ukraine were not well thought out. Among other things, this can be accounted for by the fact that drastic changes occurred far sooner than participants of the movement and its theoreticians themselves could expect, that a great many of newly minted ideas made their entrance on the arena of social thought or were imposed by various political forces in Ukraine and beyond its borders.

*4. Totalitarian Institutions Against Ukrainian Informal Groups*

Both in the previous period and during perestroika, well up to the military and Communist Party putsch of August 1991, Ukraine was an obedient part of the former totalitarian USSR, in fact, one of its bulwarks.

Yet, early in 1988 the first informal public associations made their appearance there. In various forms they raised questions concerning the spiritual and national revival of Ukraine; specifically, they put forward demands to revive the Ukrainian language, to rehabilitate national symbols, to introduce the institution of republican citizenship, to legalize prohibited Churches — the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church — and to declare the republic economically and politically overeign. According to the statistical data of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, based on data obtained by KGB agents, as early as March 1989 in Ukraine there were about 60,000 members of informal associations or groups who held 1200 rallies and meetings in which 13,000,000 people took part.

A complete and detailed history of informal patriotic organizations, which appeared during *perestroika* can undoubtedly be found now only in the KGB archives. Special secret services carefully documented the development of Ukrainian informal patriotic organizations and each public **/112/** action conducted by them, for they had a well-organized network of secret agents in what they called "self-organized associations and groups of negative orientation."

The documents recently made public (see publications in the *Narodna Hazeta's* first issues of 1994) testify to the fact that Agency 3 of the Ukrainian KGB "in conjunction with regional KGB boards have worked out. and are carrying out measures to ensure the monitoring for the processes taking place in these (national liberation — *Author)* groupings and to register anti-social activities of extremists. Special groups have been formed in Agency 3: one (operative-investigative) for work at the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the other for counterintelligcnce work in other informal associations and groups of anti-social orientation. In regional KGB boards from two to four operation officers are assigned these tasks". The report especially emphasizes the importance of these agents' work and notes in this connection that the KGB had "to get rid" (precisely the word) of unreliable agents and recruit "promising" ones, which supply "absolutely essential operative information", having been specially taught the "abilities and habits of working in the milieu of extremists and nationalists."

"The essence of the work carried out by the KGB bodies" is illustrated in the report by the way the activities of the UHU have been neutralized: the uncovering of "a mechanism of their interaction with foreign subversive centers," registration of "specific illegal acts," along with prevention of "the numerical growth and, eventually, demoralization of the groupings" "The agents' work with a view to disintegrate and compromise the leaders in the eyes of their 'like-minded colleagues'" was considered the most efficient method. It was also noted that precisely due to such measures the KGB had managed to create "among the dissidents an atmosphere of quarrels, mutual reproaches, dislike, and suspicion."

That the KGB and the Communist Party of Ukraine were behind a flood of publications in the newspapers *Pravda Ukrainy, Radianska Ukraina, Robitnycha Gazeta,* **/113/** Kyiv's *Prapor Komunizmu,* and hundreds of provincial Communist Party papers of that period designed to compromise the patriots is now quite obvious. An official document of the period reads: "An important line of work is debunking the nationalist leaders before the public in mass media. In 1989 alone over thirty such articles were published on the basis of KGB materials." The contribution of the Ukrainian TV and the *Radianska Ukraina* was especially noted for that. Those were, as was mentioned, only backbiting against the leaders and all in all "in 1989 materials of KGB agents were used for 280 articles in the republican and local press and 120 radio and TV programs" — in other words, one publication a day. KGB "cadres" reported to Moscow that they recorded on videotapes mass actions of democrats, and that "specially assigned officers and Comsomol volunteer groups took part in those activities in order to act as witnesses of illegal acts of instigators and extremists in courts." Very telling is the following official KGB evidence: "As a result of careful documentation and registration, in 19881989, 74 members of the UHU were arrested for administrative violations and sentenced to 15 days in prison each and a fine from 50 to 1000 rubles... During that period, using documentation and registration of dissidents' actions by the General Procurator's Office and KGB, 28 objects of surveillance were officially warned and 43 were subject to preventive "words to the wise." And further: "More than 800 people were detained and tried for organization and participation in unsanctioncd rallies, disobedience regarding militiamen's demands and other violations of law."

All patriotic informal organizations were under the KGB surveillance. Documentary evidence of this can also be found in something else: the law enforcement structures were directed by top functionaries of the CPU: Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, Yuri Yelchenko, Leonid Kravchuk and lowerlevel *apparatchiks* in regions, districts and towns: "Information on the situation in informal associations of negative orientation, obtained by Ukrainian KGB men, and used for **/114/** working out specific proposals on the localization of their activities is in timely fashion reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In June 1989, the question of increasing political and organizational influence on informal groupings was deliberated by the ideological commission of the Central Committee."

Undoubtedly, all this should be taken into account in an analysis of reasons of real contradictions and differences in opinions in the national democratic movement. This well-known fact — the existence of a great network of provocateurs and informers in every pore of Soviet society — could in itself cause many problems for the movement. All these factors could not but influence, with time, political and ideological wavering and transformations of the leaders of Ukrainian informal associations and the national democratic movement as a whole.39

*5. The National Idea and the "Democratic Platform" in the Communist Party*

Given the oppressive nature of the totalitarian surveillance over society, one realistic way of ruining the communist empire was an opposition within the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) known as the "Democratic Platform." Formally, the opposition can be considered as formed as a result of the establishment of its coordination committees in early 1990 in Kyiv (the Democratic Platform's ideological and organizational center was the Communist Party Committee of Taras Shevchenko University) and in Kharkiv. The sociopolitical program of the Democratic Platform was radical: renunciation of monopoly of a single ideology, resort to the present-day humanitarian thought as the theoretical foundation of the Party, rejection of communism as the party's major objective and of its monopoly of power, prohibition of the party organizations in the state and self-government bodies, internal party democratization, and its transformation into a party of the parliamentary type. Great im-**/115/**portance was attached to an official public admission of the CPSU's responsibility before society for all its wrongdoing.

The initiators of the Democratic Platform regarded the Communist Party's transformation as a method and guarantee of social reform. Naturally, major efforts were focused on the struggle with reactionary forces in the power structures and the dismantling of the administrative command system rather than on the previous methods of social reform.

As for the transformation strategy, typical of the majority in the Democratic Platform in Ukraine was the following approach: first of all democracy; then, on its basis, independence; and creation of a civilized, democratic, law-governed national state. It was clear that, for ail contradictions of the perestroika period, Kyiv received democratizing impulses from Moscow. They were to be made use of to the maximum. The balance of democratic and totalitarian forces in Ukraine was by far less favorable for ruining the totalitarian system than on the Union-wide scale. Gaining independence under the circumstances was risky from the viewpoint of prospects for genuinely reforming society.

Precisely on this were based proposals to transform the CPSU into a Union of Communist parties of the Union Republics and were pinned the hopes for a new Union Treaty. Only somewhat later, at the state of the complete divorce with the Left conservative majority in the Communist Party of Ukraine and the forming of a separate party, could a foreign policy concept emerge oriented toward various forms of political partnership among the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

The Democratic Platform offered a more radical program than simply transforming the Communist Party into a Social Democratic one. The presence of the Democratic Platform counterbalanced, to some extent, the authoritarian forces in the CPSU, which substantially consolidated in 1989-1990 and actively prepared to remove Gorbachev. The Democratic Platform made him turn, in fact, into a peculiar centrist. The inner political struggle and further erosion of **/116/** the Communist Party became the major factors of the empire's disintegration. Likewise, the formal breakdown of the CPSU (and the Communist Party of Ukraine as its integral part) guaranteed, in reality, the party and state *nomenklatura* its dominant positions: they were quite fast in discarding the old ideology and then adapted the ideology of Ukrainian nation-making to their own narrow corporativist needs.

Symptomatically, many functionaries among the Communist ideological and *apparatchiks* activists counterattacked the Democratic Platform from orthodox communist positions, and later, after metamorphoses in official ideology, turned into professional patriots to avoid remaining on the wreckage of the party.

In fact, in the late 1980s the Ukrainian communist *nomenklatura* faced a rather hard choice. On the one hand, the Democratic Platform in the Communist Party of Ukraine was gaining momentum as a reformist opposition to the orthodox party leaders. But, on the other hand, the feelings of a certain segment of the humanitarian intellectuals, primarily those around Ukraine's Writers' Union, had earlier found their organizational implementation in the Rukh (Movement for the Perestroika) which held its founding congress in the fall of 1989. There were many now well-known people among its initiators and founders of this mass public organization: Ivan Drach, Foka Burlachuk, Vyacheslav Briukhovetsky, Myroslav Popovych, Valery Chmyr, Vasyl Yaremenko, Volodymyr Cherniak, Stanislav Telniuk, *etc.* The *nomenklatura,* could not resort to an open suppression of "dissidents" from the Democratic Platform without knowing for certain the outcome of the struggle in Moscow, for to manifest such independence would mean, first, the violation of all Party rules the system of the *apparatchik* hierarchy had to abide by, and, second, a demonstration of friendly feelings toward "nationalism." Similar "prospects" for the regime were also opened up in case of support expressed for the patriotically minded forces of Rukh. All this urged them to maneuver, one evidence of the which was TV debates **/117/** conducted by Leonid Kravchuk, then head of the ideological department of the Central Committee of the CPU, with Rukh leaders. The latter's tactic lay in seizing any and ail possible advantage of Moscow's ideological sanction for criticism of party hardliners which "had grown absolutely bureaucratic" (incidentally, nearly all Rukh leaders were at the time also Communist Party members). And the CPU's tactic was to make use, to the maximum, of the party's statutory limitation on such criticism and to fabricate "the nationalist image" of the Rukh in the minds of their Moscow party bosses. At first this tactic manifested itself in the sanctioning by CPU leaders of publication of the Rukh program in the newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina,* but with the reservation that Rukh's ideologists should make alterations and amendments to the draft program.40 Incidentally, the right to such recommendations was provided for in the Rukh draft program itself, where one of the major theses ran: "Rukh recognizes the guiding role of the Communist Party in society and represents a link between the party's perestroika ideas and the initiative of the broadest popular masses."

But, as it later appeared, the Rukh was for the CPU less a threat than the Democratic Platform. In any case, the organizational and propaganda possibilities of the Ukrainian party *nomenklatura* obviously outweighed Rukh's capabilities, while the Democratic Platform could lay claims on the "most sacred of all things" — the property of the CPU. Under any circumstances, the Rukh was unable to substantially undermine foundations of its existence.

A rather favorable combination of factors evolved for the party *nomenklatura.* This made it possible to compromise and undermine the Democratic Platform by saying that it was a cosmopolitan organization lacking any national ideology, which was planned by Moscow to be transformed into an instrument of its imperial policy and a weapon in the struggle against "nationalist" trends. In that way, the interests of Gorbachev, then scared by the scale of the Baltic and other manifestations of "separatism" were also indirectly served; at **/118/** the same time, Gorbachev's opponents in the Politburo who had already sensed the Democratic Platform threat were also backed up by that to some extent. Eventually, Gorbachev's own wavering made it possible for the conservative orthodox Stalinist wing of the CPSU Central Committee to greatly increase its influence and gave the party bosses in Ukraine freedom of action. Relying on the recommendations of the CPSU Central Committee given in an open letter "For Consolidation on Matters of Principle", the Central Committee of the CPU adopted, on April 13, 1990, a resolution "For Consolidation of the Communist Party of Ukraine and Counteraction to Creation in It of Faction Groupings". In doing so, the Ukrainian party *nomenklatura* finally made its historic choice. Paradoxically, by ruining the communist empire and its backbone — the CPSU — the Democratic Platform paved the way for an ultimate transformation of the pragmatic part of the Ukrainian *nomenklatura* into the so-called "statehood builders."

The present-day type of Ukrainian statehood is determined, not in the last place, by the very priorities chosen by the Communist Party bosses in the time of the Gorbachev reformist projects. It was precisely then that the *Party of Power* began discarding its ideological ballast in order to retain its commanding positions in the economy and politics. And the more so that the real privatization of a great deal of objects, owned by the party, through the agency of authorized persons, mainly from Comsomol structures, had already demonstrated fabulous prospects for the experiment designated to switch the society from the lines of *nomenklatura* socialism onto those of *nomenklatura* capitalism. It was then (in 1988-1990) that the basis of the future strategic "nation-making" alliance of the communist *nomenklatura* with National Democrats, their recent "ideological enemies" was laid down. The act of their fraternizing at the time, when on August 24, 1991, Ukraine's independence was proclaimed, became the crowning point of this.

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Ukraine in Geopolitical Concepts in the First Third of the Twentieth Century

## *Vadym LEVANDOVSKY*

The tendencies of geopolitical orientations reflected in public activities of the ancient Kievan and Galician descendants of Prince Rurik, Ukrainian princes, boyars and nobility, the Cossack hetmans, as well as the traditions of geopolitical thought of later-date political figures and intellectuals — I. Mazepa, P. Orlyk, I. Vyhovskyi, Yu. Nemyrych, M. Dukynskyi, M. Kostomarov, M. Drahomanov, M. Mykhnovskyi, Yu. Lypa, S. Petlyura, D. Dontsov, V. Lypynskyi and many others, including a well-known Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine) proposal on establishing the Baltic-and-Black Sea Alliance — all this must be analysed without delay and taken into account. However, this investigation initiates a different aspect of geopolitical studies. It has as its purpose to observe how the idea of an independent Ukraine correlates with the traditions and theories of West European geopolitical thought and corresponds to the ideas and theoretic structures of a common European home. To solve the problem of geopolitical reorientation, our intellectual, political and scientific elite will need to overcome the relics of "ghetto" mentality1 and work out a Ukraine-centred outlook which will impose a reference system on the project of the country's further development. Bearing in mind that a Ukraine-centred vision of the world does not contrast with a Europe-centred one and in general coincides with it, the creation of the former requires acquaintance with a plethora **/122/** of European geopolitical literature, particularly belonging to the first third of the twentieth century, a period when foundations were laid and basic notions, categories and concepts of this branch of political and philosophical thought were developed.

As the heirs to a long-established tradition, politicians and scientists of the early twentieth century advanced a series of interesting ideas and projects. Whether or not implemented, they produced a considerable effect on social thought, the internal political situation in various countries and the development of international relations.

*1. Rudolf Kjellen: Ukraine in World War I*

In his work "The Political Problems of the World War" written in 1915 the Swedish scholar R. Kjellen analyses the reasons which led to the outbreak of World War I, its probable consequences, and marks that one of the priority goals of the war must be solving the problem of Eastern Europe: the balance of forces and border configuration in the region will be influencing the state of affairs throughout Europe for a long time. A characteristic feature of that war was the emergence on the world history arena of a new force — racism, for Russia entered the war under the banner of an outright racist slogan of ensuring pan-Slavic racial and political unity. The course of events proved, however, that the source of confrontation in Eastern Europe was not a racial rivalry between Germandom and Slavdom, but a collision of the "Asian unlimited will to power"2 and a primitive, "low" (from the ethico-axiological viewpoint) interpretation of race professed by Russia with a much higher principle of culture, development, and civilization. In fact racial identity and solidarity did not play any role in this conflict, for both German, Slavic, and Finno-Ugric peoples of Europe (protecting the high European values) came out in a united front against Russian aggression and proved that "unity of race is a chimera".3 The awareness by the Slavs of their **/123/** European cultural identity and attempts by Russia to "turn pan-Slavism into pan-Russism"4 made the former take part in a joint European anti-Russian struggle, which displayed "bankruptcy of pan-Slavism as a political factor".5 The Swedish scholar suggests that it was the desire to acquire West Ukrainian lands, disguised by pan-Savic propaganda demagogy, that was the reason for Russia entering the war. While the "Ukrainian issue," as a whole, was one of the main contradictions that caused the war; Kjellen suggested "We have... every reason to consider the Ukrainian issue as one of the main motives in the world war."6

Specifying on the map the position of forces drawn into conflict7 by a tortuous line from the mouth of the Vistula in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, Kjellen marks the areas on which Russia encroached "in the name of race."8 The other line, separating Russia from the Baltics, the Belorusian and Ukrainian lands (in fact as far as the Don), delimits Russia's western borders as a line to be set "in the name of culture" and Europe.9 The latter line is a "cultural borderline"10 of Europe — "What is West of it belongs to Europe as a whole, which is determined by culture irrespective of race."11 Kjellen vigorously supported the project of political transformations in Europe, advanced by a German philosopher Edward von Hartmann.12 He stated with confidence that thanks to Europeans being aware of their cultural community, Russia's claims in Europe were not destined to materialize.

Kjellen was certain that the Slavs had already understood from their own experience the true essence of Russia's "Slavic" policy in which "an ideal ethno-political motive serves... the achievement of a real geopolitical aim."13 "They cannot remain blind toward a gross contradiction between the mouth of Russia singing songs of freedom for all Slavs and her hand wielding a whip... — Russia's domestic policy has not undergone any change, the Poles are cowering under new blows, and there is still no dawn breaking over the steppes of Ukraine."14 **/124/**

In his post-war work "The Great Powers and the World Crisis" (1920) Kjellen detailed his vision of the East European problem. Soviet Russia, which has come out of the cradle of a "Mongol-tainted Muscovite tsarism,"15 is the heir apparent of old Russia, the "seamier side of Europe laced up in a united state with the seamier side of Asia."16 Kjellen stressed, as did many Eurasious, that the specific function of Russia is an intermediate link between the cultural worlds of Europe and Asia.

Brushing aside similarities between the polyethnic USA and "Russia of 100 nations" Kjellen drew attention to two events: the outlines of territorial location of nations and their uneven cultural development. The first special feature lies in a clearly non-homogeneous settlement of Great Russians surrounded from all sides by a belt of alien nations, including the West "Swedes and Finns, Estonians and Germans, Letts and Lithuanians, Poles, Ruthenians and Roumanians....We have also classified ... the Ruthenians or "Little Russians" as alien nations."17 Culturally, however, the Russian domination over these nations "was, in essence, the abuse of a higher culture by a lower one;"18 this domination was ensured by "a policy of pre-planned oppression of the higher nations on the European border and by an artificial and coercive mixing (as distinct from the natural one in America) which had as its purpose to destroy the buffer belt against Europe and to enable Russia to bring all her weight to bear on the West. This is what is known as the Russian idea."19

Greeting the national liberation struggle of the nonRussian peoples and their separation into independent states, Kjellen proclaimed: "the consequence (of establishing new states. — *Auth.)* testifies to a clearly correct way: liberated at last from the "Cossack threat," Europe receives back within its true cultural borderline its own irredentists."20

*2. Halford John Mackinder: Euro-Asia and Ukraine*

H. Mackinder's idea about a fixed division of the world into separate areas, each of which plays a certain part in **/125/** history, is undoubtedly a major contribution to geopolitical science. In a concise 1904 article "The Geopolitical Pivot of History" he suggests giving up a Eurocentrist vision of history and advances a hypothesis that a real driving force of historical process and changes in the world is the human continental masses grouped together in the Central-Northern part of the Eurasian land including the Middle East, the so-called "pivot areas," later referred to by him as the "Heartland."21

Looking back in the depth of ages, Mackinder arrived at the conclusion that the only constant in world history is permanent pressure of the Heartland on the external crests, which makes existence of the world including Europe dependent on Eurasia, subordinating general history to the impulses of the latter. The fact that world history is only secondary to and derivative of that of Eurasia, enabled Mackinder to call the Heartland a geographical pivot of history: staying out of history, being closed to it and excluded from its course, a land wich only inspires, provokes the historical process pivoting around an imaginary Eurasian pole."22

It is the Russians, according to Mackinder, who put an end to the unlimited domination of Mongols in the Heartland in the new times, but at the same time assumed all their functions: "Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India and on China replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppes... Nor is it likely that any possible social revolution will alter her essential relation to the great geographical limits of her existence."23

However the most sensitive danger to world democracy and freedom, guaranteed by the superior position of the external Eurasian margin over its heartland stems not from the latter but from joining the Eurasia's limitless resource with the intellectual and organizational potential of representatives of the crescent strips. Mackinder regarded as most probable and a most disastrous the alliance of Russia and Germany. **/126/**

If the 1904 article was a purely intellectual exercise of an armchair erudite, the work "Democratic Ideals and Reality: "Study in the Politics of Reconstruction," written in the whirlwind of revolutionary perturbations and military cataclysms and published in 1919, is pervaded by vital concern for peace and democracy of a person who combined the experience of a scholar and practical politician.

The book was written in order to prove that it was possible to defend democratic ideals and reconstruct Europe on this basis only with due account of reality which was not in favor of the liberal values and the traditional balance of forces and hence required an immediate intervention. Over and over again Mackinder felt *horreur sacree* instilled by a possibility of merging the resources of Germany and Russia which would seek revenge after a war defeat and loss of territories: they had yet to say the last word in their relationship; their defeat was the result of Germany's uncertainty as to her geostrategic priorities.

Scrutinizing more closely the course of historical processes, Mackinder somewhat corrects his vision of the driving forces on the "World Island," *i.e.* the Eurasian dryland as a whole. He was convinced, that the key, a real "sesame," to the door of the Heartland in Eastern Europe, therefore control over it is of an absolute, unconditional and geostrategic importance: "He who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; he who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World Island commands the world."24

The domination of Russia in the Heartland is based on her power in Eastern Europe; hence, the logic of struggle for world hegemony, said Mackinder, made fatally inevitable the collision of interests of Russia and Germany in this area. No matter how their relations are settled — by a military conflict, or conversely, by joining forces — Europe should counteract resolutely against all forms of German-Russian contacts in the name of preserving ideals of democracy and progress: "If we accept anything less than a complete solu-**/127/**tion of the Eastern Question in the largest sense, we shall merely have gained a respite, and our descendants will find themselves under the necessity of marshalling their power afresh for siege of the Heartland."25

The most effective protective measure must be state and political rearrangement of Eastern Europe on the Western pattern so that its existence may be based on a system of independent national states." This broad wedge of independent nations must extend from the Adriatic and Black Sea to the Baltic,"26 consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Mackinder added, the supervision in this area as well as over all processes around the Heartland must be entrusted to the League of Nations. He also insisted that a trinomial system of states should be created in Eastern Europe: Germany, Slavic plus South European States, and Russia, rather than a binomial one as suggested by F. Naumann and his supporters in accordance with their plan of a "Middle Europe" — Germany and the South Europeans versus Russia, A confrontation between Germany and Russia would be inevitable in this case.

Although in his book "Democratic Ideals and Reality" Mackinder does not single out Ukraine as an independent state, her name is written on the enclosed map in the same letters as the names of the abovementioned independent states but without outlining its borders.27 He knew only too well the reality of life and the true number of the Ukraine's independence enemies to irritate them by rubbing the salt into the wounds.28 Visiting Odesa and Novorossiysk as British High Commissioner on instructions from Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, Mackinder met various leading politicians and military figures, (particularly Anton Denikin) whom he tried to persuade (in vain) to recognize *de-facto* the newly-created states and to bring him round to cooperating with the Poles against the Bolsheviks. In the report to his government and during a Cabinet meeting Mackinder proposed establishing "an alliance of borderline states (*i.e.* **/128/** those that had gained independence upon the Russian empire's disintegration — *Auth.*) including Ukraine"29 and a union of these states with the Eastern European states.30 He also advocated the wisdom of creating a broad-based East European, anti-Russian, and anti-Bolshevik coalition. Mackinder's plan was turned down by the government. It was also rejected personally by the War Secretary Winston Churchill. Modern researcher B. Blouet notes in this regard that the short-sighted politicians worried more about the coming elections results and were simply unable to adequately assess the value of the proposal based on a 25-year-lead futurological analysis.31 He also thinks that it was this position of Britain that contributed to the demise of young Ukrainian state. "Britain withdrew and with her went the support which many potentially autonomous regions, like Ukraine, had been hoping for."32

In assigning to Germany a decisive role in the balance of the Heartland and the periphery, Mackinder did not rule out altogether the possibility of the former choosing a different path, of joining with Russia. However, he did not hesitate to declare with respect to Russia, "I can see no peace for the world. Whether the future of Russia be anarchy, tyranny, or servitude to the Germans, matters not; none of these conditions can co-exist with democracy in the world today."33

*3. "Middle Europe" and Ukraine.*

A project put forward by a wide circle of well-known German scholars, politicians and businessmen involved in the "Middle Europe" movement ("Mitteleuropa") was, undoubtedly, the most ambitious and majestic (for the time) vision of a future Europe, whose greater part was to have entered a union of Central and East European nations.

This movement is justly considered to have been launched by the national-economist Friedrich List (17891846), the politician Baron Karl von Brück (1798-1860) **/129/**and the historian, political journalist and theoretician of federalism Constantin Frantz (1817-1891). It is thanks to such outstanding figures as F. Naumann, P. Rohrbach, M. and A. Weber, G. Schulze-Gevernitz, G. Delbrueck and A. Schmidt that the movement existed as a powerful and influential political trend.

The final aim of that movement was to create a single economic, cultural and legal space in the lands between France and Russia, and between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, which would embrace the nations, showing greater closeness to each other than to Russia, France and other Germanic and Romance nations.

The movement acquired organizational integrity after the publishing of the book *Mitteleuropa* (1915) by Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919), which attained a general circulation of over 100,000 copies in two years and evoked an enthusiastic response. In 1916 the book was translated into French, English and Hungarian, and two years later into Swedish, Italian and Russian.34 A brochure by the same title, which explained concisely the ideas of the 1915 book came out two years later with a circulation of 113,000 copies.

When *Mitteleuropa* was being published, F. Naumann was a well- known theologist, politician and editor of the influential *Hilfe* (circulation 100,000) which carried the works of prominent political and social figures of Germany, including Max Weber. Naumann was known in political circles as an advocate of the national-social (not to be confused with national-socialist) movement, which tried to channel into one stream the two most powerful waves of German history: the national-bourgeois and the socially oriented proletarian, as well as to synthesize the precepts of Christianity with German idealism, humanism with class solidarity, and democracy with monarchy. It was a goal which was to appear, in the words of historian Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954), as a kind fairy tale by the cradle of a new Germany, leaving her a magic gift, that "noblest dream of German history,"35 while promoting mutual under-**/130/**standing between the working class and the bourgeoisie and greatly influencing the consolidation of revisionism in Social-Democracy. But it was not successful. Had it come true, the Nazi movement would have never succeeded, Meinecke believed.

The same spirit of compromise and solidarity, understanding and good-will pervaded the idea of a Central-European federation. Well before publishing *Mitteleuropa,* when assessing the consequences of Russian aggression in a series of articles, Naumann expressed worry about the destiny of the East European nations: the coveted goal of independence, and the titanic efforts of recent decades would be brought to naught if the Russian plans were realized: "it concerns the Rumanians, Bulgarians as well as Finns, Lithuanians, Estonians, Poles, and Ruthenians in Russia,"36 Making a sober assessment of the constellation of forces in the Central European region, he asserted that the attainment of statehood by the Poles, Czechs, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians)37 would depend on assistance or, conversely, opposition on the part of Russia or Germany, for the former were still too weak to exist independently, and hence "as an international force, we stretch our hand to the lesser neighboring middle European peoples and suggest that they move together with us toward the future."38

In *Mitteleuropa,* Naumann revealed his vision of a new community. The fundamental reason given in its favor was that all nations of the above region beloi g to a single "Middle European people's group" *(Menschheitsgruppe Mitteleuropa),39-* 40 whose homogeneity — in spite of religious, ethnic, linguistic differences — was determined by the socio-cultural landscape and economic structures of the same type, as well as by common labor ethics, *i.e.,* similar "economic spirit" and "economic character," which enabled Naumann to speak of a united "Middle European economic nation"41 which professed a single "new socio-economic religious denomination."42 **/131/**

At the same time the Middle European community was still in the process of formation and characterized (as compared to the neighboring West European one) by a certain immaturity and an insufficient formative status: "our Middle European type has not yet reached perfection, it is still being formed... We are, if I may say so, a historical semi-finished item, and what we look forward to is the day of perfection... We have great strength, very high quality, and ability to work, but it is only now that high school is to begin: the culture of Middle Europe is growing around the Germans, a human type is developing which is intermediate between the French, Italians, Turks, Russians, Scandinavians. We long for this Middle European."43

Naumann was sure that each Middle European nation bore the traits and properties which others somewhat lacked. The goal of Middle Europe, therefore, was to unite the German and non-German constituent parts so as to use the mutual complementarity for a common benefit, avoiding the German element's superiority: "No to domination, yes to unification! We have more horsepower, you have more melody. We think mostly in terms of quantity, the best of you in terms of quality. Let us put together what we are capable of individually..."44

In terms of ideology Middle Europe was based on a total combination of conservative and liberal principles — the existing traditions and institutions combined with a realistic and pragmatic approach to innovation. Middle Europe's political system was defined by Naumann as union ("Bund" — league, federation, confederation) a union of states, nations, or a suprastate: "No state-making part of this suprastate will ever lose its political independence, unless it sacrifices its own sovereignty won and defended with much effort and blood... On the contrary, it is in all the participants' interests to thwart any brisk plans of a melting pot." In other words, it would not be a new state, but a union of the existing ones, being created under the title "Middle Europe."45 It was this model of a Middle European alliance that was pro-**/132/**posed in 1882 by C. Frantz: "Naturally, it will not bring forth any national body or any state at all. It must be a union (Bund) with quite different elements at that.... Centralization and uniformity should be categorically avoided."46 The emergence of Middle Europe would have eliminated the topicality of various pan-Slavic and pan-Germanic projects and plans of Greater Serbia, Greater Romania, *etc.,* all of which are dangerous in their consequences. Prague was also to be the seat of Middle Europe's administrative bodies.

For various reasons concerning culture and civilization Naumann absolutely rejected any idea of an alliance between Germany and Russia, which would only prop up the latter's ailing economy for further military expansion: "Our cultural feeling protests against it, and our hearts will never agree to it. It is better to be small and lonely than Russian."47

The pages of Mitteleuropa are full of highly optimistic inspiration, poetic and romantic fervor on the prospects of a future commonwealth. However, the warm, moving, even sentimental words about smooth coexistence and mutual national complementarity go together with passages cold, terse, and rational in German style about the necessity of order, discipline, and subordination (which is, of course, right). These are dissonant to the book's general content and spirit, and, true as it may be, it can frighten off the lyrical Slavic soul.

In his *Mitteleuropa* (1917), Naumann stressed that as a result of geographic location and, moreover, of will and historical fate, the nations between Germany and Russia (including Ukraine48) have to orient themselves to one of these states, belong to its sphere of influence and form blocs with them. Hence, "What does not want to or cannot be Russian must become Middle European."49 (A. Penck characteristically calls these "intermediary" nations — the Finnish, Swedish, Estonian, Lithuanian and Romanian — as *Zwischeneuropa,* "The Lands Between."50 Naumann thought that on completion of a war, after a common struggle against the **/133/** Russian enemy the nations could not just go it alone: "Blood binds us, future danger binds us. Mutual respect also binds us... Long live Middle Europe!."51

In the weekly *Mitteleuropa,* founded in 1917 to propagate the ideas of this movement, Naumann also stressed the advizability of creating the union by noting the need to forestall international conflicts, preserve institutional order from approaching ruin and chaos, and the need to increase the well-being of all.52

However, the idea of Middle Europe proved rather inconsistent with the realities of the time. The issue of Middle Europe was taken off the agenda because of Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the defeat of Germany in World War I. In his last "Middle European" article "A Temporary Farewell," printed during the Christmas holidays of 1918, Naumann expressed confidence that, despite all setbacks, the idea of Middle Europe would not be rejected altogether — its validity and viability were ensured by life itself, *i.e.,* by psychological, economic, and geographic factors, such that all artificial and arbitrary aspects of the idea would pass away, while everything objective would remain; "looking into the near or distant future, they (advocates of Middle Europe. — *Auth.)* say to each other, "Farewell,"53

No doubt, the concept of "Middle Europe" as a phenomenon of German intellectual history includes a rather considerable element of German messianism, a belief that Germany had a certain metaphysical duty before God and man, a sense of being worthy of great status, and a justifiable *sub speciae aeternitatis.* Attempts to "speak its piece" brought about an Eastward orientation of efforts. It looked to the East as a boundless expanse of downtrodden lands literally clamoring for help.

If Germany had found beneficial ground for its aspirations and fulfilled the noble mission of liberator, it would have received the sincere gratitude of that generation as well as true affection and devotion of generations to come. It would also have acquired for the future trusted friends **/134/** and reliable allies among the various nations of over half of the continent.

It is for this reason that the most far-seeing and conscientious politicians of Germany continued to warn tirelessly against any expansionist plans in Eastern Europe; moreover, they insisted on consolidating forces to oppose Russia. As Max Weber, a participant in the "Middle Europe" movement, thought, "any policy beyond our Eastern border, if it is to become realistic (Realpolitik), is inevitably to be a West Slavic and not a German national policy... It is in the East and by no means in the West that we will have cultural missions to perform outside our borders."54 (Like the overwhelming majority of other European researchers, Weber referred to the Ukrainians as Western Slavs).

Another "movement participant", the well-known historian Hans Delbriick (1848-1929), who never concealed his warm feelings towards Ukraine, declared proudly: "Whether or not Russia considers the enslavement of Europe and Asia as her mission is her business, but we see it as Germany's mission to save Europe and Asia from this Muscovite oppression."55 He noted that Germany had protected European culture from the onslaught of Muscovite barbarism over the course of two generations, and it was not an eventual policy, but a predestination of Germany, a mission for mankind.56

Henry Cord Meyer, a modern researcher of the "Middle Europe" movement, while sincerely regretting that Naumann's project, "rooted in the best elements of European Christian tradition, with its emphasis upon decency, morality, and humanity,"57 had not. been implemented, he still considers that if the war had kept on the mid-1916 course, the German politicians and ideologists would have had to concentrate on the 'Middle European direction" and "Middle Europe" would have become a reality. Instead, an unbridled and heady nationalism took the upper hand in both Germany and Europe, and the European politicians lost every reasonable ability to adequately treat and assess events, nor did they see the great constructive value in that idea; while victory over Germany **/135/** and Russia's remoteness all but strengthened the illusion of safety. Consequently, the chance of re-structuring Europe was largely ignored: "it is sad and sobering to see in retrospect the opportunities that were missed."58 However, Meyer is sure that "the fortunes of history may once again grant the Western world an opportunity to refashion the pattern of Europe. There might be another chance to reestablish a community of free and creative life,"59 of building "a free, reintegrated, post-Soviet Europe,"60 the chance which, if it arises, must not be ignored by the West.

*4. Ukraine in the Geopolitical Thinking of Max Weber*

The idea of creating an independent Ukraine was put forward by Max Weber. It was only natural for him that the Ukrainians, with their social structure and a level of development much higher than in Russia, should create an independent national state of their own. Weber's view on solving the ethnic issue (by far the most important one for Eastern and Central Europe) underwent a certain evolution. In the first years of the twentieth century Weber was greatly influenced by Mykhailo Drahomanov's ideas of federalism explained to him by Bohdan Kistyakivskyi, who in Paris, publishing a two volume collection of Drahomanov's works. The federalistic program of re-structuring Russia, laid down in Drahomanov's "Historic Poland and Great Russian Democracy," appealed to Weber because it opted for a compromise solution of a potentially explosive problem: "its (Drahomanov's program. — *Auth.)* great strength is in its explicit combination of economic and ethnic ideals".61 Weber also fully shared Drahomanov's opinion that social structure of the Russian empire was the main obstacle to Russia's liberal development and westernization, and treated Drahomanov's ideological transformation as a transition from socialist to national democracy.62 Weber repeatedly referred to Drahomanov as an author of the most democratic methods for solving the nationalities problems in a multi-**/136/** ethnic Europe. Wolfgang Mommsen, who researched Drahomanov's heritage also notes Drahomanov's influence on Weber and states that "later, too, Weber still considered Drahomanov's works as fundamental for the treatment of ethnic problems".63

The Russian policy of the "most ruthless oppression" *(erbarmungsloseste Unterdruckung)* 64of Ukraine was no secret to Weber. He noted the powerful and sometimes successful "Russification" of the Ukrainians,65 recalled the 1876 ban on publishing and import of Ukrainian literature, and stated that "only the problem of autonomy for about 30 million Little Russians is something which makes even the most consistent (Russian. — *Auth.)* democrats hold their breath."66 Weber was well aware of the program foundations and demands of various Ukrainian political groups, particularly, the Ukrainian Democratic and Ukrainian Radical Parties, and noted that the ultimate goal of some political forces in Ukraine was its secession from Russia and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.67

The course of events in Russia in the second decade of the twentieth century, its joining the First World War with overtly expansionist interests and brutal aggression against the West Ukrainian lands, only strengthened Weber's well-known Russophobia. In numerous articles and public speeches from 1915 to 1919, particularly, the article "The Transition of Russia to an Illusory Democracy" dated April 1917, he not only stressed the instances of a Mongol-type and Communist mentality among the Russians, he also made new points. Weber used the expressions "folk imperialism" *(Volksimperialismus),*68 "Bolshevik soldiers' imperialism,"69 "imperialistic intellectuals,"70 "Great Russian chauvinism,"71 "militarist mass-scale instincts,"72 and "Russian barbarians."73 Weber looked upon Russian imperialism as a phenomenon both permanent and extra-political: "Whether the expansionist encroachments bear a Tsarist, Constitutional Democratic or Bolshevik label is, naturally, not important in terms of consequences."74 **/137/**

Weber was also struck by the Russians' hostile attitude to other Slavs and the Russian troops' behavior in the Slavic lands: "the ferocious brutality performed by the Russian ill-disciplined hordes... in the areas populated with a community partially related to them ratially resembles medieval Mongol times."75 Weber ridiculed the Russian intelligentsia: "... the intellectuals' eagerness to make other nations happy was and still is in glaring contrast with the unsolved cultural tasks in their own land."76 In many articles and papers of that time Weber viewed Ukraine as a country in colonial dependence on Russia, and put it in the same category with Poland, Lithuania, Finland, and other colonies of the period, such as India, Ireland, Malta, Egypt, and Persia.77

As to Russia's European colonies, Weber considered them as "having their own and somewhat ancient culture, and in comparison with Russia... a much higher culture."78 It is for this reason that as early as late 1915 Weber favored the creation of new independent states by the non-Russian nations of the European part of Imperial Russia: "I support the creation of the Polish, Little Russian, Lithuanian and Lettish self-governing national states."79 In October 1916 Weber publicly defended the idea of Ukrainian independence again: "The central item... Ukraine!"80

Weber saw the essence of the 1917 October Revolution in establishing a military dictatorship led by sergeants, and rejected the thesis that Bolshevism relied on the proletarian masses which were "class conscious" in a European sense. In his opinion, the coup was staged "by the soldiers' proletariat," with its flair for looting as a means of survival. Hence the Russian military clique were really interested in continuing the war, particularly in Ukraine, which would enable them to further plunder and rape Ukraine under the pretext of "liberation."81 As was noted above, Weber was an active member of the "Middle Europe" movement and an advocate of creating a German-Slavic-South-Eastern-European federation with Ukraine playing an important role in it. **/138/**

*5. The "New Europe" of Robert William Seton-Watson*

The proposal of a "New Europe" by well-known English slavicist R. W. Seton-Watson was an original response to the Naumann project. Devoting himself to political activities and civil service during and after World War I, Seton-Watson did tremendous work aimed at supporting the independence of the Slavic nations, which saw the light of day from under the debris of the collapsed Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. He was an ardent advocate of Ukraine's unconditional independence.

As early as the prewar months of 1914 Seton-Watson intended to visit Russia to ascertain the ruling circles' position as to the future of Ukraine, Poland, and Finland. But he canceled the trip, having realized its utter hopelessness after reading the Russian press and meeting some prominent Slavic figures of various political and ideological persuasions: "the only way in which I could win... official, arid most of the unofficial Russia was by *Totschweigen* (dead silence — *Auth.)* towards the Ukraine Question and dropping the Finns like a hot potato — *Dafür bin ich nicht zu haben!* (Therefore don't want to do — *Auth*.)."82 In the summer of the same year Seton-Watson met in L'viv with Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Ivan Franko, Andriy Sheptytsky, Kost Levytsky and other prominent Ukrainians. Seton-Watson knew well Ukrainian culture: he called Shevchenko the "Ruthenian Burns,"83 and respected Sheptysky for having "devoted all his energies to the task of spreading education, training an active and keenly patriotic clergy, and fostering art, literature and political thought.".84 Seton-Watson's biographers assert that "the struggle of the Ukrainians in the Russian empire against the government of St.Petersburg had his strong support."85 Seton-Watson substantiated the idea of a "New Europe"86 with historical, cultural, economic, geographical and military-political factors in the journal *New Europe,* founded by him in October 1916 and edited together with **/139/** Tomas Masaryk. It was the criteria of an independent Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and other states that would serve the long-term interests of Europe and would help many nations to achieve the dream of political independence,

Considering the situation of Ukraine in his article "Ukraine's Problem" in September 1917, Seton-Watson emphasized that the Ukrainian question was one of the main reasons for World War I (he first suggested this in October 1916);87 and the course of war proved that it was no longer possible to ignore this problem. The Ukrainian question was not a modern invention but Europe's chronic problem, which "is shown in numerous books devoted to Ukrainian events, published in English as far back as the seventeenth century."88

Analyzing Russo-Ukrainian relations, Seton-Watson reached the conclusion that the roots of evil could be found in the Pereyaslav accords, for "no greater contrast in political outlook can be imagined than that between two contracting parties. On the one hand stood ancient Moscow, in which autocracy, already strong in its semi-Tartar days, acquired additional strength from methods borrowed from the West; on the other, a loosely knit republican organization resting upon essentially democratic local institutions. Just as fire and water cannot mingle, one of the two opposing types of government was bound to yield to the other; and under eighteenth century conditions the victory of Tsardom was... inevitable."89

After Russian intentions in respect to the non-Russian peoples became clear by 1917-1918, and the true essence of the Russian revolution manifested itself, Seton-Watson actively campaigned for the necessity of military intervention into Russia's affairs, not only to ostensibly preserve peace in Europe and promote comprehensive disarmament but, being aimed at reviving civil order and democracy, which would also serve the interests of Russia itself.90 The Russian revolution was, for him, the negation of the political principles of the English, American, and French revolutions, "on the vastest of scales, the substitution of theft for property."91 **/140/**

*6. Eastern Europe as the "Green International"*

The geopolitical approach to the situation in Europe used by H. Hessel Tiltman in the book *Peasant Europe* (1934) was based on socioeconomic analysis. In his opinion, the common European civilization consists of two, Western and Eastern, halves. The latter, despite some existing internal ethnic differences and official borderlines, is characterized by an identical social structure and economy, common world view, morals, culture, labor ethics, way of life, and their attributes or determinants — and are expressed by the adjectives: "agrarian," "land-tilling," "peasant," and "agricultural." In spite of incessant political and territorial transformations, the East European population has intact its *code genetique,* and carries over through mists of time and generations its vital foundations of existence, the values and ideals of its own.

Geographically, the agrarian community is situated in the territory between the ethnic boundaries of German and Russian settlements in the strip between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas: "more than half the entire population of that continent is composed of peasants. The peoples who inhabit the land of farmsteads — Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Southern Slavs, and the rest — collectively represent the largest single unit in Europe, split by artificial political walls, but united by the bonds of common interests and — in war or peace — usually common fate."92

To define this aggregate of nations, Tiltman used the name "Green International" proposed in the early 1920s by the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and head of the Bulgarian government Alexander Stamboliyski. The idea of "Green International," as put forward by Stamboliyski, envisaged the political cooperation of the East European nations against Russian Bolshevik expansion.93

Noting the Ukrainians' love of the soil and agrarian labor, Tiltman admired their industriousness, work discipline **/141/** and spirit of individualism, which brought them the highest living standards in Eastern Europe, and ever increasing well-being and wealth. He wrote about his own impressions visiting Western Ukraine: "Every Ukrainian cottage, however small, is enclosed in a fence, symbolic of that individualism and love of home and the soil which lie at the very roots of the Ukrainian temperament. The spic-and-span appearance of even the poorest village reminds the traveler that these Ukrainians are, jointly with the Hungarians, the best husbandmen in Eastern Europe."94

The fact that the lands around Przemysl, which had suffered great devastation during the war years, were quickly rebuilt such that there were no reminders of the war, was called by Tiltman "a true miracle" wrought with Ukrainian hands. Comparing the Ukrainians to the other nations, particularly the Polish, Tiltman noted a relative superiority of the Ukrainian material and intellectual culture over the Polish one. Emphasizing the necessity of righting a historic wrong and satisfying the Ukrainian aspirations to self-determination and also showing concern for European security in general, Tiltman thought it obligatory to renew Ukrainian statehood and called upon the British government to take decisive measures to promote it: "there will be neither lasting peace nor the reign of justice in Eastern Europe until that right (to freedom — *Auth.)* is granted, and the alien troops withdraw, leaving the Ukraine to control its own destinies and enrich all peasant lands by its example."95 Were Ukraine to be free, "the Ukrainian race would have been making their contribution to peace and stability of that area."96 With Ukraine in view, Tiltman thought it unpardonable that a "Western" nation should be subordinated to the "Eastern" Russo-Asian civilization.

The image of Ukraine given by Tiltman is characterized by a deep respect of its glorious ancient past, a tribute to its heroic struggle for independence, and a regret for its contemporary oppressed status. Tiltman was sure Ukraine would gain independence and free itself from the shackles of **/142/** slavery put on it by Russia. "The Ukrainians... are of a higher cultural level than the races which today oppress them."97 "Every effort to turn Ukrainians into Russians has failed."98 Tiltman expressed confidence that the aspiration for independence would be lasting and indestructible among the Ukrainians, for it was inherent in their freedom-loving nature, rooted in the deepest strata of their national selfawareness: "for generations the Ukrainian people have clung with more devotion and stubbornness to their national ideals than any other subjugated people in Europe."99

"The Great Ukraine existed not on paper but in the hearts of its people. And none who knows those sturdy peasant hosts can deny that in the hearts of Europe's largest "minority," free Ukraine exists to this day."100 The Ukrainian people "believe the day will come when they will be free... the day when Europe's Unknown Nation will write its name large on the maps of Europe, and justice will finally be done to peasant people who have fought to preserve their national identity with tenacity, courage, and indomitable will that knew not defeat."101

The reasons why the Ukrainians, "the creators of a great empire and the cradle of an early civilization far superior to that existing in the lands surrounding them..," failed to defend their independence, fell into slavery and "disappeared from history,"102 were seen by Tiltman in such character flaws as their peace-loving, democratic and compassionate nature. "The Ukrainians — and this is the real cause of their misfortunes — were neither warlike nor aggressive; they were and are one of the most cultured and democratic peasant nations in Europe, desiring only to be allowed to live on their own territories undisturbed. To that fact they owe their early disappearance from the map of Europe."103

However, despite certain differences of minor importance, Tiltman was certain that Eastern Europe was and would remain a stable geopolitical unit, a single geopolitical complex — bound up with a common historical fate, the same life values, and a common goal for the future.

1 The term "ghetto mentality" *(Ghetto-Mentalität)* emerged among German Catholics in the times of *Kulturkampf.*

2 Rudolf Kjellen, *Die politische Problems des Weltkrieges* (Leipzig Berlin, 8.Aufl, 1918), p. 98.

3 *Ibid.,* p. 95.

4 *Ibid., p.* 84.

5 *Ibid.,* p. 94

6 *Ibid.,* p.73.

7 *Ibid., p.* 99.

8 *Ibid.,* p. 102

9 *Ibid.*

10 *Ibid.,* p. 98.

11 *Ibid.*

12 See V. Levandovsky, "Ukraine and Russia: the Attempt of a Civilization Analysis," *Politolohichni chytannya,* 1992, No 4, pp. 165-170.

13 Rudolf Kjellen, *Die politische Probleme des Weltkrieges* (Leipzig and Berlin, 8. Aufl, 1918), p. 90.

14 *Ibid., p.* 94.

15 Rudolf Kjellen, *Die Grossmachte und die Weltkrise* (Leipzig and Berlin, 2. Aufl., 1921), p. 144.

16 *Ibid., p.* 136.

17 *Ibid., p.* 138.

18 *Ibid., p.* 188.

19 *Ibid.,* p. 139.

20 *Ibid*., p. 189.

21 John Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal,* 1904, No XXIII, p. 435. Quoted from: E.M. Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, 1943), p. 404.

32 *Ibid., p.* 433. Quoted from Parker, William Henry, Mackinder. Geography as an Aid to Statecraft, (Oxford, 1982), p. 157.

23 *Ibid .* p. 436.

24 Sir John Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (NewYork, 1944), p. 113.

25 *Ibid*., p. 116.

28 *Ibid.,* p. 123.

27 See *Ibid, p.* 119.

28 The thought is expressed in: W.N. Parker, *Op. at.,* p. 170.

29 W.N. Parker, *Op. at.,* p. 238.

30 *Ibid., p.* 172.

31 See B.W. Blouet, "Sir Halford Mackinder as British High Comissioner to South Russia, 1919-1920," *Geographical Journal,* 1976, No CXIII, pp. 228-236. **/404/**

32 *Ibid.,* pp. 235-236.

33 HJ. Mackinder, "General Report with Appendices on the Situation in South Russia; Recommendation for Future Policy," *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1st Series, III,* Woodward E.L., Butler R. ed. No.656, 768-87. HMSO, London, 1949, p. 786. Quoted from W.N. Parker *Op. at.,* p. 71.

34 See F. Naumann, *The Middle Europe* (Pgd., 1918).

35 F. Meinecke, *Die deutsche Katastrophe* (Wiesbaden, 1946), p. 34.

36 F. Naumann, *Werke,* (Kflln and Opladen, 1966), p. 464.

37 *Ibid., p.* 481.

38 *Ibid.,* p. 475.

39 F. Naumann, *Mitteleuropa,* 1915, *Ibid.,* p. 554.

40 *Ibid.,* p. 665

41 *Ibid.,* p. 597.

42*Ibid., p. 600.*

43*Ibid.,* pp. 554-555.

44 *Ibid.,* p. 627.

45 *Ibid., p. 735.*

46 C. Frantz, *Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland* (Chemnitz, 1882), p. 69.

47 *Ibid., p.* 675.

48 *Ibid.,* p. 869.

49 *Ibid.,* p. 869.

50 See E. Obst, "Russland," *Haushoffer K. — Hrsg. Die Grossmachte vor und nach dem Wekkrieg* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1933), p. 109.

51 *Ibid.,* p. 871.

52 See H.C. Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1915-1945* (The Hague, 1955), p. 287.

53 F. Naumann, *Werke,* p. 977.

54 Max Weber. *"Deutschland unter dem europdischen Weltmächten." Gesamtliche. pohtische Schriften* (Munchen, 1921), p. 85.

55 Quoted from A. Smidt *Das Endziel Russlands* (Stuttgart, 1916), p. 79.

56 H. Delbrueck, *Krieg und Politik, 3. Teil* (Berlin, 1919), p. 55

57 H.C. Meyer, *Op. at., p.* 330.

58 *Ibid.,* p. 340.

59 *Ibid., p.* 342.

60 *Ibid.,* p. 344.

61 M. Weber, "Zur Lage der Burgerliche Demokratie in Russland," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Tubingen,* 1906), XXII: 1, Januar, p.267.

62 *Ibid.*

63 WJ. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920* (Tubingen, 1974), pp. 61-62.

64 M. Weber, "Russlands übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus," *Archiv f. Soziahtiss. u. Sozialpolitik,* XXIII: l. Juli, 1906, Beilage, p. 202.

65 M. Weber, *Zur Lage...,* pp. 259, 269, 271.

66 *Ibid.,p.* 270.

67 *Ibid., p.* 270.

68 M.Weber, "Deutschland unter..." *Gesam.pol.Schr.* (*Muenchen.* 1921), p.80.

69 M. Weber, "Innere Lage und Aussenpolitik," *Ibid.,* p. 324.

70 M. Weber, "Russlands uebergang zur Scheindemokratie", Apr., 26 1917, *Ibid., p.* 110.

71 *Ibid.,* p. 122.

72 M. Weber, "Innere Lage...," p. 324.

73 Quoted from WJ. Mommsen, *Op. cit,* pp. 502-504, 522.

74 M. Weber, "Innere Lage...," p. 324.

75 *frankfurter,* September 18, 1917, 18.9. Quoted from W.J. Mommsen, *Op. cit.,* p. 284.

76 M. Weber, "Bismarcks Aussenpolitik und die Gegenwart." *Dez. 1915. Gesam.pol.Schr.,* p. 44. **/405/**

77 M. Weber, "Deutschland unter...," p. 90.; M. Weber, "Bismarcks Aussenpolitik...," p. 47.; the report «An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahre» in Deutsche National Ausschuss of August 1, 1916, published in many newspapers, is quoted from W.J. Mommsen, *Op. cit.,* p. 498.

78 Weber M. "Deutschland unter..." — S.90.;

79 A letter to the Frankfurter Zeitung editorial board. Quoted from M. Weber, *Gesam. pol. Schr., p.* 459.

80 Transcript of the speech in Munich on October 22, 1916. Quoted from WJ. Mommsen, *Op. cit., p.* 513.

81 M. Weber, "Innere Lage...," p. 324.

82 From letters of June 1, 1914. Quoted from H. Seton-Watson, *Seton-Watson Ch. The Making of a New Europe. R.W.Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary,* (Seattle, 1981), p. 100.

83 R.W. Seton-Watson, "Panslavism," *Europe in the Melting Pot* (London, 1919), p. 212.

84 R.W. Seton-Watson, The Ukraine Problem," *Ibid., p.* 373.

85 Seton-Watson H., Seton-Watson Ch.-Op.cit.-P.99.

86 R.W. Seton-Watson, *Europe in the Melting Pot,* (London, 1919), p. 183.

87 R.W. Seton-Watson, *Ibid.,* p. 212.

88 R.W.Seton-Watson, *Ibid.,* p. 365.

89 *Ibid*., p. 367.

90 *Ibid.,* pp. 249, 245.

91 *Ibid., p.* 238.

92 H. Hessel Tiltman, *Peasant Europe* (London, 1934), p. IX.

93 See John D. Bell, *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923* (New-York, 1977).

94 H. Tiltman, *Op. cit.,* p. 208.

95 *Ibid.,* p. 207.

96 *Ibid.,* p. 200.

97 *Ibid.,* p. 267.

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100 *Ibid.,* p. 206.

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Ukraine in Polish Foreign-Policy Doctrines

## *Volodymyr REPRYNTSEV*

The views of most Polish politicians at the turn of the twentieth century were based on the conviction that the Polish state should be resurrected within its historical borders where the Ukrainian lands were an organic part of Rzeczpospolita.1 Representatives of various political circles differed only over how to restore an independent Polish state.

One of the most popular concepts was formulated by the National Democrats, the so-called Endeks *(i.e.,* NDs) led by prominent Polish political figure and journalist Roman Dmowski. In his main works — *Thoughts of a Modern Pole* (1903), *Germany, Russia, and the Polish Problem* (1908), *Polish Politics and the Rebirth of the State* (1925), *etc. —* he entertained the idea of "incorporation," *i.e.,* making Ukrainian lands part of the Polish state, an idea that assumed a definite shape on the eve of World War I. It denied Ukrainians, as an "ahistorical", "non-state" nation, the right to have a state of their own.

The National Democrats based this on the view that in recent centuries Ukrainians had achieved nothing in either the political or cultural sphere and shown themselves to be a passive, inert clement unsuitable for statehood.

"Wherever we can build up strength and redouble our civilizing effort, absorbing other elements," wrote Dmowski, "no law can proscribe us, and to do so is even our duty."2 At the same time, he believed the realities at the turn of the **/144/** century had rendered nonsense the program of restoring Poland in the borders of 1772, which would have been a basic digression from historical tradition. Endeks believed only those lands to the East, including Ukrainian ones, should be incorporated that Poland could "digest" and gradually Polonize completely, thus becoming a monoethnic state. They considered such territories to be Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Podillia.

Other Ukrainian lands, the Endeks' believed, should belong to Russia, which they saw as a counterweight to German hegemonism. Along with this, the National Democrats planned to continue the Polonization of Ukrainian territories which wound up in the Russian Empire. The creation of Soviet Russia merely reinforced the Endek argument. Modernizing the *antemurale* idea (Poland as a bulwark of Christianity confronting the East), they took upon themselves the great mission of protecting Western civilization from the Bolshevik threat.

Thus, there was no place for an independent Ukraine in the political doctrines of National Democracy, one of the most authoritative and influential Polish political forces in the first half of the twentieth century.

No less influential and popular than the Endek view was the federalist program of Jozef Pilsudski, leader of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and most authoritative Polish statesman of this century. The essence of this program was to establish a large, strong, and vital Poland in Eastern Europe following the overthrow of tsarism and collapse of the Russian Empire. It foresaw a revived Rzeczpospolita resting on federal foundations and including Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian lands. The leading role, of course, was assigned to the Polish ethnic, political, economic, and cultural element.

Despite the fact that the program gave no answer to the question of what to do if nations did not want to unite with the Rzeczpospolita, the socialists declared their voluntary entry into the future state. Evolving later were certain **/145/** PPS figures who denied some peoples, especially Ukrainians, the right to shape their own destiny.

Thus, even before the creation of the Polish state, the two influential and popular Polish political doctrines about Ukraine, the incorporationist and the federal, were based on ignoring Ukrainian rights to self-determination and laid claims to Ukrainian lands. Other views played no significant role.

*1. Ukrainian Independence as a Threat to Polish Integrity*

The proclamation on November 7, 1918, in Lublin of the Polish Republic by Provisional Government marked the culmination of the age-old effort of the Polish people to revive their statehood. Even as this declaration of independence was being prepared, political forces in Poland closely followed developments in Ukraine and reacted strongly to what they saw as inconsistent with or harmful to future Polish national interests (recall the protests to the provision of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty giving Kholm/Chelmno and Pidliashia to the UNR and making Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna a separate crownland).

The events of 1918-1921 bear vivid witness to the fact that in practice the Polish state consistently implemented Ukrainian doctrines and concepts, earlier worked out by Polish political forces.

Let us note in passing that the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) proclaimed on November 1, 1918, was in fact strangled by the newly-created Polish state in a Polish-Ukrainian war (1918-1919) over Eastern Galicia. The Poles saw ZUNR not as an act of Ukrainian national liberation in quest of statehood but as an anti-Polish uprising on primordial (as they thought) Polish lands, which threatened the territorial integrity of their newly-formed state. The Polish side could not allow an independent Ukrainian state to be set up in Eastern Galicia. On this point all political forces of Polish society were united.

A still more vivid example of implementing ready-made **/146/** foreign-policy concepts on the Ukrainian question was the joint Polish-Ukrainian war of 1920 against the Bolsheviks. The overwhelming majority of historians have reason to believe that this was an attempt to fulfill Pilsudski's federalist program. As we know, the governments of the UNR and Poland concluded the so-called Warsaw (or PilsudskiPetliura) Treaty on April 24, 1920.3 It provided for the recognition of the Independent Ukrainian People's Republic by Poland. The Ukrainian army, allied with the Polish, went to war against Bolshevik Russia to effect the restoration of the Ukrainian Directory in Dnipro Ukraine. The treaty was, however, unequal. Taking advantage of the Directory's dire straits, Poland retained Eastern Galicia, Western Volhynia, Kholm/Chelmno, and parts of Pidliashia and Polissia. The Warsaw Treaty envisaged powerful Polish influence over the administration, armed forces, finances, and railways of Ukraine. West Ukrainians met the Treaty with hostility, while a considerable segment of Dnipro Ukrainians also took a dim view of it.

In the end, Poland failed to observe the Treaty provisions and abandoned the UNR to the tender mercies of Bolshevik Russia. In October 1920, while Pilsudski held the initiative militarily, he bowed to Endek pressure and slowed down the offensive. Poland signed a cease-fire and then, on March 18, 1921, the Treaty of Riga with the Russian Federation and Ukrainian SSR. The Treaty of Riga partitioned the Ukrainian lands between Poland and Russia, the Poles recognizing Soviet Ukraine as an independent state. Poland retained the Kholm/Chelmno region with Pidliashia, Western Volhynia, and Polissia in addition to Galicia (Eastern Galicia was annexed by Poland following the decision of the Council of Ambassadors on March 15, 1923). UNR troops were interned in Poland.

Thus, the Pilsudski "march on Kyiv" resulted in the implementation of the Endeks' program of incorporation rather than his own federalist vision. Peace with Russia was purchased at the expense of an independent Ukrainian state. **/147/**

*2. "Poland for the Poles" and the Project of a "Greater Ukraine"*

The interwar period brought to the fore the problem of what to do about the Ukrainians who became part of Poland as a result of the latter's occupation of western Ukraine. A strategy of assimilation was adopted. "Poland for the Poles" is how Endek nationality policy might be summed up. Prominent Endek politician and publicist Stanislaw Grabski wrote that "what is now the necessary condition for retaining our present border is the transformation of the territory of the Rzeczpospolita into the Polish ethnic territory."4 Naturally, ethnic assimilation of the indigenous population into the Polish environment was carried out by economic, political, ideological, cultural, and educational discrimination against Ukrainians. The National Democrats pursued a chauvinist policy of consistent and uncompromising Polonization in Eastern Galicia and Western Volhynia by means of cruel repressions and persecutions.5 In this manner the Endeks calculated that Polish ownership of western Ukraine could be guaranteed forever and Ukrainian aspirations of statehood thwarted.

Meanwhile, the competing idea of federalism trumpeted by Pilsudski's supporters was renewed and modernized, emerging in the 1920s and thirties as the doctrine of the Polish Prometheism.6

The Prometheists viewed the Second Republic's foreign policy through the prism of a future conflict between the civilized West, to which they of course assigned Poland, and communist Russia. This clash was expected to result in disintegration of the multinational Bolshevik empire. In the opinion of Pilsudski's camp, the liberated but politically and nationally immature peoples would need help in forming their own states. Poland would take up this "civilizing" mission. It was planned that the potential states would form a single Polish-led federation. **/148/**

The Ukrainian problem was assigned the lead role ir this federalist program.7 It was foreseen that after the collapse of the USSR an independent Ukrainian state, Greater Ukraine, would emerge with Polish help. It first would disown western Ukraine and, secondly, enter into a federal union with Poland. The Prometheists thought that the creation of a so-called Greater Ukraine fully complied with "Polish national interests as a means of strengthening Poland."8

However, the Prometheist program somewhat differed from the viewpoints of its forerunners, mainly concerning western Ukraine's role in fulfilling the Pilsudski eastern program in the new historical conditions by taking into account the experience gained. The Prometheists criticized the Treaty of Warsaw for ignoring the interests of Galician Ukrainians, leading, allegedly, to the failure of the "March on Kyi'V. At the new juncture, Pilsudski's supporters thought that Galician Ukrainians could serve not only as the catalyst of a movment to establish Greater Ukraine on the ruins of the Bolshevik empire but also to be in the vanguard and a mighty force of a new *Drang nach Osten.*

After Jozef Pilsudski's May 1926 coup, the government's nationality policy underwent correction. Let it be noted that the change in government and establishment of the Sanacija (Renewal) regime was in large measure motivated by the failures of the Endek program of assimilationism which had served only to fan the flames of national struggle. However, Jerzy Tomaszewski, one of the most authoritative Polish students of the period, states that "the May coup modified domestic practice only to a limited extent and for a few years... There was, however, a brief period of a certain flirtation with the national minorities." Moreover, he adds, "the practical activity of the state administration in the Eastern borderlands, regardless of who headed it, was from the very start close to the National Democrats' program."9

In the interbellurn period, the only political force in Poland which recognized the right of Ukrainians to self-de-**/149/**termination was the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (later the Communist Party of Poland) and its component parts, the Communist Party of Western Ukraine and the Communist Party of Western Belarus. The communist attitude to the "Eastern borderlands" was identified even in the names of the two latter organizations. Concretely, the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination assumed different specific meanings at different times. Thus, in 1925, following a resolution of the Fifth Comintern Congress, Communists favored the reunification of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus with Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus. After the late 1920s, only general phraseology was used, without identifying any goals and possible consequences.10

*3. Polish-Ukrainian Relations During World War II*

World War II set off one of the most tragic periods in the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations. As the result of dual aggression against Poland by Germany and the USSR and their division in concert of Polish territories on the basis of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, the western Ukrainian lands became part of Soviet Ukraine. This presented the Polish government in London the problem of working out new policy principles on the Ukrainian question.

There were both supporters of the federalist idea, mainly Prometheists, and traditional Endeks in the London government. The government in exile voiced its attitude on the Ukrainian question in a declaration of December 18, 1939, which codified its main foreign policy guidelines. The declaration confirmed in the most general terms the principles of equality and justice for ethnic minorities.11 It also announced Poland's commitment to regain its lost "Eastern borderlands."12

The real choices confronting wartime Poland on how to solve the Ukrainian question came down to the following **/150/** options: deportation of Ukrainians from Poland; real application of the principle "equal rights — equal duties," with freedom for various forms of political, social, and cultural life; a "canton-type" division of territories with simultaneous population transfers; introduction of territorial autonomy.13

Thus the choices remained the same as they had been in 1918-1919. And while certain Polish political groups were prepared to at least take into account the idea of Ukraine's independence in exchange for Ukrainian support in the fight against Germany and the USSR, official policy consisted in the preservation of *status quo ante helium* regarding the Eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic and the Ukrainian question.

Sporadic contacts of the Ukrainian nationalist underground leaders with representatives of the London Poles in 1941-1944 bore no results. Both sides presented totally opposing view. All this led to a bloody Ukrainian-Polish conflict which has poisoned the relations between the two nations up to now. Looking into the reasons for the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation, Yaroslav Pelensky noted, among other things: "There is convincing proof that the Ukrainian nationalist underground intended to 'depolonize' western Ukrainian territories, particularly, through a forced deportation of the Polish population and selective actions of extermination... On the other hand, the Polish government and its armed forces, *i.e.,* AK (Armija Krajowa, Home Army — *Auth.*) did their best to preserve a so-called "state of Polish presence" in the Ukrainian lands and resorted to terrorist and military extermination methods to execute this plan."14 Tens of thousands of peaceful inhabitants fell victim to bloody terror from both sides.

At first glance, Polish left-wing forces under *de facto* communist leadership seemed to take a position totally opposed to that of the London government in exile on the Ukrainian issue. As instruments of Stalinist diplomacy, they, while recognizing the right of nations to self-determination, most approved the annexation of western Ukraine by the USSR. **/151/**

On July 22, 1944, when the Red Army entered Polish territory, Radio Moscow announced the establishment of the Polish National Liberation Committee in Lublin, a provisional government led by Polish Communists and subordinate to Moscow. The Lublin Poles proclaimed in their program manifesto that the problem of the Eastern borderlands would be solved according to the principle: Polish lands to Poland, Ukrainian lands to Soviet Ukraine.15 On July 27, 1944, the USSR government concluded with the Lublin Poles a border agreement which took the Curzon Line (the demarcation line offered by the British in 1919 to settle the Polish-Ukrainian conflict — *Eds.)* as a basis for marking the Soviet-Polish border.16 As early as September 9, 1944, the Lublin Poles and the government of Soviet Ukraine, on orders from the Kremlin, concluded an agreement to exchange populations.17

The Polish communists considered Bolshevik Russia as the guarantor of their existence and the future status quo of Poland in Europe. They supported in every way the idea of revising Poland's western and northern borders at German expense and giving up the non-Polish ethnic territories in the East. The realization of these plans made possible the attainment of the eternal Endek dream, a monoethnic Polish state.

In 1944-1946, a Ukrainian-Polish population exchange was carried out. From September 1945 this process took the form of de facto deportation. The Ukrainians were forcibly removed by the Polish government with the assistance of security forces and three infantry divisions.

*4. "Proletarian Internationalism" as a Method of Ethnic Assimilation*

The results of World War II radically changed the situation in the Ukrainian-Polish relations. Proletarian internationalism became communist Poland's official doctrine in foreign relations and nationality policy. In reality, Poland's **/152/** policy toward Ukrainians was based on non-recognition of their quest for independence goals and on their deliberate assimilation, which was encouraged by Moscow.

As we know, Polish territory after World War II was also a battleground in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's hopeless struggle for an independent Ukraine. To impose a final solution of the Ukrainian problem and quash the Ukrainian national liberation movement, Polish communists carried out the Vistula Operation.18 Up to 140,000 Ukrainians and their families were made subject to the principle of collective responsibility. They were deported from ethnically Ukrainian regions and scattered over the nine North-Western wojwydstwa (regions) with an eye to their final assimilation. Those deported were placed under so-called administrative supervision and denied the rights to free movement and change of residence. Some of these restrictions remained in force up to the 1970s.19

In addition to deportation, Ukrainian ethnic areas also saw the desecration of numerous historical and cultural monuments as well as churches. Over 100 churches were demolished in the Lemko region alone. Also removed were place names which bore witness to the identity of their former inhabitants. Patterned on Stalinist methods, the Vistula Operation largely achieved its goals. Stripped of their land, roots, traditions, and customs, deported Ukrainians lost gradually their ethnocultural identity.

*5. Pro-Ukrainian Attitudes in Polish Society*

In the postwar period, the Polish diaspora became an important source of revising the Polish foreign-policy doctrines and concepts about Ukraine. Along with forces sharing the London government's views on the Ukrainian problem, a number of influential advocates of Ukrainian-Polish dialogue emerged. They include, above all, the Paris-based journal *Kultura* published by Jerzy Gedrojc and the Literary Institute where Ukrainian studies took rather a prominent **/153/** place (let us recall that it published the famous anthology of Ukrainian literature from the 1920s, *The Executed Renaissance,* by Jury Lawrynenko). Jerzy Gedrojc showed understanding of Ukrainian problems and sought opportunities for dialogue even before the war. He never abandoned hope that an independent, democratic and friendly Ukraine would be created in the future, and he saw it his duty to bring about conditions for Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. In the seventies, *Kultura* initiated a joint declaration by well-known Polish and Ukrainian émigrés. It is universally accepted that the Paris-based monthly laid a qualitative foundation for the future dialogue of the two nations and greatly contributed to overcoming anti-Ukrainian prejudices and stereotypes in Polish society.20

In the early 1980s an important role in forming a wellbalanced view of the Ukrainian-Polish relations was assumed by democratic and dissident groupings in Poland itself. They actually acted in line with the views of Paris *Kultura.*

Stereotypes were undoubtedly shattered by *Solidarnosc,* which in 1980-81 assumed the nature of an open, free movement devoid of enmity towards the Other, including neighboring nations. The imposition of martial law only stimulated the activity of the Polish clandestine publishers. The uncensored publication of Kazimierz Podliski's (Bogdan Skaradzinski's) *Belarusians — Lithuanians* — *Ukrainians:* Our Enemies or Brothers? (1983), aimed at demythologizing the Polish awareness of relations with neighbors in the twentieth century, which became a political milestone.

The position of such a well-known dissident grouping as the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) turned out to be pro-Ukrainian. Headed by an old anti-communist Leszek Moczulski, it was moderately nationalistic. The KPN has always attached great strategic importance to ties with Ukraine, counterposing East Europe geopolitically to the West (Western Europe and America) and the East (Russia proper).21 **/154/**

Thus, on the eve of democratic changes in Poland and Ukraine, as Polish communists quit the political arena, they left behind a sizable legacy of anti-Ukrainian complexes and stereotypes. At the same time, headway was being made by pro-Ukrainian doctrines and ideas worked out by dissidents and the Polish intellectual elite in emigration.

*6. The Making of Interstate Relations*

The coming to power in Poland of democratic forces in 1989 and the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991 signalled another radical change in twentieth century Polish-Ukrainian relations. Poland's leaders, political parties, movements, and Polish society as a whole faced the problem of working out a long-term strategy toward a new neighboring state and not just a new position in the so-called "Ukrainian question."

Poland was the first state to recognize Ukrainian independence in December 1991. But even earlier, in the fall of 1989, a group of Polish deputies took part in the First Congress of the Popular Movement (Rukh) of Ukraine. They unreservedly supported the freedom-loving aspirations of the Ukrainian national democrats. It was then that the groundwork for a new pattern of the Polish-Ukrainian relations was laid. An important continuation of the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue was the meeting of parliamentarians in May 1990 at Jablonn near Warsaw. Its effect on Poland's Ukrainian policy is still felt even now.22

The declaration on the principles and guidelines of the Ukrainian-Polish relations signed on October 13, 1990, and the Treaty on Good-Neighborly, Friendly Relations and Cooperation of May 18, 1992, laid a foundation for an equitable strategic partnership between the two states.

There are two most influential political forces in today's Poland, one "pro-European" liberal and the other "anti-European" conservative. Both treat Ukraine quite well.23 Marginal publications, however, do carry revanchist nostal-**/155/**gia such as those of the so-called Borderlands movement or Lovers of L'viv,24 where even territorial pretentions against Ukraine may be found. These articles and publications,represent neither official circles nor an influential political force. Pan-Europeanism is the main guideline in the foreign policy activities of the Polish state and such authoritative political groupings as the Democratic Union, the Center for Understanding and the Liberal Democratic Congress. The concrete and most immediate Polish objective is a full-fledged membership in the European Union and NATO. There are no differences among Polish political forces on this. They believe that today NATO is the only structure which can guarantee security in Europe as a whole. At the same time, Warsaw is interested in the development of ties in the East, in breaking down new barriers in Europe. "One of the main tasks of Polish foreign policy," said Poland's Ambassador to Ukraine Jerzy Kozakiewicz, "is to spread and strengthen various bilateral instruments in our bilateral relations with Ukraine which would facilitate Ukraine's, entry into European institutions."25 Let us recall that Poland offered Ukraine a detailed blueprint of bi- and multilateral military cooperation as part of the Partnership for Peace program. It contains measures in education, the training of specialists, military contacts at various levels, joint field exercises, *etc.* The program is thought by the Poles to be irrefutable evidence of their interest in involving Ukraine into integration processes on the subregional level.26

The leading idea of Polish conservatives is the so-called Inter-Seas movement. Its author is Leszek Moczulski, leader of the Confederation of Independent Poland.27 The main thrust of the idea is that the East European countries between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas should integrate to the maximum extent in order to avoid absorption by either the post-industrial West or chauvinist Russia and thus preserve their own independence and uniqueness. In Moczulski's opinion, Polish-Ukrainian relations are of paramount importance for the implementation of the whole program. **/156/**

The Inter-Seas idea has been enthusiastically echoed in some Ukrainian political circles. Rukh is known to have initiated a few years ago the establishment of a "Black Sea — Baltic Alliance," which is consonant with the "between-theseas" concept as is the "Europa-bis" plan advanced by exPresident Lech Walesa of Poland.

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Polish foreign policy ideas on Ukraine have undergone fundamental changes in the twentieth century, evolving with the turbulent times. The realities of the new postcommunist period determine their qualitatively new content. Polish-Ukrainian relations, despite their complex historical legacy, have irreversibly entered a phase of constructive, pragmatic and mutually beneficial development. The objective strategic national interests of the two states coincide. Free of the outside influences that have deformed them, they can already in the nearest future begin to display their great potential.

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2 Quoted from R. Wapinski, *Narodowa Demokracja. 1893-1939. Ze studiow nod dziejami mysli nacjonalistycznej* (Wroclaw, 1980), p. 42.

3 See the text of the treaty: *The Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies. The Glossary* (Lviv, 1993: in Ukrainian), I, p. 210.

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5 Y.Y. Slyvka, *Western Ukraine in the Reactionary Policies of Polish and Ukrainian Bourgeoisie (1920-1939)* (Kyiv, 1985: in Ukrainian), pp. 104-137.

6 See details: S. Mikulicz, *Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczpospolitej* (Warszawa, 1971).

7 Y.Y. Slyvka, *Op. cit., p.* 142.

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12*Dzieje Polski,* ed. J. Topolskiego (Warszawa, 1976), p. 786.

13 R. Torzeckl, "Kontakty polsko-ukrainskie na tie problemu ukrainskiego w polityce polskiego rzadu emigracyjnego i podziemia (1939-1944), *Dzieje najnowsze,* 1981, No 1-2, pp. 324-327.

14 Yaroslaw Pelenski, "Ukraine in Polish Opposition Publisistics," Kazimierz Podlaski. *Belorussians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians: Our Enemies or Brothers?* (Munich, 1986: in Ukrainian), p. 17.

15 *The Soviet Union and People's Poland, 1944-1974: Documents and Materials* (Moscow, 1974: in Russian), p. 11.

16 *Ibid.,* p.p. 19-20.

17 *Ibid.,* p. 24.

18 See details: *Akcja «Wisla». Dokumenty,* ed. E.Misilo (Warszawa, 1993). In October 1944 in his letter to the Polish emigre government US President Franklin Roosevelt in fact supported the plan of deporting Ukrainians from the Kholm region and Pidlashshia: *Chas,* 73, November 10, 1995 (in Ukrainian).

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20 *Wiez,* 1991, No 11-12, p. 261.

21 Mykola Ryabchuk, "...'May Be Decisive:" Ukrainian-Polish Relations: New Realities, New Prospects," *Polityka i chas,* 1993, VIII, p. 29 (in Ukrainian).

22 *Zustriczi,* 1990, No 3-4, pp. 31-85.

23 Mykola Ryabchuk, "Ukraine and Poland: Old Myths, New Realities," *Rada,* March 4, 1993, (in Ukrainian).

24 See Yaroslav Dashkevych, "Falsification of the Recent History of the Ukrainian People in Modern Poland. (The Societies of *Kresoviaks* and their activities," *Ukrainsky chas* (Lviv, 1991: in Ukrainian), I, pp. 15-19.

25 Jerzy Kozakiewicz, "Moving in a Good and Desirable Direction," *Polityka i chas,* 1996, No. 4, p. 21 (in Ukrainian).

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27 See *Suchasnist,* 1992, Ns 7.

Ukraine in Hungarian Plans and Doctrines

## *Mykola DERZHALYUK*

The main elements of the Hungarian national idea, as it took shape in the nineteenth century, were intolerance to Slavdom, Pan-Slavism, and Daco-Rumanianism, preservation of a united and indivisible Hungary, the determination not to allow its transformation into a federal state or the ethnic minorities' winning autonomy, securing Magyar hegemony within historical Hungary, and seeking compromise with the Habsburgs against the national aspirations of the Slavic and Romanian peoples.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49 exacerbated interethnic rivalries in the Habsburg lands. Lajos Kossuth's plans to create a unitary, monolingual state in the historic Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen (historic Hungary: contemporary Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, the Serbian Voevodina, Rumanian Transylvania, and Ukrainian Transcarpathia) were opposed by indigenous Slavs and Rumanians. Thus, when the Compromise of 1867 created the Dual Monarchy and ceded the Magyar aristocracy home rule in these lands, an integral part of the official Hungarian national idea was to at all costs avoid the danger of parts of the Kingdom ever falling under non-Magyar rule and to artificially safeguard the dominance of the Magyar national element. **/158/**

*1. Hungarian Statehood and the Ukrainian Question in the First Third of the Twentieth Century*

Beginning with the second half of the nineteenth century, Hungary pursued a policy of purposeful Magyarization and denationalization of subject nations and nationalities. In the period between 1860 and 1914, 200,000 Rusyns/Ukrainians living along the Tisza river and in the region of Zemplin were Magyarized. By the turn of this century, all urban centers in the Carpathian region had lost their national identity and been transformed into centers of Hungarian culture and the Magyarization of the Hungarian Kingdom's eastern regions. From the beginning of the twentieth century the Orthodox liturgy was conducted only in Latin, the number of schools with instruction in the Rusyn language dropped to 14 percent, while Rusyns in the region accounted for 70 percent of the population. Under the Apponyi law, from 1907 on all Rusyn schools were to be closed without exception, book publishing in Rusyn was prohibited, and in schools the Latin alphabet supplanted Cyrillic. However, the forced assimilation and the desire to "simplify" the national and ethnic situation faced powerful resistance from the Rumanian and Slavic peoples and this became the catalyst for anti-Habsburg and anti-Hungarian movements.

The 1918-1919 revolution in Austria-Hungary gave birth to new political and national aspirations: Hungarians, Ukrainians, and other Slavs struggled to establish their own independent states, while the Rumanians of Transylvania joined Rumania. Precisely in 1919-1920 relations between Hungary and Ukraine developed most rapidly.

The Ukrainian question was first raised in Hungary at a state level and as a separate problem of Eastern Europe early in 1918 in connection with the proclamation of independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and the signing on February 9, 1918, of the Brest-Litovsk Peace **/159/** Treaty with the Central Powers, including Austria-Hungary. Under the Treaty, Ukraine was recognized only within nine provinces which were broken away from the Russian state. Ukraine's attempts in 1918 to make Austria-Hungary cede Galicia, Bukovina, the Kholm region, Bessarabia, and Transcarpathia to Ukraine, where the Ukrainians were a majority, was fiercely resisted by the Habsburg monarchy, which denied Ukrainians in those regions their right to selfdetermination.

Unlike Hungary, Austria took a more moderate stand on the Ukrainian question. Since Habsburg's eastern policy was determined by Hungary, the latter's position on Ukraine was decisive for Vienna. Budapest's policy was based on the assumption that the emergence and existence of a Ukrainian state would be a dangerous precedent for the multinational monarchy. A concept of the inviolability of Austria-Hungary's eastern borders, worked out by the Hungarian government in April 1918, became the cornerstone of Vienna's position on the Ukrainian question. Accordingly, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine were regarded as especially threatening nations. Ukraine was considered the potentially greatest menace and rival, for in its striving to unify its ethnic territories into a single state it threatened the eastern borders of Austria-Hungary. In contrast to those three countries, and especially Ukraine, Hungary most actively favored the revival of Poland, which it hoped would extend its borders as far as possible to the East, deep inside the Ukrainian lands, thus helping to play down Ukraine's claims on Galicia, Bukovina, and, especially, Transcarpathia.

In the period of the people's democratic and socialist republics in Hungary in 1918-1919, Hungarian-Ukrainian relations became more equal. Hungary responded positively to the forming of an independent Ukrainian state, although the two countries failed to agree on the Transcarpathian issue. The Hungarian side (M. Karolyi, S. Garbalyi, and B. Kun) insisted in 1919 on the official recognition of Transcarpathia as part of the Hungarian Republic in the **/160/** form of autonomy proclaimed on December 21, 1918, while Ukraine stated that it would have no objection if Transcarpathia's Rusyns/Ukrainians decided to join Ukraine. As is known, in accordance with the Entente's decision of May 8, 1919, Transcarpathian Ukraine, despite the fact that Rusyns accounted for 68 percent of the population, Hungarians — 19%, while Czechs and Slovaks comprised only 3-4%, became part of Czechoslovakia, and this was incorporated into the Trianon Peace Treaty of June 4, 1920.

Disregarding the unresolved problem of Transcarpathia, Hungary in 1918-1919 viewed the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) among its most important allies, and the Ukrainian issue for the first time became one of the top priorities on Hungary's foreign policy agenda. S.Garbalyi's socialist government supported the unification of socialists and communists, in order to act jointly in the interests of the Ukrainian people. In the spring of 1919, the Hungarian socialist government put forward a proposal for joint talks between the Ukrainian Directory, Soviet Ukraine, and the West Ukrainian People's Republic on how to unite Ukraine and Galicia into a single socialist state and to form a Ukrainian coalition government, consisting of representatives of Ukraine's left forces headed by Social Democrats. This good-faith Hungarian initiative on the Ukrainian question failed, for Soviet Russia refused to recognize the independent Ukrainian socialist state and imposed communist rule on Ukraine by force.

The Treaty of Trianon proved to be the most unjust peace accord of the Versailles system, and it is small wonder that in Hungary there was not one political force which thought otherwise.

Hungary began to actively seek international support to review the Trianon Treaty, courting this time only influential forces and nations, while the unpromising Ukrainian question was ignored. Admiral Horthy was quick in deciding to trade off the Ukrainian national liberation struggle in **/161/** 1919-1921, and as early as 1923-1924 there were signs of a secret Russo-Hungarian rapprochement to exert joint pressure on Rumania. This led to an automatic suspension of the *de-facto* recognition of the UNR mission in Budapest which had been active there from 1918 until 1924.1 From that time on, the Ukrainian question was crossed off the Hungarian foreign policy agenda until the Munich crisis of 1938. In that period Ukraine was viewed only within the framework of general Russian or Polish affairs. And in those cases, when the Ukrainian liberation struggle forced Hungary to define its position with regard to Ukraine (the late 1930s), it took an anti-Ukrainian stand, for any strengthening of Ukrainian forces ran counter Hungary's designs to dominate the region.

Starting in the 1920s, a separate policy line toward Ukraine gradually took shape, and study began of the history of the Ukrainian nation and liberation movements. Hungary was especially concerned with the fact that the Ukrainian national idea won recognition in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, had a firm basis in Galicia, Transcarpathia, and that this movement had been supported by Germany and Austria. In the interwar period, Transcarpathian thought was dominated by the idea of the Carpathian region as the Piedmont of the Ukrainian liberation struggle and guarantor of Ukrainian statehood. As never before, the Hungarian irredendist striving to review the Trianon Treaty clashed with the goals of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The Ukrainian idea stood in the way of Hungary's bringing Transcarpathia back to the bosom of historical Hungary.

Hungarian observers unanimously pointed out that the major reason for the fall of the 1918-1921 Ukrainian state was an unfavorable international situation: Russia, Poland, and the Entente had actively worked against it.

Hungarians began to envision the development of the Ukrainian perspective in the direction favorable to Hungary: since after the fall of the Ukrainian People's Republic **/162/** Ukraine had been partitioned by the Entente and Russia and distributed among the Allies (Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania), these powers would do everything possible to prevent the formation of a single Ukraine.

None of these countries would welcome a solution of the Ukrainian question, for the objective of the all-Ukrainian movement was to reunite Russian-ruled Ukraine, Galicia, Transcarpathia, Bukovina, and other lands, tightly held by other nations, into a single state.2 The Ukrainian movement, whatever colors it might assume, was regarded in Hungary as a peculiar manifestation of Pan-Slavism, hostile to Hungary, Poland, and Romania rather than a national liberation struggle. Specifically, such Hungarian politicians as I. Egrita and I. Fenczik argued that this movement would clash in the future with Hungarian interests in the Carpathians, and hence that Hungary could not support it, even if it were supported by Germany and Austria: "A Ukrainian state, whether in alliance with Germany or independent, means harm and danger for Hungary."3

Particular attention was focused on the Carpathian region, which had for centuries been a natural and political bulwark protecting Hungarian and Polish interests against Russian Pan-Slavism.

The administrative, religious, land, and school reforms undertaken in Transcarpathia in 1924-1926 completely undermined the dominance of the Hungarian landed gentry, Catholicism, the Hungarian language and culture, and thereby fostered processes of Ukrainian national revival. Due to the Ukrainization of the region, most of the 750,000 Carpathian Rusyns became aware of their Ukrainian national identity. After a millennium of dominance of the Hungarian idea of the integrity of the Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen, this constituted a watershed event. Czechoslovakia's pro-Ukrainian reforms in what was then known as Subcarpathian Rus' called forth official Hungarian protest, for they were actually directed against Hungary. In **/163/** labeling the Ukrainization of the region "Bolshevization," Hungary argued on the international arena that Czechoslovak reforms actually facilitated the expansion of communism and Russian Pan-Slavism in Central Europe.

The most serious blow to Hungarian interests in the Carpathian region, was dealt by the 1924-1925 agrarian and school reforms. Huge expanses of land previously owned by Hungarians (over 1.6 million hectares) were redistributed to Slovaks and Rusyns who en masse left mountainous areas and settled on the plains among Hungarians. The introduction of largely Ukrainian and Rusyn language schools in the region (whose share increased from 14 to 74 percent) transformed the Transcarpathian Rusyns into nationally conscious Ukrainians committed to the idea of creating a Ukrainian state, while pro-Hungarian forces in the late 1930s lost their local dominance. It was no accident that political circles in Hungary resorted to active confrontation, which became "one of the most important foreign policy tasks"4 and undertook to refine their policies in the Ukrainian question.

The new approach consisted in extensive dissemination in the Carpathians of Rusyn ideology and propaganda, which might drive a wedge between nationally (Ukrainian) and locally (Rusyn) oriented elements of the local Slavs. Rusyns were also set apart from Galicians and Ukrainians as a whole, for, ostensibly, they had developed as distinctly different nations. Russians and Ukrainians living in the USSR were treated as the bearers of Bolshevism, and Galician Ukrainians — as an offshoot of the Polish ethnic group. It was maintained that Rusyns in the Carpathians should be identified as a separate nationality which objectively gravitated toward Hungary.

In interwar Hungarian geopolitical doctrines, the Carpathian region (Transcarpathia and Galicia) were to remain only in the hands of Hungary and Poland, because Hungarian politicians maintained that the two countries constituted the only indomitable defenders of European civi-**/164/**lization and Christianity from Eastern barbarians, Turkey and Russia, at the crossroads of the cultures of Europe and Asia. In the mid-1930s Hungarian Prime Minister G. Gambesz emphasized that Hungarians defended not only themselves but also the whole of the higher European civilization. Along with the Polish people, Hungarians had been created by God "for the mission of guiding and ruling over the Oriental races."5 Only if Poland agreed to the establishment of a Ukrainian state as a buffer between it and Russia, would Hungary support it as long as it served Polish interests.

*2. Hungarian Geopolitical Strategy During the World War II*

In 1938-1941 Hungarian approaches to the Ukrainian question were imbued with a caution born from taking into account German strategy. Its major points were to recover Transcarpathia, to come to a rapprochement and even alliance with Ukraine, if such a state should arise due to German assistance, for such a Ukraine would be a German protectorate. Budapest also realized that Ukraine, should it gain Soviet Ukraine, would be stronger than the entire Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia). Thus, Ukraine could become an ally of Hungary, in order to jointly confront the latter. Warnings were voiced against opposing the establishing of a Ukrainian state, for its population of 35-40 million would overcome all obstacles and, hence, it would be wiser to form an alliance with Ukraine from the very beginning of its existence.6 However, this vision of Ukraino-Hungarian friendship was not to be realized.

In 1938-1939, the major objective of Hungary's strategy became to seek review its northeastern borders and to recover its historical lands in Slovakia and the Carpathian region. The Munich crisis dramatically stimulated political processes in this part of Europe. In October 1938, a powerful political organization — the Ukrainian National "Associ-**/165/**ation (UNA), headed by A. Voloshyn and F. Revai — was formed in Transcarpathia. The UNA proclaimed as its goal the creation of a Carpatho-Ukrainian state, united all nationally conscious forces in the region, distanced itself from Czech, Hungarian, and Russian interests, and made the idea of Ukrainian statehood and national independence the sole motivation of its activities. On March 15, 1939, in Khust the Transcarpathian Soym (Parliament) proclaimed the independence of the Carpatho-Ukraine according to the principles of the 1918 Ukrainian People's Republic. On that same day, Hungarian troops invaded and within a few weeks annexed the Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary. The heroic resistance of the less than 15,000 Carpathian Sich riflemen to the offensive of the 150,000-men regular Hungarian army had been doomed from the outset. The drawing of a common border with Poland "became the highest achievement of Hungary in central Europe."7

The annexation of the Carpathian region by Hungary, as was held in Budapest, "ushered in a new millennium of the Hungarian-Rusyn fraternity" and did away with the twenty years of Czech and five months of Ukrainian dominance in the region, for, allegedly, Rusyns had nothing in common with Ukrainians except for the fact that both peoples were Slavic. Between them stood "the solid insurmountable wall of a millennium of Magyar-Rusyn fraternal history."8

The struggle to join Carpathian Rus' to Hungary was waged under slogans of autonomy for the region, but in the summer of 1940 this phrase was discarded, for Hungary found itself in close proximity to the USSR, and the potential threat increased: it was one matter to speak of Carpathian Rus' autonomy with Poland as one's neighbor and quite another matter to deal with a USSR that had gained access to the Carpathians.

In 1939-1944, the cultural and spiritual life of the Czechoslovak period came to a standstill, and all Ukrainian organizations which professed the Ukrainian idea and the unification of all Ukrainian lands were eventually dissolved. **/166/** All activities of communist, Ukrainian nationalist, and Sich riflemen organizations were banned as well, and their members were to be arrested and banished from the region, supplanted by newly-organized Hungarian and Ruthenian organizations which spoke for inviolable unity with Hungary and to whom any thought of the common ancestry of Rusyns and other Ukrainians was alien.

The Soviet reality which confronted Hungarian soldiers and politicians during World War II, largely on the territory of Ukraine, served only to reinforce their certainty of the barbarity of Russian Bolshevism. They had never seen a more depressing picture anywhere. After the Stalinist inquisition of the 1930s, Ukraine was in a terrible state. A nation of forty million, so much spoken about in Europe, seemed to have vanished altogether. The Bolsheviks seemed to have exterminated all Ukrainians capable of building a nation. "Now," M.Kosma, Horthy's Transcarpathian representative, told the local population in the autumn of 1941, "nothing is left of the Ukrainian nation, except the mass of people, utterly deprived of its brain-center and national leaders." After the torments inflicted by Russia, one could hardly speak about a Ukrainian national liberation movement in Soviet Ukraine. Under the circumstances, it was argued, Rusyns who had lived 700 years in the Hungarian state had only one option: to flee to the Carpathians to seek asylum there and under the Hungarian flag find refuge from extermination by the Russians. For if Rusyns had found themselves under the power of Russian or Ukrainian Bolshevism, they would have been quickly assimilated because of their linguistic proximity and the small size of their population.9

Hungary's active participation in the German war against the USSR was primarily motivated by its interests in Ukraine, specifically in destroying the USSR along with the elimination of the Slavic threat and consolidating Hungary's position in the region.

Hungary attained its military and political objectives primarily on ethnically Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainians' **/167/** very presence in and proximity to the Hungarians led the latter to view the Ukrainian ethnic group in the Carpathians as a threat to Hungarian interests, especially given their being on opposite sides in the war.

The Hungarian government several times (in 1940 — 1942) analyzed a General Staff proposal to resettle the Carpathorusyns to Galicia or deep inside Hungary, but no decision was made. Until mid-1942, Hungary attempted to bisect Galicia into two parts: a southern one to be annexed, while leaving the north to Germany. This was planned in order to reinforce the security of Hungary's eastern borders and to weaken Galicia as a stronghold of the Ukrainian liberation struggle exerting great influence over the Transcarpathian Rusyns. In July 1942, Berlin refused to approve the project. These and other problems hinged on the outcome of the war against the USSR, and their solution was postponed until the postwar period.10

In the course of the war, over 900,000 Hungarian soldiers and officers were stationed or passed through the territory of Ukraine, half of Hungary's Armed Forces. Hungarian wartime military-political ideas were effected largely on ethnic Ukrainian lands. The defense of the lower Carpathians (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Transcarpathia) by the 320,000 strong First Hungarian Army from April until October 1944 was the most hard fought and serious battle during the final stage of the war.

For the first time, Hungarians used to their advantage the confrontation between the Russian and Ukrainian ideas. In the first half of 1944 the Hungarian military concluded a neutrality agreement with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Western Ukraine, and in July 1944 signed an accord with the UPA proving for a truce between them and mutual assistance in the struggle against their common enemy, Bolshevik Russia.

The UPA general order No. 896 (July 1944) explained the reason for this military-political armistice. In exchange for Hungarian military assistance, the UPA High Command **/168/** publicly announced the establishment of good-neighbor relations with Hungary at the price of ceding Carpathian Ukraine. The Hungarian side had agreed to give arms and medicine to UPA detachments and signed a peace accord with the UPA leadership only because the UPA recognized Carpathian Ukraine as part of Hungary. "One cannot fight insanely over a tiny plot of land (the Carpathian region)," the order stated, "and simultaneously give away our sacred Motherland, territorially larger than France, to Moscow."11

However, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council formed in July 1944 rejected the UPA High Command decision that there were no territorial claims against Hungary and issued a statement recognizing "the right of any people to its own state on its ethnographic lands."12

The destiny of Transcarpathia was decided in June 1945 (as in 1919) by the victorious powers — this time in favor of the Ukrainian SSR, taking into account the numerical superiority of the Transcarpathian Rusyns over Hungarians and Slovaks.

Hungary lost 1.3 million people, and all annexed territories were returned to neighboring countries, in accordance with the 1920 Trianon Treaty. Hungary also lost its influence on the territories of all its neighbors. A third of all Hungarians found themselves outside Hungary.

The victorious Soviet Union drew its western borders and policies in East Central Europe in its own interests. Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia, Bessarabia and the Ismail region were transferred to Soviet Ukraine. As in East Central Europe as a whole, a Soviet-type socialist regime was established in Hungary.

After the war, only few well-known scholars and men of letters (G. Szaroz, F. Glac, I. Czurka) openly sought foundations for realizing the Hungarian national state idea in the new situation, while the political system very quickly discarded its former ideals and rather slowly elaborated new spiritual principles of Hungarian existence. On the international arena, Hungary did not raise any question which could run counter **/169/** to the interests of the neighboring countries or threaten the inviolability of their borders. Meanwhile, internally the political elite tried to find a way out of their desperate situation. Hungarians maintained that the unjust 1920 Trianon Treaty was in fact renewed in 1947 on even worse terms, and they could not reconcile themselves to it.

*3. Hungarian Policy Toward Independent Ukraine*

Its wartime national catastrophe compelled Hungary to radically review its former policies and change its strategy. In the second half of the twentieth century, Hungary gradually repudiated its interwar blunders, rejected the concept of an armed revision of borders, discarded the goal of forming a Hungarian state within the "St. Stephen" framework, and began to actively seek reconciliation with Slavdom, Rumanians, and to overcome the legacy of official anti-Semitism.

Only in the 1990s, after its social system had been transformed and a new democratic order established, did Hungary begin to shape a truly independent foreign policy. Its most essential elements are recognition of inviolability of borders, reciprocity, the integration of Hungary into the European Union, the wish for rapprochement with and eventual entry into NATO, and the protection of Hungarian minority rights only through mechanisms of international law.

Despite the fact that Hungary has renounced its interwar irredentism, there are still serious problems in its relations with Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia. These have to do with the fact that, while recognizing the established state borders, Hungary does not consider the conditions facing Hungarian minorities in these countries satisfactory, defends the rights to national and cultural development for all the fifteen million Hungarians distributed among six foreign countries, and tries to prevent the assimilation of its former compatriots.

Current Hungarian-Ukrainian relations are qualitatively different. Hungary recognized, without reservation, Ukraini-**/170/**an independence and was the first neighboring countries to sign an Agreement on the Fundamentals of Good-Neighbor Relations and Partnership on December 6, 1991, thus far the only important bilateral document between Hungary and a neighboring state. In it both parties recognized the mutual inviolability of their borders, pledged to provide each other mutual assistance in case of aggression against either by a third state, and to participate in the protection of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities in accordance with international agreements. This sound Hungarian-Ukrainian partnership is due to the favorable conditions the Hungarian ethnic minority enjoys in Transcarpathia which, in the opinion of Hungarian spokesmen, are much better than those Hungarians face in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia.

Politicians in popular-democratic Hungary consistently emphasize that "Ukraine's independence, as well as that of other new countries of Europe, should be safeguarded at all costs. Hungary will not profit by destabilization of the situation in any neighboring state or the restoration of the USSR which would again become our neighbor."13

Very indicative is Budapest's presumption that as the Ukrainian state becomes stronger, it will be a staunch ally of Hungary in defending the interests of the Hungarian ethnic minority and developing integrative processes in Europe. A strong and stable Ukraine, allied with Europe, would be in a position to exert greater influence in overcoming the injustices arising from the division of the Hungarian, nation: in this direction the partnership between Ukraine and Hungary has a bright future and is bound to grow stronger.

Hungary has of late made efforts to play, together with Ukraine, a mediator's role in the rapprochement between Germany and Russia as the major factors influencing the future of Europe. With the impulse toward integration dominant on the continent, Hungary and Ukraine are committed to jointly supporting the processes of European integration.

1 *Magyar Orszàgos Levéltàr (MOL. K-28, 1926. L, 5272. 2,3, 6. old.*

2 I. Fencsik, *Kàrpàtoroszok multja éis jelen,* (Pécs, 1939), 6, 12. old.

3 I. Egry, "Magyarorszag es Ukrania," *A Cél,* 1939, marcius, 73, 76. old.

4 L. Ruttkay, "Az ukràn mozgalom es a Ruténföld," *Magyar Szemle,* 1931, № 4, 376. old.

5 *Magyarorszàg és Lengyelorszàg. Bp.* (Warszawa, 1936), 83. old.

6 M. Kozma, *Beszédek, cikkek, elöadàsok, nyilatkozatok. 1940-1941. Bp.,* 1942, 145. old.; *Turmezei L. Az ukràn kérdés magyar szempontjai. Bp.,* 1939, 8. old.; MOL K.-28, 1940, 225. t.-p-21800.

7 *Uj Magyarsàg,* 1939. marc. 17., 2. old.

8 *M0L. K*-28, 1940-E-15363, 22, 24. old.

9 M. Kozma, Uo. 145, 185, 195. old.

10 *Hadtörtenelmi Intézet Levéltàra* /HIL/. VKF. I. o., 1942. 5121/eln., 277. d., 46-47. old.; Uo. 5311/eln. **/407/** 278. d., 52-55. old.

11 *HIL. Rdplapgyuteminy,* 1944, 1Y. 312. sz.

12 *UPA Annals,* Vol. I (Kyiv, 1995: in Ukrainian), p. 132.

13 *Uj Magyarorszag,* 1994, februar 18., 3. old.I.

Ukraine and the Ukrainian Question in Czechoslovak Policy

## *Stepan VIDNYANSKY*

The Czechoslovak state that emerged in October 1918 with Entente support brought together the territories of the historic Czech lands, Slovakia, Hungarian- and Ukrainian-populated areas as well as Transcarpathian Ukraine, which had never been connected with the Czechoslovak state historically or ethnically.1

This posed before the Czechoslovak Republic serious foreign-policy problems, in particular, that of asserting of the principle of territorial inviolability in Europe on the basis of the 1919 Versailles peace accord. This explains not only the foreign policy of the young Czechoslovak state but also for its attitude to the political aspirations of other neighboring nations. It is no accident that, well before the Czechoslovak Republic declared its independence, one of its founders, Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Benes stressed in a memorandum to the Entente governments the special geopolitical position of the future state in Central Europe from which it was possible "to exert a direct influence on Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland and, and hence on Russia and Ukraine." He also emphasized the importance of his country in thwarting the Bolshevik threat from the east.2

One of the main components of the Czechoslovak Republic's (CSR) foreign policy from the start was its policy on Ukraine proper.

This policy would undergo changes influenced by vari-**/172/**ous circumstances and determined to a great extent by the overall attitude Czechoslovakia's leaders and politicians toward the Ukrainian question, Ukrainian statehood, and Ukrainians in general. At the same time, it also largely depended on the attitude toward Ukraine of the Entente, the participants of the Paris peace conference, on the developments in Russia and the Ukrainian lands, on the policies of Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Germany on Ukraine, and, finally, on which trend in the CSR political circles had the upper hand — the pro-Russian, imperial one (Karel Kramar and his allies) or the one sympathizing with the natural cultural aspirations and statehood ideas of the Ukrainians (Tomas Masaryk, Benes *et al.)* which became dominant in the 1920s.

*1. The Establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Ukrainian Question*

An important moral and political factor in the development of Czechoslovak-Ukrainian relations was that during World War I Ukraine may played the most important role in the history of Czechoslovak national liberation movement. Suffice it to remember that it was in 1916 in Kyiv that the Alliance of the Czechoslovak Committees in Russia held the session of its leadership and the congresses of its delegates; Kyiv hosted the main branch of the Czechoslovak National Council — the nation's highest representative body and prototype of the future Czechoslovak government — as well as the headquarters of the Czechoslovak Army and its reserve battalions. And, finally, it is in Ukraine, in Kyiv that the first future President of the Czechoslovak Republic Tomas Masaryk spent more than four months.

Masaryk supported the Ukrainian people's national liberation aspirations and actively cooperated with Hrushevsky, Vynnychenko, Petliura, Shulhyn, and other *Central Rada* figures, thus helping to lay the foundations of Czechoslovak-Ukrainian relations. **/173/**

The Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) was recognized by the Czechoslovak National Council and accordingly by the Czechoslovak Legions on Ukrainian territory.

Masaryk's favorable attitude toward Central Rada changed to negative after the latter issued its Fourth Universal and Ukraine signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers, for Ukraine had concluded a peace treaty with and turned for help to the Czechs' main enemies, whose defeat was necessary in order to create an independent Czechoslovakia. In addition, the complete independence of Ukraine ran counter to Masaryk's views on the solution to the Ukrainian problem and the postwar New Europe.

Masaryk was in general quite familiar with the Ukrainian affairs, first of all, thanks to joint political activities with the Galician representatives in the 1907-1911 Viennese parliament, friendly relations with Ivan Franko and other prominent Ukrainians, and his scholarly interest he evinced in Slavic problems, especially, in the histories of Russia and Poland. He acknowledged essential differences between "Little Russians" and "Great Russians" and the ethnic and geographic unity of "Little Russians" and "Ruthenians" divided by the political borders, referred to Ukrainians as the largest oppressed nation, sympathized with their national liberation sentiments, and showed understanding of the ethnic, cultural, political, and independence-seeking aspirations of the Ukrainian people. Masaryk always stressed that the Ukrainian question was not only linguistic but also political and cultural. He usually interpreted it in an overall Slavic context, with due account of the true content, strengths, and weaknesses of the Ukrainian movement as compared to other Slavic nations, and believed that the viability and real forces of each nation that determined its essence.3 From this perspective, Masaryk could not imagine Ukraine as a fully independent state. In his opinion, the Ukrainian problem was, in any case, to be settled politically in the form of a state alliance (self-government, autonomy, **/174/** federation) with Russia, the latter becoming democratic as soon as possible. He looked on this federation as a barrier to pan-Germanism and thought that Ukraine's political independence would cause a new split among the Slavs, weaken Russia's power as the main counterweight to the panGermanic threat to the Slavic nations, and put independent Ukraine under such strong German influence that would in fact be a colony. It is for this reason that Masaryk said frankly after the proclamation of Central Rada's IV Universal: "We recognized Ukraine when it proclaimed itself a state as part of a federative Russia in the Third Universal. We could not accept it from a Czech and Slavic point of view... We recognized Ukraine as part of Russia and thought that Ukraine would still be fighting. But the IV Universal states that there will be no war, there will be peace, with Austro-Hungary in particular... I must say, since I am empowered to do so, that I am not prepared to recognize an independent Ukraine outside Russia as a legitimate political entity. It is a clear challenge to my opinion. To break up Russia is, to my mind, merely to work for Prussia."4

Reflecting on the postwar "reconstruction of Eastern Europe and the necessity of establishing new states, Masaryk returned to the future of the Ukrainian people: "...the Hungarian Little Russians (Transcarpathian Ukrainians — *Auth.*) desire to become an autonomous part of the Czechoslovak state... The Little Russians in Galicia and Bukovina will decide on their future and, in particular, their attitude to Poland and Ukraine... Russia will be united as a federation of nations. Ukraine will be an autonomous part of Russia, for the attempt to gain independence has shown the Ukrainians that their separation from Russia leaves them subjugated to the Germans..."3

Official Czechoslovak foreign policy did not support the so-called Ukrainian separation when it was the question of Dnipro Ukraine. A similar position was also held over the West Ukrainian lands including Eastern Galicia: the CSR **/175/** did not recognize officially the government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR). Yet, Czechoslovakia did not accept Poland's claims to Eastern Galicia and acknowledged the right of the latter to unify with other Ukrainian lands and thus also become a component part of a Russian democratic federation. Czechoslovak political and especially economic circles were much interested in shifting Russia's frontier towards the Carpathians and drawing a common Czechoslovak-Russian border.6

Czechoslovak foreign policy on the Ukrainian question at the end of and after World War One was careful and well-balanced because it was largely shaped by the victorious Entente attitude towards a "united and indivisible Russia," for, as Benes, head of the Czechoslovak delegation head at the Paris peace conference, states, "none of the allies wanted an independent Ukrainian state, there was a desire to accept, as a last resort, the formation of a Russian federation with Ukraine as an autonomous entity."7

*2. The Development of Bilateral Relations*

Geographic proximity of Czechoslovakia and Ukraine, the political interests and economic requirements of the neighboring nations objectively motivated the development of mutual economic ties. Professor S. Dnistriansky, an active champion of the Czech-Ukrainian rapprochement, said in 1919 that "a predominantly bread-producing Ukraine and a predominantly industrial Czechoslovakia could mutually complement each other and are destined to do so."8 A still more resolute opinion to this effect was voiced in 1922 by the journal Nova Ukraina published in Prague. "The demands of the Ukrainian economy are so great," said the editorial "Ukraine and Czechoslovakia," "that Ukraine cannot do without international exchanges or aid in the nearest future. Ukraine may be satisfied with the nature of the Czech industry. The capital Ukraine needs can come only from Czechoslovakia."9 **/176/**

Czechoslovak ruling circles tried to establish close political and economic relations with both East and West Ukrainian governments. This is witnessed by the exchange of diplomatic missions between Czechoslovakia and the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) (late 1918) and between the CSR and UNR Directory in 1919. Although unofficial, they worked actively in the field of Ukrainian-Czechoslovak cooperation, especially economic.10 The relations between Czechoslovakia and ZUNR, which held an important place in the CSR's foreign-policy doctrine with due account of Czechoslovak-Polish differences and rivalries (for example, many Czechoslovak officers served in the ZUNR army with the consent of the CSR government), also displayed still more clearly the economic aspects of cooperation.

While officially Czechoslovakia took no position toward Eastern Galicia (though Czechoslovak political and economic circles supported and cooperated with ZUNR and favored its unification with the other Ukrainian lands as part of a federative Russia thus drawing a common CzechoslovakRussian border) the same cannot be said of ZUNR. Certain political, especially Russophile, circles of West Ukrainian society had discussed as early as late 1918 the possibility of handing over Transcarpathia and the Lemko region to Czechoslovakia as autonomous entities.11

The question of reviving ZUNR and establishing a federation between Eastern Galicia and the Czechoslovak Republic was also raised late in 1919 by Ukrainian imigris in the CSR on an official level and in the fall of 1920 by the Ukrainian National Council in the USA before the Entente.12 This complicated the Czechoslovak-Polish relations and was used by Czechoslovak diplomacy in difficult negotiations with Poland over a common border and potential utilization of its territory for exporting Czechoslovak goods to the Eastern markets. It is no accident that in December 1919 CSR President Masaryk had to assure Polish Ambassador Malkiewski in Prague that Czechoslova-**/177/**kia was no longer interested in fixing a common border with Russia and would be content to have a common border with Romania which came into being after joining the Transcarpation territory to the CSR and was of parlament importance for fulfilling Czechoslovak plans of creating a "Little Entente."13

Proceeding from its main foreign policy goal of consolidating of the correlation of forces established after World War One in Central and South-Eastern Europe, the ruling circles of Czechoslovakia largely welcomed the end of the Soviet-Polish war and signing of the Treaty of Riga in 1921 as settling a most complicated problem of the postwar order in Eastern Europe. Soon thereafter relations with Poland were normalized: October 1921 saw the signing of the Czechoslovak-Polish treaty on neutrality and giving up mutual post-war claims as well as an additional secret protocol concerning, above all, the fate of Western Ukraine. According to those documents, the Czechoslovak government, inter alia, in fact approved the seizure of Western Ukraine by Poland and confirmed Poland's eastern borders established by the Riga treaty. It promised political support on the international arena for Poland's claims to Eastern Galicia and abandoned cooperation with the ZUNR government in exile headed by Petrushevych.14 This political act in fact drew the line at Czechoslovakia's official policy and relations with Ukrainian independent state entities, the UNR and ZUNR governments.

From then on the Czechoslovak government, while still remaining a firm opponent of the Soviet state and assuming a wait-and-see position on toward it, was compelled to gradually change its Eastern policy under the pressure of international circumstances (the Genoa Conference, the beginning of the end of Soviet Russia's foreign political isolation, *etc.)* and domestic CSR financial and industrial circles promoted economic and diplomatic rapprochement between the two states. Soviet Ukraine was recognized de facto by Czechoslovakia in May 1921 when M. Levytsky visited **/178/** Prague as head of a Soviet Ukrainian trade mission and Czechoslovak representative V. Benes visited Kharkiv. After lengthy negotiations, an interim trade agreement was signed on June 6, 1922, between Soviet Ukraine and the CSR, which opened broad opportunities for mutually-beneficial economic cooperation.

It should be noted that this agreement was not purely commercial: on the insistence of the Ukrainian side it also included political clauses. The agreement's preamble stated the necessity of keeping neutrality in case of a conflict of one of the parties with a third state. Article I envisaged the establishment of "an independent representation of each State in the other State." At the same time, the governments pledged to break official relations with various offices, representations, organizations, and persons "which are aimed at working against the government of the other State." "It is true," said the Report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in October 1922, "that this interim agreement leaves open the question of de jure recognition of Soviet power, but it grants representations of the Contracting Parties all the rights and privileges of diplomatic corps and regards them as the only representations of one state in the other. In this respect, the agreement signifies the de facto recognition of Soviet power."15

The change in the Czechoslovak policy on the Ukrainian question are also reflected in the memorandum of the UNR diplomatic mission head in Prague M. Slavynsky to the UNR government on January 15, 1921: "In this time, when any return to the old order on the territory of former Russia is becoming all the more impossible, ...the highest Czech official, public and political circles nurture the idea of transition from the current wait-and-see neutrality and even indifference over to active policy on the Ukrainian issue."16

Indeed, the so-called Ukrainian question was very high on the Czechoslovak foreign policy agenda in 1921-1922. In addition to establishing economic ties with Soviet Ukraine, **/179/** the development of mutually-beneficial contacts between foreign-trade organizations, export firms and businesses of the two republics, it also included Czechoslovakia's active participation in rendering aid to the 1921 — 1922 famine victims in Ukraine as well as in solving the problem of refugees (Ukrainian émigrés) in the CSR.

However, the broad opportunities for CzechoslovakUkrainian relations, trade, and rapprochement created at the end of and immediately after World War One narrowed, and after the formation of the USSR the term "Ukraine" altogether disappeared from the CSR foreign-policy concepts and doctrines.

*3. Ukrainians in the CSR, the Problems of Transcarpathian Rus*

Yet, in the 1920s and 1930s the so-called Ukrainian question remained pressing for Czechoslovakia, its President and government, but this time in the domestic, rather than foreign, policy. This period witnessed a major problem of the attitude to Ukrainians who had found themselves in the Czechoslovak Republic following the dramatic events of World War One. Here the question concerned Czechoslovak policies toward the 400,000 "Ruthenians" in Transcarpathia which was handed over in 1919 to the CSR under the name of Subcarpathian Rus by decision of the Paris peace conference, as well as about 20,000 émigrés from other Ukrainian lands who had had to leave their homeland after the defeat of Ukraine's national liberation movement and found refuge in Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia's policy supported, above all, the democratic trends in the midst of emigration with due account of its multiethnic composition. Unlike other European countries with Russian refugees, Czechoslovakia distinguished (at least until 1924) between the Russian and Ukrainian emigrations as independent entities. Later on, Czechoslovak government policies on the Russian and Ukrainian emi-**/180/**grants almost entirely centered upon problems of scholarship, education, and culture.

With official and unofficial assistance and on the initiative of prominent Ukrainian émigrés, in the 1920s and 1930s Czechoslovakia saw the founding and successful functioning of dozens of Ukrainian research and educational institutions, organizations, leagues; and publishing houses (Ukrainian Free University, Ukrainian Economic Academy, Ukrainian Drahomanov Higher Pedagogical Institute, Ukrainian Studio of the Plastic Arts, Museum of the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle, Ukrainian Communal Publishing Foundation, *etc.)* which united the best Ukrainian intellectuals whose work enriched Ukrainian and world scholarship and culture.17 In the interwar years Prague, along with Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv, became a center of Ukrainian cultural, scholarly, and even sociopolitical life and remained until 1945 the most active nucleus of Ukrainian emigration in Europe.

However, the Czechoslovak government policy on Ukrainian emigration began to change substantially from the late 1920s on. Financial support was ended for Ukrainian research, cultural, and educational organizations, and some of them were closed. One of the reasons lay in the Great Depression which led the CSR to drastically cut its budget. Butthe main reason was the exacerbation of domestic political struggle in the CSR and the mounting pressure of Czech national socialists who traditionally supported a pro-Russian tilt in foreign policy. Left-wing forces, above all communists, were also hostile towards the "Wrangelites" and especially "Petlurists." In addition, the hopes of a democratic transformation of Russia began to vanish, as did the political hopes connected with the postwar émigrés.

In 1934 the CSR and the USSR established diplomatic relations and in 1935 signed a Treaty on Mutual Assistance. Conditions for the activity of Ukrainian political emigration in the CSR essentially deteriorated, not in the least due to their contacts with Nazi Germany. The Polish government **/181/**also opposed support of the Ukrainian emigration.

Besides, cultural and political processes in Subcarpathian Rus (Transcarpathia) were developing ever more unfavorably for Prague. In the late 1920s it began to assume a distinctly independence-minded, Ukrainian stance, which was most actively assisted by Ukrainian emigrants but regarded by Prague as a threat to Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity.

The Czechoslovak leadership regarded this problem as its internal political affair on the grounds that "the fate of Subcarpathian Rus has been sealed finally and for centuries to come... According to the peace conference decision, Czechoslovakia, once it becomes the owner of this region, will never cede it..."18 Yet, conscious of the indigenous Transcarpathian population's ethnic affiliation to the Ukrainian people, their historical striving for joining their brothers beyond the Carpathians and a pro-Ukrainian political trends which had been growing in the region since the turn of the century, the leadership was aware of the fact that, as Masaryk admitted in his memoirs, the inclusion of Subcarpathian Rus into the CSR greatly enhanced the problem of Czechoslovakia's attitude toward Ukraine, the Ukrainian people as a whole, and introduced a Ukrainian bias into its foreign policy.19

According to the September 10, 1919 Treaty of Saint Germain, Czechoslovakia pledged to "establish the territory of Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, within the borders fixed by the main allies and friendly states, as an autonomous entity within the Czechoslovak state, granting it the highest possible degree of self-government compatible with the integrity of the Czechoslovak state."20

Making a well-rounded and unbiased assessment of all things positive and negative in the development of Subcarpathian Rus/Transcarpathia as part of the CSR (1919-1939), one must admit that, although Transcarpathian autonomy largely remained on paper until the last days of the CSR's existence (for a number of subjective and objective **/182/** reasons, autonomy was in force only from October 1938 to March 15, 1939, and Czechoslovak official policy in the region was inconsistent and highly contradictory), no one can deny the generally positive tendencies in the socioeconomic, cultural, and political development of Transcarpathia in the interwar years. In any case, this time fate was much more "friendly" to Transcarpathians than, for instance, to the population of Bukovina, Eastern Galicia, and Volhynia under Romania and Poland. The Czech government spent more than it raised from the Ukrainian-populated territories. Governmental investments for the development of Transcarpathia in 1919-1933, for example, amounted to about 1.6 billion koruna. And this greatly assisted in revitalizing the economic life of Transcarpathia in the 1920s and 1930s. Most of today's researchers of Transcarpathian history are convinced that the interwar period in this original, historically turbulent region was one of the most important and generally much more positive periods as compared to the previous years, and that it was as part of Czechoslovakia that Transcarpathian Ruthenians passed a crucial stage in their socioeconomic, national, cultural and ethnopolitical development, signaled their existence to the world and, finally, established their own Ukrainian state, Carpatho-Ukraine.21

One can therefore state that in the interwar years Ukraine and the Ukrainian question were high on Czechoslovak policy the agenda. These policies, despite all the tactical zigzags and evolution cansed by the international situatuon, were in general fairly realistic and constructive with respect to Ukrainian affairs.

*4. Transcarpathian Ukraine During World War II*

The aggressive actions of the fascist countries from the mid-1930s first of all impacted upon Czechoslovak interests, to which ever more flagrant claims were laid by Germany, Hungary, and Poland. From early 1938 the questions of Czechoslovakia's future as a state, Slovakia, and Subcar-**/183/**pathian Rus' (Transcarpathia) as its parts were in the focus of attention of European diplomats and the world public. Due to its geopolitical position, Ukrainian Transcarpathia was a major link in the system of the then European security (the Little Entente as well as the 1935 agreement on mutual assistance between France, the Czechoslovak Republic, and the USSR). This was why the Czechoslovak government did its utmost on the eve of its national tragedy to retain that territory as part of the republic and to repulse claims on it not only from Hungary, which considered it to be "historically Hungarian," but also Poland, which claimed a part of it in its demands of a common border with Hungary, and Rumania, which sought the annexation of Eastern territories inhabited partly by Rumanians.22

The question of Transcarpathia was also brought to the top of international political agenda by events in the territory itself, where in the late 1930s the center of West Ukrainian life shifted. Ever more resolute demands of Transcarpathian political leaders to grant the territory an autonomous status, the consolidation on this basis of leading political parties of Subcarpathian Rus' as well as the international situation finally forced the Prague government to begin to seriously address the problem.

The Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, affected fundamental interests of all the peoples of Czechoslovakia, including Transcarpathian Ukrainians. The partitioning of Czechoslovakia considerably stimulated autonomist political forces in Transcarpathia, especially those of Ukrainian orientation, and also in Slovakia, which resulted in great changes in Czechoslovakia: on October 6, 1938, Slovakia was granted autonomy, on October 11, Carpathian Rus' was given the same status, and the country transformed into a federal state. In Transcarpathia itself, the idea of creating "a Ukrainian state in the Carpathians" as "the center of Ukrainian national movement" gained momentum, with great hopes pinned on Germany's support.23

These events extremely aggravated Czech-Ukrainian **/184/** tensions and led, in particular, to armed clashes on March 13-14, 1939, between Carpathian Sich riflemen and Czech troops in Khust, which made it impossible for the armed forces of the Czechoslovak Republic and the young Army of Carpathian Ukraine to cooperate militarily on the eve of the Hungarian invasion of Transcarpathia and the German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia.24 The final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, and annexation on that same day of Carpathian Ukraine by Hungarian troops with Germany's consent, only one day after its independence had been proclaimed, created an essentially different situation.

But the question of the fate of Transcarpathia, as well as other Ukrainian lands, was not removed from the agenda of international relations. Specifically, it became an object of complex foreign policy combinations of Czechoslovak President in exile Eduard Benes in his Central and East European policies and especially in his attempts to consolidate alliance relations between the Czechoslovak Republic and the USSR.

The Soviet Union was the only country which in a special statement denounced the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 1939, and the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine. At the same time the Soviet Union sought a rapprochement with Germany and to strengthen its influence in the southern Carpathians. On September 17, 1939, in accordance with the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, Moscow moved its troops into Eastern Galicia making a decisive breakthrough in the cause of reunification of Ukrainian lands, which the world community obviously received with mixed feelings. The timing, circum.stanccs, and form of its realization could not evoke a positive response and cast a shadow on fulfillment of centuriesold national aspirations of the Ukrainian people. Only a few statesmen of Europe directly and openly supported the action. One of them was Czechoslovak President Benes, who met with Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain Maysky in London on September 22, 1939. The latter not only made **/185/** an entry in his diary about the former's approval of the Red Army operation, but also noted: "He asks for only one thing — to do so that the USSR would have a common border with Slovakia. This is very important."25 For the first time in the history of official Czechoslovak-Soviet relations a question was raised in the course of the meeting about a future fate of Carpathian Ukraine. Benes entertained only two possible alternatives of solving the problem: that territory should remain part of the Czechoslovak Republic or, should the USSR become Czechoslovakia's neighbor, it could go to the USSR, but not in any case to Hungary or Poland.26

In January 1939, Benes sketches the following model of postwar Europe: "In Central Europe, a great role will be played by Russia... Hitler will help us become Russia's neighbor. After all disasters our task is to have Russia in Uzhgorod, so that Pryashiv would be as close to Russia as possible... The border with Russia should be as long as possible."27

Still , underlying these and other of Benes' ideas were primarily tactical considerations, specifically, to win support of the Soviet Union in the question of eliminating the consequences of the Munich" Pact and the restoration of Czechoslovakia within its 1937 borders. An analysis of the relationship between the Czechoslovak Republic and the USSR during World War II testifies to the fact that neither the Czechoslovak government in exile nor the Soviet leadership had a clear vision of Transcarpathia's future: their positions changed as events on the front evolved. Very telling are the following facts: the USSR was the first to recognize the Czechoslovak government in exile and during the war concluded with it a number of important treaties and agreements (specifically, the treaty of June 18, 1941 on joining forces in the struggle against Nazism and forming Czechoslovak military units on Soviet territory, which could enlist those born in Transcarpathia who fled to the Soviet Union in 1939-1941 and wound up in NKVD prisons or concentration camps; the treaty on friendship, mutual assis-**/186/**tance and postwar partnership of December 12, 1943, under which the USSR promised not to interfere in Czechoslovak internal affairs in the postwar period; the agreement of May 8, 1944 on a gradual transfer of liberated territories under the jurisdiction of the Czechoslovak administration). Importantly, all these Soviet-Czechoslovak documents provided for recognition of Czechoslovakia's prewar borders, including its eastern part, the territory of Transcarpathian Ukraine.28

However, after the Soviet Army had recovered Transcarpathia's territory in October 1944, the USSR began violating concluded agreements and treaties and ever more actively interfered in the internal political life of the liberated territories.29 In response to natural concerns and numerous complaints and reproaches of the Czechoslovak government and Benes himself that the Soviet side violated bilateral and international treaties and tried in fact to solve the question of Transcarpathian Ukraine on its own, Moscow ever more confidently and insolently retorted: "The popular movement in Transcarpathian Ukraine is not an accidental phenomenon, it has its ethnic and historical roots. Thus the Soviet government cannot and will not ignore it", "it cannot prohibit Transcarpathian Ukrainians from freely expressing their will."30 And while these arguments may be true to a great extent (recall that the Manifesto on Transcarpathia breaking away from Czechoslovakia and reunification with Soviet Ukraine, approved by the first Congress of People's Committees of the territory in Mukachevo on November 26, 1944, was later signed by approximately 250,000 adult inhabitants of Transcarpathia), still one cannot help feeling behind it a decisive and unswerving policy of the mighty victorious power directed toward expanding its own territory at the expense of strategically important regions and moving the USSR's postwar borders farther beyond the Carpathians in order to gain access to the Danube Lowlands with a view to directly influence Central Europe.

On June 29, 1945, the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement on Transcarpathian Ukraine was signed in Moscow. It em-**/187/**phasized: "Transcarpathian Ukraine (called according to the Czechoslovak Constitution Subcarpathian Rus'), which on the basis of the September 10, 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germaine, became an autonomous unit within the Czechoslovak Republic, reunifies, in accordance with the will expressed by the population of Transcarpathian Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of the two High Parties, with its true motherland, Ukraine, and becomes part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic."31

As early as the beginning of 1944, the leadership of the new Czechoslovakia, restored at the end of World War II, expressed its intention to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Ukraine.32 In the summer of 1945 Czechoslovak President Benes said that Ukraine could become a key member of the Slavic bloc.33 But at that time there was no way to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. Once the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement of June 29, 1945 on the transfer of Transcarpathian Ukraine to "its true mother, Ukraine" was signed, the question of diplomatic relations with the Ukrainian SSR was immediately consigned to oblivion. Interestingly enough, the signing of the agreement took place without the participation of Ukrainian diplomats and representatives of Transcarpathian Ukraine, although formally the text of the agreement was written in Ukrainian, Russian, and Slovak authentic copies.34

*5. The "Ukrainian Issue" in Communist Czechoslovakia*

After the February 1948 events, the people's-democratic regime in Czechoslovakia was replaced by the totalitarian model of socialism of the Soviet type. One of its components was a new foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia toward "alliance, friendship, and cooperation " with the USSR, and the "theory of proletarian, socialist internationalism" became official doctrine in the practices of its international relations. This doctrine did not admit the possibility for developing equal and mutually beneficial relations **/188/** within the so-called "socialist camp" or the more so for pursuing any separate independent policy regarding Soviet Union Republics, first of all with Ukraine, any manifestations of whose "separatism", free choice and "plenty of independent rope" were frowned upon, censured, and repressed by Moscow. It is very indicative that in the wake of Czechoslovakia's liberation from the Nazis, Ukrainian institutions of culture, education, and science, established there in the interwar period by Ukrainian émigrés were immediately liquidated as being "anti-Soviet" or "bourgeois-nationalist", while those émigrés who did not have enough time or did not want to flee to the West, were deported to the USSR and suffered reprisals.35

The policy of Czechoslovak Communist authorities toward Rusyn/Ukrainians in Eastern Slovakia, specifically in the Pryashiv region,36 in the first postwar years facilitated the economic, cultural, and ethnic growth of the republic's Ukrainian population, among whom the feeling of interrelations with Ukraine and its native people was dominant. The Ukrainian National Council of Pryashiv region (UNCPR), founded on March 1, 1945 at the congress of delegates from ethnic Ukrainian settlements and regions in Pryashiv, even tried at the first stage to solve the Ukrainian issue in Czechoslovakia by way of reunification of the Ukrainian-speaking northeastern regions of Slovakia with Transcarpathian Ukraine as part of the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, repeated attempts to settle legislatively the existence and functioning of the UNCPR and other organizations of the Rusyn/Ukrainian population of Czechoslovakia were not successful: the struggle of the UNCPR for national-cultural autonomy of ethnic Ukrainians in Slovakia also failed to bear fruit.37

The natural process of urbanization and mass resettlement of Czechoslovakia's Rusyns-Ukrainians to predominantly monoethnic settlements in Western Bohemia and Moravia in the 1950s-1960s also influenced negatively their ethnic awareness. Negative consequences were also produced **/189/**by artificial "Ukrainization" and attempts to solve interethnic problems by administrative-bureaucratic methods.

The struggle against "Banderaism," the political trials of "nationalists," including Ukrainians in the 1950s-1960s in Czechoslovakia, the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church and the official imposition of Orthodox Church beliefs on Rusyns-Ukrainians, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and further "normalization" and stagnation in the sociopolitical and economic development of the country also promoted the isolation of the Rusyn/Ukrainian population in Eastern Slovakia from Ukraine. In addition, the "ideological correctness" of the Ukrainian SSR and its public organizations resulted in curbing relations with ethnic Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, and any concern about their national and cultural development was considered inadmissible, to say the least.

The 1989 revolution in Czechoslovakia also failed to bring about a radical improvement in the situation. Complex internal political processes in the country, the aggravation of Czech-Slovak disagreements, and the manifestations of Slovak nationalism hindered the growth of ethnic awareness among ethnic Ukrainians in Czechoslovak Federal Republic. The "divorce" of Chechia and Slovakia and the formation of two sovereign states was not favorable for their development, either. Moreover, the Rusyn-Ukrainian population in Slovakia split into "Rusyns" and "Ukrainians" in the wake of the national-cultural and political enthusiasm brought about by radical changes of the past few years. The fact that a segment of the ethnic Ukrainian population preferred to return to the old ethnic self-name was determined by a number of historical, ethnopolitical, and national-cultural factors. Not the least part in that was played by the desire to preserve their ethnic identity and the resistance to the policy of Slovakization in the situation of building the Slovak state. **/190/**

*6. Independent Ukraine in Czech and Slovak Foreign Policies*

Czechia and Slovakia are objectively interested in the stable development of an independent democratic Ukraine as well as in economic cooperation with it. For countries of Central Europe, Ukraine remains a strategic transit way to markets of the CIS countries. Slovakia and Czechia define their concepts of developing partnership with Ukraine in different ways, although the following factors are decisive and common: a dynamic development of bilateral international relations, seeking regional integration and rapprochement, along with the intensification of cooperation within all-European structures.

Czechia does not have a common border with Ukraine. Its *Ostpolitik* conceptually shifted to the background as compared with the development of ties with member-countries of the European Union. Slovakia has more common interests with Ukraine, especially in the Carpathian region. After Czechoslovakia's disintegration, Ukrainian-Slovak relations have developed more dynamically than Ukrainian-Czech ones. During his visit to Kyiv on June 29-30, 1993, Slovakian President Mikhal Kovac signed the Treaty on friendship and cooperation. Very important in it is the clause about absence of any territorial claims by either party. Political understanding between Ukraine and Slovakia facilitates the fruitful development of economic ties.

On April 26, 1995 in Prague, Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Vaclav Havel signed a treaty on friendly relations and cooperation between Ukraine and the Czech Republic. A joint commission on economic and trade partnership was formed and is now quite active.

A very important point in the policies of Czechia and Slovakia regarding Ukraine is the latter's involvement in regional processes of integration. Due to the position of Czechia and Slovakia, in June 1996 Ukraine became a mem-**/191/**ber of the Central European Initiative. At the same time, mainly, because of the deep economic crisis in Ukraine, Czechia and Slovakia are very cautious about Ukraine's prospects of joining the Vysegrad bloc and its possible ascension to the Central European Free Trade Zone.

Slovakia, Ukraine, and Czechia cooperate actively in the Council of Europe. They harmonize their conceptual foreign policy paradigms on most problems of current European politics and really contribute to the construction of a new integrated Europe.

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Ukraine in Rumanian Foreign-policy Concepts

## *Serhiy HRYHORYSHYN*

At the turn of the twentieth century the foreign policy strategy of Rumania's ruling elite was based on the concept of uniting all "Rumanian historical provinces" into a "unitary Rumanian nation state," the Ukrainian lands of Northern Bukovyna and Southern Bessarabia being treated as part of this "Greater Rumania." Well-known Rumanian historians N. Iorga, C. Giurescu, A. Xenopol, I. Nistor *et al.* helped develop the concept of a "Greater Rumania." Their efforts were aimed at searching for ethnic, historical, and geographical reasons which would confirm Rumania's "right" to the whole territory of Bukovyna and Bessarabia. This idea was intensively propagated both inside and outside the country.

*1. Rumanian Policy on Northern Bukovyna During World War I*

The most authoritative official ideologist of the Kingdom of Rumania's "eastern policy" was Professor I. Nistor who motivated in his works the concept of Rumania's "historical right" to Pokuttya, Bessarabia, and all of Bukovyna, and first formulated in Rumanian historiography claims to so-called Transdnistria (between the Dnister and the South Bug).1

When on August 1, 1914, the First World War began **/194/** in Europe, it became clear that Rumania would not stay out. At that time the latter's relations with Austria-Hungary were strained to a breaking point due to their rivalry over Transylvania. Bucharest's appetites were not confined to territories mostly populated by Rumanians but, also extended to Hungarian, Serbian, and Ukrainian territories.

In early September 1916, after two years of political and diplomatic maneuvers and a gradual distancing from its former allies, the Central Powers, an agreement was signed in Bucharest on Rumania's entry into the war on the Entente side.

Rumania entered World War I in order to annex new territory and create a "Greater Rumania," with ethnically Ukrainian lands being the main target. Rumanian mass media of the period expended great effort to shape a corresponding public opinion and win over those political figures and intellectuals of Bukovyna who were oriented toward the Habsburg Empire. As early as November 1914 the Rumanian political figures of Bukovyna demanded that the King of Rumania not enter the war against Austria-Hungary, for it was Russia that presented the "main danger" for the Rumanian people "which could be defended only by a strong Austria."2 They were loyal to the Austro-Hungarian Empire even when the latter was already disintegrating under the pressure of liberation movements of the nations it had oppressed. For example, C. Isopescu-Grecul, announcing on July 22, 1918, a declaration of the "Rumanian parliamentary club" of Bukovynan deputies requesting the Vienna government to protect "the vital interests of Rumanians in Austria", clearly stressed that refusal of protection could lead to disaster, for "Mr. Wilson and the Entente would have handed us over, contrary to our wishes, to the Rumanian Kingdom."3

Thus, at that time Rumanian political figures in Bukovyna did not permit themselves even to think of their land's unification with the Kingdom of Rumania but, on the contrary, voiced their trepidation at such an unwanted alternative. **/195/**

In late October 1918 H. Hryhorovych, a deputy from Bukovyna, said in the Austrian parliament that "the Rumanians of Bukovyna have no doubt whatsoever that its Ukrainian portion (of Bukovyna — *Ed.)* should belong to Ukraine and the Rumanian part to Rumania."4 At that time not one political figures in Bukovyna's Rumanian community laid claim to the northern part of the region populated mainly by Ukrainians.

Late October 1918, however, witnessed a dramatic speed-up of activity among advocates of the slogan of "Greater Rumania." For example, the Suceava newspaper *Veata None* denounced on October 27, 1918, the "national council" in Vienna which suggested dividing Bukovyna along ethnic lines. "As to Bukovyna," the newspaper wrote, "its seems to us that our deputies have been too hasty in accepting its dismemberment... Historically and geographically, Bukovyna is indivisible. This is a purely Rumanian territory not only from Suceava to the Prut but also from Vatra-Dornei to the Dnister."5 A similar position was also held by the Rumanian\* newspaper *Glasul Bucovinei* which wrote on October 25, 1918, "We do not recognize any rights of the Ukrainians to any part of Bukovyna as a Ukrainian land and call upon all Rumanians... to resist... to the alienation of our ancient land."6

Simultaneously with this ideological campaign among the population, ruling circles in the Kingdom of Rumania, aided by pro-Bucharest Bukovynan political figures led by J. Flondor, tried to create at least a semblance of "legal foundations" for handing the whole Bukovyna over to Rumania. It was decided to form a new "national council" in Chernivtsi as a counterweight to the one in Vienna. On October 27, 1918, a Bucharest-inspired "constituent assembly" passed a resolution on the creation of the "Rumanian national council" and "unification of all Bukovyna with other Rumanian lands to form a nation state."7

The haste with which this "constituent assembly" was carried out was dictated by the urgent need to obtain from **/196/** the mock "representative body" a formal pretext for Rumanian intervention. On November 11, 1918, the Rumanian army entered Northern Bukovyna. Martial law was imposed the following day. N. Iorga explained the emergency measures by the fact that "things were tilting in favor of the Ukrainians."8

The Rumanian government and Flondor's entourage worked to juridically formulate an act "unification." For this purpose, the "Committee of Bukovynan Emigres" was relocated on November 23, 1918, by the Rumanian government from Jassy to Chernivtsi. The whole "committee of émigrés" composed of 54 persons with I. Nistor at the head was at once co-opted by the "Rumanian national council" at an extraordinary session on November 25. After the co-optation, the "national council" passed a resolution to convene in three days a "Congress of the Bukovynan people" which would proclaim the "unification" of Bukovyna with Rumania in a legally acceptable form 9.

The entry of the Rumanian army into Northern Bukovyna postponed for twenty-two years the fulfillment of the will of the land's Ukrainian population expressed on November 3, 1918, at the Bukovynan people's assembly in Chernivtsi.

The ZUNR (West Ukrainian People's Republic) government protested to Rumania over the occupation of Northern Bukovyna, but it failed to help the Bukovynans, for the West Ukrainian state was already having to defend itself from Polish armed forces. The government of the Ukrainian Hetmanate was in its death throes and lacked any real military force to defend the territory it had.10 Simultaneously, neither the Ukrainian SSR nor the USSR ever recognized the Rumanian annexation.

*2. "Rumania for Rumanians" and Ethnically Ukrainian Territories*

To integrate the occupied lands, an administrative unification law was adopted in the interwar period. **/197/** Representatives of the occupation authorities tried to prove that "Bessarabia and Bukovyna are artificial entities of Austrian and Russian origin... They have no right at all to exist in Rumania."11 10 *cynuts* (provinces) supplanted such historic entities as Moldavia, Bessarabia, Bukovyna, Wallachia, and Transylvania.

The main direction of Rumania's ethnic policy was the Rumanianization of Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities. As soon as in the academic year 1926/27, there remained not a single Ukrainian primary school in Bukovyna; all had been Rumanianized. The law on public education demanded that citizens of "Rumanian origin" who had "forgotten" their native language send their children to state or private schools where Rumanian was the sole language of instruction.12 Ukrainians were forced adopt Rumanian surnames. The very word "Ukrainian" was prohibited in the early 1930s.13.

Rumanian's rapid drift toward fascism greatly intensified discrimination against the Ukrainian population. In the early 1930s leaders of the National Caranist Party put forward the slogan "Rumania for Rumanians." Rabidly chauvinist propaganda was accompanied by punitive measures in order to impose all things Rumanian. The law "On the Protection of National Labor" (1938) demanded ousting of the native population by the Rumanian element not only from state offices but also from private enterprises.14

Efforts to assimilate the indigenous population were carried out by means of economic, political, ideological, cultural, and educational discrimination against Ukrainians and other national minorities. By pursuing a consistent policy of Rumanianizing the national minorities, Rumania's ruling elite attempted to demonstrate the irreversibility of their ownership of the Ukrainian-inhabited regions of northern Bukovyna and southern Bessarabia.

The onslaught of reaction and fascism in Rumania was accompanied in the 1930s by assertive foreign policy maneuvers. Joining the fascist bloc was regarded by the Rumanian government as a guarantee against Horthy's claims to **/198/** Transylvania and a reliable method of preserving its rule over the seized (1918) Ukrainian lands and invading new territories. For instance, in a speech made in late November 1938, Prime Minister of Rumania M. Cristea was unequivocally encroaching on the Transdnistrian lands, i.e., he favored the annexation of the Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (basically today's Russian-held Transdnistrian Republic — *Eds.)* which was then part of the Ukrainian SSR.15

Rumania's policies, its rapid rapprochement with Nazi Germany posed a threat to the security of the USSR's southwestern borders. At the same time, Moscow was exploring the possibilities of solving the territorial problem. The August 23, 1939, Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact and September 28 Boundary and Friendship Treaty isolated Rumania *de facto* and gave the USSR *carte blanche.* On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Union delivered a note to the government of Rumania stressing, among other things, that the question of returning Bessarabia was organically connected with that of handing over to the Soviet Union the part of Bukovyna mostly populated by people tied up with Soviet Ukraine both by "a common historical destiny and a common language and ethnic composition."16.

On June 27, at the session of the Royal Council which debated the Soviet note of June 26, the Soviet demands were opposed by King Carol II and three others, while the rest of the Council insisted on accepting the offered conditions, which was brought to Soviet government notice. On June 28 Soviet troops entered Northern Bukovyna handed over together with Bessarabia by Rumania.17

*3. Bucharest's Wartime Geopolitical Projects and Ukraine*

In the conditions of on-going world war the disengagement of the Rumanian and Ukrainian lands could not be final Plans for renewed expansion were quite popular in Bucharest and encouraged bv Berlin. Rumania, forced to **/199/** hand over a part of Transylvania to Horthy's Hungary as per the Vienna Protocol of August 30, 1940, received at the same time Hitler's unambiguous promise of compensation at the expense of Ukraine.

The establishment of a military fascist dictatorship by Antonescu speeded up Rumania's joining the Axis. On November 23, 1940, the government of Rumania signed the Tripartite Pact. All questions of joint actions against the USSR were coordinated between Hitler and Antonescu before May 1941. Rumania was promised Bessarabia, Northern Bukovyna, and Southern Ukraine in case of victory.

An essential role in working out the geopolitical concepts of Rumania's ruling circles on the eve of World War II was played by such works of I. Nistor as "Rumanians beyond the Dnister," "Transdnistrian Rumanians," and "Ancient Rumanian Settlements on the Dnister's Far Bank,"18 aimed at winning over public opinion to the invasion of those lands. In July 1942 Nistor delivered a paper, "The Geopolitical and Cultural Aspects in Transdnistria" full of delight over the fact that "the latest political events, in a close organic connection with on-going military actions, have brought about a new situation beyond the Dnister," that Nazi Germany and Kingdom of Rumania "have achieved a concrete territorial disengagement and supported the creation of a new Rumanian province known as Transdnistria," while "the administration of Transdnistria can rest on the age-old ethnic, political, and cultural foundations" of this land.19

Military gains in the war's early stage brought forth still more claims to Ukrainian lands. The newspaper *Unirea* demanded Rumania extend its border "to the Dnipro or beyond." When German and Rumanian troops reached the Volga, the Bucharest daily *Curentul* wrote that the border of Rumania should go... along the Urals and thus create a "Rumanian empire as far as the gateway to Asia."20 Various pseudoscientific geopolitical and historical theories were resorted to. G. Bretianu, for example, put forward the thesis **/200/** of Rumania's need for a so-called "safety space" of the Rumanian state which in fact repeated the *Lebensraum* idea of German Nazism.

The Rumanian fascists relied for the practical help on the Nazis in invading foreign lands, including the Ukrainian ones. German military defeat not only thwarted the Rumania's plans for invasions, but also led to the precipitous fall of the fascist regime in Rumania itself.

*4. "National Patriotism" as a Method of Assimilating Ethnic Minorities*

The postwar settlement fixed the Soviet-Rumanian border as of January 1, 1941. Its Bukovynan portion as well as an area in the Danube mouth corresponded, as a whole, to historical realities and the ethnic composition of the population. Yet, tens of thousands of Ukrainians remained as an ethnic minority in Rumania.

The coming to power of a Communist-led national democratic government effected essential changes in the Soviet-Rumanian relations. Ukraine was not a subject. The theory of "proletarian internationalism" became Rumania's official doctrine in the practice of international relations and the nationalities question.

The first postwar years witnessed certain steps towards revising the concept of the national territorial identity of Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia. The works of such Rumanian historians as Academician M. Roller, C. Cusnir-Mihailovici, P. Constantinescu-Iasi, V. Liveanu *et al.* noted that the Kingdom of Rumania, "taking advantage of the hard conditions in the young Soviet republic," had "occupied" Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna, admitting that "the Ukrainian peasants of Northern Bukovyna had offered resistance to Rumanian occupiers."21

The ethnic policy of the Rumanian Communist Party was rather contradictory. Much was done in Rumania in the late 1940s and fifties to revive the ethnic minorities, develop **/201/** their languages, and promote their cultures. Ukrainian schools were opened in almost all villages and cities with the Ukrainian population, there were two- pedagogical colleges training teachers for the Ukrainian schools. In 1952 a Ukrainian section was established in the Philology Department of Bucharest University. This period saw an upsurge of cultural activity, the birth of Ukrainian literature mostly among the young intellectuals. A certain contribution in this was made by the Ukrainian-language bi-weekly *Novy Vik* published since May 1949. The 1940s and fifties saw the publishing in Rumania of Ukrainian-language manuals, fiction, and sociopolitical literature. Ukrainian clubs and libraries were opened in Ukrainian-populated areas. The former had at their disposal choirs, drama societies and other local-talent units which also enjoyed popularity among the Rumanian population. Ukrainian fiction began to develop. The works of poets O. Melnychuk, I. Shmulyak, G. Klempush, V. Borshay, and Y. Pavlysh along with those of prose writers I. Fedko, S. Yatsentyuk, K. Regush, and others are well-known in and outside Rumania. At the same time, Rumania's Serbian minority was subjected to terror and repressions.

When the so-called "independent political line" was formed, the positions in the ethnic question and international relations enshrined earlier in Communist Party documents began to be revised.

In May 1966 Nicolae Ceausescu, making a report dedicated to the forty-fifth anniversary of founding the Rumanian Communist Party, criticized the definition of Rumania as a multinational country and put forward a thesis of its being "unitary nation state."22

These guidelines were widely covered in the historical and sociopolitical literature published in Rumania thereafter. A process of radical revision of Rumanian national history and relations with the neighboring countries took place, ending in official recognition of a "new historical concept" expressed in a retrospective review of Rumania's history in-**/202/**cluded in the RCP Program. This "retrospective review" clearly expressed the main ideas and theses of the theory of "continuity" of Rumanian history in the Carpathians-Danube basin. This "theory" was aimed at proving the "historical" right of Rumania to the territories of Bessarabia and northern Bukovyna. This concept became the crux of the whole ideological, political, and educational activities of the RCP.

To rally the population around the Rumanian leadership and support the latter's "self-sufficient," "independent" political course, mass political work widely utilized nationalist ideas of Rumanian historiography, including those generated in the interwar and wartime periods.

Ideological work hoped to educate the population in the spirit of "national patriotism" and undoubtedly fostered nationalist sentiments among many Rumanians. However, such nationalism and chauvinism, the purposeful Rumanianization of ethnic minorities, including Ukrainians, relied upon by Ceausescu's totalitarian regime in its domestic and foreign policies, were in fact among the causes of its fall. Rumanian literary critic V. Cristea wrote in late January 1990 in the journal *Rominia Literare:* "The Ceausescu phenomenon did not have just one distinctive feature, Communism, it also had a different, no less destructively influential trait, i.e., nationalism or, to be more exact, ultra-nationalism, chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism. To manipulate us, Ceausescu did not play on Communist persuasions which, to be true, did not exist; he played on nationalist prejudices: these, unfortunately, lived on in the hearts of many."23

*5. Current Complications in Rumanian-Ukrainian Relations*

The fall of Ceausescu's totalitarian regime and the advent to power in Rumania of democratic forces in December 1989 as well as the proclamation of Ukraine's independence in 1991 brought about fundamental changes in the Ukrainian-Rumanian relations. The Rumanian parliament, gov-**/203/**ernment, political parties, and public organizations faced the problem of working out a new strategy of bilateral relations.

Rumania recognized independent Ukraine on January 8, 1992, and established diplomatic relations with it on February 1, 1992. Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Melescanu thinks that "Ukraine is Rumania's most important neighbor from the political and economic viewpoint." In an interview to the newspaper *Rominul* Melescanu stressed, *inter alia,* that Ukraine "is the largest country bordering on Rumania, a very important market for our country and, last but not least, a country populated by a Rumanian ethnic minority, a country containing territories which used to be part of the Rumanian national state."25 This is why relations with Ukraine are a priority for Rumania. The cooperation of Rumania and Ukraine in the Black Sea basin, one of the areas of tension in Russo-Ukrainian relations, is treated by Rumanian politicians as an important "trump card to be used immediately."

Postcommunist transformations in Rumanian society and politics have not brought about recovery from nationalist intolerance, manifested in territorial claims on Ukraine raised by radical political forces of the neighboring state which regard it as an active factor of struggle for power. Normal development of bilateral relations is hampered by active and biased exploitation in Bucharest's ambiguous official policy of certain historical issues and, above all, the national and territorial status of northern Bukovyna, Hertsaïv region, as well as the former Khotyn, Akerman and Izmail districts of Bessarabia.

Gradually pursuing a policy of "small steps" on Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna, the Rumanian ruling elites are attempting to integrate these territories first economically and culturally, then politically. The Rumanian press has of late thrown around the idea that UkrainianRumanian borders are supposedly not guaranteed by international treaties and can be thus revised. This is based on the fact that Ukraine was not an independent subject of in-**/204/**ternational law at the time those treaties were signed and did not take part in signing them. There territorial issues delay the drafting and signing of a bilateral political treaty between Ukraine and Rumania. Negotiations on signing this document have been conducted for several years now, but the two sides have not yet narrowed their differences. Rumania continues to insist on including in the preamble of the Treaty a clause on condemning the political consequences of the secret Protocol of August 23, 1939. Bucharest does not agree to include an article on the renunciation of any territorial claims of the two parties. The Rumanian intentions to revise borders find no support in Europe. Quite symptomatic against this background was Rumania's futile attempt to slow down Ukraine's entry in the Council of Europe.

The question of the territorial status of North Bukovyna, South Bessarabia and the Zmiïny island, and the gathering of historically Rumanian lands to form a "unitary Rumanian state" is high on the agenda of the election platforms of all the programs of practically all Rumanian political parties. The Ukrainian factor plays a complex role in Bucharest's strategy on Moldova.

Ukrainian-Rumanian relations are also marred by the attempts of certain Rumanian political forces and mass media to falsify Ukraine's policy towards its Rumanian ethnic minority. Rumanian national radical circles and print media engage in vicious anti-Ukrainian propaganda. For example, an article, "Troglodyte *Khololitry,"* printed in the newspaper *Flacara* stressed, in particular, that "the worst attitude in Ukraine has always been towards Rumanians," while, "of all the neighboring countries, Rumania is the object of deepest hostility," that "it is *khokhols* (a derogatory term for Ukrainians — *Eds.*) that are guilty of many things, such as harassing the North Bukovyna Rumanians who have their churches ruined, their graves desecrated, their property looted, their school, cultural activities, and press banned."26 There is no scarcity of such materials in the Rumanian press. **/205/**

In reality, the Rumanian ethnic minority in Ukraine enjoys far more rights than its Ukrainian counterpart in Rumania. Ukraine offers opportunities for the Rumanian population to receive secondary education in their native language, has created conditions for the development of culture and preservation of ethnic traditions, *etc.*

Yet, in spite of their complicated historical heritage, of existing difficulties and problems, Ukrainian-Rumanian relations have irreversibly entered a phase of pragmatic, mutually beneficial development. The geo-strategic position of both countries and their objective national interests in major strategic matters gradually bring them closer. The deepening of reforms in both countries should form a basis for constructive Rumanian-Ukrainian relations. The desire for rapid integration into European structures also makes imbued Bucharest with realism.

1 In 1910 his work *Moldavian Claims to Pokuttya* (I. Nistor, *Die moldauische Ansspriche auf Pokutien* (Wien, 1910)) was published in Vienna, the book *The Rumanians and Ruthenians in Bukovyna* (I. Nistor, *Romanii si rutenii in Bucovina: Studiu istoric si statistic* Bucuresti, 1915) was printed in Bucharest, and 1918 saw the expanded German-language version of this work *The National Struggle in Bukovyna* (I. Nistor, Der *nationale* **/409/** *Kampf in der Bukowina: Mit besonderer Berucksictingung der Rumanen und Ruthenen historisch beleuchtet* (Bukarest, 1918)). "During peace negotiations in Paris and elsewhere as well as while drawing the Polish border, the ethnographic map attached to the German edition was the basic source of information for negotiating and substantiating our rights to the whole Bukovyna." V. Grecu, "Ion I. Nistor ca istoric," *Omagiu tui Ion I. Nistor: 19191937,* p. 30.

2 I. Nistor, *Unirea Bucovinei: Studiu si documente* (Bucuresti, 1928), p. 15.

3 Quoted from *Failure of Bourgeois and Nationalist Falsifications of the History of Soviet Bukovyna* (Kyiv, 1987), p. 84.

4 *Viata noua,* 1918, 3 noiem.

5 *Viata noua,* 1918, 27 oct.

6 *Glasul Bucovinei,* 1918, 25 oct.

7 I. Nistor, *Unirea Bucovinei: Studiu si documente,* p. 37.

8 I. Iorga, *Istoria romanilor,* Vol.10, p. 424.

9 However, the analysis of the "General Congress" proceedings shows that it was not an elected body and not authorized to seal the fate of Northern Bukovyna. See I. Nistor, *Unirea Bucovinei: Studiu si documente,* p. 169.

10 V.M. Botushansky, The Participation of Bukovynan Ukrainians in Ukrainian State-Building," *The People's Assembly of Bukovyna. 1918-1933. Proceedings and Documents of the Regional Workshop on the 75th Anniversary of the November 3, 1918, Bukovyna People's Assembly* (Chemivtsi, 1944), p. 59.

11 *Krasnaya Bessarabiya,* 1936, № 10, p. 13 (in Russian).

12*Monitorul oficial,* July 26, 1924.

13 V.M. Kurylo, *In the Liberation Struggle of 1922-1940* (Lviv, 1977), p. 48.

14 *Ibid.,* pp. 49-50.

15 See N.I. Lebedev, *The Collapse of Fascism in Rumania* (Moscow, 1976: in Russian), p. 208.

16 *Ibid.,* p. 265.

17 *Essays in the Political History of Rumania (1859-1944)* (Kishinev, 1985: in Russian), pp. 384-386. Since the transfer of Northern Bukovyna was not preceded by a unilateral action of the Soviet Union but by a bilateral exchange of notes, and the Soviet side "enabled the Rumanian statesmen to freely express their will, all talk about a "probable annexation is superfluous," stresses a West German international law expert H. Weber in his study "Bukovyna in World War Two" (*Cf.* H. Weber, "Bukowina in Zweiten Weltkrieg," *Volkerrechtliche Aspects der Lage der Bukowina im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rumannien, Sowietunion und Deutschland* (Berlin, 1972.). The International Law Aspects of the Bukovynan Situation." From the international law viewpoint, the definition of "occupation" can only be applied to Northern Bukovyna before the invasion of its territory by the Rumanian troops both in 1918 and 1941, proves Weber convincingly. See H. Weber, *Op. cit.,* pp.9, 14.

18 I. Nistor, *Romanii de peste Nistru: Lamurire pentru a-i ojuta in lupta.; Nistor I. Romanii Transnistreni* (Cernauti, 1925). I. Nistor, "Vechi-**/410/** mea asezarilor romanesti dincolo de Nistru," *Anal. Acad. Rom.,* Ser. III, 1932, T.12.

19 I. Nistor, "Aspectele geopolitice si culturale din Transnistria," *Anal. Acad. Rom.,* Ser. III, 1942, T. 25, pp. 32, 47.

20 N. I. Lebedev, *Op. cit.,* p. 356.

21 M. Roller, *Problem: de istorie* (Bucuresti, 1951); C. Cusnir-Mihailovici, *Despre situatia revolutionara din Romania in perioada 1918 — 1920* (Bucuresti, 1955); P. Constantinescu-Iasi, *Influenta Marii Revolutii Socialiste din Octombre asupra miscarii revolutionare din Romania* (Bucuresti, 1957); V. Liveanu, *1918 Din istoria luptelor revoluttonare din Romania* (Bucuresti, 1960).

22 N. Ceausescu, *Rumania in the Final Stretch of Socialist Construction* (Bucharest, 1969: in Russian), I, p. 403.

23 Quoted from *Za rubezhom,* 1990, № 14, March 30 — April 5, p. 4 (in Russian), p. 4.

24 T. Melescanu, "Romania a trecut din tabara candidatilor la integrarea euro-atlantica, in tabara potentialilor membri ai acestei aliante," *Romanul,* December 24, 1994, January 8, 1995, p. 5.

25 This motivation is, of course, out of place, for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic took pait, along with other allied states, in signing the 1947 peace treaty with Rumania; it has been a UN member since the inception of this international organization.

26*Flacara,* 1993, December 8.

Ukraine in Turkish Foreign Policy

## *Mykola NESUK* (§§1-2), *Nataliya KSIONDZYK* (§§3-4)

*1. Turkish-Ukrainian Contacts During World War I*

Turkey begins to genuinely understand the importance of Ukrainian problem during World War I, when the idea of Ukraine's liberation with the help of the Quadruple Alliance countries finds full support and syppathy on the part of leading Turkish politicians.

Well before Turkey's entry into the war the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) issued an address to the Turkish people. This address is the first official document in modern Turkish-Ukrainian relations. Ukraine and Turkey were described as allies against the common enemy, Russian autocracy.

The SVU statement evoked a response in Turkey. The press commented on harassment suffered by Ukrainians under the Russian yoke. The newspaper Tarjiman-e-Haqiqat stated that all the Ukrainian people could only preserve their language and nationhood if they enjoyed the kind of rights granted by Austria-Hungary.1

The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine enthusiastically received news of Turkey's going to war. The dream of Turkish troops landing in the North Caucasus and on the Black Sea coast of Russian Ukraine took clear shape, including the participation of Ukrainian volunteers in a Turkish expeditionary corps to initiate a national uprising in Southern Ukraine and the Kuban. **/208/**

To establish contacts with Turkish and Bulgarian official and unofficial circles, representatives of the Supreme Ukrainian Council and the SVU were sent to Sofia and Constantinople. Delegates of the Supreme Chief Ukrainian Council L. Tsehelsky and S. Baran met the leading Turkish politicians Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey. The latter supported the aspirations to create on the ruins of a defeated Russia an independent Ukraine as a defensive wall against Russian invasion of the Balkans and Mediterranean.2

The SVU group in Constantinople was instrumental in disseminating information about the Ukrainian question in Turkish provinces. "The intelligent Turks have been completely carried away by the Ukrainian cause", a correspondent of the *Visnyk SVU* (SVU Herald) reported in the spring of 1915. "On coming across a Ukrainian, all of them begin to talk about Ukraine, about the liberation struggle of Ukrainians and sincerely wish them to free themselves from Moscow's grip."3

The greatest achievement of the SVU mission in Constantinople was the declaration by Interior Minister Talaat Bey, one of Turkey's three actual leaders, published on November 24, 1914. In late October 1914 the *Tasfir-i-Efikiar* in its article "A new Nation" maintained that the formation of a Ukrainian state would be a great service to the world and mankind.

Talaat Bey stated that the Sublime Porte as well as the Cabinets in Berlin and Vienna recognized the necessity of Ukraine's liberation from Russian domination; after Russia's defeat the Ottoman government would be ready to help the Ukrainian people establish an independent state. The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was recognized as the national organ of Ukrainians residing in Russian Ukraine.

The political consequences of Talaat Bey's declaration would be difficult to overstate. It was the first official document in international relations which recognized the right of the Ukrainian people to create an independent state. The Talaat Bey declaration is as important for Ukrainian history **/209/** as the Balfour declaration is for the history of the Jewish people and state of Israel.

The Young Turks' newspaper Jeune Turque (in French) noted that "The interests of the Ukrainians are closely bound up with Turkey's. The Ukrainian state desired by Ukrainians would separate Russia from the Black Sea. The creation of a non-Russian Slavic state would free Turkey from the policy of intrigues and antics pursued by the Russian autocracy which strives to dominate Constantinople and the straits."4 A successful liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people and Ukraine's breaking away from Russia were seen as delivering a powerful blow on Russia's traditional policies and relieving Turkey of the danger threatening it in the past two centuries.

The SVU delegation had one more task in Turkey: to lay down the conditions for forming a Ukrainian military unit which would land together with the Turkish troops in Kuban or northern Black Sea region, in the area of Odessa, to kindle the Ukrainian population's national liberation movement against the oppression of tsarist Russia.5

The uprising in the Caucasus and Kuban was being prepared by a special German-Turkish committee which was also exploring the possibility of involving Ukrainian envoys whose activities also extended to the organization of an uprising in the Russian Black Sea Fleet.6

The SVU representatives discussed in Constantinople the questions of Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation with the confidantes of Turkey's war minister Enver-pasha. It was envisioned that a small Ukrainian unit supported by a sizable Turkish force would try to trigger off a revolutionary movement in Ukraine after landing somewhere on the Russian Black Sea coast.7

However, in November 1914 Enver-pasha, while supporting in general such an operation, named as its condition absolute supremacy on the Black Sea, which was practically unattainable. Taking account of the real correlation of forces on the Russian-Turkish front and the anti-Turkish senti-**/210/**ments of most residents in Kuban and Ukraine, there were no chances of a successful operation. Both at ther land and sea theaters of war the initiative was gradually passing over to the Russian troops. Besides, if the Ukrainian representatives had arrived in Northern Caucasus in the Turkish landing force trains, they would have been thought of as representatives of an occupational enemy army.

The probability of such developments was forecast by the SVU leader A. Skoropys-Yeltukhovsky in his analysis of the situation on December 20, 1914. The SVU leadership makes a conclusion that the Kuban population's awareness is not high. That is why they should be assured that the action planned in Constantinople will be carried out to serve the interests of the Ukrainian people rather than those of the Turks.

The people's masses should understand that there are objective prerequisites for building a Ukrainian state and vigorously use every opportunity to attain the goal set. The Ukrainians should be convinced that it is in the interests of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Turkey to work for the creation of a Ukrainian state as a buffer between them and Russia. This, according to A. Skoropys-Yeltukhovsky, should allay the Ukrainians fear of being used in the war as cannon fodder only to be left to their fate after Russia's defeat. The awareness of vital interests binding Ukraine and antiRussian allied states could have become a powerful method of anti-Moscow propaganda in Ukraine.8

But real possibilities of Ukrainian-Turkish partnership, especially in the war situation, turned out to be limited. As early as 1915 Turkey's dismal military failures frustrated any chances and hopes of its pursuing a vigorous foreign policy.

*2. Turkish-Ukrainian Relations in 1918-1921*

In accordance with Article 8 of the Brest Peace Treaty, additional agreements were concluded between the Ukrainian People's Republic (URP) and individual states of **/211/** the Quadruple Alliance. A Ukrainian-Turkish accord was sighed in Brest-Litovsky on February 12, 1918. The agreement announced null and void all the laws, regulations and orders issued on the territory of each party under the martial law. Some of the articles settled the questions of repatriation of POWs and internees and material indemnities. Mutual privileges were provided for. In view of the absence of any treaty basis for their relationships, the URP and Turkey agreed to conclude a consular convention as well as some other bilateral documents.9

The Brest Peace Treaty was instrumental in turning Turkey from Ukraine's enemy into its ally. It was just at that time that news about agitation for annexing Odessa to the Ottoman Empire appeared in some Turkish newspapers. The claims were hailed by a group of Turkish politicians who, with references to historical, economic and geographic factors, tried to justify Turkey's claims on Odessa which ceased to be part of the empire only 120 years ago.10 However that policy line failed to acquire significance.

M. Levytsky, the first Ukraine's ambassador to Constantinople, dealt with such political problems as the Crimea issue, the Bessarabia and Balkan questions, relations with Persia (an opportunity of contacts with Persia's representative in Turkey). He was especially concerned by events in the Caucasus. Consatantinople was visited by representatives of the Northern Caucasus who sought support in creating a separate Muslim state. Applying to the Turkish side for help, they laid claims on the whole Northern Caucasus, up to the Kuban River, thus trying to annex a part of the Kuban Cossacks' territory.11

Generally, Ukrainian-Turkish relations in the time of the UPR started on a constructive note. Mutual orientation to support and partnership can be testified to by the work of Turkey's Ambassador to Kyiv Akhmed Mukhtar-Bey.12 That trend persisted in the time of the Directory.13 **/212/**

*3. Soviet Ukraine in Turkish Foreign Policy*

On acquiring an essentially different state status after the disintegration of the Osman Empire, Turkey faced an acute problem of freeing itself from essential dependence on the Entente nations and consolidation its own international position.

In the situation of intensified Turkey's blockade in 1920, the Kemal-Pasha government naturally sought contacts in the northern direction where he expected to gain not only moral, but also material and military support. Under the circumstances, a change in political regime could negligibly influence strategy. As early as March 15, 1921, the Moscow Treaty on friendship and fraternity was signed between Turkey and Soviet Russia, and on October 13 of that year, the Kara Treaty with republics of the Soviet Transcaucasia. Late in 1921, an extraordinary Ukrainian mission, headed by member of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Mykhailo Frunze visited Ankara. He handed over a large sum of money to the Turkish government. On January 2, 1922, the Treaty on friendship and fraternity was signed between Turkey and Ukraine. Speaking on January 3, 19-22, at the reception after the signing of the treaty, Chairman of the Great National Assemble M. Kemal-Pasha noted: "Turkey and Ukraine are the nations closest to each other. Likewise is friendship between the peoples of these countries."14

A new Turkey's leadership was quick in forgetting the foundations of bilateral ties laid down in the first post-war years and readily answered bolshevist advances. Thus, the Ankara Treaty on friendship and fraternity became another important milestone in the good-neighborly relations between Ukraine and Turkey. It provided for establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, formed the legal basis of **/213/** their political alliance and initiated active partnership in commercial, economic and cultural spheres.15

The Ankara Treaty, along with the Moscow and Kara Treaties, was of great significance for further development of the independent Turkish state and manifested a breakthrough in the diplomatic and economic blockade by the Entente nations. In addition, the treaties worked considerably for the military success of the Turkish patriotic forces. But later on the treaty failed to play a great role in Ukrainian-Turkish relations which actually lost full-fledged interstate essence.

As early as in early and mid-1920s, Turkish-Ukrainian trade relations were rather intensive. Ukrainian official circles granted Turkish merchants the right of free entry to Ukraine at any time and conduct commercial operations at great fairs organized in the 1920s.16 Turkish vessels could enter Ukrainian Black Sea and Azov ports without special visas of Soviet representatives in Turkey. A sizable portion of Turkish export to the USSR passed just through Ukrainian ports. In 1925 in Kharkiv the Ukrainian-Oriental Trade Chamber was founded with its branches in Kyiv and Odessa. The Chamber facilitated foreign trade by various Ukrainian organizations. According to the data of the People's Commissariat for Trade of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, Turkey was the major trade partner of Ukraine: in 1926-1927 the share of Ukraine's foreign trade with Turkey accounted for 45% of the overall Ukraine's foreign trade. According to the statistics of the USSR's Main Customs Board, in the same period Ukraine's share was about 35% of the USSR's total export to Turkey.17

An important role in the development of Ukrainian-Turkish relations, scientific contacts and cultural tics was played by the All-Ukrainian scientific association of orientalists founded in January 1926. It focused its activities in the political-economic and historical-ethnological directions. Many studies were devoted to Turkey, to its economy, policy, history and language. It was just that association, along **/214/** with the Turkological Commission headed by Academician A. Krymsky and some other public and culture figures, that in the late 1920s and 1936s kept up a dialog between the two countries through contacts with Turkish colleagues.18

Later on, Stalin's isolationism and World War II led to a practically complete degradation of Ukrainian-Turkish relationships. Only in the 1960-1980s, when relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey were normalized and considerably improved, Turkey's economic, scientific-technological and cultural ties with Ukraine intensified. But they did not have any political overtones and could not be developed independently by the two nations.

*4. Restoration and Development of Bilateral Relations at the Present Stage*

Real bilateral relations began to be restored only when the USSR was in a deep crisis, and preconditions emerged for Ukraine's becoming independent. The first documentary evidence of this became the 1989 Protocol between the Turkish Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on the development of economic and trade relations.

In the spring of 1991, Turgut Ozal, the then President of the Turkish Republic, came to Ukraine on an officfal visit. On March 13, 1991, the President met with the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament. The leaders of the two countries adopted a joint statement and signed the Declaration on principles and goals of relations between the two nations. Specifically, the Declaration noted: "Proceeding from the mutual intention to continue good traditions laid down by the Treaty on friendship and fraternity of January 2, 1922, Ukraine and Turkey declare about their desire to develop mutually beneficial cooperation in political, economic, ecological, scientific-technological, informational, cultural, humanitarian and other spheres."19

The Ukrainian side emphasized its desire to support **/215/** the Turkish President's initiatives on creating a zone of the Black Sea cooperation as one of the ways of developing integration processes in Europe. In this respect, the Declaration manifested willingness of the two countries to work jointly for environmental protection, primarily of the Black Sea, and elaboration of a corresponding ecological convention. The visit also resulted in signing documents on cooperation in the spheres of telecommunications and culture, and an understanding was reached on establishing the Ukrainian-Turkish Association for foreign economic and trade relations. On November 20, 1991, ten days before the All-Ukrainian referendum on independence, Turkey announced about establishing consular relations with Ukraine.

The USSR disintegration and creation of independent Ukraine put new tasks before Turkey and opened up new prospects. On March 5-6, 1992, Turkey's Foreign Minister Kh.Cetin made an official visit to Kyiv, during which the Protocol on consultations in foreign policy matters was signed. And in May 1992 Ukraine's President L.Kravchuk came to Turkey on an official visit, the first in the history of bilateral relations, during which the Treaty on friendship and partnership between Ukraine and the Turkish republic was signed.

The two sides confirmed "their obligations within the framework of all documents signed earlier and now efficient acts, especially the Treaty on Friendship and fraternity between Ukraine and Turkey of January 2, 1922. The Treaty of May 4, 1992, laid down the foundation for a comprehensive bilateral cooperation in political, economic, cultural and other spheres. It provides for development of direct ties between enterprises as well as close cooperation in the fields of environmental protection, science, technology, communications and informatics, tourism and sports. It was noted that "the sides agree to conduct consultations with a view of coordinated development of their relations and exchange of opinions on international and regional matters". Particular attention is attached to partnership in the Black Sea **/216/** region on the basis of the Declaration on the Black Sea economic cooperation, signed on June 25, 1992, in Istanbul by eleven countries of the Black Sea region and stating mutual obligations of the member-countries to gradually lift constraints on the flow of capital, goods, services and people. The agreement provides for the development of infrastructure as well as maximum encouragement of business partnership.20

Proceeding from international commitments, Ukraine and Turkey also agreed on close cooperation within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in the UN bodies.

The conceptual approach of the Turkish government to constructing strategies in the region lies in that the policy of balancing between Russia and Ukraine can be shifted to the Ukrainian side, if the latter will, in its turn, work in that direction, too. Russia is a country whose policies are difficult to prognosticate for a number of geopolitical, national, ethnic and social reasons. Ukraine demonstrated its desire to maintain peace and security not only within its borders but also in the whole region, and its policies are easier to foresee and may be more in line with Turkey's national interests.

One of the major tasks, set by Turkey before itself, is to assist newly independent states in their transition to market economy. One of the reasons for this is that all those countries are its neighbors. "The first reason is our own interests: we want to have problem-free neighbors, we want them to stand on their own feet and advance along the lines on their own. We want only to help in the process". The Turkish President named Ukraine — "one of Turkey's powerful neighbors" — among the top priority neighbors.21. Addressing Ukraine's Parliament on May 31, 1994, Turkey's President said, in particular: "Turkey attaches importance to being Ukraine's reliable friend, useful neighbor and serious economic and trade partner, and it works in this direction. We are pleased to see that Ukraine, too, extends to us its hand **/217/** of friendship and partnership with similar feelings and intentions."22

Another reason of Turkey's special interest in its northern neighbors is a Turk, or, in the case of Ukraine specifically, Crimean Tartar factor. As Turkey's President noted, the Crimea is the homeland of "our brethren."23 Turkey deems it not only its duty, but also the duty of other countries, to render them assistance. And if now hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tartars have returned to the Crimea, then today this is a problem not only for Ukraine, which is not in a position to solve it on its own, but also for all civilized nations.

In connection with the 50th anniversary of the deportation of the Tartar population from the Crimea, Turkey's President pointed out in his address: "Our Tartar brethren ... are a great branch of the Turkish nation, they have occupied their place among those who wrote Ukraine's history, and they are the strongest bridge of friendship between Turkey and Ukraine". The Turkish side gratefully acknowledged the efforts of Ukraine's government in bringing Crimean Tartars back to their historical homeland and expressed its readiness to help solve their housing problems.24 Turkish organizations and companies on the peninsula intensify their activities in economic and humanitarian fields.25 In general, the Crimean issue is very high on the agenda of Turkey's foreign policy regarding Ukraine.

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The first steps of Turkey and Ukraine along the road of developing independent bilateral relation in a new historical situation demonstrated their mutual interest and intention to achieve an essentially new level of inter-state partnership. This is testified by the fact that Ukraine's and Turkey's positions on a wide range of burning problems are quickly becoming ever closer. Their solution can play an important part in economic, social and cultural life of the two coun- **/218/**tries. Further intensification of contacts between them has in fact formed a new vector in their foreign policy courses, which can radically change priorities in international orientations of Near and Middle Eastern, and Central and East European countries.

1 *Herald of the Union far the Liberation of Ukraine (Vtsnyk SVU)* (Vienna, 1914: in Ukrainian) part 2, p. 9.

2 K. Levytsky, *The History of Galidan Ukrainian Liberation Struggle Since the 1914-1918 World War* (Lviv, 1929), p. 11.

3 *Vtsnyk SVU,* 1915, parts 15-16, p. 9.

4 *Vtsnyk SVU,* 1915, parts 9-10, p. 17.

5 A. I. Skoropys-Joltuchovskyj, *Ezwagungen bezuglich der Konstantinopel der Aktion und der Verlegung des Sitzes des Prasidiums des Bundes nach Konstantinopel* (Wien, 20. Dezember 1914), HHSt. A.PA 903 Kr. 8b. Ausfertigung.

8 This goal was desirable because of Turkey's promise that the insurgent Russian ships could have cast anchor in Constantinople and hoist Turkish flags in a favorable situation. See *Telegramm in Ziffem an Markfraf Pallavicini in Konstantinopel, nr. 602* (Wien, am. 9. Oktober 1914), HHSt. P. A. 902 Kr. 8b. Konzept.

7 See details: *Privatschreiben des Grafen Hoyos an den Oberst Hranilovich, Armeeoberkommando* (Wien, am 8. November 1914), Streng geheim. — HHSt. A.P.A. 902 Kr. 8 b. Konzept. *Provisorischer Bericht...* (Wien, den 16. Desember 1914), HHSt. A.PA 903 Kr. 8 b. Ausfertigung. *Kabinett des Ministers. Privatschreiben des Grafen Hoyos an Oberst von Hranilovish* (Wien, am 14. November 1914), HHSt. A.PA. 902 Kr. 8 b. Konzert. *Streng geheim. Chiffre-Telegramm des K.u.K* **/411/** *Ministeriums des Aussem an Markgraf Pallavidni in Konstantinopel, Nr. 744 (Wien. 13. November 1914), HHSt. A.PA. 902 Liasse Kr. 8 b.*

8 *Al. Skoropys-Joltuchovskyi,* Erwagungen bezuglich der Konstantinopler. Aktion..., HHSt. A.P.A. 903 Kr. 8b. Ausfeitigung.

9 The Ukrainian-Turkish Supplement to the peace treaty signed on February 9, 1918, in Brest-Litovsk between the Ukrainian People's Republic, on the one hand, and Turkey, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, on the other. *Peace Treaty Between the Ukrainian People's Republic, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the other* (Kyiv, 1918: in Ukrainian), p. 14.

10 *Nova Rada,* № 46, March 31 (18), 1918. (in Ukrainian).

11 Central State Archives of Ukraine, file 3766, op. I, case 111, sheet 5.

12 Central State Archives of Ukraine, f. 3766, op. I, spr. 114, ark. 22. *Nova Rada,* J6 164, September 14 (1) 1918.

13 This brief period is associated, *inter alia,* with the activities of the new Ukrainian ambassador in Turkey Oleksandr Lototsky. "Turkey is Ukraine's as much natural ally in the South as Poland is in the West," thought Lototsky. See O. Lototsky, "In Constantinople," *Proceedings of the Ukrainian Research Institute* (Warsaw, 1939: in Ukrainian), XL, pp. 15-24.

14 I. Chernikov, "From the Depths of Centuries. On a Peace-Making Tendency in Ukrainian-Turkish Relations Against the Historical Background," *Polityka i chas,* 1994, № 7, p. 82.

15 See the complete text of the treaty: *Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy* (Moscow, 1961: in Russian), V, pp. 9-14.

16 The fairs in Kyiv *(Kontraktovy),* Kharkiv *(Khreshchensky)* and Odesa.

17 "Ukraine and Turkey," *Skhidny svit,* 1929, № 1-2, pp. 8-9 (in Ukrainian).

18 See details: I. Cheraikov, "...Decided to Strengthen the Best and Cordial Bilateral Relations Forever...." *Potitika i vremya,* 1992, № 4, p. 39 (in Russian); "The Visit of a VUNAS Delegation to Turkey," *Skhidny svit,* 1929, № 1-2, pp. 375385 (in Ukrainian).

19 *Holos Ukrainy,* 1992, October 21 (in Ukrainian).

20 *Milliyet,* 1992, 26 Haziran.

21 "Eurasia Today," *Eurasian Studies,* 1994, vol. I, № 3, Fall-p. 102.

22 *Sayin Cumhurlar kanimizin Ukrayna Parlamentosunda (Verkhovna RadaYuksek Sivyet) yapacaklare konusma* (Kiev, 31 Mayis, 1994 Sail. Saat 10.00)

23 "Eurasia Today," *Eurasian Studies,* 1994, vol. I, № 3, Fall-p. 107.

24 *Sayin Cumhurlar kanimizin Ukrayna Parlamentosunda (Verkhovna Rada-Yuksek Sivyet) yapacaklare konusma* (Kiev, 31 Mayis, 1994 Sali. Saat 10.00)

25 *Vseukrainskie vedomosti,* May 29, 1996 (in Russian).

Ukraine in German Strategic Plans

## *Mykola NESUK* (§§1-2), *Victor KOVAL* (§§3-4, §6), *Volodymyr SERHIYCHUK* (§5), *Andtiy MARTYNOV* (§7)

*1. Ukraine in German Eastern Strategy in the Early Twentieth Century*

Geopolitical realities at the turn of the century compelled Germany to allot considerable attention to the Ukrainian question. This attention was also caused by immediate economic interests and growing strains in their relationship with Russia.

German policy in Eastern Europe and Ukraine in particular, was formed in three centers which exerted an essential influence on the German policy. The Pan-German League and Fatherland Party posited the goal of defeating the Russian Empire and pushing its borders far to the East. The Ukrainian movement was considered by them as a factor which could weaken Russia. The existence of an independent Ukraine was regarded strictly within the strategy of German eastward expansion. The Pan-Germanists planned German colonization of Galicia and the Black Sea coast. The second group represented by journalists and academics, the most prominent among them being Paul Rohrbach, author of a well-known work, The Non-Russian Peoples of Russia and Us, favored independence of the Russian Empire's non-Russian nations. Ukraine was seen as potentially the chief outpost in Eastern Europe against the Russian expansion to the West. Finally, the third group headed by Prof. Otto Hörtsch further developed the **/220/** Bismarck political line of maintaining good relations with Russia on the assumption that Russia would remain an undivided state.1

The Kaiser's entourage and the General Staff maneuvered between the viewpoints of the Pan-Germanic League and Hortsch's group while the Chancellor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were inclined to accept the Rohrbach group's recommendations. Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg took into consideration, at the onset of World War I, the possibility of organizing and supporting revolutionary national movements in tsarist Russia. In his memorandum to the German ambassador in Vienna he mentioned Germany's intentions to provoke an uprising in Ukraine and turn Ukraine, Russian Poland, the Baltics, and the Caucasus into buffer states.

It is characteristic that immediately after signing with Ukraine the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the German ambassador in Kyiv von Mumm asked to send the well-known advocate of the Ukrainian cause Rohrbach to Ukraine. Such a step was thought to be more useful than direct pressure on the Ukrainian government through diplomatic or military circles. Rohrbach was expected to influence indirectly the orientation of Ukrainian politicians since, as noted by von Mumm, the Central Rada "was deepening the chaos with its communist experiments to the detriment of our interests."2

The collapse of tsarist Russia speeded up the crystallization of German policy on Ukraine. Paradoxical as it is, Berlin was inclined to uphold the principle of national self-determination despite the threat of ever-increasing national movements on territories under its control.

The Central Powers hoped for a separate peace with Russia, and for Austria-Hungary, due to its catastrophic condition, such a peace was critical. At the same time they had to bear in mind the probability of British and French involvement in the newly-created states. This in turn fact prompted Germany to coordinate her interests with Russia. German territorial claims against Russian were minimal and **/221/** only touched upon Lithuania and Courland. The Central Powers intended to define the future destiny of these regions with due regard of the local population's wishes. Russian Poland (the Congress Kingdom) was also to become an independent state closely connected with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Russia was to conclude an immediate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and recognize her peace treaty with the Quadruple Alliance.

Germany's interest in Ukraine rapidly mounted throughout 1917. The element of duplicity in Germany's Ukrainian policy gradually disappeared. Official German conditions dated August 19, 1917, specified that, apart from recognizing a newly-created Polish state, Germany would uphold the right to sovereignty of Ukraine, Finland, the Baltic provinces, Flanders, Ireland, Egypt, and Persia.

General outlines of the German plans on Ukraine were drawn up on October 25, 1917, at the meeting of Chancellor Michaelis with the political chief of the German Army's High Command General Berthenwarfer. In view of Ukraine's exceptional economic potential, the army had to support German industrial interests in Ukraine. It was noted that the separation of Ukraine from Russia would weaken the latter in all aspects, push it away from the Balkans and the Black Sea straits and offer Germany a land passage to the Middle East via the Balkans. The army thus initiated a new German policy toward Ukraine, and the new Chancellor agreed unequivocally.

It was difficult, however, to apply the new strategy because of all too rapid political changes in Ukraine.

The minutes of the Brest negotiations show that German representatives never stressed their rights to military intervention or economic penetration. The Ukrainian delegation turned to Germany for military assistance against the Bolsheviks after signing a peace treaty when the Kyiv government was in obvious crisis. General Hoffmann wrote in his memoirs; "It was a logical conclusion for me that we could not reject this request. We had already said A and **/222/** now had to say B; we recognized the Ukrainian government as a legitimate one and concluded peace with it; we therefore had to make sure that the concluded peace was really implemented, and this required, above all, support for the government we had made peace with. It is for this reason that our troops entered Ukraine."3

*2. Austro-German Bloc and the Ukrainian Question*

Austria-Hungary pursued its Ukrainian policy especially actively because the Habsburg monarchy ruled Galicia, the Ukrainian Piedmont, and some politicians in Vienna entertained the hope of annexing Dnipro Ukraine under favorable conditions.

In November 1914 Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Berchtold noted that "our main objective in this war is the long-term weakening of Russia, and therefore, if we win, we will set about creating a Ukrainian state independent from Russia." With this in view, Vienna would support targeted activities of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU).4

Among Austrian politicians expectations of Ukraine's separation of Ukraine from Russia prevailed from the beginning of the war.5 On the other hand, there was an uderstanding that the future Ukrainian state must be truly independent and not governed from Vienna because the monarchy could not survive the attachment of thirty million new Ukrainians. An idea of transforming Eastern Galicia into a center of all-Ukrainian cultural aspirations was being considered, in particular.6

Detailing Vienna's strategic plans, the Austrian consul in Lviv Urbas noted that it was not in Austria's interests to have a still longer border with Russia after the war. By occupying Poland, Vienna would have acquired most of the Russo-German border, which would have increased the confrontation area of Russia and Austria-Hungary and reduced that of Russia and Germany. How to avoid such a situation naturally depended on the progress of war. **/223/**

The first possibility was to establish an independent Ukraine between the Dnister and Dnipro which would separate Russia and Austria-Hungary in its Northern part. The following factors militated against an Austro-Hungarian protectorate over Ukraine and simultaneous occupation of Poland: 1) the zone of confrontation with Russia would remain as large as ever; 2) the zone of confrontation with Romania could double: if Bessarabia were engulfed by Romania, the latter would become Austria-Hungary's eastern neighbor; 3) the requisite military effort would be beyond the country's capabilities; 4) it would be extremely difficult, even, next to impossible to simultaneously play the Polish and Ukrainian cards because drawing a border between Poland and Ukraine would be an endless problem.7

Independent Ukraine could not oppose Russia without protection by a non-Russian force, otherwise it would tend to become a radical socialist republic, a neighbor Vienna could hardly welcome. An autonomous Ukraine, as the result of a peace treaty, would have been an illusion if dominated by Russia; Russia would have continued its traditional Russification or unleash a new war. This left only three options: a) Ukraine under a German protectorate; b) Ukraine under a joint Austro-Hungarian and German protectorate; c) personal union of Ukraine with Romania.

Ukraine under German protectorate would have had the advantage that the German-Russian border as well as the zone of German-Russian confrontation would remain large, that Ukrainian socialist tendencies would come under strong military influence, and that German trade would obtain a convenient and wide passage to Asia via the Black Sea, which would result in stabilizing the Balkans.

A personal union of Ukraine with Romania would also have been acceptable. It would have stopped Romania's expansion to the East and destroyed its monolithic nature. Romania would also gain a long-term dispute with Russia.

A joint protectorate of Austria-Hungary and Germany over Ukraine would have been the least desirable thing but **/224/** still acceptable as a last-resort, with Austria setting up the Ukrainian civil administration and Germany taking upon itself forming its army. In general, to summarize Urbas, a German protectorate over Ukraine should be favored because Austria-Hungary for both political and military reasons could not exercise such a protectorate and simultaneously occupy Poland, and in any case Ukraine would not be viable without help from a non-Russian force. In case of German refusal, a personal union with Romania might be proposed.8

Vienna's Ukrainian policy was marked by secrecy: its attitude to the aspirations of a large European nation for liberation was never made public. As early as December 1914 the SVU pointed out the need for an official declaration by the Central Powers to the effect that after the defeat of Russia they would promote the establishment of a free and independent Ukraine. "Such declarations made well before the German-Austrian armies enter the Ukrainian territory and brought to the notice of the Russian public — as with the well-known Talaat Bey declaration of November 24, 1914 — are sure to be the best method of Austrian and German propaganda among Russia's Ukrainians. The SVU, on its part, will do its utmost to promote the spread of agitation materials in Ukraine through its representatives."9

In August 1915 a memorandum addressed to the Austro-Hungarian High Command was made public by the All-Ukrainian National Council, which was closely tied ideologically and politically with the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. The authors — K. Levytsky, Ye. Olesnytsky, and L. Tsehelsky underscored their desire not to separate Western Ukraine from Austria-Hungary state but, on the contrary, to augment it at the expense of Russian Ukraine. They urged that Austro-Hungarian forces should not stop at the Bug but should penetrate to the Dnipro and Black Sea in order to liberate the Ukrainians from Russian rule and create an autonomous political entity closely bound to the Central Powers. Further, they argued that the separation of the Baltic provinces and Poland would no longer be suffi-**/225/**cient to weaken Russia to the point where it could no longer threaten the Central Powers. The only way to weaken Russia was to separate from it all or most of Ukraine.

Circumstances forced the future Ukrainian state to seek guarantees for its existence exclusively from the Central Powers. There were and could be no conflict between Ukraine and the Central Powers. In terms of politics and economics, Ukraine could only gain from the Central Powers. The natural directions of Ukrainian expansion from time immemorial were to the east and southeast.

At the same time Ukrainian public figures voiced their concern over Polish encroachments into Ukrainian lands. The incorporation of Eastern Galicia, the Kholm region, Volhynia, and Podillia into a future Polish state or even an autonomous Poland would have been totally unacceptable to Ukrainian national and political interests as well as inadvisable and even dangerous for the Central Powers. If ever the choice arose between Russian pressure and an extremely chauvinistic Polish regime, the oppressed nation would choose the lesser evil and tend to come to terms with Russia which would become more flexible after defeat.10

A year later the All-Ukrainian National Council presidium, aware of the intentions of the Central Powers to finally resolve the Polish problem in the nearest future, sent its demands to S. Burian, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs. First, official Vienna was notified that no Ukrainian territories where Ukrainians constitute a majority wished to be joined to Poland. Secondly, the Ukrainians who resides west of the area of compact Ukrainian settlement and might be made part of Poland should be granted all the rights of ethnic minorities. Thirdly, the Ukrainian territories occupied by the armed forces of the Central Powers, *i.e.,* the Kholm region, Southwestern Grodno, Southwestern Minsk, and Volhynia, if not made part of an independent Ukrainian state, should form an autonomous entity closely associated with the Central Powers.11

Despite loyalist declarations by the Union for the **/226/** Liberation of Ukraine and the All-Ukrainian National Council, the Austrian approach to the idea of an independent Ukraine changes from friendly to cool and even hostile as the war went on. Official Vienna took a dim view of the plan to quantitatively increase the Ukrainian Sichovi striltsi legion, forbade the SVU to conduct national agitation activities among Ukrainian prisoners of war and gradually reduced assistance to it.12 In January 1915 the Viennese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an instruction on relations with Ukrainian organizations and ordered the SVU to transfer its headquarters from Vienna to a neutral country.

But Austria's most unpleasant surprise for Ukrainian organizations was its plan of establishing a Polish Kingdom incorporating Ukrainian lands. This clearly showed that Austrian policy-makers accorded the Ukrainian problem secondary status. As a result, Ukrainian politicians gradually adopted a pro-German attitude.13

As a consequence of the revolutionary events of 1917, the Ukrainian question in the eyes of the Central Powers took on a wholly new light. Ukrainian democracy in Russia opposed the idea of a complete separation of Ukraine from Russia from the very onset of the revolution referring to it as a "stab in the back for Russian democracy." Ukrainian politicians did not clearly define their stand on future Ukrainian borders. A considerable part of the Ukrainian population favored joint action with the "Motherland," especially against the external threat.

In the face of such circumstances, Vienna thought that the best line for troops entering Ukraine was this: "In these circumstances we are waging a defensive war and striving for a just peace for all. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of the neighboring nations; on the contrary, we give these nations a chance to decide their own fate."14 It is noteworthy that a Viennese diplomat was giving this kind of advice as early as August 1917, long before the Brest Peace was signed and the troops of the Central Powers appeared in the Ukrainian People's Republic. **/227/**

Also consonant with this position is a memorandum prepared in August 1917 by the presidium of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Club in the persons of Yevhen Levytsky and Yevhen Petrushevych. The Austrian deputies from Galicia wrote that beyond the shadow of a doubt the creation of a Ukrainian state, even in a federal union with Russia and other new political entities like Finland, the Caucasus, Turkestan, etc., was in Austria-Hungary's interests because it would cause Russia to disintegrate into its ethnic and territorial components. It was also understood that Ukraine would require a certain period of time to consolidate itself.

Ukrainians wished only that the Central Powers, if they occupied the above-said territories of an autonomous Ukraine, should recognize the provisional government in Kyiv and the Ukraine's right to a certain measure of political home-rule as well as to commit themselves to support Ukrainian aspirations, keeping in mind their own long-term interests pending the opening of a peace conference. Ukrainians looked forward to a clear-cut promise that if the armies of the Central Powers entered Ukrainian territory, they would not dissolve local bodies of the Kyiv provisional government but rather offer them real support, strengthen them, and foster their further development.15

Thus, having changed, radically its Ukrainian policy, Austria-Hungary reached a turning point at the Brest-Litovsk negotiations with the delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the signing of a "bread peace" with Ukraine.

The Ukrainian delegation began negotiations in Bres-tLitovsk in early January 1918, ending in the signing of a peace treaty between the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, on the other, on the night of February 9, 1918. The Brest Treaty proclaimed an end to the war between the UNR and the Central Powers. A border was drawn in the West and Northwest of Ukraine. The problem of prisoners of war was discussed, and economic relations were regulated. **/228/**

A secret protocol was also agreed to between the UNR and Austria-Hungary related to the future destiny of Ukrainian lands in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Vienna promised to introduce in both houses of the Austrian parliament a bill to establish a Crownland of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina by July 20, 1918. On its part, the UNR guaranteed legislative rights to the Polish, German, and Jewish population in the Ukrainian Republic.16

The Ukrainian delegation was to fulfill yet another important task, obtaining armed assistance from Germany and Austria-Hungary to restore the authority of the Central Rada. It was decided at the conference of the top-level German leadership on February 13, 1918, to aid Ukraine as part of the overall war effort on the Eastern front starting from February 18 after breaking the cease-fire with Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian representatives were also to sign an address to the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary to this effect. As a result, the Ukrainian lands were occupied by 500,000 troops of the Central Powers and military administration of Berlin and Vienna, while Ukraine was divided into spheres of influence.

After World War I and the Ukrainian-German rapprochement in 1918, German interest in Ukraine literally exploded. Universities and specialized research institutions began to attach great importance to Ukrainian studies. Nor could the then newly fashionable discipline of geopolitics overlook Ukraine. Various concepts of German policy toward Ukraine were elaborated, primarily on the basis of the experience of German-Ukrainian relations at the end of World War I. Ukraine was regarded as a potentially powerful independent nation, should it be reassembled from the four parts into which it had been partitioned in 1919-1920, capable of exerting great influence on the future balance of power in Eastern Europe.

But these concepts failed to influence German Realpolitik. During the Weimar Republic, the German government sought to have the best possible relationship with **/229/** Moscow. That automatically excluded playing the Ukrainian card. For Hitler, Ukraine was not a separate agent in politics, only part of a much greater political game. Therefore, while the number of research institutions studying the East considerably increased, they could not define the direction of the country's political strategy. As in any totalitarian state, only the Nazi leader's views and intent carried weight.

*3. Hitler's Concept of Lebensraum and Ukraine*

As Hitler formulated it in Mein Kampf, the main objective of Nazi German foreign policy was to win more Lebensraum (living space) for the Germans as a racially superior people. Hitler announced: "To be sure, this territorial policy cannot be carried out in Cameroon but only in Europe... Therefore, the unique opportunity for Germany to pursue a sound territorial policy lies only in winning new lands in Europe itself... It should be clearly understood that this objective can be achieved only by means of war...17 But if we today speak of new lands in Europe, we can have in mind above all only Russia and its subject border states."18 By the latter the Nazi Ftthrer meant the USSR's western republics, including Ukraine.

Hitler did not have any special plans for Ukraine, which he viewed only as a part of a huge space up to the Urals, which Germany had to conquer from the Soviet Union. Of course, this is not to say that Hitler unaware of Ukraine and its importance.

In his address to a massive yearly party conference of Nazis in Nuremberg in September 1936, he declared, "If we had at our disposal the colossal raw materials of the Urals, Siberian forests, and the limitless fertile plains of Ukraine were within the boundaries of Germany — we would have everything."19

Disclosing his intention to attack the USSR as soon as possible to the High Command on July 21, 1940, Hitler remarked in passing: "Political aims: a Ukrainian state, a **/230/** Baltic federation, and Belarus..." Ten days later, speaking before the same audience, he said something quite different: "In the final analysis: Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states should go to us."20 The former statement reiterated a then widely held view among German students of geopolitics that in order to weaken Russia, Ukraine should be separated from it and transformed into an independent state oriented toward Germany and serving as a counterweight to Russia. The latter statement reflected just the concept of gaining Lebensraum in the East.

This confusion was repeated in early 1941, when preparations for the German attack on the USSR were in full swing. The High Command was then working out the "General Instructions on Special Matters Related to the Directive No. 21 (Plan Barbarossa)." A special issue was future policy on the occupied Soviet territory. Hitler's instructions included, among other things, the following: "The future campaign will be not just an armed struggle. It will also be a clash of two ideologies. In order to bring the new war to a victorious end, it is not sufficient to occupy the territory and defeat the enemy's armed forces. The whole territory must be dissected into a number of states with their own governments, with which we could make peace."21

That was not what he actually had in mind — even in the noncommunist West, where by that time Germany had already defeated and occupied six countries, none of them was offered a peace treaty. Hitler postponed peacemaking until final victory in order to be in a position to reshuffle all of Europe and its colonies in accordance with his imperialist and racist ideas. Moreover, he did not need any state with its own government in the East, on the territory of the USSR, where the population slated for a fate very different from that of Western Europe. In the East "Our tasis to build, as fast as possible and with minimum of armed forces involved, socialist state formations dependent on us. The task is so difficult that it cannot be left to the Army."22

One can judge the essence of tasks of the Nazis policy **/231/** from other instructions: "...the Judeo-Bolshevik intelligentsia ... must be removed," *i.e.,* exterminated. Hitler did not know that after the Bolsheviks there was hardly anything left of the local intelligentsia. The "socialist state formations" which Hitler had in mind meant that the subjugated population of the East would be, as under the Bolsheviks, absolutely without any legal rights, and all power and large-scale property would belong to the invaders.

On April 2, 1941, Alfred Rosenberg, the main Nazi authority on national and ethnic problems in the USSR, who was appointed by Hitler as his "representative on a centralized solution of problems of the East-European space," submitted the "Memorandum No. 1" to the Führer. In it he analyzed the state of affairs and made recommendations for future policy in various of the Soviet territories to be occupied by Germany.

Unlike Hitler, in foreign policy matters Rosenberg, although he was an official Nazi ideologist and always favored the annihilation of bolshevism by military means, held not so much extremist as traditional imperialist views. In contrast to the Führer's vision of a colossal new German Lebensraum in the East, he rather saw there in the future a new balance of forces which he hoped to align in a way most advantageous to Germany and ensure German domination without radical ethnic cleansing, leaving the population where it was. In the section about Ukraine, Rosenberg wrote:"Ukraine (Borderland Region): Kyiv was the main center of a Varangian state, with a Nordic ruling class. But even after the Tartar conquest, Kiev for a long time served as a polar opposite to Moscow. Its inner national life was based on virtually independent traditions which had arisen on its own, contrary to claims of Muscovy historiography, which has predominated in European scholarship.

[Our] political task with respect to this region should be to encourage the striving for national independence, up to the formation of an independent state, which would be assigned, alone or in association with the Don region and **/232/** the Caucasus in the form of a Black Sea Union, to curb constantly Moscow and to safeguard the Eastern borders of the Greater German Lebensraum. And economically, this region should simultaneously become a powerful source of raw materials and additional food supplies for the Greater German Reich.

To that part, which is regarded in the USSR as purely Ukrainian, it would be necessary to add borderline strips from the indigenous Russian area ... in order to weaken [it] and, at the same time, to have a permanent counterbalance against it. (Here parts of Kursk and Voronezh administrative regions are referred to).

Achieving this political goal would require directing the administrative and economic organization of the whole [Ukrainian] region."23

The Rosenberg plan envisaged no changes in the ethnic composition of the Eastern territories, except for the Baltic states. Its main thrust was to weaken and isolate Russia which he hated and feared; hence, the Rosenberg plan was to encircle Great Russia with a belt of nation states dependent on Germany and hostile to Russia. Ukraine was to be one of them. It was the greatest among them, therefore it demanded the greatest attention.

Similar views were also held by some other influential German officials, especially among the top military leadership who remembered well German Army's temporary stay in Ukraine in 1918 at the request of the Ukrainian Central Rada. But these views differed from Hitler's plans and were to yield no results. Führer rejected the Rosenberg proposal

On April 25, 1941, Rosenberg completed his work on "Memorandum No. 2." The plan detailed in it was completely in line with Hitler's instructions. It envisaged creating colonial satrapies in the form of German Reichskomissariats: Ostland (the Baltic states and Belarus), Ukraine, Muscovy, and the Caucasus) on occupied Soviet territory. Under this plan, Ukraine was to extend as far as the Volga river, in-**/233/**cluding the territory of the Autonomous Republic of the Volga Germans.24 This plan, as Rosenberg's other proposals, remained only on the paper.

Addressing to his subordinates a secret report in January 1941, SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler emphasized that "the major objective of the war against the Soviet Union is extermination of 30 million Slavs."25 On May 2, the Ost Economic Headquarters approved following principles of the German economic policy on occupied Soviet territory: "1. The war can be fought only under the condition that ... all German Armed Forces will be fully provided at the expense of Russia. 2. When we have taken everything what we need from the country, tens of millions of people will undoubtedly starve to death."26 Referring to Russia, the Nazis meant the USSR, but when they mentioned provisions for their army, they had Ukraine in mind.

On July 16, 1941, Hitler had all the Nazi top officials assembled for instructions on occupation policy. He noted: ... we will emphasize once again that we had to occupy this or that region, to govern it, and to put everything in order there; it is in the interests of the population that we ensure order, regular food supply, transportation, *etc. —* that is why we resort to necessary measures. No one should be able to grow aware that we are beginning the Final Solution! Despite this, we are in a position!" Hitler added a few words about the Ukraine: "Antonescu wants to have Bessarabia and Odesa with a strip of land to the westsouth-west of Odesa". He made it clear that the Romanian dictator would get what he wanted.

"Generally," Hitler noted, "we face the task of cutting a giant pie in accordance with our needs, so that we can first assimilate it, second manage it; and third exploit it." "The main principles are: The formation of a military state west of the Urals must never again be possible, even if we have to fight, a hundred years to achieve this goal. The Reich will be safe only when there are no alien armed forces west of the Urals; Germany commits itself to safeguarding this space **/234/** from all possible hazards... Only Germans have the right to bear arms, but not Slavs, neither Czechs, Cossacks, nor Ukrainians."27

This differed from Rosenberg's somewhat pro-Ukrainian line, who emphasized that, in his opinion, in every Komissariat there should be a different attitude toward its population: "In Ukraine, we should begin with matters of culture; we should awaken the historical consciousness of Ukrainians, found a university in Kiev, *etc."* This was disputed by Guring, who maintained that in Ukraine the Germans first of all should think about how we can get maximum provisions from it." Rosenberg replied, "in Ukraine we should also encourage certain aspirations for independence."

When Hitler repeated that "the Reich's territory should encompass the Crimea, including a sizable adjacent area (north of the Crimea); this adjoining territory must be enveloped by as great a territory as possible," "Rosenberg voiced his fear for the Ukrainians living there." Rosenberg's position put Martin Bormann on his guard: "It would turn out several times that Rosenberg had attached too much attention to Ukrainians; he wants to enlarge considerably the old Ukraine."

Rosenberg's efforts failed. His candidate for the position of the Nazi governor-general in Ukraine was rejected. At Guring's suggestion, Hitler appointed Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia, Reichskomissar of Ukraine.

Koch was the personification of the most brutal form of Nazi dictatorship.28 In his talks with his subordinates, he used to point out that the lot of Ukrainians was to be the slaves of Germans, "white Negroes," and that all those who were even a potential threat to the invaders' domination in Ukraine would be subject to physical extermination. The central place among the forces hostile to occupation troops was relegated by Koch, as by Hitler himself, to the national intelligentsia; therefore, it was to be the first to be exterminated, and if the victims happened to be comparatively not **/235/** too many, that was only due to the fact that Moscow had already done the job.

Hitler's satrap did not conceal his views; but then they could not be hidden, for they were carried out in specific open actions by the occupation authorities. Koch's public pronouncements before the Germans to the effect that there would be no Ukraine whatsoever, merely a German colony, that the knout was the most necessary instrument for governing it, and that Ukrainians were Untermenschen (subhumans) did not take long to become widely known. Koch resolutely rejected the idea of forming even some sort of pseudo-political body composed of local public figures, as was the case in Reichskommissariat Ostland (the Baltic states and Belarus). He once said that should he happen to come across a Ukrainian, worthy of sitting at the same dinner table with him, he would immediately order him shot.

The Koch administration plundered and tortured occupied Ukraine, but the Soviet authorities did not demand his extradition to have him brought before the court for his crimes against the Ukrainian people. One can venture a justified guess that it was a sort of solidarity. By his politics Koch exacerbated to the utmost relations between the Germans and Ukrainians. Hence, he did precisely what Stalin needed done and what the latter ordered Soviet partisans to do when they inflicted damage to the Germans in order to provoke retaliation against the Ukrainian peasantry.

Stalin well understood how before the war the Ukrainian villagers had viewed his power with its artificial "collectivization famines," forced labor in collective farms, and ten-year prison sentences for several wheat ears gleaned after the harvest in order to assuage hunger. He also knew too well that "German quotas" — obligatory food supplies taxes levied on every homestead — were twice as low as those imposed by the Soviet regime. Under the Germans, the Ukrainian village was more well-to-do than before the war. Military actions of "people's avengers," *i.e.,* partisans, **/236/** who, in fact, never defended the local population from the invaders, were intended to swing the feelings of the countryfolk in Stalin's favor. Stalin's vile strategy, realized by the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, achieved its toll: hundreds of Ukrainian villages burned to the ground by the Germans and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian dead

Ukraine was in turn bloodied and depopulated in turn by the two totalitarian monsters, red and brown. The typological similarity of these totalitarian dictatorships constituted the basis of their inhuman cooperation. At a conference on July 16, 1941, Hitler said: "The Russians have now issued an order on guerrilla warfare in our rear. These partisan actions are also of some use for us: they make it possible for us to kill anybody..."29

*4. General Plan Ost*

The implementation of the sweeping program of ethnocide, launched just after the defeat and occupation of Poland, was to reach its apex of mass annihilation of people in the Eastern territories. On October 7, 1939, Hitler signed a decree on consolidating the German nation. Specifically, it provided for resettling German citizens and Volksdeutsche from foreign countries, setting up new German colonies, and creating a new German peasantry.30 This decree began the series of the previously mentioned and various other inhumanely atrocious directives and orders, and their implementation became the essence of the German policy in occupied Ukraine. It created and put into operation mechanisms to depopulate the Eastern territories from killing hostages to the gas chambers of the "death factories."

Entertaining a scheme of gaining new immense territories in the East, Hitler regarded them as a space for enlarging the German rural population, which, he believed, was the most valuable part of the nation. This is why the strengthening of the German nation was considered to de-**/237/**pend on the numerical growth of the German countryfolk, but not in Germany where spare land was scarce or practically nonexistent. Ukraine was always viewed in Germany as an ideal region for agriculture. Therefore, it could not but become an object of primary importance in the future Nazi policy of Germanizing the East. This spelled extreme danger for the people of Ukraine.31

Appointed Reichskomissar for consolidating the German nation, Heinrich Himmler immediately established, also in the SS system, the corresponding Reichskomissariat. Its planning division began to work out plans to Germanize the East. Soon afterwards it became known as General Plan Ost (East). It was precisely this plan that formed the basis of the political doctrine of Germanizing the Slavic lands.

The main thrust of the plan was that most of the Slavic population was to be deported to the Siberia, space thus vacated place to be resettled by Germans and closely related Germanic peoples. Only certain fragments of Master Plan Ost are now known. Specifically, it mentions Galicia, from which 65% of the local population was to be deported.32

The first stage of the plan's implementation was scheduled for twenty-five to thirty years after the war. During this period, a network of "marks," colonies of German settlers, as to be established on the vast expanses of the European USSR. Alongside them, economic-administrative and military strong points, built anew only for Germans at intersections of strategic routes, were to arise. Germans would not settle in Ukrainian towns, resulting in the latter's degradation and come ruin. The number of German "marks" would increases, their network grow denser and, finally, they were to merge, covering the whole territory of Ukraine.33 Only the territory, but the population, was slated for Germanization.

In his evening table talk, which were recorded, Hitler most often mentioned Ukraine. Soon after the Smolensk conference, he said, "We will take the southern part of Ukraine, first of all the Crimea, and turn it into an exclu-**/238/**sively German colony. It will not be difficult to drive the local population away." But this was to be only the beginning of Ukraine's colonization. "In a hundred years, millions of German farmers will live there... 130 million people in the Reich, and 90 million in Ukraine."34 Ukraine's economic resources drove him ecstatic. "Where else is there a region capable of yielding iron which could equal Ukraine one in quality?.. Ukraine has manganese which is sought after even by America. And so many other prospects besides!"35

The Nazis did not await the war's end to begin Ukraine's Germanization. Establishing agricultural estates for the SS officers was its first form. Very suggestive of the lot of the local population is the fact that the position of the general manager of the estates was given in July 1942 to O. Pohl, the superintendent of Hitler's whole system of concentration camps, which was also a branch of the SS.

It was no accident that the SS officers became the owners of new estates whose aggregate area on the territory from Ukraine to the Baltic Sea amounted to 600,000 hectares,36 for from the beginning to the very end the whole matter of Germanizing occupied lands was the sole' responsibility of the SS. Holding privileged positions in the state structure of Nazi Germany, the SS wanted to take the best part of the loot which fell into the hands of the armed forces, and paid no heed to the appetites of Wehrmacht (Army) colleagues. Tales of the future enrichment of German soldiers and officers at the expense of seized Soviet lands was one of the main features of fascist propaganda. Meanwhile, the SS officers received estates, trying to capture as much as possible. In the long run, it reached such a scale that on October 26, 1942, Himmler had to issue a circular saying that some of his subordinates had lost any sense of proportion in acquiring property in the East.37

As early as 1942, the first steps were made to implement the main idea of the General Plan Ost. In July 1942, in connection with the fact that the center of gravity of the military operations had shifted to the southern wing of the **/239/** Soviet-German front, Hitler's Field Headquarters were relocated to the outskirts of Vinnytsia; Ukrainians had to be evicted, and Himmler ordered 10,000 Germans resettled in their place.38

On October 15, the zone of total deportation was extended, by Reichskomissar of Ukraine Erich Koch's order, to the southern parts of the adjacent Zhytomyr region. Here it covered up to sixty localities.39 The whole zone was referred to as Hegewald ("forest reserve"). On December 12, after the operation had been practically completed, Koch issued an order on establishing the Hegewald German resettlement district with an area of 500 square kilometers and a population of 9,000.40 In accordance with General Plan Ost, the district was excluded from the sphere of authority of the Reichskomissariat of Ukraine and transferred to SS jurisdiction bodies.41

Nazi planners worked out the doctrine of Germanizing the East in the situation when the course of the war betokened their victory. But as early as November 1942 event occurred events which pointed to quite a different outcome.

A radical change took place in the course of the Soviet-German war where the major forces of two hostile world coalitions fought. In April, Hitler ordered a halt to General Plan Ost, which, as did all other aspects of German policy of that period in the East, had brought terrible suffering and devastation to Ukraine.

*5. German Policy Toward the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists*

When preparing for an attack on the USSR, the Nazis first planned to make use of Ukrainian nationalists. The latter, in their turn, agreed to collaborate, having believed the assurances by German state officials that Germany would assist in restoring a Ukrainian independent conciliar state.42 At that moment, the nationalists could not find any other outside force which would help the Ukrainian people to re-**/240/**instate their own statehood. In doing so, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) pursued its own independent line and tried to influence German policy regarding Ukraine.

In June 30, 1941 in Lviv, the Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State was proclaimed, in compliance with the "Resolution No. 1 of the National Assembly of Ukrainians", in the presence of German authorities. Specifically, the document ran: "The Revived Ukrainian State will closely cooperate with National-Socialist Great Germany, which under the guidance of Adolph Hitler is establishing the new order in Europe and the whole world, and is rendering assistance to the Ukrainian people in liberating themselves from the occupation by Muscovy, The Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army, to be formed on the Ukrainian soil, will further fight, along with the Allied German army, against the occupation by Muscovy, for the sovereign conciliar Ukrainian State and the new order in the whole world."43

But very soon afterwards, Ukrainian Nationalists were to be disillusioned: their expectations for Germari assistance in reviving an independent Ukraine came to be shattered. After the OUN leadership had refused to revoke the Act of June 30, 1941, reprisals of the Nazi punitive system were launched against members of the OUN. Soviet secret agencies gave the following evidence of the reprisals:" Despite the fact that for several years the German top leadership had been promising the OUN leadership to realize the major clause of their "program", the Nazi military authorities did not hesitate to take severe measures in order to discontinue the activities of Ukrainian Nationalists directed toward creating an "Independent Ukraine", arrested S.Bandera, the OUN leader, drove other OUN leaders away from Ukraine, and prohibited the local Nazi Administration to enlist the services of S. Bandera's people for fighting partisans, having declared them "personae non gratae."44

It should be noted that the Nazi High Command not **/241/** only took drastic measures to terminate the activities of mobile OUN task groups, which were organizing the Ukrainian local governing bodies on the occupied territory (specifically, they halted in Vasylkiv near Kyiv and sent back a group which was to proclaim in Kyiv the restoration of independent Ukraine), but also began to recall from Ukraine those German officers who supported Ukrainian Nationalists in this. In particular, it was just the case with Professor Koch, the special Reich representative in the Süd Army group, who, as was admitted by the Reichskomissar of Ukraine on September 20, 1941, "supported Ukrainian aspirations for creating an independent state to a measure which not only was politically unreasonable, but ran counter German interests". Specifically, Profes sor Koch approved of the establishing of the Ukrainian Council of Accredited Representatives in Volhyn' that assumed powers, nearly equal to those of the Reich's government. For example, this Council would appoint heads of Ukrainian administrations in all administrative-territorial units from oblast's (regions) to small rural districts, establish Ukrainian courts and appoint judges, and, besides, issue various orders and instructions to Ukrainian authorities.45

A dispatch sent by Saburov, a Soviet partisan commander, bears the following testimony: "When the Nazis had gone back on their earlier promise to S.Bandera's people to help form an "independent Ukraine" and began to arrest them, the latter went underground. Bandera's people directed all their efforts to form reserves for organizing the "Ukrainian National Army". In this, they relied on Ukrainian police superintendants, commanders of Ukrainian military units (formed earlier by Germans), burgomasters, village headmen and teachers, in order to influence, through their offices, their subordinates and entourage. As a result, the police and Cossacks turned into the main channel of forming and arming the nationalist Bandera detachments.

S. Bandera's people set for themselves the aim of taking advantage of the Red and German Armies' being rendered **/242/** inefficient at the fronts and raising a revolt (or, as they call it, "revolution") in order to capture towns and big railroad junctions by force and to proclaim an "independent Ukraine."46 Indeed, such an anti-Nazi uprising, initiated by the OUN, did take place in spring 1943, when all the Ukrainian police force overnight joined the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), waging an armed struggle against German invaders in order to establish a Ukrainian state on the ethnic Ukrainian territory.

At present, the exact number of Nazis killed in actions against the UIA is not yet known.47 Likewise, the data on the number of Ukrainian "collaborators" killed in actions against the Nazis remain unprecise. Formerly secret archives now made accessible to the general public contain documents revealing that there were hundreds of armed battles and clashes of the UIA and the Nazis, specifically, in Volhyn' in March-April 1943.48

The Nationalists launched an anti-Nazi military campaign all over Ukraine. For instance, a dispatch of Savchenko, the People's Commissar of the State Security of the UkrSSR, dated May 24, 1943, and sent to the name of Strokach, the chief of the Ukrainian Headquarters of the partisan movement, read: "A number of our sources and captured documents indicate that, despite mass German reprisals against members of the OUN, and among S. Bandera's supporters in particular, the latter, on going underground, have intensified their activities rather than curtailed them. The OUN has sent its emissaries to all regions of Ukraine and is setting up clandestine organizations, centers and legions, is building stores of weapons and ammunition, is equipping print shops, and is training soldiers and officers for an armed struggle."49

The anti-Nazi struggle of Ukrainian Nationalists was extended beyond the borders of the UkrSSR onto other ethnic Ukrainian territories, and further, onto the Third Reich's territory itself. Especially active fightings were in the regions of Berestove, Pinsk, Kholm, and in the Sian river area. **/243/** This is definitely evidenced by documents of the People's Commissariat in Internal Affairs of the UkrSSR50 and those of Germans,51 specifically, the ones about arrests of large groups of S.Banders's people in Braunschweig, Dresden, Leipzig, Berlin, Hannover, Munich, Vienna, Prague, Breslau, Danzig, Bremen, Hoemnitz, Dusseldorf, *etc.*52

*6. Ostpolitic FRG in 1949-1989 and Ukraine*

In the 1950s, West Germany's major foreign policy concern was "face-lifting", i.e. improving the Bundesrepublik's image in Europe. In the situation of the divided German nation and the harsh Cold War confrontation, the "Western vector" of the FRG's foreign policy was a top conceptual priority. The "Eastern vector" served the needs of confrontation between the USSR and the USA in Europe.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's conceptual paradigm presupposed West Germany's integration into Western economic, political, and military structures. After the FRG had joined NATO and the Warsaw Pact had been formed, during Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955 the FRG established diplomatic relations with the USSR. Political circles and public opinion in the FRG considered the USSR a military superpower; therefore, Bonn's real policy regarding the USSR was conceptually concentrated on Moscow. The Ukrainian, as well as other Union Republics, were not taken into account. In such a historical situation any other approach would only have been Utopian. The assassination of Stepan Bandera, the émigré Ukrainian nationalist leader on October 15, 1959 in Munich for some time aggravated relation between the FRG and the USSR, but it could not provoke a "conceptual revolution" in West Germany's attitude toward Ukraine's independence, for at that time Nikita Khrushchev's ultimatum on the status of West Berlin and the acute "Berlin crisis" were more pressing foreign policy problems for Bonn. Ukraine's cooperation with the German **/244/** Democratic Republic proceeded only in the framework of relations of the "first German socialist state" with the Soviet Union.

In 1957 the FRG signed the Rome Treaty on the European Economic Community. Willy Brandt noted that "Germany comes back to itself and the creative forces of its history through Europe". Jean Monnais, one of the "founding fathers" of integrated Europe believed that a deeper West European integration could be for Germans in the FRG a sort of substitute for their national unity.

Clear signs of the FRG's renunciation of its "cold peace" with the USSR appeared in West Germany's foreign policy only after the "grand coalition" of the CDU, CSU and SDPG had come to power in Bonn in 1966. Chancellor Brandt defined the paradigm of "a new Eastern policy" in his memoirs in the following way: "Opening with our own German key the door leading to détente, and putting an end to Germany's division." The Moscow Treaty, signed on August 12, 1970, laid down the foundation of the post-confrontation period in relations between the USSR and the FRG. In the historical perspective, this treaty knocked out the first stone from the Berlin Wall.

*7. Independent Ukraine in the Foreign Policy of Reunified Germany*

A new historical opportunity for achieving the strategic national objective, reunification of two Germanys by peaceful means, arose for the Federal Republic of Germany. This FRG goal determined its strategy and tactics toward the Soviet Union. While the USSR disintegrated and Germany was in the process of reunification, the main thing for Bonn was to avoid irritating Moscow by making advances to the national independence movements, which were gaining momentum in the republics. This is why Germany had a very moderate and cautious attitude toward the conceptual clarification of its position regarding the independent states **/245/** which formed after the USSR's collapse.

The place of independent Ukraine in reunified Germany's foreign policy doctrine can be defined in analyzing the FRG's strategic policy objectives toward Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russia.

In the early 1990s, the paradigm of foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, that was shaped and realized during 1949-1989, underwent transformation. American political scientist H. Guypel maintains that in the Cold War period the basis ot the FRG's foreign policy conception was formed by the paradigm of "idealism and orientation toward balancing."53 Under the conditions of historic changes in Europe in 1990, Hans Genscher, then FRG Foreign Minister, defined a new conceptual paradigm in the following way: "We seek dynamism in stability."54 It was just this conceptual approach that determined the position of the FRG in the situation of geopolitical transformations in the early 1990s. Being open to various alternatives in the new historical situation, which succeeded the Cold War era stability, facilitated transformations in both Eastern and Western Europe. National interests urged Germany to an active conceptual elaboration of a new policy toward the USSR and East European countries rather than to an escape to the umbrella of Western institutions. On October 3, 1990, Germany again became a single unified nation. "A great power" with its global foreign policy interests has emerged in the heart of Europe, seeking a new role for itself on the world arena and having a great vested interest in the East European region.

The revision of paradigm of the FRG's foreign policy conception is connected with the problem of strategic choice: either to continue advancing in the direction of further Europeanization, or to try once again to shape Europe after the German pattern. A rapid pace of achieving internal unity along with further work toward European integration remain the strategic goals of unified Germany. Objectively, the intensification of this process continues to be the center-**/246/** piece of the European direction in unified Germany's foreign policy: "Establishment of an enduring peaceful order for the whole of Europe; ascension of Central and East European countries to the European Union, and an economically sound and politically efficient European Union," said Germany Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, "these are the strategic choices of unified Germany on the threshold of the twenty-first century."55

Independent Ukraine has already assumed, in fact, its own "niche" in Germany's foreign policy paradigm. The FRG respectfully accepted the outcome of the December 1, 1991 referendum on Ukraine's independence. Soon after, on January 17, 1992, Kyiv and Bonn established diplomatic relations. The Embassy of unified Germany was the first among the embassies of Western countries established in independent Ukraine.

The Joint Declaration on fundamentals of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine vividly demonstrated the new conceptual paradigm of the FRG policy with respect to Ukraine: "The Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine... remember ill-fated periods of the recent European history... and wish to make their contribution to the cause of peace in Europe and the whole world. This answers the underlying needs of the German and Ukrainian peoples."56 However, the "Russian factor" remains essential in German-Ukrainian relations.

Russia inherited from the former USSR a legal basis for further development of partnership with the FRG up to the year 2010. Ukraine had to begin from scratch to build up its own legal and agreement basis. In the early 1990s Germany felt obliged to show its gratitude to Russia for the latter's consent to unification of Germany. At that time the FRG's policy toward Russia was aimed at ensuring favorable diplomatic conditions for unification, scheduled withdrawal of the former USSR's troops, and unobstructed access to Russia's power and mineral resources and raw materials. A geopolitically stable Russia, with democratic order and with-**/247/**out poverty and imperial expansionism, is a conceptual objective of the German policy toward Moscow.

At the same time, Ukraine has not experienced any discrimination from Bonn. A model of equitable approach to Ukraine and Russia is gradually forming in Germany's foreign policy doctrine. Generally, unified Germany itself encourages the process of defining the policy of the European Union regarding the CIS. "The signing of agreements on partnership and cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and other countries of the CIS," noted Kinkel, "is of great importance for us."57 Working out various forms of cooperation, Ukraine's admission to associate membership in the European Union, realistic economic assistance, and gradual creation of preconditions for mutual rapprochement are all elements of the FRG's conceptual approach to Ukraine. Advances in Ukrainian reforms will increase the potential and priority of relations with independent Ukraine for the FRG.

The forming of the conceptual basis of the FRG's policy toward Ukraine is taking place in a complex historical situation. Germany objectively perceives Ukraine's geopolitical significance for stability in Europe in the Eurasian context, since Ukrainian independence fixes and renders irreversible geopolitical changes which occurred in Europe in 19891991.

Ukrainian-German relations have taken on a qualitatively new character. Germany has emphasized its intention to develop consistently a relationship of friendship, cooperation, and good-neighborliness. Realism, pragmatism, and tolerance have become the conceptual principles of the FRG's policy toward Ukraine.

1 Ihor Kamenetsky, "German Policy Toward Ukraine in 1918 and Its Historical Genesis, *Ukrainsky istoryk,* 1968, No. 1-4, pp. 14-15.

2 *The Collapse of the German Occupation of Ukraine According to the Occupiers' Documents* (Moscow, 1936: in Russian), p. 38.

3 Gen. M. F. Hoffman, "The Brest Peace," in *The Brest Peace: Personal Accounts and Materials* (Lviv, 1928: in Ukrainian), pp. 268-269.

4 Telegrams in Ziffern des k.u.k. Ministerium des Aussern an Markgraf Pallavicini in Koustantinopel, Nr. 776. Wien, 20 November 1914, Haus-Hof und Staatsarchiv von Osterreich-Ungarn. Politische Abteilung (HHStA. PA.) 902 Liasse Kr. 8b. Ausfertigung. The Union for the liberation of Ukraine (SVU) was established by wellknown Ukrainian figures in early August 1914 to work for an independent Ukrainian state.

5 Austrian consul Urbas was involved in organizing the volunteer Sichovi Striltsy in Lviv. He attributed his difficulties to the Ukrainians' backwardness, poverty and inadequate political experience (in contrast to the Poles). Despite this, however, Urbas considered the Ukrainian cause far more promising than its Polish counterpart, for, while the Ukrainians looked to Vienna, not St. Petersburg for independence, the Poles would always try to play Russia and Austria off against each other. See: Urbas an Hoyos: zur Bildung eines ukrainischen Freikorps. Frage zur Schaffung eines selbstandigen polnischen und eines ukrainischen Staates. Lemberg, 6 August 1914, HHStA. P.A. 523 Liasse XLVII/11. Ausfertigung.

6 Privatschreiben des Grafen Hoyos an Konsul Urbas. 11. Korpskommando Lemberg. Wien; 11. August 1914, HHStA. PA. 523 Liasse XLVII/11. Konzept.

7 Urbas an Hoyos; uber drei verschiedene Molichkeiten zur Schaffung eines ukrainischen Staates. Wien, 20. August 1914. Geheim, HHStA. PA. 523 Liasse XLVII/11. Ausfertigung.

8 *Ibid.*

9 Der Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine an Urbas. Wien, 16 Dezember 1914, HHStA. PA. 903, 8b. Ausfertigung.

10 Denkschrift des Allgemeinen Nationalrates an das k.u.k Armeeoberkommando. Wien, 16. August 1915, Kr. A. Op. Nr. 14241/1915. Ausfertigung.

11 Allgemeiner Ukrainischer Nationalrat an k.u.k Minister des Aussern. Wien, 15. August 1916, HHStA. PA. 929 Kr. lit. AusfertigungAuszug.

12 See: Kamenetsky, *op. at,* pp. 12-13.

13 *Ibid.,* p. 14.

14 Die Ukraine und Russland. Der k.u.k. Gesandte Shechenyi an Seine Exzellenz den Herrn Minister des k.u.k. Hauses ung des Aussern Ottokar Czernin. Kopenhagan, 21. August 1917, HHStA. PA. 1042 Kr. 58. Ausfertigung.

15 Das Prasidium der Ukrainischen Parlamentarischen Vertretung an Czernin. Wien, August 1917, HHStA. PA. Kr; 58. Ausfertigung. **/413/**

16 Geheimprotokoll der Deklaration Czernins über die Schaffung eines autonomen Ukrainishen kronlandes, bestehend aus Ostgalizien und Nordbukowina. Brest-Litowsk 8 Februar 1918, HHStA. PA. 523 Liasse XLVII /12 g/ Ausfertigung.

17 Before World War I Germany had 539,000 sq. km. of territory. Hitler hoped to increase this ten-fold, thus gaining for the German people a vast "living space," *Lebensraum,* by occupying, first, contiguous territories and, later, territories contiguous to those previously occupied.

18 A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf,* (Munich, 1939: in German) pp. 147, 152-155, 741-742, 766-767.

19 *Völlascher Beobachter,* September 45, 1936.

20 F. Haider, *War Diary* (Moscow: 1969: in Russian), vol. II, p. 60.

21 *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmacht fuhrurgestab). Bd. I: August 1940-31. Dezember 1901,* ed. H. A. Jacobsen (Frankfurt/Main, 1965: in German), pp. 341.

22 One can judge the character of Nazi ideology from such phrases as "The Jew-Bolshevik ideology... must be destroyed." Hitler's "socialist state" foresaw that the indigenous poopulation to the East of Germany would be, like the Bolsheviks, absolutely without rights with all power and large-scale property belonging to the occupiers. *Ibid.*

23 *Der Numberger Prozess,* ed. Prof. Dr. P. A. Steiniger, vol. II (Berlin, 1957: in German) p. 259.

24 *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: Series D (1937-1945),* Vol. XII (Washington, 1962), p. 927.

25 *The Nuremberg Trial: A Collection of Materials in Seven Volumes* (Moscow, 1958: in Russian), vol. III, p. 358.

26 *Ibid.,* p. 392.

27 *Ukrainian Historical Journal, 1971, No. 6, p. 120.*

28 Ibid.

29 *Ibid.*

30 R. L. Koehl, *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945* (Cambridge, 1957), p. 247.

31 It was planned to depopulate the conquered territories and repopulate them with Germans. See: H. Rauschning,. Gesprache mit Hitler (Zurich-New York, 1940: in German) p. 129.

32 *Military History Journal,* 1960, No. 1, p. 94 (in Russian).

33 Together with this was the intention to create economic-administrative and military defensive points, to be built from scratch for German's only, at strategic junctions. See: *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 1941-1944 (New York, 1953), p. 13, 76.

34 *Ibid.,* p. 507.

35 *Ibid.,* p. 45.

36 A. Dallin, *op. at,* p. 284. German official data.

37 *Ibid.*

38 *Ibid.,* p. 286.

39 *The Zhytomyr Region During the Temporary Occupation by German Fascist Aggressors, 1941-1944: A Collection of Documents* (Zhytomyr, 1948: in Ukrainian) p. 104 and the map between pp. 104-105; V. Kosyk, *Ukraine During the Second World War, 1938-1945* (Paris-New York-Toronto, 1992: in Ukrainian) **/414/** pp. 272-273.

40 Dallin, *op. at,* p. 286.

41 Nazi planners worked out the doctrine of Germanizing the East after their final victory, but already in the period from November 1942 through February 1943 the war took a different course, and in April 1943 Hitler ordered work on plan *Ost* suspended.

42 For decades the ruling communists were able to sow in broad cirles of our society the myth of large-scale OUN collaboration with the Nazi aggressors during World War II, presenting the Ukrainian nationalists to both their own people and the world at large as traitors, sellouts, and bastards. Such a view prevailed among segments of the Ukrainian public and was reinforced by historians, among them foreign ones.

43 Ukrainian Central State Archive of the Supreme Organs of Power and Administration in Ukraine (hereafter TsDAVOVU), f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 5, ark. 3.

44 Ukrainian Central State Archive of Social Organizations (hereafter TsDAOU), f. 1, op. 22, spr. 75, ark. 3.

45 TsDAOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1063, ark. 61.

46 TsDAOU, £ 62, op. 1, spr. 253, ark. 1.

47 According to approximate data presented at a scholarly conference in Ivano-Frankivsk in April 1995, 10,345 occupiers.

48 TsDAVOVU, f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 164, ark. 2-2f, 15-17.

49 TsDAOU, f. 62, op. 1, spr. 227, ark. 22.

50 TsDAOU, f. 1, op. 22, spr. 78, ark. 16-18.

51 TsDAOU, f. 62, op. 1, spr. 227, ark. 31-32.

52 Yet another reason for accusing the Ukrainian nationalists of collaborationism is that they were allegedly armed by the Germans. In truth, the UPA had many German weapons, but these were either obtained in battle with the Germans or exchanged for food. There are countless examples of such exchanges.

Serious studies of the corresponding documentary sources now underway will make it possible to fill in many gaps in the history of Ukraine and to reveal the whole truth about the activities of the OUN-UPA during World War II. Hopefully, this will give lie to the falsifications fabricated by communist propaganda about the alleged collaborationism of the Ukrainian insurgents, who sacrificed many of their lives in the struggle against the Nazis. TsDAOU: f. 62, op. 1, spr. 254, ark. 16.

53 Gary L Geipel, "Germany and the Burden of Choice," *Current History,* November 1995, p. 375.

54 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Zukunftsverantwortung Reden* (Berlin, 1990), p. 138.

53 Klaus Kinkel, "Deutschland in Europa," *Europa-Arhiv,* 1994, No. 12, p. 337.

56 Ibid., p. 339.

57 *Europa-Arhiv,* 1993, No. 17, p. 338.

Ukraine in US Foreign Policy Doctrines

## *Yevhen KAMINSKY* (§§1-3, §5), *Oleksiy HARAN* (§4)

At the turn of this century, the basis of US foreign policy doctrine remained the notion of isolationism, which was formulated in a Congressional Resolution as far back as 1783 as follows: "The true interest of the states demands that they be involved as little as possible in politics and quarrels of European nations."1 To this traditional category of isolationism the growth of American power in the world then posed an antipode, interventionism. The history of US foreign policy in the twentieth century is the struggle between these two approaches.

*1. Terra Incognita*

Up to the beginning of World War I, the "Ukrainian question" and Ukraine itself remained for official Washington terra incognita.

This may have been governed by a dualistic factor. First, in its foreign policy the United States was traditionally guided by the priority it gave federalism as a state structure.

It was quite natural for official Washington to view information about the Ukrainian struggle for political independence as something very like the American Civil War transplanted onto Russian soil. In 1919, American diplomat Polk would explain to Arnold Margolin, the Ambassador of **/250/** the Ukrainian Peoples (or National) Republic (UNR) in London: "Ukraine is something like our South, and Russia plays in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict the part of our North. That is why the whole Ukrainian-Russian quarrel reminds us of the American Civil War."2 American leaders gave priority not to legal but to political factors, basing themselves on a principle enunciated by the US Supreme Court: "Who is de jure or de facto sovereign over a territory is not a legal, but a political question."3

Though directly involved in the complexities of this Gordian knot in the heart of Europe in 1917-1919, the USA did not pursue a separate policy line on Ukraine. Washington regarded it, at most, as a component of its policy toward Russia. Only to a certain extent can one speak of a US policy on the Ukrainian question. In US global interests Ukraine was relegated to a "zone of indifference." Even in Woodrow Wilson's program statements, full of sympathy for the national self-determination of peoples, the Ukrainian question failed to find a place. Predominant in Wilson's attitude toward the UNR was an unwillingness to complicate America's political choices. There were fears that an imprecise selection of priorities would lead to unwanted conflict with Russia. And this may account for US vacillation concerning the direction and essence of its Russian policy.

In the Ukrainian case, we deal with a specific triad of factors: the priority of economic relations with Russia for US business, the inability of America's Ukrainian immigrants (then numbering about 500,000) to meaningfully influence public policy; and the predominance of socialists among the immigrants themselves. Robert Lansing's State Department led official opposition to Ukrainian independence. Lansing based his views on arbitrary interpretations of the political situation in Russia by US intelligence services and diplomats, views which were often primitivized support for Russian propaganda stereotypes, dismissing Ukrainian independence as something thought up by the Germans. **/251/**

In their turn, leaders of the Central Rada (Council, Ukraine's highest authority) failed to define clearly their position vis-a-vis the US. They somehow overlooked Resolution 52 on Ukrainian day in the USA, passed by Congress in the spring of 1917 and signed into law by President Wilson. Speeches of the authors of the resolution in the Congress, who referred to Ukrainians as "a model of a new nation," "a race left in oblivion," and the people as distinctly identified as Poles, Russians, or Bulgarians, vanished with the wind.4 But a year and a half later, when a far-reaching draft resolution on the Ukrainian question was introduced in Congress, the bill died in committee. The complete text of Wilson's 14 points presented at the Paris Peace Conference failed to even reach Ukrainian political leaders.5 And when in the summer of 1918 the idea of forming a Russian legion was discussed on Capitol hill, Congressmen were practically unanimous in their opinion that such an entity would serve the interests of the US and indivisible Russia.6

A real attempt to open Ukrainian relations with the US was made only by representatives of the Directory (Dyrektoriya, a sort of revival of the ill-fated Rada) at the Paris Peace Conference where UNR representatives were forced to operate in the corridors. Even then, in early 1919, the UNR failed to enunciate any clear-cut foreign policy program. As Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the first leader of the Directory, put it, "The Entente, which occupied Odesa, was frightening, the Germans were terrible, and the Bolsheviks were dangerous."

Under conditions of foreign aggression and total war, the Directory included the following ambiguous point in its Declaration of December 26, 1918: "In the sphere of international relations, the Directory stands for absolute neutrality."7 This attempt to assume the pose of an outside observer at the time when a new European status quo was being recognized actually meant Ukraine's self-exclusion from the political arena. **/252/**

There was a chance to establish relations with the USA. American analysts warned the US Administration about the dangers of overestimating the strength of Russian antiBolshevik forces. The Inquirer analytical group set up at Wilson's behest, maintained that there was no alternative to the independence of the non-Russian nations, that Ukrainian sovereignty should be supported, and that Eastern Galicia should be allowed to join the UNR after a plebiscite. In 1919 the Inquirer group viewed the Crimea as part of Ukraine. But US leaders opted for another course.

*2. On the Fringe of Interests*

During 1921-1938, top echelons of power in the victorious Western countries "not a single time raised the Ukrainian issue as a separate point of their political agenda, one shattering for the unity of the USSR."7 For two long decades the Ukrainian question disappeared altogether from the agenda of serious US policy. Lacking any real levers of influence on official Washington, former UNR leaders who now found themselves in emigration concentrated their efforts elsewhere.

Even under conditions of official isolationism, the US continued to stake its hopes on one and indivisible Russia which is evidenced US recognition up to 1933 of Bakhmetiev, the Provisional government's ambassador supported by Russian émigrés, as a legitimately accredited ambassador.

Only as events unfolded in Europe, did the US begin to show more interest in Ukrainian problems. For example, G. Messersmith, the US Charge d'Affaires in Austria, on February 8, 1935 urged the State Department to take countermeasures to thwart Hitler's designs on Ukraine.9

For the supporters of Ukrainian independence the situation of 1918 recurred. They could not count on their own forces, and anti-democratic Germany was again promising "assistance." But Washington even several months before **/253/** the outbreak of World War II believed that the disintegration of the USSR would merely "stimulate" a war for territorial succession.10 As two decades earlier, once again the idea of Ukrainian independence was seen through the prism of "German intrigues." In his report to the White House and the State Department of December 15, 1938, Warsaw-based American diplomat D. Biddle wrote that self-determination of the Ukrainian people was instigated by Berlin. Even some time after the German Drang nach Osten began, American policy makers were motivated in their attitude to the USSR and Ukraine more by fears of "Balkanization" perhaps than even that of a conflict with the Nazis.

Telling is the following. After meeting with Prof. Granovsky, leader of the American OUN-dominated Organization for the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (ODVU), deputy head of the European division of the State Department L. Henderson wrote on July 3, 1941: "I answered him that at present the US government cannot define its position on Ukrainian independence."

Only few documents of American diplomacy are marked by attempts to give a more open assessments of Ukrainian issues. D. Poole's memorandum to the leadership of the State Department of May 14, 1945 said: "...nobody can be interested in producing the impression that the US government might become a reckless supporter of the disaffected. It is essential, first and foremost at this moment, to come to an amicable settlement with the USSR. Nothing should be done that might undermine these efforts."

To sum up the US position on the Ukrainian issue in 1938-1945, one could say that it took into account the following factors: forced alliance with the Soviet Union; another split, in the Ukrainian diaspora; the opposition of the Western Allies of the USA to redrawing borders in postwar Europe; and, finally, a victory over Nazism as the main objective. Under the circumstances, US officials zeroed in on possible scenarios of further development in Ukraine and around it in postwar period, prospects for the Organization **/254/** of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN/UPA), *etc.*

*3. The Ukrainian Question and the Cold War*

With the war ended, the Ukrainian question was put on the agenda mainly in connection with the creation of the UN. At first, the US took a very tough stand on separate Ukrainian SSR membership. Alteration of this stand should be viewed in connection with Great Britain's position which hoped to extend representation to British colonies and thus influenced President Roosevelt's views. London's position was also determined by the highest degree of readiness to demonstrate its rejection of communist ideology. This was exemplified by Winston Churchill's famous Fulton address, and afterward by President Harry Truman's speech in New York. Whereas the British leader called for liberating East European nations, the US President cautiously said: "We believe that all the peoples ready for self-determination should be allowed to choose their own forms of government... without interference by any outside agent." This change of position, hardly noticeable at the conceptual level, found its realization in the actual situation related to Ukraine.

In November 1946, the British government raised the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with Ukraine. The US response came in June 1947 in the form of a memorandum by director of the European Board at the State Department H. Matthews to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. It consisted of two parts: "Advantages" and "Disadvantages." The former read, in part: "Establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Ukraine would give the Administration a valuable listening point in one of the most important republics of the Soviet Union," which would make it possible for Washington to obtain timely information to be taken into account in defining its relationship with the USSR. The second part of the memo pointed out: **/255/** "Separate individual recognition of Ukraine would lead to greater complications in our relationship with the Soviet Union and give the Soviet government room for maneuver in its attempts to realize its own specific interests in international affairs." Proceeding from these highly pragmatic considerations, Matthews summarized his proposals in one major point: "It is expedient to refrain from making a decision on this matter until we can see whether the British have succeeded in establishing direct relations and this has brought them any advantages." Other State Department documents demonstrate that Ukraine had low priority in US strategic policy-making.

Before the White House was occupied by Dwight Eisenhower, who opted for the Alan Dulles doctrine of "liberation" (and whose first days in office witnessed Stalin's death and the end of the OUN/UPA's armed struggle), US policy on the Ukrainian question had been based on principles defined in the document titled "US Objectives Regarding Russia" prepared by the State Department for the National Security Council in August 1948.

The document emphasized that the US was not interested in fomenting Ukrainian separatism, for that could damage its relations with Russia, which would certainly render Ukraine's independence null and void. But, the document affirmed, if the Ukrainian people would themselves disclaim these arguments, this would demonstrate "the moral right of Ukraine to an independent status."

Thus, in US foreign policy, approaches to the "Ukrainian question" generally remained situational. The issue was seen exclusively through the prism of possible complications in international relations rather than that of a European "stateless people" deserving support. In trying to avoid additional problems in relations with Moscow and balancing between the policies of isolationism and interventionism, Washington would more often raise the Ukrainian issue in its ideological than political sense. The White House and the State Department viewed the Ukrainian **/256/** question in terms of Russian or Soviet policies. The very word "Ukraine" was almost absent from confidential documents."

Essentially significant is the conclusion of London Professor H. McDonald that "Ukrainian Nationalist organizations never won political power or attained a degree of consolidation, sufficient to influence the strategic priorities of Western countries...; the legitimacy of the Soviet State within its 1941 borders and its geostrategic presence in Eastern Europe were taken as something indisputable."12 These words concern, certainly, both the 1917-1922 situation and events from 1938 to the early 1950s. In the early 1950s still prominent was still the stereotype of isolationism referred to by Jaroslaw Pelensky as "the concept of avoiding hasty judgments."13 At the same time, the documents show that the US State Department always kept track of developments in Ukraine.

In the early 1950s within the context of decolonizaton American analysts initiated the Captive Nations Resolution. One motivation for this was that Washington more and more often appeared to champion the oppressor, while Moscow posed as a fighter for national self-determination. On the conceptual plane, certain American pundits gradually began to break with Russocentricism in analyzing Soviet history.

Ukrainian problems found their way increasingly into American official circles. Interest was boosted by Moscow's own anti-nationalist campaigns. Washington came to be faced with the problem of working out a new conceptual approach. This was also fostered by the USSR's energetic efforts to supplant American influence in the Third World.

Rather exemplary became the creation in 1954 of the Assembly of European Captive Nations directly assisted by John Foster Dulles, and later, the American Captive Nations Committee chaired by former President Herbert Hoover.

Late in 1952, a brochure, The Spirit of Independence: America and Ukraine, was published in New York with a **/257/** foreword by Senator Moody and word to the reader by Interior Secretary Chapman. An angry Soviet Embassy urgently sent its translation to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and Ukraine as well as the USSR and Ukrainian SSR Foreign Ministries "to adopt proper measures." The greatest ire among the Communist Party leadership was raised by the senator's comparison of "the present period in the history of Ukraine" with events in the USA during its War of Independence.

Naturally, even given the global confrontation of two systems it would have been naive to hope for an American crusade to liberate Ukraine. For Washington relied at the time on the approach suggested by George Kennan: "If we both politically and economically take offensive actions not only against the Soviet regime but also the strongest and most numerous ethnic element on the traditional lands, and do so in the name of national extremists among whom no unity can be imagined and who will never be able to remain in power without relying on American bayonets... to withstand the pressure of Russian revanchism, this would mean absurdity on such a grand scale that even the recent adventure in Vietnam loses its significance."14

The first attempts to legalize American support for Ukraine's independence was made by Georgetown University Professor Lev Dobriansky in 1957-1958. The situation was favorable, given the following point in Eisenhower's 1957 inaugural address: "Our total commitment is to serve our world together with the people of all nations and nationalities... We respect aspirations of those peoples, now subjugated, for freedom."15 Dobriansky, who was well connected in Congress, based his case on the following: Wilson had been a man of theory, not action; the major perpetrator subjugating the captive peoples is the socialist system; the USA was wrong in having established diplomatic relations with the USSR; peace can be preserved only by the USSR's disintegration, but in order to accomplish this continual psychological activities are needed.16 By that time, **/258/** the stake on evolutionary changes in the USSR got the upper hand in the American political thinking also. As far. back as May 19, 1952, John Foster Dulles underscored in Life magazine "the moral aspects of influence precisely due to which the USA will ruin the Soviet imperial structure."

In the summer of 1959, Dobriansky presented a draft resolution on the captive nations to Senators Paul Douglas and Jacob Javits. In July, both Houses virtually unanimously adopted public law 86-90 on "Captive Nations week." Ukraine ranked fourth on the list, which was the first official recognition of Ukraine's existence in US history. The law was designed to achieve its objective through a "war of nerves" with the Soviet Union. Its proclaimed aim, the USSR's disintegration, was to be realized by way of "demonstrating initiative, alertness, and perspicacity, as far as the main imperio-colonial state of today's world is concerned."17 It was a matter of a gradual erosion of the Soviet system.

The law was not mere lip service. From Eisenhower to Bush there was an annual ritual of Presidential proclamations on the Captive Nations, Congressional resolutions, mass rallies and protest meetings, along with articles on the topic. But at the same time, pragmatism restrained the actions of Washington politicos who feared economic and political destabilization in the USSR. For example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sharply criticized America's Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson for stating that in 1917-1922 "Soviet Russia conquered the independent non-Russian republics."18

Efforts of many years' standing eventually made the problem of subjugated Ukraine reach beyond the confines of psychological warfare against the USSR. The Reagan Administration put the nationalities issue at the center of its policy toward the USSR, and for the first time broke through in traditional American apathy on this issue. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Ukraine was frequently mentioned in The Congressional Record, the official publication **/259/** of the US Congress. It was American legislators who did not allow US interest in Ukraine to wane, engaging in debates on numerous bills and statements. From 1970 to 1979 alone, there were over 150 legislative initiatives concerning Ukraine.

As far as officials in the US executive branch, they (for example, Vice-President Rockefeller, Presidents Nixon, Carter, and especially Reagan) from time to time sent congratulatory messages to Ukrainian American political organization pledging support in their struggle for liberation of the Ukrainian people. The US State Department had a reserved position on this matter up to the collapse of the USSR.

On the whole, US political circles proceeded, until very recently, from the assumption that the USSR would not disintegrate peacefully. This is well illustrated by the following estimates made by American political analysts in late 1991: "In the final analysis, the Bolsheviks have signed their own death warrant. By savagely suppressing any manifestation of nationalism and political dissent, they created preconditions for the instantaneous collapse of communism and the Soviet state after seven decades. And when the end came, nobody showed any readiness to help them."19 Meanwhile, the top US leadership offered, according to journalist Theodore Sorensen, only a few weeks before the Belovezha accord on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, "free counseling rather than the foodstuff, fuel, or finances necessary to live through the winter... Washington's emissaries preached the doctrine of saving (the USSR), feigning action."20

The final conclusion is that, first, Ukraine and its independence were not on the US foreign policy priority agenda while the USSR existed; second, a primary influence on the gradual dissolution of the Soviet Union was exerted through political-ideological methods of an erosive nature; third, official Washington was guided by the assumption of an unlikely peaceful disintegration of "the Soviet Empire"; fourth, in its "Soviet policy," most top US leaders were concerned **/260/** with the inevitability of undesirable chaos and destabilization as a result of the USSR's possible disintegration.

*4. Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Challenge for the United States*

Restraint and inertia were typical of official Washington during *perestroika,* for it cared first of all about proper relations with Moscow over the problem of global security.

One of the explanations for the Moscow-centered approach in Washington was probably the fact that the initial platform of popular movements in the Soviet Union included demands for a new Union treaty, which at that time was resisted by Gorbachev, and, in fact, creation of a confederation. In Ukraine not only *Rukh* adhered to this, position, but also the more radical and anticommunist Ukrainian Helsinki Union. There was socialist phraseology in the documents of the popular movements and references to the "true Leninist nationalities policy." This is why the expectations of many specialists on Soviet nationalities were not about the "dissolution of the Soviet Party-state," but about some kind of "Bulgarization" of republics,21 *i.e.,* greater republican autonomy within the Soviet context. For the West it was also necessary to test the seriousness of Gorbachev's intention to reform the Soviet Union "from above." As Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out, the West's actual political response to secessionism should be more tempered if the Soviet Union does become engaged in a bona fide effort to redress fundamentally the existing national inequities... the West should do more then merely applaud. It should the tangibly help that experiment...22

But the most important reason for the cautious official line was the fact that the United States was determined not to undermine its relations with Gorbachev on a wide range of security issues. American policy-makers had already made a new and "revolutionary" approach: to move "beyond containment," as proclaimed by George Bush on May 12, 1989, **/261/** to test Soviet "new thinking," and, if the new Soviet course should prove to be reliable, to assist its main adversary in its desire to be transformed and reformed. The United States was also afraid of the possible expansion of militant Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. By the beginning of the 1990s, one more argument for stable relations with Gorbachev was the Western concern for the payment of the large Soviet debt.23

Practical consequences of the previously-mentioned problems for American foreign policy began to arise in 1990; after the republican elections in March, popular movements shifted to the idea of independence. The independence of Ukraine was *de facto* proclaimed as the aim of Rukh in June and finally adopted by the Second Congress of Rukh in October 1990. But US officials and many leading Sovietologists still considered Ukraine and Belarus to be the main supporters of the Kremlin's attempts to preserve the Soviet Union. This created a serious gap of approaches between the Ukrainian national movement and U.S. official policy. Before 1990 there was no contradiction between American rhetoric in support of national self-determination and the program documents of the popular movements; from now on this divergence became clear.

The official policy of the United States was to broaden contacts with the republics. At the same time, answering the question about possibilities of recognition of their independence, Counsellor of the Department of State Robert Zoellick pointed out: "We do not support the 'break-up' of the Soviet Union, and I cannot speculate on the criteria of circumstances under which the US might 'recognize' the independence of entities that might emerge... there is a different situation, obviously with the Baltics, whose aspirations for independence we back."24

The Congress was probably better prepared than the administration to understand the aspirations of popular movements in the republics. First, support of the ethnic lobby was of great importance for many Congressmen. Second, **/262/** many members of Congress worked in 1970-80s on human rights cases in Ukraine. They knew the situation and, moreover, they knew much about former political prisoners who now became the leaders of several national democratic organizations. They had no pro-Moscow stereotypes towards these people. The campaign for human rights provided a kind of alliance between liberal Democrats and hard-line anti-communist Republicans. They new fairly well the situation in Ukraine, new many former political prisoners who had already become leaders of several national democratic organizations. They had no Kremlin propaganda-imposed stereotypes about these people

As a result, several documents devoted to the situation in Ukraine were passed by Congress, among them the November 15, 1989 Senate letter asking President Bush to urge Gorbachev to legalize the banned Ukrainian churches, and the 1990 Joint Resolution authorizing a week of commemoration for the victims of the 1932-33 forced famine in Ukraine. The visits of Rukh leaders to the United States were of great importance as well. They helped to overcome the effects of Soviet propaganda, which tried to describe the Rukh as a dangerous nationalist movement.

In late July 1991, during the meeting with Bush, Gorbachev inserted some remarks about Yugoslavia: he wished to persuade Bush before his visit to Kiev that Ukrainian secession might lead to a Yugoslav-type war.25 Bush was worried that "Gorbachev's accomplishments [were] being lost in all this talk about independence." Therefore, he himself inserted into the draft of his Kiev speech several passages intended, as he said, to make the speech "more sensitive to Gorbachev's problems."

As Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott describe, the welcome of the American president in Kyiv was in sharp contrast to the reception in Moscow, "where much of the populace regarded him as just one more foreign dignitary coming to pay homage to the most unpopular man in the Soviet Union." But this did not change Bush's approach. **/263/** Perhaps it even strengthened his intention to support Gorbachev. In Kyiv, Bush referred to his listeners as "Soviet citizens" and compared federalism in the United States and in the Soviet Union: "As a federation ourselves, we want good relations, improved relations, with the republics." He stressed that the United States "will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred." Obviously it was aimed at Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, "but Bush also knew that there were similar ethnic passions in Ukraine, and his warning thus applied to his listeners in Kiev as well."26 If Bush was really trying to send a message not only to the Caucasus but to Ukraine as well, it was, as I argue below, a misunderstanding of the policy of the Ukrainian national movement towards ethnic minorities.

As soon as one month after the putsch in Moscow the attitude to the newly-independent republics changes.

The disagreement in the Administration was about how to get more influence in the new states: by quick recognition (Cheney) or by recognition as the reward for fulfillment of certain conditions (Baker). There was also pressure from Congress for quick recognition. The resolution adopted by the Senate on November 20 called on the president to recognize Ukraine's independence should the December 1, 1991 referendum confirm the Ukrainian Parliament's independence declaration. To a great extent, these steps can be explained not only by the understanding of new geopolitical realities but also by the coming elections.

At a meeting with Ukrainian-Americans at the White House on November 28, Bush indicated that the United States would recognize the independence of Ukraine after the referendum on December 1. Gorbachev's recognition of Ukraine's independence was not mentioned as precondition of this step. This was an important shift in American policy. However, when Gorbachev called Bush and said he was "disappointed" that the United States acted "prematurely," Baker conceded to his aides that Gorbachev's complaint about the US position on Ukrainian independence had some **/264/**merit; it was a bad precedent for the United States so badly to 'jump the gun'... Scowcroft agreed, admitting, 'I think we've signaled a more forward-leaning policy than we had in mind.' He warned the president that by shifting sides so blatantly, "we may prejudice relations between Kyiv and Moscow."27

But this shift was balanced by taking into account Yeltsin's new role: the United States promised to wait to recognize officially Ukrainian independence until Russia had done so. Washington made it clear to Ukraine that she still had to "deserve" recognition of her independence so vividly confirmed at the December 1 referendum.

On December 8 and 9 of 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States was established. The leaders of the three Slavic republics first informed Bush of their decision, and then informed Gorbachev, thus angering him to become angry. From then on the Bush administration was no longer eager to support Gorbachev.

The United States expressed its support of the creation of the Commonwealth structure. In November 1991, a group of nuclear security specialists argued that "the United States still has an incentive to prefer as little disintegration as possible... the United States may have little leverage on the disintegration question. But it can try to create incentives for union rather than independence."28

On December 12, Baker stressed that US priorities which were essential for American recognition of the new states were, in the following order: (1) military and especially nuclear security; (2) democracy, and (3) market-oriented economies. Having received a positive response from the Ukrainian government regarding these principles and the international obligations of Ukraine as one of the state-successors of the Soviet Union under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States recognized Ukraine as well as Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan after gorbachev's resignation on December 25. **/265/**

*5. A Breakthrough in Bilateral Relations*

The firsr years of Ukrainian independence were marked with a complicated development of bilateral relations. Washington put a stake on the relationship with Russia to handle most problems inherited from the USSR. In its relations with Ukraine the US was primarily concerned about nuclear security, preservation of the balance of forces in Europe, and Kyiv's practical actions in this direction were for some time raising queries in the West in general and the US in particular.The year 1994, which the US proclaimed the year of Ukraine, saw a turning point in Ukrainian-American relations. The signing of the Tripartite Agreement on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine gave impulse to improved relations between Ukraine and the US. But there turned out to be major, more profound, and longer-lasting factors of America's attention and good will toward Ukraine: the understanding of the fact that, with the Cold War over, the situation in Europe has become more complex in certain respects, whereas Ukraine as a state situated in the center of the continent is of no small importance; a gradual rise of great-power chauvinism in Russian political life; heed to Zbigniew Brzezinski's idea that if Ukraine again becomes part of Russia, the latter will automatically become an empire; and the realization that Ukraine's stable development is bound up with the security of Eastern and Central Europe, interest in which is an American tradition.

Essential changes in the US political course towards Ukraine, a new vision of her role in Eastern Europe were revealed in the speeches of President Bill Clinton during his visit to Kyiv in May 1995.

At the same time, there remain essential factors hampering the realization of the great potential of bilateral relations. First of all, there is the matter of social and political uncertainty in Ukraine along with constant infighting in the top echelons of power, the character of which calls forth **/266/** doubts about Ukraine's prospects. Also to be mentioned are Ukraine's inconsistent and far from satisfactory progress toward a democratic, law-governed state and the feebleness of its democratic forces. Conspicuous also are Ukraine's inflexibility and the inappropriateness of some of its foreign policy principles from the perspective of building up a system of security, and, at the same time, unrealistic expectations of receiving economic assistance.

The tendency in the US to reduce the foreign aid budget and the insignificant interest of American private business in Ukraine, as a result of these factors, also militate against better relations as does the fact that that Ukraine's legislative guarantees to foreign investors remain inadequate.

Thus, the major problems of the further development of US-Ukrainian relations are now concentrated in Kyiv. At the same time, the reality is such that the US policy development in Europe will necessarily take into account events in and around Ukraine.

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11 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918-1951: Documents and Materials Relating .to the Eve of the Second World War,* vols. I, II (New York, 1948); 4 *Decade of American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956-61* (6 vols.: Washington, 1957-65), *etc.*

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13 Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Ukrainian Question in US-Soviet Relations During and After World War II, *Suchasnist,* 1962, No. 7, pp. 77-78 (in Ukrainian).

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15 D. D. Eisenhower, "Second Inaugural Address," *New York Times,* January 22, 1957.

16 L. Dobriansky, *US Policy of Unfinished Liberation (Jersey* City, 1966), p. 4-21.

17 *Congressional Record,* November 29, 1967, P. H 16052.

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19 "Speedy End Belies Durability of Communist Experiment," *The Washington Post,* December 29, 1991.

20 Theodore Sorensen, "Who is America to preach?" *Los Angeles Times,* October 24, 1991.

21 See, for example, Alexander Motyl, "The Sobering of Gorbachev: Nationality, Restructuring and the West," *Politics, Society and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia,* ed. Seweryn Bialer (Boulder, 1989), p. 171.

22 Z. Brzezinski, "Post-Communism Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs,* LXVII: 5, Winter 1989-1990, p. 20.

23 The incapability of the American leadership to react adequately to the new situation may also be explained by the crisis in Sovietology. See: P. Rutland, "Sovietology: Notes for a Post-Mortem," *The National Interest,* No. 31, Spring 1993, p. 112. Ukrainian studies were well-developed in comparison with those of other non-Russian peoples of the USSR, but as Alex Motyl put it, "As students of Soviet **/416/** ethnic relations — the "nationality question" — can attest, most mainstream Sovietologists and Kremlinologists considered their professional interst in non-Russians to be an exotic pursuit. Ukrainian studies, like Armenian studies, were frequently considered irrelevant to 'real' politics in the USSR, politically motivated by emigre agendas, and emotionally charged by nationalist perspectives. In a word, it was supposed to be 'unscholarly.'" A. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism* (New York, 1993), p. 5.

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The Ukrainian Question in Russian Political Strategy

## *Viktor ADAMSKY* (§§1-7, co-author), *Borys KANTSELYARUK* (§§1-7, co-author), *Oleksandr DERGACHOV* (§8)

Russia's political doctrine on Ukraine, dominated since the Treaty of Pereyaslav by centralism and the determination to eradicate any signs of ethnic separatism, underwent no essential change at the turn of the twentieth century despite a pronounced upward tendency in the Ukrainian liberation movement. Imperial policy was justified by a series of various theories saying that there is a single Russian nation living on the territory from the Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean, speaking a single Russian language and having the same historical traditions.1

*1. The Ukrainian Question in the State Duma*

In the autumn of 1905, Russia's ethnic problems, particularly the Ukrainian question, acquired for the first time an official status, becoming the object of discussion not only in the imperial government but also in the newly-created legislative institution, the State Duma.

The latter, formulating the program of its activities, stated: "Russia is a state populated by various tribes and nationalities. It is possible to unite these tribes and ethnicities spiritually only by satisfying their requirements as to preserve and develop their identity in certain questions of everyday life. The State Duma shall take care about an adequate satisfaction of these just requirements."2 **/268/**

On the contrary, neither the government declaration read out in the Duma by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ivan Goremykin, nor the throne speech of Nicholas II assigned the national question a high priority. True, the government did declare its readiness to reorganize local government and administration with due regard for the special features of various borderlands.3

The problems of cthnocultural development became by far the most important for ethnic minority deputies, who formed a parliamentary faction of autonomists for a "mutual support and protection of the nationalities of Russia striving to achieve democratically based national-territorial or regional autonomy."4 Some of its representatives, however, favored an idea that not all the nations were "mature enough" to demand autonomy. That is why the Ukrainians decided to found their own parliamentary group, incorporating representatives of diverse philosophical attitudes, who, nevertheless, equally advocated the necessity of granting Ukraine autonomy in a restructured future Russian state.5

The second State Duma turned out somewhat more radical in composition, which influenced its discussions of the nationality question. Pyotr Stolypin stressed: "It is planned to introduce local government in the Baltic, the Western Territory and the Polish Realm on the same general foundations, with some variations dictated by local peculiarities, while the status of special administrative entities will be granted to areas populated by Russians, who have their own special interests."6 Openly chauvinist aggressive phrases began to pepper the speeches of right-wing deputies.7

The position of the Ukrainian parliamentary group also further crystallized, passing from general theoretical statements to practical stands on specific issues. In particular, the public education bill introduced by the Ministry of Education was substantively amended with a clause calling for native language instruction in primary schools. Also prepared were bills on Ukrainian local government and autonomy. Taking account of the fact that none of the political **/269/** parties in the State Duma advocated full-scale territorial autonomy for all the non-Russian peoples, the Ukrainians decided in late May 1907, to withdraw from other parliamentary groupings and found a separate fraction with its own program, organization, tactics, and discipline.8

Debates on drawing up a message to the Emperor became a crucial point vividly illustrating the attitude of most members of the third State Duma to the problem of national minorities.9 The proposal of the representatives of "non-state" nations, supported by the Constitutional Democrats, to add the words "satisfy the just aspirations of the nationalities which constitute the state" was rejected.10 The Duma assured the tsar that it would do its utmost to enhance the grandeur and might of an indivisible Russia."

At the same time, in a Ministry of the Interior circular of January 20, 1910, Stolypin instructed the governors not to allow foundation of "alien, including Ukrainian and Jewish, societies, irrespective of their aims", due to the "incompatibility with Russian state ideals of societies having narrow national and political goals, for associations on the basis of such national interests lead to a mounting ethnic isolation and discord, and may result in a threat to the public tranquillity and security."12 In 1911 the head of government expressed himself even more clearly: "The historic task of Russian statehood is to combat a movement, now called Ukrainian, which nurtures the idea of reviving old Ukraine and organizing the Little Russian Ukraine on an autonomous national-territorial basis."13 Various liberties gained with the October Diploma of 1905 were gradually curtailed. The Ukrainians became the object of a brutal pressure from Russian nationalism and repression by the imperial government.

The position of right-wing parties in the fourth State Duma on the Ukrainian question did not undergo essential changes, which is amply evidenced by debates connected with the inquiry of moderate deputies about the prohibited celebration of the centennial of Shevchenko's birth. V. Pu-**/270/**rishkevich expressed the right-wing's attitude to this extraordinary event. His speech essentially boiled down to the idea that in modern conditions the Duma had no moral right to allow public observances honoring the poet's memory, for Ukrainians were sure to seize the opportunity to launch a political movement and would develop what from the standpoint of the state were Utopian ideas. For this reason, any attempts to encourage the honoring of Shevchenko's memory, who "was in the eyes of Russian intellectuals a precursor of some special concepts, a poet who bore ideals which have nothing in common with Russian state ideals, are totally unacceptable for me, as a Russian, and for our faction."14

The Duma's left-wing factions and the Constitutional Democrats took a different stand. Pavel Miliukov stated, among other things, that the Ukrainian movement, deeply democratic in its content, was not the priority of intellectuals alone, for it was launched by the people themselves. Hence, it would be impossible to stop it but very easy to turn it against the Russian state, stifling the last hope for even slight improvement of the Ukrainians' situation within the imperial complex. Addressing the parliamentary majority, Miliukov warned that, if such policies continued, the Dontsovs in Ukraine would number not in individuals and dozens but in hundreds, thousands, and millions.15 The Duma finally voted for an inquiry, but that act did not affect the decision of the government which thought it harmful to Russian state interests to make even slightest concessions to the Ukrainians.

*2. The Autocracy's Ukrainian Policy During World War I*

With the outbreak of World War I the tsarist government's policy on Ukraine consisted in an attempt to practically achieve a two-pronged strategic goal. First, Russia tried to expand the outer boundaries of her territory as much as possible by political incorporation of West **/271/** Ukrainian lands (Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia) whose population, even in the opinion of Russian liberals, belonged to the ethnographic stratum of Russian nation.16 This program was no secret: on August 5, 1914, it was officially proclaimed in the manifesto of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolaevich: "From now on there will be no oppressed Rus," the manifesto said, "The heritage of St. Vladimir, the land of Yaroslav the Wise, Princes Daniel and Roman, casting off their yoke, will hoist the flag of a united, great, and undivided Russia."17

Secondly, by joining the western region the autocracy also expected to improve the internal situation in the country, solving the Ukrainian question forever in Stolypin's spirit. Petersburg was aware it was impossible to achieve this as long as there was a "center of the Mazepist movement," where political freedom and the will to a national and cultural development always kept the Ukrainian idea alive.

The practical embodiment of these plans began immediately after the Russian army entered Galicia. On August 19,1914, the highest military authorities approved regulations on the administration of "enemy regions" and appointed Count G. Bobrynsky Governor-General of the territory. It was the Russian administration's immediate task to take measures "to merging the territory with the Empire politically and ethnically."18. On September 10, 1914, Bobrynsky let the people of Lviv know how this "merger" was to come about: "I consider Eastern Galicia and the Lemko region primordial Russian lands," he said, thus "the administration of these lands should be based on Russian foundations... I am going to introduce the Russian language, law and system with due gradualism, without radically breaking from the existing order."19

The Governor-General ordered restrictions on the right of free arrival and departure in the region; suspended the activities of various clubs, societies, and leagues; banned lo-**/272/**cal elected institutions; and imposed military censorship. Ukrainian bookstores were to be closed altogether due to "the anti-Russian selection of publications available."20

All educational institutions in Galicia were temporarily closed by a special decision of September 18, 1914. Later on, with the Governor-General's consent, it was permitted to open primary schools, provided the authorities made sure that the law-abiding teaching staff used only manuals "without any bias to the detriment of Russian state interests."21 In addition, an obligatory condition for opening schools was that Russian be taught at least five hours a week, using only history and geography manuals cleared by the Russian Ministry of Education. Opening secondary and higher educational institutions remained prohibited.

The military and civil administration also resorted to the mass deportation of individuals whose presence in the territory was considered a danger to Russian state power.22

Ukrainian patriots were also persecuted in Central Ukraine, in spite of the loyal position held by the Society of Ukrainian Progressives. As early as the first days of the war, the Kyiv administration closed the newspaper *Rada,* the weekly *Selo,* and monthlies *Literaturno-Naukovy Visnyk* and *Ukrainska KhataP* Ukrainian popular education societies, publishing houses and cultural societies were closed throughout Ukraine and the "unreliable" deported to Siberia. In reality, Ukraine was brought back to the worst times of national oppression.

*3. The Provisional Government and Ukraine*

Upon the fall of the tsarist regime in Russia, official state power passed to a newly-formed Provisional Government pending convocation of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Its policies were initially guided by the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet — CD) Party which took into account the economic and military-strategic importance of Ukraine to the future of Russian statehood.24 **/273/**

In May 1917, Kadet leader Pavel Miliukov, explaining his party's tasks in the sphere of regional reform associated with national aspirations of the empire's nations, expressed confidence that the party would be able to find a decision which, while enabling some areas of Russia to set up a regional autonomy based on local legislation, would not compromise Russian territorial integrity. The preservation of an integral imperial state entity, emphasized Miliukov, "is the limit dictating the party's radical decision. The disintegration of the state into sovereign independent entities is considered absolutely impossible."25

The first legislative acts of the new regime in ethnic policy followed these postulates exactly. However, the Provisional Government resolution on lifting religious and ethnic restrictions, which allowed the use of local languages in the paperwork of private firms and as medium of instruction in private educational institutions of different levels,26 could no longer satisfy the nationalities. Numerous representative forums and the most influential political parties in Ukraine favored national-territorial autonomy. This demand was made by a Central Rada delegation to the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee of Soviets.27

The answer of the Petrograd leadership to Ukrainian aspirations was negative. The government did not want to recognize the Central Rada as spokesman for the whole Ukrainian nation, for it had not been elected by universal suffrage. Moreover, the government also motivated its decision by the fact that only the All-Russian Constituent Assembly would be competent to act on Ukrainian autonomy.28

It should be noted that official Petrograd was inconsistent in the very first steps in nationality policy. Referring to the absence of a right to establish autonomy in Ukraine, the government, nevertheless, in its reply to Poles of March 29, 1917, upheld the right of the latter to self-determination, although the Kingdom of Poland, like Ukraine, enjoyed no privileges under the autocracy. **/274/**

Having found no support in Petrograd, the Central Rada issued its First Universal on June 10, 1917, informing the Ukrainian people: "From now on we are the masters of our life."29 Although the document did not say directly about setting up an autonomous system, the decisions on allocating a part of incomes for national-cultural requirements starting July 1, introducing the post of Commissioner of Ukrainian Affairs under the Provisional Government, and electing of an executive body, the General Secretariat, clearly indicated the Rada's direction. On June 26, the Central Rada instructed the General Secretariat to prepare a report for the coming session on convening a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.30

In these conditions Petrograd decided to resort to negotiations resulting in a certain compromise. The Central Rada undertook in its Second Universal not to solve unilaterally the question of Ukrainian autonomy until the All-Russian Constituent Assembly was convened. On the other hand, the Provisional Government endorsed the General Secretariat as the highest administrative body in the predominantly Ukrainian provinces, and declared that it favored the Rada's drawing-up of a draft resolution on Ukraine's national-political status in a way it deemed acceptable to meet the area's interests.31

This agreement caused, however, a government crisis in Petrograd. Kadet ministers left the government, explaining that such early establishment of local power in Ukraine, accountable to public organizations and intended to function with an indefinite authority and within indefinite borders, was an inadmissible and highly dangerous precedent.

However, the Kadets soon agreed to reenter a coalition. This came about primarily due the fact that after the July events in Petrograd the policy of compromises toward Ukraine pursued by Aleksandr Kerensky was *de facto* rejected. For example, the "Statute of Supreme Administration in Ukraine," drawn up by the Central Rada as agreed upon with the Provisional Government, was not confirmed by the **/275/** central government. All the Petrograd governmental circles could do was to approve a "Temporary Instruction" which greatly limited the Rada's prerogatives. A few moments in this document are noteworthy, for they vividly illustrate Russia's new course in its Ukrainian policy. First, the Instruction stated that the Constituent Assembly was only to solve the question of local government rather than national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine. Secondly, the General Secretariat was still regarded as not a territorial organ of power but as the central government's highest body for local administration. It was the Provisional Government, rather than the Central Rada,1; that was to approve its composition. The General Secretariat's competence was narrowed and its decisions deemed valid only for five provinces (Kyiv, Podillya, Poltava, Volhynia, and Chernihiv). Moreover, there had to be four representatives of ethnic minorities among the secretaries, which exceeded their proportional percentage in Ukraine. Thirdly, the Central Rada and the General Secretariat were only granted the right of legislative initiative in territorial administration, while passing laws remained with the central government.32

Mounting anarchic tendencies in Russia more and more governed Petrograd's Ukrainian strategy. At the State Conference in Moscow (August 1917), which was intended to demonstrate the unity of Russian society, Kerensky said on behalf of the Provisional Government that he would do his duty before the state and would not make any decisions contrary to its interests.33 Minister of Interior Avksentyev stressed that he would make the idea of statehood pivotal in domestic development and would combat anti-state divisions with all his power.34

Taking account of. the above trends and the unlimited right to national self-determination, the Central Rada decided on August 9, 1917, to convene as soon as possible the Constituent Assembly of ethnic Ukraine so that the population could itself solve the question of Ukraine's political status and her attitude to Russia.35 **/276/**

To ascertain the aspirations of the empire's ethnic minorities, the Central Rada convened a Congress of Peoples in Kyiv (September 1917). In unanimously passed resolutions the delegates advocated the right of each nation to organize its national and personal autonomy, with its "lawmaking area" and some forms of internal organization of life to be determined by the National Constituent Assembly convened on the basis of a "universal, equal, direct and proportional vote by secret ballot and without sex discrimination."36

The political moves of the Ukrainian leadership aimed at convening the Constituent Assembly brought about a new conflict between Kyiv and Petrograd. The Russian Ministry of Justice sent an inquiry to the attorney of Kyiv's judicial chamber, branding the Central Rada's actions separatism. At the same time, it was stressed that the government would throw all its weight and take measures to safeguard the honor and dignity of Russia. Ukraine was held an integral part of Russia and the General Secretariat a governmental body in the territory which, as such, should pursue the policy of central authorities. Therefore the message suggested an immediate investigation of the Rada and Secretariat actions and criminal proceedings against them if any all-Russian laws were found violated.37 These intentions, however, were not destined to materialize because the empire soon found itself in a whirlwind of new sociopolitical

upheavals.

In October 1917, power in Russia was taken as the result of a coup by the left-radical Bolshevik party whose political doctrine geared all the most important issues of domestic and foreign policy exclusively to the "interests" of the proletariat's struggle to establish a new political order. As part of attaining this strategic objective, Ukraine was assigned a primary role, owing to its material resources and geopolitical characteristics.

In addition, Petrograd's doctrinal demands to Ukraine were determined by the whole historical heritage of the **/277/** Russian Empire. In this sense, as Nikolai Berdiaev noted wittily, the Bolsheviks only represented the third (after the Muscovite Tsardom and Petrine Empire) act of the Russian great-power spirit, a little modified and transformed to reflect new realities.38

*4. The Bolshevik "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia"*

The fundamental principles of the new power in the ethnic question were laid down on November 15, 1917 (Gregorian calendar), in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia."

The document did not alter the unitary structure of the imperial state complex, nor did it display any intentions of the new authorities to change it in future. In terms of world outlook, the communists did not accept either a "national-cultural autonomy" or the principle of federalism. The latter was regarded by them, from the viewpoint of the interests of the "proletarian revolution," as "absurd" (Lenin) in general (and, in particular, in the Russian conditions), as a "quixotic effort to set back the clock" (Stalin). All one could expect at most was a tentative autonomy for some historical regions with the same constitutional standards for all.39

Yet, the Soviet government guaranteed all ethnic communities equality and sovereignty, free development of ethnic minorities, cancellation of all ethnic or religious privileges and restrictions, and declared the right of Russia's nations to a free self-determination, including separation and setting up independent states.40

The Bolsheviks were conceptually against separation, but, after seizing power, they did not dare to immediately eliminate a slogan they had been steadily exploiting in the prerevolutionary period to attract the sympathy of national movements in the struggle against the tsarist — and later Provisional — government. They also expected that the empire's nations, except, probably, autonomously organized **/278/** Finland and Poland, would not express much desire to use this maximum right. Anyhow on the eve of the coup Lenin stated with overconfidence: "If the Ukrainians see us as a republic of Soviets, they won't break away."41

However, pretending to lay a legal basis for Russia's nations to legitimately quit the empire, the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) did not establish a procedure which might make possible exercise of this proclaimed right. It was in fact a mere declaration of right, for the practical solution of the secession issue, as the Bolsheviks warned in a party resolution, would be considered in each concrete case separately, depending on circumstances and with due account of the interests of social development as a whole and the proletariat's struggle for socialism.42

In response to the Bolshevik coup, the Central Rada, which did not share the communist program of socioeconomic and political transformations, issued on November 20, 1917, its Third Universal, declaring its firm determination to begin organizing Ukrainian political life within its own state framework, proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) consisting of nine Ukrainian provinces, while stressing that it did not secede from Russia but would do its best to make the Russian Republic a "federation of equal and free nations."

The Bolsheviks, posing as successors to the previous regime in the whole geopolitical space of the empire and trying to further maintain their grip on the all-Russian state structure, were forced to react in some way or another. Despite the Central Rada's tolerant attitude to the Soviet government, Sovnarkom dared not even think of a *de facto* recognition of the UNR, for the Ukrainian leadership's idea of autonomy in no way complied with official Petrograd's principles, for this autonomy was "approaching, to some extent, state independence" and "had its own constitutional right, either based on an agreement with the central authorities or granted so that the central power cannot withdraw it unilaterally."43 **/279/**

Yet, Sovnarkom did not dare to openly accuse the Kyiv government (General Secretariat) of illegitimacy, for this would have meant to contradict its own declarations.

Given the failure of the Kyiv Bolsheviks to seize power by force of arms and illusory hopes to win at the Constituent Assembly elections to be held in January 1918, Sovnarkom had no alternative to a military invasion in order to bring Ukraine under its total control.

A new interpretation by Communist party theoreticians of the right of nations to self-determination became the ideological justification of intervention. According to the renewed theory, this principle ceases to be universal during a socialist revolution. From then on, the specific essence of this right mostly depended on the nature of society in which it was being exercised, for the Bolsheviks said unequivocally that they would support the right of the toiling masses, not the bourgeoisie, to self-determination. As to Ukraine, the conclusion was as follows: "We say to the Ukrainians," Lenin stated on December 5, 1917, at the First All-Russian Naval Congress, "as Ukrainians, you are free to organize your life as you please. But we will extend a fraternal hand to Ukrainian workers and say to them: we will fight together with you against your and our bourgeoisie."44

On December 17, .1917, Petrograd formally recognized the UNR in a "Manifesto to the Ukrainian People" full of ultimatums to the Ukrainian Rada, but it also said that, since the Central Rada was pursuing a "bourgeois policy," this essential circumstance precluded the Russian leadership from "recognizing the Rada as a plenipotentiary representative of the Ukrainian Republic's working and exploited masses."45

Finally, a Soviet republic is proclaimed in Kharkiv on December 25, its government being immediately recognized by Russia. To oversee it, Sovnarkom appointed Sergo Ordzhonikidze "provisional extraordinary commissar to Ukraine."

In this political situation the Central Rada proclaimed **/280/** independence of Ukraine in its Fourth Universal, expecting this to put up a certain legal barrier to the threat of further extension of destructive processes. However, Petrograd, which controlled the situation to a large extent, utterly ignored this act.

Yet, Lenin understood that it was not easy to keep Ukraine under Soviet control solely by force. For this reason, even the Kharkiv congress identified Ukraine as a federated part of the Russian Republic in its resolution on self-determination.46 By force of circumstances the Bolsheviks had to soften their orthodox positions and somewhat modify the original program. Thus, in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People" approved by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets (January 25, 1919, the Soviet republic was this time referred to as a "federation of the free republics of diverse nations."47

It is noteworthy, however, that, while declaring a new form of state system, the document contained not a single juridical explanation of the "federation" category, proclaimed no new foundations for building a republic. Nor did Lenin clarify his stand, but only underlined in his concluding speech to the congress that a powerful revolutionary federation existed.48

It was RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) People's Commissar for Nationalities Joseph Stalin who essentially clarified the Bolshevik strategy. Unlike Western bourgeois-democratic federations *(e.g.,* Switzerland or North America), which were a union of territories divided by geographical conditions or historical happenstance, the Soviet federation was a "union of certain territories which came apart historically and now differ both in special habits and ethnic composition." While in America or Switzerland federalism led to a bicameral system, this system did not suit Russia, for, according to Stalin, it did not meet the elementary requirements of socialism. A Congress of Soviets elected by all the working masses or a Central Executive Committee acting in its stead must be the highest **/281/** legislative body of the Soviet federation.

As to the competence sphere of the central Sovnarkom, the latter was to be in charge of army and navy affairs, foreign relations, railways, post offices and telegraph, money, trade contracts, general oversight of the economic, financial and bank policies. Regional Sovnarkoms were to deal with schools, courts, administration, *etc.*

Therefore, federalism of the Soviet Republic did not violate the fundamental forms of political centralization. After all, it was to play the role of a transition stage from a "coercive tsarist unitarianism" to a "voluntary and fraternal unification of the working masses of Russia's all nations and tribes." The ultimate goal was to lay foundations of "a unitary socialist order."49

As is known, the first attempt resulted in a short-lived communist regime in Ukraine. Under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia pledged to recognize the UNR independence and withdraw its troops from the occupied lands. Strategically, however, the Bolsheviks did not abandon further plans of political incorporation of Ukraine, considering documents signed in Brest-Litovsk only as a temporary basis for tearing the western periphery from the center.50

*5. "Military-Political Alliance" as a Form of Reviving the Empire*

The surrender of Germany in World War One ushered in a new stage in Moscow's Ukrainian policy. On December 24, 1918, the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs announced that, by repealing the Brest Treaty, the Russian government no longer recognized Ukraine as an independent state.51

However, after establishing a Soviet regime (USRR — Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic) as a result of another military invasion, Russia's Sovnarkom failed to renew the legal system of the previous period. There were objective reasons for this. When the Bolshevik troops were only advanc-**/282/**ing deep into Ukrainian territory, Bolshevik Foreign Minister Georgy Chicherin sent an official reply on behalf of the Russian government to the protests of UNR premier Volodymyr Chekhivsky: "There are no RSFSR troops in Ukraine. The military action now under way on the Ukrainian territory is between the Directory troops and those of the Ukrainian Soviet government (formed in Kursk on November 28 — *Author),* the latter being entirely independent."52

When Russia began to control most of the Ukrainian territory, the newly-formed government of Khristian Rakovsky advocated in its program document a federal union of the two republics, the forms of which would be worked out at an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets.53 However, the composition of the Third Congress of Soviets (March 1919) turned out so inconsistent with the set goal that the Bolsheviks did not even try to moot a question of a federation with the RSFSR. Instead, the Constitution of Ukraine adopted at the Congress said, "The USRR declares its firm determination to be part of a united international socialist Soviet republic as soon as there are conditions for its formation; at the same time, the USRR declares its complete solidarity with the already existing Soviet republics and its decision to enter into a closest political unity with them to work jointly for the triumph of a world communist revolution and to set up a closest possible cooperation in communist construction which we only imagine on a world scale."54

The RSFSR Sovnarkom had to accept the existence of an independent state apparatus in the republic, though it did not give up even an inch of the principle of centralism and overall control. An RKP(b) Central Committee resolution of April 8, 1919, sent to the party's Ukrainian branch as a guide for practical work, stressed the unconditional necessity for a joint Red Army command, logistical support, and communications control on all fronts. To reach this goal, the RSFSR People's Commissariat for State Control **/283/** was to extend its jurisdiction to all state institutions of the Ukrainian republic.

It should be noted that the RSFSR leadership was not totally unanimous as to how to launch the process of reviving a neo-imperial state complex. Lev Kamenev, for example, thought it advisable to fully merge Ukraine with Russia.55 This option was not rejected altogether, but the Russian Politburo decided to choose a more flexible tactic to avoid an open confrontation with the ethnic movement.

On June 1, 1919, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) issued a decree "On the Military Alliance of the Soviet Republics of Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Belorussia to Fight against Imperialism." The form it assumed fully complied with the Bolshevik doctrine. Management of the basic branches (military commissariat, economic councils, railways, finances, and labor commissariats) was concentrated in the hands of undivided collegiums.56

This resulted, wrote member of the military council of the Ukrainian front S. Savytsky to the USRR Defense Council, in "a complete merger with the RSFSR rather than unification of the revolutionary fronts of the fraternal Soviet republics."57

The Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) warned the Bolsheviks against probable negative consequences of the "immediate introduction of a primitive and thoughtless centralized system of administration," which separated the proletarian state from local conditions of life and denies any independence to members of the alliance. That is why, to complement and further develop the VTsIK decree, the Borotbists strongly advised forming a special commission for drawing up a draft federation of Soviet republics on the basis of equality.58 But the ruling party ignored the proposals of national communists, and, as a result, in August 1919 the Bolsheviks were forced to leave the Ukrainian territory for the second time.

Analyzing later in 1919 the causes of previous defeats **/284/** in Ukraine, Lenin admitted that all attempts to hold the Ukrainian ground would be unsuccessful without serious (or at least seemingly serious) concessions to the national movement. These conclusions necessitated a search for more "perfect" imperatives and an essential alteration of tactics before a third intervention.

First, Moscow, as never before, began to stress its favorable attitude to Ukraine's independence. This was even officially confirmed, though not by state power bodies but in a non-binding party resolution.59

Secondly, Lenin decided to involve in Soviet statebuilding the Ukrainian communist parties, above all, the UKP(b), which had liberated whole districts from Denikin's army on its own. Directives of the Eighth RKP(b) Conference became the ideological platform of cooperation.60 At a time when Russian troops had not yet fully occupied Ukraine, Lenin in his public speeches did not accentuate differences in the fact that the Borotbists favored complete independence, but in confidential documents he classified as "counter-revolutionary" and "petit-bourgeois" demands the party's intentions to form a Ukrainian Red Army and a national communist party as a separate section of the Comintern.61 These actions of the communist leader were fully in line with his understanding of the independent USRR status. In the "Letter to Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Victory over Denikin" of December 28, 1919, Lenin, after analyzing the trends of Ukrainian communism (advocates of Ukraine's complete independence, more or less close federal union and complete merger of Ukraine with Russia), stressed that the Rakovsky government should solve in its practical program the problem of "whether Ukraine ought to be a separate and independent Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in union (federation) with the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic or merge with Russia in a single Soviet republic."62 Thus, the element of Ukraine's complete independence in Lenin's views vanishes into thin air, and all the "alternatives" really come down on-**/285/**ly to unification with the RSFSR: either as complete merger or federal union, with centralism of the communist party being its political content. Hence, such question as drawing state borders between the republics was "not principal, unimportant and secondary" for Lenin.63

Thirdly, the Bolsheviks not only declared their respectful attitude to the Ukrainian language and cultural institutions but even at first adhered to this in practice, which even their opponents had to admit. In particular, UNR Prime Minister Isaac Mazepa wrote in early February 1920 from Kamyanets-Podilsk in a letter to Symon Petliura: "As to Ukrainian culture in general, the Bolsheviks have in fact opted for recognizing it, and this year nothing has been heard about their persecution of the Ukrainian cultural institutions or language."64

It was the Fourth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets that specified the shape of Ukrainian-Russian relations. For this reason, the qualitative composition of delegates became the object of special care for Moscow and the ruling party in Ukraine, taking into account the past experience. On March 28, 1920, the Ukrainian Communist interim bureau decided to cancel elections in the uprising-stricken areas.65 On April 4, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (VUTsVK) and the central election commission receive a directive to work out regulations on representation norms for the congress with the following quotas: peasants could elect one delegate from 5000 voters, factory workers from 10,000, while the Red Army units stationed in Ukraine — from 1000 or fewer voters.66

Little wonder that the congress resolution (May 1920) "On the Official Relationship between the USRR and the RSFSR" confirmed the agreement of June 1, 1919, on the advisability of uniting the commissariats of the armed forces, railways, finance, economy, labor, post and telegraph, while the newly-elected VUTsVK was instructed to further follow the line of a closer rapprochement with Russia. It was also revealing that the congress, while endorsing the idea of an **/286/** independent state constitution, at the same time considered Ukraine and other Soviet republics as "forming part of the RSFSR."67

To sum it up, the Moscow Bolsheviks, after changing tactics in the approach to settling a top-priority "Ukrainian question," managed at that time to make decisions which fully corresponded to their strategic plans.

*6. The Period of Contractual Relations*

Moscow's Ukrainian policy during 1919-1920 was characterized by two principal moments: first, virtual subordination of all most important spheres of Ukrainian public life to the Russian ruling structures; second, absence of any streamlined legislative system.

The VTsIK decree of June 1, 1919, was adopted only for the period of the military threat from the "monarchist and capitalist counterrevolution," while the Fourth AllUkrainian Congress of Soviets resolution did not in fact assert Ukraine's declared legal status *vis-a-vis* the RSFSR, for it was a unilateral act. Moscow did not hasten to react to this document because of tactical considerations. The point is the communists continued to regard the federal principle of state-building only as a transition stage on the road to complete unity.68 As long as there was a faint hope of a revolutionary explosion in Western Europe (they believed the war with Poland would speed it up), they did not hasten to legislatively endorse federal forms. The RSFSR People's Commissariat for Nationalities' was drawing up the project of a flexible "regional autonomy of the borderlands." According to Stalin, this should have several levels: narrow administrative autonomy (Volga Germans, Chuvashes, Karelians); a little wider political autonomy (Bashkirs, Kirghizes); and finally Ukrainian type of autonomy.69 This means that Lenin's People's Commissar of Nationalities saw no essential differences between the RSFSR autonomous regions and formally independent republics. **/287/**

The Stalinist version of "autonomization," however, failed to materialize in this period. In the fall of 1920 the foreign political situation changed radically. Russia had to open peace talks with Poland. As soon as it became known to A. Levytsky, head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Warsaw, he also proposed, through the minister of foreign affairs in Moscow, peace negotiations with Poland, but Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied that there was only the authority of the USRR whose representatives were part of the Soviet delegation.

The Polish side, however, did not rush to recognize the mandate of the Ukrainian Soviet government, considering Ukraine part of the RSFSR. The situation exacerbated when S. Shelukhin, delegated by the UNR government to hold the talks, arrived in Riga. For this reason, Chicherin wrote in a telegram to Danishevsky who headed the Soviet delegation: "Self-sufficiency of the Ukrainian Soviet republic is a fact the Polish delegation may know, but now we must inform them of this."70

The signing in Moscow on December 28, 1920, of the "Workers' and Peasants' Union Treaty between the RSFSR and the USRR" in fact opened a new period in interstate relations of Russia with the Soviet republics — the period of contractual relations. The document recognized the independence and sovereignty of both sides but, nevertheless, indicated the necessity of rallying together their forces by forming a union "for defense purposes as well as in the interests of economic development." The RSFSR and USRR thought it necessary to announce that any joint obligations they would assume with respect to other states might only be dictated by the common interests of the workers and peasants of Soviet republics.

To better attain this objective, the two governments united the commissariats of military and naval affairs, foreign trade, finance, labor, railways, post and telegraph, and Supreme Councils of National Economy. It is noteworthy that the united commissariats were part of the RSFSR, and **/288/** representatives of Russian people's commissariats were being appointed to the Sovnarkom of Ukraine as acting government members. Accordingly, it was intended to exercise control over the united commissariats through all-Russian congresses of Soviets and the VTsIK, with Ukraine delegating there her representatives.71

The legal foundations of the treaty deprived Ukraine of any chance to essentially affect the united commissariats; hence, special agreements to regulate the procedure and form of home rule were never worked out in detail. This enabled Russian people's commissariats, now in fact above the two states, to fully control Ukraine's military and national economic complex.

The administrative practice which in fact reduced the republic to the status of a Russian autonomous region provoked mass-scale protests of the Ukrainian leadership. To put an end to endless conflicts between the commissariats, Stalin decided it was time to fix *de jure* the existing situation. In a letter to Lenin and other members of the Politburo of January 13, 1922, he stated that some comrades proposed an earliest possible unification of all independent republics with the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy, and he fully shared this viewpoint. Hence, the Russian Federation's People's Commissariat for Nationalities began to draw up the relevant document.

Obviously, there was no unanimity in Moscow on this question. This is why, in order to take the initiative in its hands, the Ukrainian Politburo ventured for the first time on March 11, 1922, to come out with a proposal to specify the relationship between the republics, with the theses of the December (1919) RKP(b) conference as a basis (before that, all Ukrainian initiatives were first to be sanctioned by Moscow).

The Ukrainian Bolsheviks expected Lenin to be able to curb the aggressiveness of Russian governmental apparatus in Ukraine and remind it that it was purely Russian, while there were also local national authorities in the republics. In **/289/**other words, the provinces still naively believed in the possibility of implementing the declared idea of equality.

*7. "Voluntary Unification" — Doctrine and Practice*

Several years' efforts of the RSFSR authorities to implement their political doctrine on the "Ukrainian question" logically resulted in a "voluntary" unification of the republics within the Soviet Union.

Leaving aside the well-known facts of this action, suffice it to recall certain attempts of the Bolsheviks to somewhat alleviate the situation. It is, particularly, the Leninist position in the dispute about the principles of relationship between the republics, for even now it is often treated as alternative to the Stalinist one.

After familiarizing himself on September 25, 1922, with the commission draft (Stalin's "plan of autonomization") and the minutes of its discussion, Lenin wrote to Kamenev the next day: "You must have received from Stalin the resolution of his commission on the incorporation of independent republics in the RSFSR... In my opinion, the question is arch-important. Stalin displays a certain tendency to hurry up." As we see, Lenin did not say that Stalin was conceptually wrong in his very approach to settling this truly complicated matter, he only marks the tendency to "hurry up." What did Lenin suggest instead? Not to offer bait to "independence seekers," he thinks it fit first to reword the text a little: "Write in par. 1 "Formal unification with the RSFSR in a Union of the Soviet republics of Europe and Asia" instead of "joining the RSFSR."

As to the essence of the draft, Lenin advocated a more centralizing position than did Stalin himself. Lenin suggested merging of the republic people's commissariats of finance, food, labor, and national economy with their respective Russian counterparts, though the above draft only envisioned a formal subordination of the former to the latter. As to independent people's commissariats of justice, the interi-**/290/**or, land farming, education, public health and social security, the RSFSR Sovnarkom chairman proposed convening joint advisory conferences and congresses, which the Stalinist draft did not envision either.72 However, knowing the position of "nationals," above all, the Ukrainians and Georgians, Lenin chose not to press with these supplements.

The analysis of Stalin's project of "autonomization" and Lenin's amendments to it shows that these politicians had no conceptual differences with respect to the methods of drawing the national republics into a unitary neo-imperial complex.

Thus, the search for an optimum model of implementing the Russian political doctrine on Ukraine continued throughout 1917-1922, Forms of its practical implementation were changing, but its essence remained intact. Declaring at different stages various options for inter-state relations, Russia was in fact trying to use them for reaching its strategic goal — the preservation of total control over all major areas of Ukrainian public life. The Bolshevik party's centralist principles found their practical application in the organization of state structures. The form (creation of the USSR) was only supposed to veil over the true essence of the imposed unitary statehood.

*8. Ukraine in Modem Russian Strategy*

The period of a union treaty and a virtual unitary state, the USSR, resulted in Ukraine's deep immersion in the Eurasian political and economic space and her ever-growing all-round dependence. The objective processes of integration in the conditions of a total etatization assumed a distorted nature as a matter of axiom. Decades of over-centralization, society's dwindled flexibility and capability of self-regulation and, what is more, self-government utterly complicated the process of secession and gaining a true independence.

Russia and Ukraine turn out to be closely connected doctrinally in terms of a still-unresolved problem of their **/291/** awareness as new separate states. It is not the question of the identical content of national concepts and doctrines but the superimposition, indivisibility of the material of civilization: history, culture, the economy, place in the international community, etc. Russian geopolitical thought does not have any generally accepted concepts for identifying its proper natural boundaries and territories; it abounds in such categories as "spheres of exclusive interests," "zones of influence," "areas of Russian-speaking population," and "the near abroad." This resulted in the formation of a new Russian nation and a specific attitude to ethnic questions as such, the absence of clearly-defined methods of pursuing the domestic and foreign policies and the presence of problems in the relations with any neighboring state unless the latter agrees to the role of satellite.

All this shows up most vividly in Russian policies on Ukraine. The making of the two states and the respective societies continues and has as its aim, among other things, to finally divide the above-said "material" and use it at one's own discretion without detriment to the other side, which would bring forth self-determination and mutual understanding on a new basis.

The solution of these problems is being slowed down, on the part of Ukraine, by her insufficient readiness for independence, on the part of Russia by her inability to adequately perceive the new historical realities and identify new national goals. The paradigm of restructuring Russian statehood includes the unconditional inheritance of old great-power ideologemes, principles, and foreign-policy styje and the vision of its geopolitical role. Moscow did not even admit the thought of reconsidering its old imperial past and historical responsibility, of renewing its relationship with the nearest neighbors. All this determines the conceptual approaches and contents of Russian strategy toward Ukraine.

Russia has no experience (except in very distant times) of establishing foreign political relations with Ukraine. The five years of independent existence have proven insufficient **/292/** to transform Russo-Ukrainian relations from the internal to the external sphere. This is not part of the Kremlin's plans and is not determined by the very content of these relations, which is amply reflected in their formal and informal aspects.73 The terms of interstate relations fixed in the Treaty of Bela Vezh — transparent borders, a single information space, comprehensive obligations with respect to all-round integration coupled with a still great isolation from the outer world — are very critical factors of forming Russian and especially Ukrainian (scale effect) statehood, testifying to a virtually incomplete disengagement.

The two states, newly formed in 1991, inherited very well-developed, mutually vital but insufficiently formalized relations which are therefore difficult to regulate and are virtually hostage to "good will" and can easily turn into an instrument of self-willfulness. Russo-Ukrainian friendship is not a myth. On the contrary, it is an objective reality requiring no reconsideration or debunking because it does not belong to the sphere of interstate relations. The destruction of Ukrainian statehood was quaintly counterbalanced with the disappearance of Russian statehood under the Bolshevik regime. Russification brought on inequality but influenced, in fact, the attitude of Ukrainians and other nations to power as such, be it the Kremlin, republican or local ones. The emergence of individual sovereign states became a serious test for relations between the two nations.

The consolidation of modern Russian statehood, and the legitimate renaissance of Russian patriotism contain a threat to infect society with xenophobia, arrogance, the great-power spirit, and thus reduce the relations between Russians and Ukrainians to servicing a certain "official course."

Russian policy on Ukraine has undergone some symptomatic qualitative changes in the past few years. The proclamation of the sovereignty of Russia on June 12, 1990, and of Ukraine on July 16, 1990, initiated the restoration of fullscale bilateral relations. While the two countries were advocating independence, they were allies, with the Soviet **/293/** Union as a common enemy. The presence of a center, Gorbachev's maneuvers, confederation prospects and, last but not least, Russia's first difficult independent steps developed a situational parity in Russo-Ukrainian relations.

Upon the collapse of the USSR, relations between the two countries remained for some time greatly camouflaged by such a specific structure as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS seems to be keeping the former republics away from the common international legal space and creating qualitatively new standards of relations on the Eurasian expanses. Ukraine's and Russia's co-authoring CIS basic documents only threw in relief the contrast in their approaches to integration processes on the Eurasian territory. For Moscow, the CIS is an instrument to legalize and practically serve its "special interests" in the region; for Ukraine it is the method of a "civilized divorce." It would be a mistake to treat Kyiv's position as anti-integrationist; it is only a natural result of understanding the impossibility of building a proper state without a radical qualitative restructuring of relations with Russia and getting out of her tutelage. It is for these purposes that such steps were taken as the declared intention to "become in the future a permanently neutral state staying out of military blocs"74 and the decision to eliminate Ukrainian nuclear weapons, which deprived Moscow of the possibility to brandish the security problem as part of her reintegration strategy.

At the same time, former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev announced openly that Russia could not accept the loss of "geographical positions it took centuries to conquer,"75 that Ukraine's territorial integrity was doubtful, for her borders might be altered peacefully.76 In addition, the official Russian military doctrine states: "... factors which intensify threats to the Russian Federation's military security are some still-to-be-negotiated segments of the RF official borders and an unsettled legal status of Russian Federation troops stationed outside their limits."77

Under the influence of circumstances attending the im-**/294/**plementation of the program of building a "Greater Russia," proclaimed by the Russian political establishment, the mass awareness of Russians toward Ukraine and Ukrainians evolves from incomprehension and a sense of injury to malice and arrogance. This also formulates, in a certain measure, the sentiments of the Russian political elite, creates a fitting background to the emergence of revanchist and aggressive conceptual approaches to relations with Ukraine.

One of the views of Ukraine is that it is an artificial, weak and amorphous entity doomed to a permanent crisis and fruitless internal clashes. A Ukraine like this allegedly has no prospects as an independent state and will sooner or later break up or have to abandon an independent strategy and accept a deep economic, military and political reintegration with Russia. This means it is only enough to wait and not to create unnecessary international legal obstacles to exercising this option in the future.

Another concept is based on Ukraine's right to independent existence, with her borders and overall status to be "specified." There is a widespread opinion (especially among foreign-affairs columnists) that Ukraine took advantage of the results of the Russian Empire's historical efforts, of the USSR's foreign political successes and thus received "too much" when the imaginary republican borders became official. There are also attempts to tie up the recognition of Ukraine's borders with the conditions and for the period of her CIS membership, *i.e.,* with the preservation of a special status of Russo-Ukrainian interstate relations.

It is by this concept that the Supreme Soviet of Russia was guided when it in fact recognized in 1992 as unlawful the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine and passed a resolution on the "Russian status" of Sevastopol in 1993.78 The Russian executive's dissociation from these decisions in no way settles the problem. The years of experience from the political and diplomatic struggle around the problem of the division, place, basing of the Black Sea Fleet demonstrated the interaction of Russia's diverse political forces in the **/295/** "Ukrainian direction", rather than differences between the latter. Virtually all ideologists of Russian statehood are unanimous in demanding international recognition of Moscow's exclusive and top-priority interests in Ukraine.

Russia's unofficial but true strategy toward Ukraine is essentially clarified by the concept of "leadership instead of direct control," laid down in the "strategic course of Russia towards CIS member-states" — "a modernization of relations beneficial for Russia, whereby it could preserve the advantages of her geo-strategic position and, at the same time, create much more attractive conditions in the CIS, rather than a modified restoration of the situation, which existed before the USSR collapse."79

This strategy worked effectively enough in 1992-1993. Despite a formally extensive international recognition, Ukraine remained largely isolated in the Eurasian space dominated then and now by Russia. The new independent states, in general, looked out of place in the global system of security and stability, were "destroying" the armaments limitation and disarmament mechanisms. Having become the USSR successor, Russia gained automatically certain formal advantages over the other heirs to the Union.80 Western states, above all the USA, displayed an obvious interest in dealing only with Moscow in these matters. The latter made full use of the nuclear-weapons question and general uncertainty in Ukraine's foreign political course to isolate her.

There have been gradual qualitative changes since 1994 as a result of a partial improvement of Ukraine's image and accumulation of problems in the relations between Russia and the West. Russia is gradually losing various means of political and diplomatic leverage with regard to Kyiv. Meanwhile, the economic factors of bilateral relations, which remain active enough in the conditions of a permanent crisis and Ukraine's essential lag in reforms, are coming to the fore.

1996 has marked changed accents in Moscow's official foreign political course by way of acute debates during the **/296/** election campaign. A rather powerful flashback of antiWesternism, the loss of priority (compared to other post-Soviet states) in the relations with the West necessitated a turn towards the CIS countries.81 It is evident that Moscow-Kyiv contacts are assuming a new quality, given a predictable course of Russia's relations with Kazakhstan and Belorussia and a limited importance of relations with other CIS members. Relations between the two states have become an essential factor of modern international life; they no longer look solely in the CIS pattern, are gradually getting rid of postcommunist features and entering the international law field.

Latest developments82 have shown that Russia has finally lost Ukraine as its borderland; the Kremlin's inability to grasp the logic of geopolitical changes complicates reaching a mutual understanding at the present stage and calls into question strategic partnership between them.

Moscow is not prepared to change the algorithm in its relations with the neighbors and to switch over to a true parity and partnership. There still remains a rigid alternative: either *Diktat* and subjection or rivalry. Russo-Ukrainian relations are the relations between the two states which are far from completing the process of their making. It is apparently Ukraine's weakness that is the main obstacle to achieving parity in Russo-Ukrainian relations.

1 Catherine II best formulated the essence of this policy in 1764 in a secret order to General Procurator Prince Vyazemsky: "Little Russia (Ukraine), Lithuania, and Finland are provinces governed on the basis of privileges confirmed to them. To violate or immediately withdraw them would be very inexpedient, and to call them foreign pr take issue with them would be more then a mistake; it would be stupidity. These provinces, as well as Smolensk, should in the most gentle fashion be Russified and stopped from seeing themselves as wolves in the forest. This will be most easily accomplished if intelligent people are selected to govern these provinces." *History of State and Law in Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1996: in Ukrainian), p. 145.

2 *The Duma Collection: The First State Duma Fist Session, April 27-July 8, 1906),* p. 123.

3 *Ibid., p.* 134.

4 M. Hrushevsky, "On Maturity and Immaturity," *Ukrannsky vestnik,* 1906, No. 4, p. 203 (in Russian).

5 Illya Shrah was unable to read in the Duma the declaration Hrushevsky had written because on July 8, 1906 the Tsar dissolved parliament.

6 *State Duma, Second Convocation, Stenogram, 1907, Second Session* (St. Petersburg, 1907), p. 112.

7 *Ibid,* pp. 146, 485, 1508, *et passim.*

8 F. Matushevsky, "The Ukrainian Community in the Second State Duma," *Literaturno-naukovy vistnyk,* 1907, No. 7, pp. 97-98.

9 By decree of June 3, 1907, the Tsar dissolved the Second Duma and changed the procedures for electing its successor, explaining that, "created in order to enhance the power of the state, the State Duma must be Russian in spirit." *The State Duma in Russia: A Collection of Documents* **/417/** *and Materials* (Moscow, 1957: in Russian), p. 273. The new electoral law practically excluded conscious Ukrainians from parliament.

10 *The State Duma, Third Convocation: Stenogram, 1907-1908, First Session* (St. Petersburg, 1908: in Russian), part 1, p. 246.

11 *Ibid.,* p. 136.

12 Cited in V. Doroshenko, *Ukrainianism in Russia (Modern Times)* (Vienna, 1917: in Ukrainian), p. 83-84.

13 Cited in N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *History of Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1993) vol. II, p. 430.

14 *The State Duma, Fourth Convocation: Stenogram, 1914: Second Session* (St. Petersburg, 1914), part 2, p. 729.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 915.

16 See: P. Strove, "Great Russia and Holy Rus'," *Russkaya Mysl,* 1914, No. 12, p. 178; P. Miliukov, "Russia's Territorial Acquisitions," *Chto zhdet Rossiia ot voiny* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 50 *et passim.*

17 Cited by V. Levynsky, *Tsarist Russia and the Ukrainian Question* (Geneva, 1917: in Russian), p. 35.

18 *Report of the Provisional Military Governor General of Galicia on the Governance of the Territory from September 1, 1914 to July 1, 1915* (Kyiv, 1916: in Russian), p. 2.

19 *Ibid., p.* 3-4.

20 *Ibid., p.* 23.

21 *Ibid.,* p. 32.

22 In February 1915 approximately 10,000 persons were deported as "unreliable" from the Przemysl region, as Bobrinsky himself acknowledged. *Ibid., p.* 17.

23 D. Doroshenko, *History of Ukraine, 1917-1923* (Uzhhorod, 1932: in Ukrainian), vol. I, p. 5.

24 Ukrainian grain was one of imperial Russia's main exports; Ukraine's coal supplied the whole empire, and control of Ukraine gave Russia access to the Black Sea, from which it could influence the Balkans and Near East.

25 *Rech,* May 10, 1917.

26 "Decree of the Provisional Government on the Removal of Religious and National Restrictions," *Revoliutsiia i natsionalnyi vopros,* ed. S. Dimanshtein (Moscow, 1930: in Russian), vol. III, p. 53.

27 "Statement of the Central Rada Delegation to the Provisional Government and Executive Committee of Soviets on Ukrainian Autonomy," *Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukranni* (Kyiv, 1994: document in Russian), p. 37.

28 "Provisional Instruction on the Rejection of Ukrainian Demands," *Revoliutsiia i natsionalyi vopros, p.* 59.

29 "First Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada," *Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukranni* (document in Ukrainian), p. 40.

30 "Resolution of the Central Rada," *Ibid. p.* 43.

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46 *Ibid.*, p.74.

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50 Lenin; PZT, vol. 37, p. 7.

51 *Izvestiia VTsIK Sovetov,* December 24, 1918.

52 Cited in V. Vynnychenko, *The Rebirth of a Nation* (Kyiv-Vienna 1920: in Ukrainian), vol. III.

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69 Stalin, *Works,* vol. 4, p. 355 (in Russian).

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72 Cf. Lenin, *PZT,* vol. 54, p. 201-202.

73 Paul D'Anieri, "Independence and Sovereignty in the Ukrainian — Russian Relationship," *European Security,* IV:4, Winter 1995, p. 603-621.

*'"'The Constitution of Independent Ukraine: Documents, Commentaries, Articles* (Kyiv, 1995), p. 58.

75 *Izvestiia.* October 8, 1993.

76*Le Monde,* June 7-8. 1992.

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79 For greater detail on the Crimean issue cf. O. Haran, Ya. Koval, A. **/419/** Shevchuk, "Ukraine and the Crimea in Russia's Geopolitical Concepts, *Political Thought,* 1994, No. 3, pp. 208-212.

80 This is especially the case concerning representation in international organizations and participation in many international agreements where Ukraine, like other new states, has to start from zero.

81 Cf. interview with Yevgeni Primakov, *Izvestiia,* March 6, 1996.

82 We primarily have in view Ukraine's participation in the structures of European integration, inasmuch as the temporary weakening of pro-Russian forces in the Ukrainian establishment, the adoption of the new Constitution along with the obvious ineffectiveness of Moscow/Minsk programs of reintegration and related agreement among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzia.

The Metamorphoses of postcommunist power

## *Oleksandr DERGACHOV, Volodymyr POLOKHALO*

At the turn of the 1990s, the "democratic temptation" in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former USSR, including Ukraine, was so great and social expectations so overblown that a host of intellectual traps appeared on the road to conceptual assessment of the new postcommunist reality. This primarily reflects a desire to skip sociohistorical time in appraising and modeling complex political processes, along with a penchant to the point of dogmatism for embracing methods and traditions of political research based mainly on West European and North American material.

These traps remain and give rise to numerous myths and pseudoscientific hypotheses. Although postcommunist societies are already historically mature (in terms of the scale and dynamics of sociopolitical transformations they are undergoing), political theory still lacks productive intellectual innovations, while political scientists, remaining captive to their own and imported scholarly stereotypes, simply cannot overcome their own inertia in understanding the central category of political science, the category of power.

*1. Totalitarianism and Power: The Need for Rethinking*

A pertinent question arises: what kind of system of understanding and elucidation might yield results in the political analysis of postcommunist power? **/300/**

We believe that the most productive approach to answering this question may reside in *revising the notion of totalitarianism as an integral component part of a larger problem* — *the problem of power.*

Modern political theory characterizes totalitarianism as a type of political regime, political, and social system in which is inherent an all-embracing (total, totalitarian) control over society and the individual by the authorities. In this case, in identifying the main traits of totalitarianism, emphasis is laid, as a rule, on the role of ideology (eschatological and teleological in orientation and revolutionary in content) which the ruling elite forcibly instills in the population as "the only correct science," as well as on reprisals and the threat of them, which enable the rulers to dominate the individual and society.

There also are various other political science approaches to defining totalitarianism and modeling it theoretically. Without attempting a detailed analysis of these approaches, let us nevertheless note their common and gravest shortcoming: their tendency toward formalism. What is studied primarily are the external characteristics and attributes of totalitarianism (particularly, the absence of political rights and freedoms) as well as the instrumentalities, forms, and mechanisms of totalitarian control over society. In this area, researchers concentrate attention primarily on the classical varieties of totalitarianism which emerged in the twentieth century: communist (Stalinist) totalitarianism, fascism, and national socialism.

Simultaneously, its real signs and sources — the *total dependence* of the individual on the regime, of the citizen on the state — are overlooked. We mean here not only and not so much ideological dependence but also other numerous, often far from obvious, latent, non-economic, social, sociocultural, legal, and economic multi-dimensional dependences which point to variegated forms of power relations associated with coercion and violence. In the final analysis, the answer to the key question of comprehending the essence of **/301/** totalitarianism and totalitarian power — whether a person plays an active role in these power relationships or is an object without rights (passive or active) in thrall to those who wield power — is neither simple nor unequivocal, especially within the context of the new, extraordinarily complex, and contradictory realities of the late twentieth century.

*2. Postcommunist Neototalitarianism: Its Genesis and Special Features1*

In the political thought of the postcommunist period most persistent and widespread is the idea that the general degradation and Collapse of communist ideology was simultaneously accompanied by the degradation, delegitimation, then collapse and disintegration of the communist totalitarian power, a power personified by the party/state *nomenklatura* and communist *bureaucracy.* At first glance it would seem logical and convincing to build the following quasitheoretical model on the pyramid: anti-totalitarian revolution (1989-1991) — post-totalitarian power — post-totalitarian state — post-totalitarian society.

In other words, the fact is almost axiomatic and proven that totalitarian power has exhausted its potential, that therefore the state and sociopolitical life has been "detotalitarianized," and that there have been or are being successfully implemented principles of organizing power along the democratic vector of political development: man — society — state (power).

Meanwhile, the experience and practice of the postcommunist transformations testify to something entirely different: in the postcommunist states, or in most of them at any rate, *nowhere'has the nomenklatura's power been either abolished of taken away by anyone; the nomenklatura itself has never given up power voluntarily to anybody, and the communist nomenklatura system of power as such has never fully disappeared anywhere.*

These are already obvious enough tendencies in the **/302/** evolution of the old power. We emphasize the main special features of this process of evolution.

1. The carrying out of a "revolution from above," the purposeful self-transformation of communist totalitarian power and, as a result, the emergence of new types and varieties of power relationships genetically, essentially, and historically connected to previous ones. The special feature of this unusual "revolution" is primarily the evolutionary transformation of political and state power into a new type of ownership by means of the illegitimate, shadow appropriation and distribution of the totalitarian nationalized "property of the whole people" by its actual possessor, the former party bureaucracy, on the initiative of its pragmatic "reformist" segment.

The second half of the 1980s saw the beginning of, first, the conversion of political and state power of the ex-communist nomenklatura into clan/corporativistic, nomenklatura/capitalist economic power, secondly, the intensive concentration of this new/old power outside society's control, and thirdly, the formation of a new postcommunist financial oligarchy. In this sense it becomes possible to state that a new, "magic" merger of politics and economics occurred, *the direct transformation of the appropriated property into political and state power and vice versa.* In this respect during approximately the last ten years the postcommunist states (with, perhaps, some exceptions) a self-sufficient, mutated system of power gradually evolved, a system commanding adequate resources, totalitarian in essence, and simultaneously alienated from the majority of society. Into this the old comunist *nomenklatura* (both its pragmatic "reformist" and orthodox wings) and accordingly, with the appearance of new so-called "opposition" communist parties, the greater part of the neocommunist nomenklatura were organically assimilated.

2. The criminalization and corruption of power structures and the state bureaucracy, growing role of shadow group politics, and growing claims to power and influence **/303/** upon "necessary" decisions by publicly unconstituted power centers, i.e., the "mafiaization" of power and the emergence of a so-called "fifth power."

Many postcommunist, especially post-Soviet, states are characterized today not only by an unprecedented scale of venality among their civil servants but by the transformation of corruption into a norm of sociopolitical existence. These countries *de facto* witness a *symbiosis of the state bureaucrats at various levels, the leaders of semi-legal and shadow economic enterprises, and criminal world bosses, cementing these forces into a shadow nomenklatura.* On this basis total control is exerted over the distribution and redistribution of state property and economic resources ("privatization"), over the spheres of production, market, foreign trade, over economic and social policy as a whole.

In essence, political power has become a universal commodity, which, depending on supply and demand, commands a certain price. However, this commodity has become an object bought and sold only on a black market, a political market closed to the majority. This is a monopolistic trade, in which a greater or lesser portion of power becomes a universally liquid commodity traded among strong criminal *(nomenklatura)* corporativist clans.

Finally, it has become normal and natural that many leaders of these clans (or their agents) step by step emerge from the "shadows" to political frontstage, seeking social recognition and public legitimization. They have been actively drawn to politics and openly buy themselves key positions in executive and legislative bodies at both the national and local level. It is clear that under such circumstances the anticorruption campaigns announced in almost every post-Soviet state are nothing more than populist posturing. It is understood that such campaigns cannot have even the slightest measure of real success in the near future, for this would mean destroying not only the political and economic conditions but the very mode of existence of contemporary postcommunist power. **/304/**

3. Thanks to the above tendencies, the crisis and, hence, the ruin and fall of the state's totalitarian communist ideology has not become a basic factor which could cause an irreversible destruction of the very essence of totalitarian power relationships.

The real delegitimation and collapse of the communist political doctrine did not lead to the delegitimation and ultimate collapse of communist totalitarianism in its various guises, from moderate in Slovakia and Bulgaria to more rigid in the former USSR. Moreover, communist nomenklatura-based power in the former socialist states has displayed extreme permeability and adaptability to new conditions, having sensed the weakness of the Marxist-Leninist political ideology with respect to its main function, total control and legitimacy, long before the collapse of the communist system. It is in this sense that we should understand the emergence of the first alternative elements, so to speak, compensatory surrogates of the old doctrine: "new thinking," "the priority of common human values," *etc.,* in the official lexicon of the 1980s. Thus, the collapse of communist ideology did not find the communist nomenklatura unawares. The nomenklatura had prepared for it even before the deideologization of the masses took place.

Without doubt, this does not mean that the nomenklatura ceased to value the legitimizing significance of political ideology as a mechanism for total control over society or at least as a formidable obstacle to the formation of truly democratic opposition parties and a full-fledged counterelite. In essence, the nomenklatura treats political ideology as a certain meta-ideology within which the production and dissemination is carried out of a conglomeration of ideas, myths, and slogans based on a specific sociopolitical situation and certain sociocultural peculiarities.

Postcommunist meta-ideology is not a certain ideological condition but a process of filtering various ideational-political attitudes, of testing various views in terms of their ability to reproduce power relationships according to the to-**/305/**talitarian model of dependency: state (power) — society — individual. It can deftly combine in a broad repertoire both the "pure" classical political doctrines (communism, nationalism, and fascism) and form hybrids by mixing them with elements taken from other political doctrines, including democratic ones (social democracy, liberalism, *etc.).* But all the recombinations of postcommunist meta-ideology remain aimed at the preservation and cultivation of the social and nationalist Utopias which constitute the ideological dominants of totalitarianism.

*3. The Geopolitical "Genes" of Postcommunist Power*

The power established in the formerly communist countries has the same origins and thus has essential common features. The totalitarian and overideologized nature of the former social system led to all-encompassing "communization," the denationalization of political power, while a rigid centralization of inter-state relations and control by the Kremlin created the *de facto* absence of sovereignty and independence. For decades full-fledged national existence was lacking and a forced socialist integration nurtured a deeplyentrenched compradore ruling stratum in the postcommunist countries. Of course, the above-mentioned social mutations on the CIS territory went much deeper than in East Central Europe or even in the Baltics and influenced the logic of how the new regimes were created, their qualitative differences, and geopolitical orientations.

A rigid external dependence and internationalist standardization of political life long for rendered it impossible to pursue a national strategy of development. Strategy was Moscow's monopoly. Likewise, in the conditions of a declining "centralizing force," *i.e.,* a radical change of external circumstances, all countries of the region were doomed in most cases to sovereignty and independence, though it contradicted (or greatly anticipated) their internal development.

It is natural that the abrupt and largely unforeseen **/306/** changes of the status of statehood placed an especially onerous burden on power which not so much guided the process of sovereignization as it managed it. This has a special impact on the situation in the "Eurasian space" where independence came as a redistribution of power between the central and peripheral (republican) nomenklaturas. The oppression and elimination of any, especially national, elements of civil society in the former USSR left no niche for a competitive counter-elite. Objective preconditions for a qualitative renewal of the party of power, as a prerequisite to national revival and, the more so, for transition to a civilized competition of alternative political forces, is still absent here. In this respect, *power in the new independent states is firmly held by the forces which originate genetically from the imperial, social internationalist past and, in any case, take on the role of the representatives and defenders of national interests.*

Postcommunist power and the top state bureaucracy of the post-Soviet countries have benefited the most from the collapse of the USSR and have a powerful material stimulus to patriotism. However, it is only the question of a nonguaranteed and far-from-complete corporative and national interests. As evidenced by the example of Belarus, such power can easily ignore not only the social expectations of society but also the very idea of statehood and independence, for it lacks truly national roots and responsibility for the people. A unique dynamism and ease of reintegration processes in the CIS is accounted for precisely by the fact that what we see is not a rapprochement among states as such but *a recombination of alternatives for the division of influences and mutual support of the national parties of power,* their use of the stand-by "Eurasian" geopolitical mechanisms of rule which are not subject to regulative mechanisms or direct impact of the international community and international law.

Simultaneously, there is a more large-scale and marked external dependence of postcommunist power: it is no longer able to remain absolutely isolated in the international space **/307/** and refuse to "work" under conditions of free competition. It has to adapt to certain standards of democracy and seek material assistance from the developed countries. All this results in a situation which, for want of the ultimate responsibility before the people, gives rise to external dependence or even formal international liability as to self-reform and carrying out general democratic socioeconomic and political changes. This strikes a new contradictory balance between non-productive geopolitical dependence within the "near abroad" and general imperatives of a civilized development. This in turn was mirrored a new contradictory balance in the logic of internal political struggle and created unique concepts combining, in different proportions and for different reasons, nationalism and internationalism, patriotism and servility to the empire. What they retain in common is the absence of a nation-state linchpin, readiness to trade off national interests and sovereignty in order to consolidate their own power.

*4. The Neototalitarian Paradigm of State-Building in Ukraine*

In 1991 Ukraine raised its national flag without having any real program of political and economic independence or political philosophy. And today the Ukrainian state and society are still in an uncertain condition The content of domestic discussion concerns not only the strategies and priorities of socioeconomic development, the principles governing its political structure, but statehood itself. The ever-deepening crisis and spontaneous social processes make it extremely difficult to identify tendencies and the most shortterm prospects. "Great" and "European" Ukraine displays a political life amorphous in both content and form. This characterizes not only the current ruling elite (the party of power) but also the political forces which pretend to offer a realistic alternative. Under these conditions, the flow of criticism (of the most diverse nature in terms of its points of departure, **/308/** degrees of intransigence, and to whom it addresses itself), hunts for the guilty and enemies, now an integral feature of Ukrainian political life, are, with some exceptions, a spontaneous manifestation of discontent and disagreement, an impulsive reaction to the escalation of difficulties, but by no means the evidence of a true understanding of the real state of affairs, the essence of problems and the possibilities for their solution. The Ukrainian regime itself is interested in these problems only insofar as the latter affect its prospects for self-preservation.

Ukraine's problems were forced on it by foreign history and a highly unnatural but internally logical coexistence of the incompatible: deep-rooted signs of dependence, provinciality, and inadequacy; demands for independence; the huge debris of economic, political, and mental Bolshevism, along with a pressing need for transformations and building a civilized society. Under normal conditions, a state cannot contain such opposites and remain viable. Such contradictions cannot be reconciled; between them there can be no rational compromise; conflict among them is inevitable. Under conditions of natural independent development such a collection of domestic problems could only bring on a revolutionary situation, which would by axiom envisage the presence of powerful political and socioeconomic dynamics. Ukrainian society has not inherited such dynamics. The impulse to independence and state-building has proved to be neutral in a general civil context and failed to decide the main thing — what kind of a state independent Ukraine ought to become.

The process of gaining independence was characterized by hyperbolic expectations that the socioeconomic situation would improve and society would go forward rapidly. A widespread attitude toward reforms as something already accomplished is one of the most stable and hence strange myths in postcommunist Ukraine. Indeed, there was not (nor is there now) a single political force which would not declare that reforms are needed. Meanwhile it also must be stated that not a single well-thought-out program of reforms **/309/** has ever been proposed. This concerns both the economy and the political sphere and is the natural result of Ukrainian society's internal unpreparedness for self-organization, for working out a strategy — capable of offering a way to ameliorate its inherited internal disharmonies.

Such is society's condition — anomaly and the symptoms of sickness. Inability to perceive, formulate, and defend its basic national interests is the main reason for Ukraine's political and socioeconomic stagnation and ill-defined prospects of development.

Ukrainian society lacks above all certain social strata capable of performing important public functions. Of special importance is the political weakness and lack of independence of the intellectual elite, along with the criminal and nomenklatura-like essence of national entrepreneurship. This results in the weakness and lack of independence of the general democratic segment in the political spectrum, which is drawn into a nomenklatura-run state-building process. Thus, there are no real alternatives, even the least real resistance, to the state's "self-building," led by the party of power without a blueprint endorsed by society. Power acts in a rarefied sociopolitical space and makes use of it.

It is the unstructured, amorphous nature of society that hampers its self-organization and purposeful influence on the authorities, even under conditions of the deepening economic crisis. This also rules out the establishment of a fullfledged party system and normal political process in general. Various formally self-evident elements of democracy do not really work, and a sizable part of the population understands neither their importance nor value. A decorative Ukrainian democracy is extremely convenient for the party of power and of little use to the masses. And this, in turn, discredits real democracy.

During the years of independence, Ukraine has gained the image of the most stable and conflict-free state in the CIS. This "achievement" constantly figures in the program speeches of top leaders and is used to demonstrate that a **/310/** certain state strategy has been successfully carried out. Leaders of the national democratic forces are also inclined to turn to an idea of social accord supposedly rooted in the nation's mentality. In general, internal stability of Ukraine is officially portrayed and mostly accepted as a sign of "Europeanness," civilization, and a guarantee of successful social transformations.

Yet, Ukrainian stability, as evidenced by the experience of recent years, is of a highly contradictory nature and remains one of the factors which in reality utterly fails to influence the character of political and economic reform. This stability is mostly based on a conscious or "instinctive" unwillingness to tackle these differences rather than on their absence or settlement. The paradox is in the fact that the *passivity and indifference of Ukrainian society is the real guarantee of today's "stability."*

The state power in Ukraine is not stagnant. The highest party and suite nomenklatura, which dominated unconditionally in Ukraine in 1991, appropriated the idea of sovereignization and took the task of state building on themselves. National democratic forces (first of all, national and only then democratic) went to their former ideological enemies as junior partners giving the latter their slogans and a sizable share of their prestige. The idea of Ukrainian statehood began to cement the political system in a neoetatist vein, sanctify overbureaucratization, set a peculiar monopoly on patriotism and at the same time lose, quite logically, popularity and support "from below." The matter of such state-building also proved familiar and quite acceptable for "leftwing" forces of all hues and attracted the "professional" interest of the army of bureaucrats, thus becoming the property of the nomenklatura as a whole.

The task of reviving and building society was cast aside in favor of one of a purely pragmatic and directly profitable character for those most prominent in carrying out the program of strengthening state structures. This process concentrated within itself practically all the contents, contradic-**/311/**tions, and real divisions existing in the country. Simultaneously, *state-building in such a general, neototalitarian vein hindered the development of democratic institutions and the nation's creative potential in general.*

A special feature of the structure of power resides in its combining heterogeneity, homogeneity, integrity, internal struggle and, at the same time, corporativism, a penchant for ideational metamorphoses, and an ability to reach compromise among those who hold different views and represent different groupings. There is every reason to speak about the existence in Ukraine of a well developed and strong party of power capable of serving the interests of various nomenklatura groups through collective exploitation of the country's resources. As for the political clashes and conflicts we witness today on Ukraine's political scene, they occur not in connection with cardinal changes in the system of power itself, but due to the regrouping and rotation of the interests of certain components of the political elite. There is no doubt that, should a real threat emerge from some new social and political sub-stratum, all these components, now seemingly inimical to each other, would immediately rally together, as has often been the case since August-September 1991. However, there is as yet no such "threat" from society.

The very mutual understanding among state functionaries who brandish slogans of European-type reforms and those who declare themselves champions of the ideas of "social justice," their blending into a single body of the party of power engenders the phenomenon of Ukrainian stagnation-development syncretism and still new stagnation, albeit now under the national flag.

In these conditions, working out a long-term strategy or a specific state program is fraught not so much with the destabilization of society as the destabilization of the party of power. In search of overall stability different factions of Ukrainian establishment rally around a political center which now lacks any social base. Meanwhile, an essentially **/312/** populist maneuver is thus being carried out, a futile attempt being made to reconcile incompatible sociopolitical concepts. The popularity of the idea of a special "third way" among both left-wing conservatives and official reformers is a vivid testimony to their common fear of fundamental changes, their desire to evade definitness and concreteness, so much needed by society, but risky for those in power.

Search for an optimum strategy of development was replaced by the very pragmatic tactic of strengthening the governmental structures, which brings a quick profit to the main executors. This process in fact concentrates all the achievements, differences, and marked changes the country is undergoing. Yet, state-building in such a general, totalitarian version nips in the bud democratic institutions and the nation's creative potential as a whole. This vector of development was plotted already under Leonid Kravchuk and is being further extended today. Leonid Kuchma, after conducting, since the presidential election, rather complex maneuvers in the process of setting the priorities of domestic and foreign policy, shows no haste to specify and fix publicly the objectives of his own presidency.

Making use of the passivity of society, the extreme weakness of democratic institutions, and the state control over the mass media, the party of power, now headed by a second president, has built a complex but quite recognizable political pyramid based not only on a hierarchial structure of administration but also on the accumulation of general promises and calls for patriotism. This is the largest and most universal trust company exploiting popular credulity. The whole population is its investors in both the purely financial and economic sense as well as in terms of delegating their own will to power. The company is monopolistic and out of control; it has paid no dividends for almost five years, yet it functions legitimately. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that qualitatively different leaders could have obtained a popular mandate, given the situation in society. Under such conditions of a nominally democratic election **/313/** mechanism, the dependent status of vast strata of the population, and its totalitarian, distorted political culture, Ukraine has at the helm what it has.

The further distancing of power from the people, its being out of control, its defending itself from real competition and responsibility are all obvious. *The Ukrainian paradigm of state-building today is but the manifestation of creating a state for its own sake, outside society and above it.*

1 See also: Polokhalo V., "Neototalitarian Transformations of Postcommunist Power in Ukraine," *The Political Analysis of Postcommunism,* (Kyiv, 1995), pp. 155-161.

State-Building in Ukraine: Ways of Legitimation

## *Yevhen BYSTRYTSKY* (§1, §3, §4), (§6, co-author), *Oleh BILYI* (§2, §5), (§6, co-author)

Contradiction between a politically accomplished action and its sociopolitical consolidation in the form of a stable social system/political regime is one of the most essential features of so-called transition periods. This period of sociopolitical transformations is a constellation of a great many contradictions between the new, not yet legitimized, and the legally and morally old, which is in the process of passing away, of clashes between different ideological aspirations, group and corporate claims and demands; it is a time of general legal uncertainty — a hoped-for environment for socially active individuals, including adventurists, at all levels of turbulent and confused life. However, even in this period of social and political uncertainty, a certain "disorganized organization" still exists, life goes on; forms of community are ruined and come into existence; the dim outlines of a new social organization emerge from the dust raised by the collapse of the imperial edifice.

The vision of a transformed social system and political order depends precisely on the processes which hardly keep society from complete self-destruction, judicial lawlessness, and chaos in a transition period, and which define the future socio-cultural form: these are the processes of legitimation. **/316/**

*1. The Problem of Legitimation*

In current social and political philosophy, the notion of legitimacy implies that there are sufficient arguments to warrant the claim that a given political regime is good and just. A legitimate order is a social and political system which deserves recognition. Legitimation is the process by which a given political organization of society is generally recognized.1

In postcommunist practice, the term "legitimation" is most frequently used in the narrowly pragmatic sense of the denotation that the political mandates of active politicians constitute "lawful" claims for political power.

In this sense legitimacy means only the legality of the actions of those who wield power and that of political power as a whole. Problems of legitimacy primarily hinge on questions of preserving or ruining one or another form of a social system and hence on more profound changes in the collective identity of people than on purely political transformations.

Legitimation is a complex process of uniting society on the basis of common values and of simultaneously demonstrating its capability to assume a collective identity from the standpoint of the political organization of society, primarily when new states and social institutions are formed. It is precisely this kind of situation which we witness in contemporary Ukraine.

In the strict sense of the word, only political orders can have and lose legitimacy. Only the political forms of social organization, and, first of all, the state, need be legitimized.2 This is especially vividly manifest in periods of social transformations.

State power as such is, of course, not in a position to establish by itself the collective identity of society; nor is it by itself able to effect social integration on the basis of community values which are in principle not at its disposition.3 **/317/** We find it difficult to accept this after decades of domination by a state-imposed ideology and the violent, totalitarian imposition by the state of an artificial system of social identity (of the so-called "Soviet man"). This best enables us to understand the historic collapse of the unnatural values of communism which were long imposed "from above" by means of torture and lies.

This is why the communist regime was never truly legitimate. For it always ignored the values which are produced in a naturally historical way by human communities in their coexistence, and on which natural forms of social integration, including ethnic groups and nations, are based. Marxism gravitated toward what may be referred to as the bolshevik arrogance of self-legitimation: its ideology rested on its capacity for its own existential self-affirmation, or, as Marx put it, praxis.

Any political organization of society requires legitimacy, *i.e.,* maximum acceptance on the basis of the values and forms of collective coexistence which a community already recognizes. But the process of being legitimized requires, in its turn, certain conditions, of which the main one is that of publicity, being accessible to all. Legitimization is a political discourse which evolves over time, a process of dissemination, discussion, deliberation, and, in the final analysis, demonstration of the collective validity and acceptability of legal norms, which by and large are established spontaneously and instinctively by the new political actors. This in turn testifies to the legitimizing potential of political discourse.4 Legitimizing potential represents the principles and motivations which can be mobilized to publicly demonstrate the legitimacy of a given policy and have the social force of creating consensus, which is the most essential precondition for legitimacy.

In the postcommunist situation, legitimation is a problem in several cardinal senses. First, there is the problem of turning back to the practice of legitimation after nearly a century of domination by an illegitimate, self-legitimized, **/318/** regime. Second, there is the issue of the artificial imposition (by means of targeted propaganda and planned ideological actions) of a system of values which should have been formed in a natural historical way (in culture, traditions, language, everyday life, *etc.),* and which create that legitimizing foundation and potential of the new political system. Third, postcommunism as the state of "postcommunist society" can in reality rely only on previous traditions and habits of a pseudolegitimate political regime. It is the point of a legitimizing potential available in society — those ideological constructs, level of individual self-understanding, general values — which is a living conglomeration of various principles of the legitimation of postcommunist power and the new political regime. Let us examine this more closely.

*2. Ideobgy and Utopia in Postcommunist Transformations*

Claims concerning an "ideological vacuum," lack of alternative to market-oriented reforms, and the need for some form of authoritarian rule have become commonplaces and trite cliches of postcommunist political discourse. These three cliches are interconnected by a peculiar logic whose foundations were laid down over the whole totalitarian era in the history of the Soviet empire.

Today's talks of ideological vacuum do not at all imply lack of a range of certain ideas which arise spontaneously and form what is generally referred to as social consciousness. They point primarily to the loss of dominance that is always made possible by the "collective unconscious" when all human behavior is directed toward a single center and has a purely affirmative character. For all its schizophrenic character of the period that can be, defined as the "twilight years of totalitarianism," the most important actions related to social choice were characterized by the absence of self-reflection.

One example will suffice. Each step in the career of a Communist Party or Youth League functionary required the **/319/** observance of a special ritual, regardless of in what high or low esteem the individual held a certain Marxist dogma or Marxist ideology as a whole. In this way a magical act was effected, *i.e.,* one's social status was changed by uttering cabalistic words. And it is this very process that is denoted today very inaccurately, by the phrase "ideological vacuum." While a need for a coherent political doctrine to substantiate and legitimize power grows in the postcommunist period, the ability to create such a doctrine is nil.

This is why in the determinist formula of "no alternative to reforms" the magic reaches its outer limits. Paradoxically, in this formula power strives to speak the language of Utopia and simultaneously stops speaking it. This paradox was originated by Khrushchev, when he ventured to determine the exact date of the advent of communism and by so doing transposed the regulative (essentially repressive) ideal on the space of a specific historical time. The effusively Utopian character of this formula is noticeable first of all in the assumption that a person always and everywhere acts in accordance with his or her economic interests. Hence, say, a blind faith in the possible emergence of a businessman who is always and everywhere ready to abide by the principles of formal rationality or, according to Max Weber's definition, mental foundations of Western business cooperation. The new market ideology in its fashion reproduces the Utopian basis and uses as a magical instrumentality the communist ideology, which gradually gains force in mass consciousness as a dream about Paradise lost or a Golden Age. The Marxist textbook maxims also become magical. Suffice it to mention the claims concerning primitive capitalist accumulation which supposedly inevitably goes hand in hand with a sharp increase in crime.

At the same time, disregarded by the diligent pupils of the Marxist humanities grades are some very essential elements of economic history, namely, that the institutions of private property (in the form of manufactures, land, and finance capital) had formed long before the "great leap" to a **/320/** new economic formation (created out of thin air and made much of by Marx) occurred. Suffice it to recall that as far back as the thirteenth century the Knights Templars financed the construction of cathedrals and made loans to kings. This order can boast of the fact that it was the first to found the European banking tradition, introducing financial guarantees, checks, and letters of credit.

The determinism of the formula "there is no alternative to reform" conjures up from oblivion yet another shibboleth of the Communist Utopia, the cult of self-sacrifice and enduring patience. This cult was quite organically functional when the so-called two/three year transition period was declared, but it is rendered absurd now that the transition period is said to last almost forever, for one or two generations at least. The communist regime, organized in a "priestly state," formally proclaimed the self-sacrifice of "priestly" party secretaries. In so doing, it intended to affirm its right to own an individual's secrets, the right to violate his or her privacy and even "intimacy to save the flock." The current Establishment is no longer in a position to resort to this method of rule; nor is it capable of devising a new one beyond the bounds of its own mental inertia and apparatchik pragmatism. The point is that in order to exercise power it is necessary to have a whole range of stable structures, *i.e.,* structures which function continuously.

Under totalitarianism, every such structure was correlated with its symbolic location in Utopia. Specifically, the state economic plan was tied to the religion of "equal distribution of goods" and the mythology of "justice," no matter whether this or that clerk was aware ornot of the connection. Without its Utopian foundation the regime found itself the captive of pure form. It is no accident that the idea of a "power vertical," *i.e.,* an essentially geometrical equivalent of power structures, is becoming more and more current in the present-day political jargon. Thus it becomes quite clear why the mass media are puffed up in various ways with phantasmagoric projects of progressive authoritarianism as **/321/** the only means of escape. For its popularity, the project owes much to the half-hearted "perestroika enlightenment".

As early as the end of the perestroika, Moscow-based publicist Igor Kliamkin began to challenge the hitherto negative image of Chilean dictator Pinochet. A little too late, Moscow publicistic fantasies found their easy way to Ukraine. The economic stabilization in Chile was referred to as one of the General's greatest services to his country.

Yet, even if one chooses to ignore the chimerical character of our country's political process and to refrain from analyzing the real political factors of such stabilization, one should always bear in mind the price Chileans paid for it. Tens of thousands of lives were lost (certainly not the same order of magnitude as the "achievements" of Soviet totalitarianism). Worthy of note is the fact that it was precisely the checking of privatization processes by the dictatorship in Chile and, hence, the country's dynamic economic development in the late 1980s, that compelled the business elite of that country to demand the dismantling of the military regime, and they liquidated it.

The image of so-called "progressive authoritarianism" is spearheaded primarily to regaining the disciplinary mechanisms of power lost as a result of the August 1991 abortive putsch in Russia. That is why closely related paradigms of state system appear so seductive.

Suggestive is also the fact that even until now neither of the above-mentioned ideas have found its effective continuation, but attempts to proceed within the framework of the above triad recur. Among such attempts, one may mention the quests for a universal ideology or "Ukrainian idea" and periodically resumed "state orders and awards" issued from the Presidential entourage. Those who engage in such quests seem not to have realized that the very notion of "national idea" was originated by the Russian religious-philosophical thought, and later turned into the fundamental structural element of the so-called ideocracy of Eurasianism.

The intention to create a universal ideology is in fact **/322/** indicative of political radicalism whose ideal is a Utopia of the integrity of society's transformation. It views the institutions of representative democracy as essentially artificial. This is why forms of the so-called direct democracy (specifically, referenda) appear as a natural and supposedly effective means of legitimizing this criticism.5 Despite any intellectual qualities of its present-day bearers, "plenipotentiaries of the people's suffering," in such a situation the upper hand is gained by a reanimated communist ideology, an ideology blended with a Machiavellian method of abusing parliamentarianisrn, which Lenin himself-once employed so well.

Socialism, as Nietsche once aptly remarked, always goes hand in hand with an excessively inflated power, preparing secretly for terror or drumming the word "justice" into the heads of semi-literate masses in order to finally corrupt their minds... and to sate them with good news in order to serve the vile game they have to play. "Socialism can also be used in order to convince especially brutally and strikingly of the danger of concentrated state power, and in this way to sow mistrust in the state as a whole. When its husky voice joins in the war-cry "as much state as possible," at first it becomes louder than ever, but soon still louder resounds the opposite cry, "as little state as possible."6

To paraphrase Nietsche, one can state that the more often and louder the call for creating a new ideology can be heard, the sooner the semi-literate masses fall into the traps of socialism, and the more urgent becomes the need for civil society.

It is worth noting that state orders for a new ideology coincide temporally with the hastening of the so-called constitutional process. This is a unique paradox. For a constitution itself should be a product of ideological activity sometimes spanning several generations. The history of the US and France evidences this most conclusively. Moreover, these activities were by no means the product of some planned action or order. If one is to extrapolate the logic of the nation-building improvisations of the nomenklatura, one **/323/**should also add the obedience of its subjects. Meanwhile, the major problem lies elsewhere.

*3. The National Idea, Civil Society, and Political Nation*

Specifically, this most general problem has an exact designation: the political organization of current Ukrainian society. In this regard, we have in mind ways of making a Ukrainian *political nation.* But, in contrast to the notion of nation seemingly obvious today, the issue of political nation remains, for various reasons, complicated or simply unattainable.

The most general problem resides in the fact that the notion of political nation is difficult to define. When emphasis is laid on political characteristics of national community, first of all peculiarities of national community as a political association of people are implied. "Political" is derived from "politics." It is absolutely inadequate to treat politics in the trivial and hackneyed terms of "the art of the possible" or "the concentrated expression of economics."

As early as at the beginning of its appearance, "politics" meant the desire and ability to live together in a *polis.* According to Aristotle, a political community (body politic) implies the division of "honors, property, and everything else which can be divided among fellow citizens of a certain state system (structure)."7 In other words, it is not only a matter of division of power at the top level of collective coexistence, but also the level of everyday life of the "microphysics of power" (Michel Foucault) — a division of powers and rights to own property and even "pay themselves tribute" among fellow citizens, and, in general, making use of social advantages before other compatriots. To put it differently, the notion of the political implied not only the processes of division of power at the top echelons of state institutions and the political elite. Political power rests, not least, on the personal or individual self-affirmation of man in his everyday life world. This is why a political community is **/324/** a society viewed from the point of view "of a distribution of roles, tasks, advantages, or losses, which are felt by members of society in case they all wish to live together and which turns society into a unified whole."8 Today there are sufficient theoretical grounds to speak of politics as the regularities of existence and division of power and authority among people, extending from the level of everyday existence up to the complex processes of delegating and dividing power between the top echelons of power-holders.

From this perspective, a *political nation is a community which in a certain way works out the principles, rules, procedures, and rituals of power division. The problem of forming a political nation is primarily a problem of organizing a division of power and prerogatives among people at all levels of social life.*

In the first years of Ukraine's independence, the greatest publicity, largely of a publicistic-literary character, was won by the *national —* Ukrainian — *idea.*

The sense of the national idea as a basis for organizing (and, specifically, constituting) a Ukrainian community is rather unambiguous. It originates from definitions suggested in his time by Dmytro Dontsov, the main theoretician of Ukrainian integral nationalism. His historical discovery was that he clearly defined the political essence of the Ukrainian idea (as well as other "national ideas" of the twentieth century) as the power-based liberation of the Ukrainian national community on the principle of will to power — and here Dontsov borrows from Nietsche's primer — and thereby to achieve Ukrainian independence.

The essence of the "Ukrainian idea," according to those who held such views, lies in a natural historical binding of the Ukrainian community with a single will for political self-affirmation. To use the vocabulary of the late twentieth century, this collective identity may be treated in very different ways, depending on how radical are views expressed by its interpreters, that is, defining national unity on the basis of cultural and blood relationships, arguing for common **/325/** historical traditions, destiny and religion, calling for an immediate solution of the language question (for to attain of linguistic homogeneity) or rhetorically asking "Isn't Ukraine for Ukrainians?"

The real essence of the national idea lies in a *pre-political* (natural-ethnic) understanding of social unity. Simultaneously, the true political significance of the national idea resides in solving the problem of legitimation, in Ukraine's case by making a new, postcommunist power, another political regime customary.

Politics is the real embodiment of the division of one thing, power, among the members of society, and knowledge of the rules governing this distribution. The national idea is the knowledge and feeling (conscious experience) of the natural and cultural kinship of people. However, resorting to images of the national idea in post-Soviet political discourse supplants the political organization of societjTper *se.* Here, an a priori legitimate political organization of community is meant, which so far struggles for the right to freely approve powers distributed among its members (citizens). After Rousseau and the French Revolution, such a community came to be known as a nation, the sovereign people, who, first of all, have become aware of their political freedom and have already solved justly the major political problem — the problem of the national division of power. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, beginning with the 1848 Springtime of Peoples, national liberation movements, including Ukrainian nationalism, added to this definition their understanding of nation as the people who have freed themselves from outside oppression and colonial dependence. This is why *a nation is a people which has liberated itself in all senses — both domestically and in foreign policy.*

The national idea is not in itself sufficient to characterize a nation's political organization. It is a manifestation of a proto-legal, proto-political — natural-historical assocition of people, their tribal "organization" (consolidated by "land" and "blood"). Of course, this name can be used to designate **/326/** the sphere of the political — that of power division. But in this case the national idea is not and cannot be a notion of the political realm of human relations *per se.* Its mystery is in how it legitimizes a given political regime. Identification of the national idea with the regime which acquires social and political legitimacy on its basis is conducive to the dangers of self-legitimation and political despotism. One-sided political interpretation of the national idea inevitably leads to a naive, uncritical and simplistic understanding, favoring the authorities and according them a supposedly natural legitimacy. Any power based only on "national" ideology is extralegal, for it can have no objective extrinsic criteria for assessment, judgment, and truth. When an act of legitimation on the basis of national feelings is identified with a redivision of power, an environment arises favoring moralists of various kinds who assume the role of self-proclaimed spokespersons of the collective identity.

Collective identity is established in a natural historical way, in the course of everyday life. This is why invoking the general values of the national idea always resorts to and converts the customary norms of coexistence, or a sphere of moral views. But moral truth or so-called historical justice (say of the restoration of the ancient Ukrainian state) are simple apologetics. Calls for moral justice on behalf of the whole community pass over the question of the political justice for its individual members. One should never assume that demands for political justice based on democracy are secondary in planning political steps from the first act of collective liberation to how the state provides for advances in the economy, culture, science, technology, *etc.* First, independence, with the rest coming afterward. The experience of the developed democracies testifies to the opposite. Social progress derives from a just, maximally democratic, political regime.

However, the division of power, as is demonstrated by political history, is not a matter of "tribal love" and "brotherly relationships" within an ethnic stock: it is a rationalized **/327/** affair, and according to, say, Machiavelli, it is a cynically calculated struggle for power and recognition, which does not lapse into sentimentalism and openly mocks "non-violent resistance." This is why any concept based on the national idea is always, in fact, be they of a sentimental-moral or activist-volitional character, an attempt to legitimate one's own political power or that of one's ethnic relatives.

The latency and misunderstanding of the fact that the national idea only overlaps with political organization of society *per se* and is merely a basis of political legitimation of power regime becomes apparent with time through actual political developments, which are destructive to the organization of social life. This is most vividly manifested in the mass disillusionment with the narrow nationally-oriented state policy of the first Ukrainian President's Administration and, especially, in the speedy transformation of the national democratic elite into a *neonomenklatura,* in its narrow-minded "corporativism" based on ethnic "purity" and, hence, conducive to assimilation by the similar, if formally different, old nomenklatura nepotism of Kravchuk's successors. Along with the general awareness of their failure to cope with the task of politically unifying the Ukrainian nation, it is reflected in the further and still greater tendency to counterpose *the national idea to the ideals of civil society.*

Indeed, the idea of civil society bears directly on the problem of the political organization of society. And an extension of this concept testifies all the more to the fact that in society groupings (Hegel, author of the idea of civil society, would use the terms "corporations" or "strata") should exist through which the people associated in them can exert real influence on the organization of political power in society, simultaneously maintaining maximum independence from the state. Civil society is an aggregate of separate, independent individuals (each with their own needs and private interest), where groups of citizens are formed according to various principles of association, constituting corresponding self-governing groups. The cells of civil society are cre-**/328/**ated in order to defend the private interests of individual citizens who are independent from one another. The only thing connecting them is the requirement that they abide by legal norms and moral restrictions.

It is now clear why the ideals of civil society are so sharply counterposed to the national idea, when it is argued that the only point of the national idea lies in creating Ukraine for all its citizens, Ukraine as a law-governed state, as a social state for all. First of all, it is a matter of establishing norms and values of legal organization of the political association of people within Ukraine. The political organization of a nation is sometimes identified with legal relations, which have a purely rational, universal, and formal basis, abiding by which constitutes just the main function of the state, the state mechanism, and the whole body of state power. This basis gives rise to fantastic day-dreams about the legal organization of our disorganized society, about a law-abiding, uncorrupted power, a non-criminal economy, *etc.* But if the question of the underlying basis of the people's consolidation into a political whole of the nation only on the principles of civil society is raised again and again, the conclusions reached will not be reassuring. For the position of civil society is also based on certain views about principles of human coexistence. These are recognized, *i.e.,* already legitimate, norms of law and legal conceptions, which are shared by the whole community. The point of highlighting ideals of civil society resides in, so to speak, the super-political formation of social unity, in unclarified identification of political organization, on the one hand, and a law-governed community, on the other hand, or, in other words, the identification of politics and law.

In the current political situation, proponents of the idea of civil society as the basis of the Ukrainian nation consciously or unconsciously incline toward high-sounding slogans of statehood building and etatism. To be sure, we need a universal discipline, legal protection, and law-governed state in order to put our life — economy, politics, education, **/329/** *etc. —* right in Ukraine. And to do so, we need a strong power, strong state, strong apparatus, strong administration, and strong army — in a word, a strong state machine. Identification of the notion of civil society with the image of political nation results, in real life, in securing the administrative-neonomenklatura model of keeping the Ukrainian community in the trap of protonational unity. It is in the enthusiasm for statehood building that the views and interests of proponents of the national idea and representatives of the political Establishment coincide.

It is no accident that the new Administration talks so much about a statehood and a constitution. It is claimed that actions of the legislative and executive powers that be have allegedly obtained legitimacy. And it is no accident that the highest power does not break off, even symbolically, its relation to the state symbols, which so easily deceive Ukraine's "National Romanticists" (or romantic Nationalists).

We see that, taken separately, the two positions, which are observed today in public opinion regarding the problems of creating a Ukrainian political nation, are not self-sufficient. On the one hand, there is a problem in identifying political power and the basis of its legitimation — the national idea. In other words, there arises an extralegal situation of self-legalization (self-judgment) of "corporative" views of a certain segment of the national community. On the other hand, the incumbent political power acquires a supralegal force.

*4. Extricable Etatism*

The very Ukrainian word for "state," *derzhava,* is rather revealing: the word is derived from *derzhaty* which means "to keep together"; it is a force that consolidates people into a single unit. State is a materialized all-togetherness, community of the people. It is an institutionally realized state of coexistence in the form of the army, the militia, and, to be **/330/** sure, the officialdom, top bureaucracy, and, in addition, the institutions of law, moral, traditions, *etc.* On what principles are we put together into a single unit today? What is the basis of our state bonds which legitimizes power's keeping us together in the state of Ukraine?

The first years of independence provided their answer (on behalf of the first set of independent authorities): the basis of legitimacy of the state power is our ethno-national unity, our wish to affirm ourselves as a certain ethnocultural form of coexistence. Statehood must be subjected to realization of the national idea. In the late twentieth century, consolidating its hold is the model of ethnonational legitimation of power, or, to put it simply, *the ethnonational model of Ukrainian statehood.*

According to this model, the state is necessary primarily to support and, especially, protect, an ethnonational community from the real danger (from within and without) of its disappearance or dissolution into other ethnopolitical formations. The state is an institution of materialized force to protect, support, and put into effect the national idea, *i.e.,* the values of ethnonational cultural coexistence. The ethnonational model lays emphasis on such an understanding of the state, when the latter is regarded as primarily a protective force. Proponents of this model argue that if it is a matter of Ukraine's survival, then it would be better to live in a monarchic Ukraine (to be understood as an authoritarian-neototalitarian ethnic state) rather than in a so-called democratic Ukraine for all the ethnic groups. Slogans calling for a strong state and "statehood" are the major features of this model and of this understanding of the current tasks of the Ukrainian state. The ethnic model of the state bets on a strong state power, but the state does not only protect people, it also has to bring them together, unite them, and keep them all together. How, according to this model, does the Ukrainian state maintain such unity? What is the main principle of organization (and, incidentally, constitution) of the people into the unity of the state of Ukraine? **/331/**

The ethnic model proceeds from the assumption that the unity of people *already exists:* this is our Ukrainian collective unity, spirituality, and community. For a nation, say the proponents of the ethnic model, as such is a spiritual, cultural, and blood-related society which is already held together due to common history and life, by strong ties of traditions, historical destiny, language, religion, customs, origin, territory, and a single will. This is why the state is necessary only as an outside force, which should protect the extant community of people and true citizens. And the stronger and firmer is the state, regime, and its ability to defend the extant ethnic unity by coercive means, the better that state is. A strong state is the natural slogan of this model.

But in reality this leads to the fact that ethnic etatist aspirations back up purely superficial, bureaucratic properties and functions of the state as a mechanism for ruling and coercion. They support a natural craving for power — of actual authorities, a present-day Ukrainian administration. In addition, this fact results in a further, still greater, alienation of the power and the people. For the people are considered to have been unified, all on its own, by the single idea: the Ukrainian ethnic unity is already present, mean the champions of the ethnic model. There is nothing here for a state to do, they say; therefore, let its force protect us from outside, since this is supposedly its main business and current historical task.

The new regime has just availed itself of the inertia of these ethnic projects of a strong state. Having removed the thick national coloring of the previous model, it left intact only one catchword — state building, with episodic ritual bows to yesterday's nationalistic rhetoric. In fact, one can claim that an essentially new model, which should be referred to as one of the forcible legitimation of the state power or an *administrative-neonomenklatura model,* has arisen on the ruins of the national liberation movement. The national idea is no longer the principal one for the task of **/332/** self-legitimation of the state power, while it is from time to time flirted with. It is alleged that the power is generally necessary in order to put life — economy, politics, education, *etc. —* right in Ukraine. And to do so, we need a strong power, strong state, strong apparatus, and strong army. A situation arises where the regime creates a certain realm of its separate existence, which is, in general, far from real life.

The national idea and the idea of state building proved to be a very convenient form of power claims in the postcommunist period. But they are not a sufficient condition for legitimizing an independent state at the end of the twentieth century. They pass over a major factor in modern statehood — the free recognition of the institution of the state by its citizens, which is precisely true democratic legitimation and consolidation of the state through the life, interests, work, and business of each individual citizen.

Both the ethnic and administrative-nomenklatura models are not capable of taking into account the self-government and civic activities of people. There is much evidence of this: the current authorities obviously are not able to influence from above the processes which arise as a result of postcommunist changes initiated by the course of history rather than by them.

*5. The Legacy of the Authoritarian Personality*

Still felt is the authoritarian-etatist tradition rooted in the whole history, rituals, disciplinary mechanisms, and discourse of power of the so-called Soviet state. The centerpiece of this tradition is the individual, the subject of power who largely sets the supralegal rules of the social game. These rules constitute the flip side of all Utopias, including that of "a political nation". The authoritarian consciousness turns everything elaborated and achieved in the times of the ripening of communicative principles for a stable existence of political community into narratives without content. One **/333/** of its peculiarities is the intention to create an artificial reality, an unreal political landscape. This is a method of pseudolegitimation, which manifests the longing for the full and voluntary recognition of the right to exercise power, and, at the same time, reveals concealed illegality. History knows many such cases, when, on the one hand, there are obvious signs of a rigid orientation toward administer-and-command methods and surveillance, and, on the other hand, creating an essentially artificial political reality.

Once Fiodor Ivanovich Tiutchev, a nineteenth-century Russian imperial diplomat in Munich, better known as a great Russian poet, submitted to Tsar Nicholas I a proposal to found at state cost a foreign-based opposition journal which would publish criticisms of the empire's government and its policies. Tiutchev argued that since Russia's image in the European press was very negative, such a journal controlled from St. Petersburg could well improve it, thereby ensuring the monarchy a requisite political context. The poet's diplomatic initiative failed to receive a positive response. However, the idea of establishing an opposition periodical controlled by the government was to be revived in the Soviet empire as late as 1945. This time the initiator was Soviet Tsar Joseph Stalin who proposed to well-known Russian author Konstantin Simonov to "take care" of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Gazette), which would carry, from time to time, materials antagonistic to the dominant ideology. Moreover, Stalin promised to criticize the paper on behalf of the Politburo. This buffer role seems to have been played by the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* up to perestroika.

But what does such "shock-absorbing" mean, what is the point of it? Several decades' practices of the totalitarian regime formed a special system of controlled and institutional fear whose central agent was the authoritarian personality. Fear plays a special role in producing the effect of pseudo-legitimation. It is symptomatic that the uncontrolled discourse environment of Soviet everyday life responded to such practices rather aptly by labeling such chimeras "vol- **/334/**untary/obligatory". Unpaid Saturdays *(subotniki)* of "voluntary" free labor, the hard labor in collective and state farms, and the demonstrations on "revolutionary" holidays were thus "voluntary/obligatory" in the sense that not "volunteering" had unpleasant consequences. The model of the "Gulag brotherhood" of victim and victimizer reflected in the above word group became all-pervasive under the Soviet regime, playing the role of a universal prosthesis for legitimation. But even now deep in mass consciousness the roots remain of that model and the rudiments of punitive paternalism as a longing for a firm hand.

A characteristic feature of this type of individual is an irrational attitude toward authority. Recognition of the exceptional rights of his superior makes it possible for the individual to feel psychological balance. Subjection and subordination are, in fact, a radically reduced method of orientation in social environment, which also makes it possible for the individual to avoid a burdensome situation of making choices and to remain aloof from the threat of turning into the target of numerous questions. For a question as a way of articulating social unsettledness appears as a depersonalized image of power and various violent accidents. This reduction turns out to be both the condition and the consequence of social regulation. Thus, subordination and subjection become all-pervasive for the individual, since on an irrational impulse he accepts coercion against himself and thereby latently strives to become an agent of such coercion. As a result, some of the will to power and aggressiveness is sublimated in, so to speak, "love for the victimizer," while the rest finds its way out in building an image of the enemy or the alien, *i.e.,* he with whom the authoritarian individual does not identify.

Actually, both the ethnic and the etatist versions of legitimation of postcommunist power rely heavily on social-psychological reflexes of the authoritarian personality. "Love for victimizer" is planned on the ideological level by means of imposing personalized images of force and corresponds to **/335/** individual masochistic impulses; hence, on the one hand, a longing to shape the whole legal mechanism and to form a democratic jargon in accordance with these images, and, on the other hand, dreams about the ideal boss, longing for a "firm hand," *etc.*

At the level of the top leadership, the fear of the alien, the other and the mystery and unpredictability of the other, on transforming into administrative aggression, are always made manifest in the desire to create a crystal-clear image and to lean for support on ultimate and definite notions. According to this, the world is divided into formal and extremely over-simplified spheres, devoid of any relationship with its object, the life world. A peculiar "suprarealism" appears such that the whole social environment is merely the object of surveillance and manipulation by means of speculative ideas.9 As a result, such a formula of power is synthesized which presupposes rejection of uncertainty and darkness, *i.e.,* of all that does not fit the ideal.

One can say that from the viewpoint of a person ready to accept "strong power," the ultimate uncertainty of social relationships and the situation of permanently making choices, typical of democracy, are perceived as threats to his own authoritarian-paternalistic leanings. This is precisely why he is ready to back up administrative aggression, in this way identifying himself with the authorities, and to provide for the basis of pseudolegitimation or forcible legitimation.

The case of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* testified to the fact that the above mechanism of the functioning of authoritarian mind is subject to eventual crisis, and therefore, the authoritarian type of personality experiences crisis as well. The desire of power to make its field of action absolutely transparent and its craving for "suprarealism" finally result in the need to include specific forms of manifesting social disagreement into the sphere of the purely administrative-etatist imagination, even to provoke disagreement in order to fuel up aggressiveness lulled up by too much peace of the graveyard. A similar critical situation is well described in **/336/** the Tinianov's historical novel "Second Lieutenant Kizhe." Recall how Emperor Paul I, one of the main characters of the story, opens up for himself a secret of "how to do away with treachery and void" by simply "introducing accuracy and absolute subordination... All offices began to work. He was believed to take for himself only the executive branch. But it so happened that the executive branch muddled everything up for the Chancellery, and, as a result, there were dubious betrayals, void, and arch subjugation."10

The authoritarian mind is always doomed to reproduce the object of its concern and to distrust the image denoting or representing this subject. In the authoritarian mind one of the most reliable methods to ensure clarity of understanding and perception, analogous to the image, is the creating of a certain legitimate basis. In other words, the image of the "alien" should be easily identifiable in accordance with certain legal procedures and, therefore, sufficiently controllable.

A law on "Opposition," which legal ideologists in the Presidential milieu wanted so persistently to put into life early in .1995, was, given the nature of the postcommunist jargon, a logical act in the functioning of the authoritarian mind. Here we witness a certain inertia of the state which ensured economic productivity based on the distribution of raw materials and goods, and which still retains .its power, validity, and efficiency but obviously within the bounds of the regime's own decline and collapse. Two technologies, production technology and political technology, are inseparably bound together. For to produce means to discipline, and to discipline implies producing something, including obedient people, by means of a relevant technique of discipline.11

This means to impose upon a person his own identity by transforming knowledge about him obtained within the framework of ideology into his own knowledge about himself and to create, in this way, the subject required. This is how the internalization of state surveillance and control is **/337/** effected. The subject begins to control himself due to a selfknowledge imposed on him in the form of various narratives formed by official ideologists.

The authoritarian personality has been the centerpiece of such production. At the same time, the political technology ensuring such production has fallen to pieces almost completely. One can say that in the disciplinary workshop inherited from the Soviet regime real confusion has arisen.

Any power affirms itself and exists through its endless confrontation with illegalities of various kind. In the course of the confrontation, a repressive mechanism emerges and improves itself essentially as a means of producing obedient people. A variety of illegalities, characteristic of the totalitarian type of rule, can be correlated with a system of ministries for various industries which were an efficient and fitting disciplinary correlate of a distributive administrative command economy. The inventory of illegalities considerably shrank as the totalitarian system disintegrated. In the present socio-political situation, it is practically impossible to reproduce that, so to speak, abundance of llegalites (for example, such illegalities as "anti-Soviet propaganda," "defamation of the socialist system," *etc.).* At the same time, an element of opposition and resistance remains as a crucial need and condition of power existence and the transformation of policy as such.

*6. The Secondary Nature of Geopolitical Legitimation*

The process of state-building in Ukraine is evolving in a situation where foreign policy factors play a greater part in defining strategy than they could have in other situations. First, as has already been stated many times, Ukraine gained independence without having any elaborated system of measures which could have been formed on the basis of a certain historically evolved ideology deeply rooted in mass consciousness. Hence, the absence of a legitimate, generally accepted concept of state-building gradually led to the **/338/** growing importance of the purely material and pragmatic dimensions of how the state functions. It can even be said that the current state-building in Ukraine has a reflexive character and lacks initiative. Clearly, the lack of such a vital component of any strategy of market-oriented reform as a corresponding socio-political climate formed by cultural traditions renders very likely a restoration of yesterday's ideological orientations or an expansion of strong and developed ideologies and, first of all, Eurasianism.

Over the past several years, the term "Eurasia" has come to prominence in the vocabularies of postcommunist politicians and consolidated its place in the lexicon of many publications.

The real need for a new universalistic, global construct to be substituted for the former confrontational concept of the two world systems has been felt primarily by present-day Russian political strategists. The necessity of rebuilding the whole system of national security, called forth by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the militarized economy, has provoked a partial regeneration of the old state structure, but already on a new basis. It does not, however, follow that the geopolitical views of the postcommunist establishment, arising out of nothing, are growing into a new political vision on the ruins of the imperial expansionism of communist ideology. The most farsighted functionaries of the communist bureaucratic milieu sensed the danger that the coming political and economic crisis would bury them. Already in the late seventies and early eighties, they were actively seeking and, so to speak, trying out a new ideological doctrine.

In the 1990s, after the abortive military-communist putsch of August 1991, this trend stabilized and was gradually transformed into the dominant one in the political life of present-day Russia. The journal *Elementy* with its telling subtitle, *A Eurasian Review,* became an extreme manifestation of this trend. Its editorial soirees and socials came to be frequented even by top military officials. Only its brutal, **/339/** and sometimes abusive, disloyalty to the new authorities, its failure to understand the true agenda of Yeltsin's entourage, as well as its flagrant flirtation with doctrines of the extreme right bordering on antics denied the publication any chance of being transformed into a respectable mouthpiece of the geopolitical interests of the regenerated imperial elite.

Despite the ban on the *Eurasian Review* after the October 1993 events in Moscow, the word "Eurasia" became a peculiar code name for a political drift of the former USSR republics, including Ukraine, obviously planned by Moscow toward transforming the geopolitical belt of Russia's new satellite states into neocolonies. The abundance of raw materials and the gap in labor costs make such plans very feasible and extremely tempting to many Russian politicians.

Today we witness mounting rivalry among several branches of Russian great-power chauvinists for the Eurasian space. The idea of recovering the "lost" territories and bringing them back to the bosom of the imperial structure either resounds in political declarations or is seen in specific actions, despite the ideological coloring of its bearers.

Although the whole expanse of the former Soviet empire has become open to understanding by the Western world, it has yet to be understood. In order to fill this gap of understanding, many politicians and political scientists take the path of least resistance, refer to historical precedents, and in this case they attempt to revive an easily understood and analyzed integral image of the destructured space of a world which until recently was hostile. In this way, transformed forms of knowledge are produced which tempt the politician to maneuver professionally within the framework of imperfect programs whose methodology retains numerous vestiges of the period of confrontation between two world systems.

The avoidance of the complex and original intellectual exertions required to orient oneself in the postcommunist world goes hand in glove with esoteric techniques of pro-**/340/**ducing a political picture of the modern world. Among these, one might mention all sorts of globalist visions and doctrines as well as mythological ideas about the postcommunist world. A special role in creating such images is played by conceptions similar to the presently trendy one by Samuel Huntington based on a taxonomy that absolutely reeks of historical materialism with its schematic succession of economic formations. The division of the world into the spheres of influence or of various paradigms of cultural history does not lend itself to verification, even in the case of Oswald Spengler with his masterly encyclopedic system of arguments. But, however, such concepts as a rule condition a certain geopolitical trajectory leading politicians to the vicious circle of metaphor designed to escape confusion. They can be said to create a political virtual reality by whose norms the whole world is supposed to live. Abidance by these norms seems to confirm both the validity of the fantasized geopolitical reality and the magical omnipotence ascribed to such globalist visions. A performative mythologized image of postcommunism gives the impression of understanding the political situation, if only the requisite universalistic geopolitical schemata is found to explain it.

The suggestive political and geoeconomic force of the "Eurasian syndrome" also affects Ukrainian politicians and political scientists. Openly demonstrating its "Eurasian solidarity" is the Communist-Socialist majority in the *Verkhovna Rada* (Ukraine's Parliament), whose example can serve the frenzied propaganda campaign to draw Ukraine into CIS structures dominated by Russia. Attempts to revive and implant Eurasianist rhetoric into concepts of state strategy can also be seen in various recent statesments and publications originating in President Kuchma's inner circle.

Recourse to the legitimating potential of a modernized Eurasian ideology is a natural step in the development of etatism in the situation of uncertain basic values and lack of collective identity. Representatives of the state structures explain away their gravitation toward Eurasian views by na-**/341/**tional interests and purely pragmatic considerations related to Ukraine's critical economic situation, which arose allegedly as a result of severed economic ties with other regions of the former USSR. Indeed, if there is no sufficient national accord, then, proselytes of the newest version of Eurasianism hold, there is every ground for political self-determination through foreign policy (or geopolitical) interests.

The sense of this resuscitation of the general outlines of modern political Eurasianism becomes clear, if one raises the issue of its legitimizing principles. Underlying Eurasianism is an attempt to find external factors of legitimation, given the lack of national ones. The current ideologists of Eurasianism rely on a denationalized form of thinking about social integrity. The legacy of Soviet identity, which acquired certain attributes of naturalness due to its historical longevity, assists them reliably.

This is not, however, the main point of these attempts at a, so to speak, Eurasian legitimation of power. This issue is not one of a search for legitimacy in foreign policy relationships and conflicts but rather the further development of the etatist position that geopolitics are the state's sole responsibility.

\* \* \*

Analyzing how the political regime establishes itself under the postcommunist condition points to the main feature of its legitimation. In all cases of political affirmation, the authorities and institutions of power always try to create their own arbitrary basis of legitimation by authoritarian methods, rather than seek to establish a basis immanent in society, a natural system of basic values. This is an enduring Communist reflex of postcommunist power — to reproduce over and over (insofar as this is made possible by the time and real changes that have taken place) neototalitarian forms of self-legitimation.

To overcome this ruinous artificiality, even spectral quality, of the political organization of post-Soviet society is **/342/** possible only by means of a truly democratic process of legitimation. This presupposes creating political conditions fostering the formation of Ukraine's legitimizing basis, a new collective identity, most naturally, not by means of administrative pressure, force of imposition, or cultural coercion. It must be clearly understood that creating a political nation is, in general, a proper and beneficial process of legitimation. A Ukrainian political nation, as well as a Ukrainian nation state, Ukraine, are still in the future. The time this will have to take cannot be altered or shortened either by making an artificial national ideology or the always limited invocations of the idol of statehood.

1 In our treatment of the problem of legitimation we rely on Jü. Habermas' theoretical insights in: Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Problems in the Modem State,* in Jürgen Habermas *Communication and the Evolution of Society,* (London, 1979), pp. 178-183. See, specifically: Aleksandr Zinoviev, *Kommunizm kak Rialnost',* 1980 (in Russian).

2 *Ibid.,* p.179.

3 *Ibid.,* p.180.

4 *Ibid.,* p.183.

5 Pierre Bouretz, "Desir de transparence et respect du secret," *Esprit,* No. 211, Mai 1995, p.49.

6 Friedrich Nietsche, *Works in Two Volumes,* (Moscow, 1990; Russian translation), VoL 2, p.447.

7 Aristotle, *Nicomanean Ethics* (V,1130, b.30-33).

8 Paul Ricoer, "Hermeneutics, Ethics, Politics", in: Paul Ricoer, *Moscow Lectures and Interuiews (Moscow,* 1995; in Russian), p.49.

9 See: Theodore Adorno *et. al., The Authoritarian Personality: Studies in Prejudice, vol. 1* (New York, 1950), p. 768.

10 Juri Tynianov, *Kiukhlya: Tales,* (Leningrad, 1993; in Russian), p349.

11 Michel Foucault, *Serveiller et punir,* (Paris, 1975), pp. 208-210.

The Ethnopolitical Dimension of Statehood

***Leonid SHKLYAR***

The historical experience of Ukrainian state-building shows that geopolitical factors have always been of paramount importance for it. Ukrainian ethnopolitics are specific in their having been traditionally bound up with geopolitics. From this flows the lack or insufficient understanding in mass consciousness of a territory as a residential area of the Ukrainian nation, the missing knowledge in a great number of Ukrainian citizens of the history of her statehood, the absence of a relevant substantiation of legitimate foundations of national state-building for some social strata and ethnic groups of the Ukrainian population. Hence also the sensation that current events, when a sovereign Ukrainian state is being established, possess a certain ephemeral quality, expectations of the past returning, the Soviet Union reviving, that former Soviet republics, now sovereign states, are doomed, according to a radical scenario, to the role of tsarist guberniyas or something like Russian counterparts of American states.

*1. Ethnic Minorities as a Factor of Geopolitics*

Another fact testifying to a close connection of ethnoand geopolitics in Ukraine is the presence in Ukraine of numerous ethnic communities which traditionally were not treated as ethnic minorities. In the past years, when the **/344/** geopolitical map of Europe looked otherwise, some of these communities formed part of the ethnic nucleus of other countries, like, *e.g.,* Rumanians and Moldovans of Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia before World War II. The same is true of the Polish population of Western Ukraine and the Slovaks of Transcarpathia, let alone the Russians of South-Eastern regions and the Crimea. The radical change of Europe's geopolitical map caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an independent Ukraine have essentially changed the political situation of many ethnic groups in Ukraine primarily in terms of their self-awareness, self-assessment, *etc.* These changes of identity make themselves felt, especially in a complicated socioeconomic situation, which compels many to see independence and economic reforms as the primary cause of the crisis. All this disintegrates society along socioeconomic, political and ethnic lines, thus threatening ruin of our very statehood.

Speaking of geopolitical factors of ethnopolitics, the potential of their influence on Ukrainian state-building, one cannot avoid the problems of the titular nation, the Ukrainians. Here arise a whole series of questions connected with ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious orientation and identity, for the very structure of the Ukrainian nation is today still in the process of reconstituting, modernizing, and in an ethnopolitical sense integrating itself. It is clear that this will be rather a long process, and its results depend largely on the relationship between the titular nation and ethnic minorities, because it is these relations that do and will identify Ukrainian statehood as a certain ethnopolitical system for a long time.

*2. The Ethnopolitical Reality of Ukraine*

To outline the set of problems connected with this aspect of political science analysis, one can use the notion of "ethnopolitical reality" which reflects the modern condition of interethnic relations in the state as well as indicates such **/345/** essential parameters in the life of ethnic communities as numerical composition, the nature of population (compact or disperse), the type of population (rural or urban) and religious orientation.

Ethnopolitical reality is a multitude of ontological and political features which help create an integral image of ethnic orientation toward certain values of ethnic, public, and political existence.

To understand an ethnopolitical reality, it is extremely important to characterize the ethnopolitical map. There is no common opinion among Ukrainian academics concerning the truth of official statistics on ethnic groups in the 1989 census. Some academics seriously criticize these indices and, above all, those relating to the numerical strength of the Russian ethnic community as the largest and most influential one in the Ukrainian ethnopolitical spectrum.1

The statistics about the number of ethnic groups in today's Ukraine also seem to be mystified. Some authors use data about 120 different ethnicities residing now in Ukraine, while others have counted as few as 90. However, accuracy does not matter in this case, for there is a more essential question: is Ukraine a multinational state?

The point is that the structure of Ukraine's population, excluding the most numerous Russian ethnic community, contains about 5% of non-native ethnic groups which cannot always be described in terms of generally accepted characteristics (quantitative, socio-cultural, religious, traditional, behavioral).

According to official statistics on the population of individual ethnic communities in Ukraine, these are clearly divided into several cohort groups. The first, entirely separate one, is composed of Russians who constitute a true ethnic minority. Their total number is today about 11.2 million or roughly 22% of Ukraine's total population. The next cohort is ethnic groups numbering under one million but over one hundred thousand. There are eight such ethnic groups in Ukraine: Jews, Belarusians, Moldovans, Crimean Tartars, **/346/** Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, and Rumanians. Together they make up about 4% of the state's whole population.

The third cohort is composed of ethnic groups surpassing the fifty-thousand point but not reaching one hundred thousand. There are four such ethnic groups in Ukraine: Greeks, the Kazan Tartars, Armenians, and Germans. Their total weight in the structure of Ukraine's population is

about 0.6%.

The fourth cohort are ethnic groups numbering over ten-thousand point but under fifty thousand. There are only three such ethnic groups in today's Ukraine: Gypsies, Gagauzes, and Georgians. Their share in the national population structure is about 0.2%.

Finally, one more cohort is represented by ethnic groups under ten thousand but over one thousand each. There are at least six groups of that kind in Ukraine. Their share in the national structure is only about 0.07%. True, these statistical data may vary in any direction but not so essentially as to affect the general picture. This is connected with ever-intensifying migration processes, *i.e.,* departure and arrival of the representatives of some ethnic groups. Operational data of the Ukrainian migration service show that Ukraine already has numerous ethnic communities composed of several thousand persons. However, the latter cannot be part of the overall account of Ukraine's ethnodemographic structure of population due to the absence of permanent citizenship.

Also taking into account other aforesaid constituents of the ethnopolitical reality, namely, the nature of settlement of the above ethnic communities, the prevailing type of population, and the dominant religious orientation, let us try to reproduce from all these indices an ethnopolitical reality as a comprehensive table which deals only with ethnic minorities, without the title ethnic groups.

The data in *Table 1* show that the largest ethnic communities of Ukraine mostly reside compactly or are regionbased. They are predominantly Orthodox-oriented, with a **/347/**

*Table 1.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Ethnic group* | *Total strength* | *Nature of settlement* | *Type of population* | *Religious orientation* |
| Russians | 11,2 mil. | mostly disperse | 88% urban | Orthodox |
| Jews | 486,000 | disperse | almost 100% urban | Judaism |
| Belarusians | 439,900 | disperse, bu with compac rural settle ments | mostly urban | Catholic Orthodox |
| Moldovans | 324,900 | mostly compact | mostly rural | Orthodox |
| Crimean Tartars | 280,000 | compact | mostly rural | Muslim |
| Bulgarians | 232,800 | compact | mostly rural | Orthodox Uniate Catholic |
| Poles | 218,900 | disperse but regionally based | urban | Catholic |
| Hungarians | 163,300 | compact | mostly rural | Catholic Protestant |
| Rumanians | 134,700 | compact | mostly rural | Orthodox |

**/348/** largely rural settlement pattern, but the urbanized population of Ukraine's most numerous ethnic communities still dominates quantitatively. As we know, compactness and urbanization are more conducive to politicization than the disperse and rural type of settlement.

Let us now consider the next cohort with a strength not more than one hundred thousand but not less than five to ten thousand persons. These ethnic groups may be called more than average strength ethnic groups.

The data in *Table 2* show that ethnic groups of morethan-average strength display compact and dispersed residential patterns equally. The urban type of population prevails, while Christian orientation dominates various non-homogeneous faiths. The data also indicate still-existing Muslim and emerging Protestant orientations. Unlike the previous cohort, this one lacks communities having direct contacts with their historical homelands, which, of course, deepens the feeling of isolation from their ethnic nucleus

*Table 2.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Ethnic group* | *Total strength* | *Nature of settlement* | *Type of population*  | *Religious orientation* |
| Greeks | 98,600 | compact | rural and urban | Orthodox |
| Kazan Tatars | 90,000 | disperse | mostly urban | Muslim |
| Armenians | 60,000 | disperse | urban | Armenian Gregorian church |
| Germans | above 50,000 | mostly compact | mostly urban | Protestant |

**/349/** but allows, however, the preservation of their ethnic identityUkraine also has ethnic groups belonging to the medium cohort and numbering from ten to fifty thousand persons. There are only three such communities.

*Table 3* data indicate a prevailing dispersion of their settlement with a balance of urban and rural types of population, with certain denominational differences and Christian orientation dominating. This cohort includes two peculiar nations: the Gypsies who created their own social organization, the traveling camp, and, if living among a foreign ethnic population, accept the latter's religious orientation as their own; and the Gagauzes, one of the four autochthonous ethnic groups in Ukraine (together with Ukrainians, Karaites and the Crimean Tartars), for the ethnogenesis of Gagauzes occurred primarily on the territory of their permanent residence.

Finally, there is one more cohort of ethnic communities numbering from one thousand to ten thousand persons.

*Table 3.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Ethnic group* | *Total strength* | *Nature of settlement* | *Type of population* | *Religious orientation* |
| Gypsies | +/50,000 | disperse but there are regional compact settlements | hard to identify | mostly Orthodox |
| Gagauzes | +/30,000 | compact | mostly rural | Orthodox |
| Georgians | 25,000 | disperse | mostly urban | Georgian autocephalous church |

 **/350/** These ethnic groups are less-than-average size in the structure of Ukraine's population.

*Table 4* shows that this ethnic cohort is dominated by a disperse nature of settlement with a mostly urban type of population. A Catholic-Protestant orientation is prevailing here. This cohort is also special in having the Karaites, an ethnic group of autochthonous origin featuring a clear ethnic identity, language, anthroponyms, and specific form of the Judaic faith.

As to the nature of settlement of the most numerous ethnic communities, Ukraine combines the dispersion of some and the compactness of others, high urbanization with the domination of the rural settlement pattern, both proximity to and remoteness from historical homelands.

*Table 4.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Ethnic group* | *Total strength* | *Nature of settlement* | *Type of population* | *Religious orientation* |
| Slovaks | +/-10,000 | compact | mostly rural | Catholic |
| Czechs | + 9,000 | disperse | mostly urban | Catholic |
| Latvians | +/- 7,000 | disperse | urban | Lutheran |
| Lithuanians | + 5,000 | disperse | urban | Catholic |
| Estonian | +/- 5,000 | disperse but with regionbased settlements | mostly urban | Protestant |
| Karaites | +/- 1,500 | mostly compact | urban | Judaism |

The above tables represent far from all ethnic groups. They do not include the so-called small-size (mostly numbering several hundreds or even dozens of persons) ethnie groups still to be studied by ethnology and political ethnology. We have to note such phenomenon as particularization of ethnic interests, fragmentation and separation to one's own liking, which creates a unique alternative to processes of consolidation.

1 See: Yaroslav Dashkevych, "Ukrain'ske Vidrodzhennia i Natsionalni Menshyny" in: *Materialy Naukovoyi Konferentsii Respublikanskoi Assotsatsii Ukrainoznavtsiv,* (Kyiv, 1990: in Ukrainian), p. 51.

In Search of a Model of Economic Development

***Ihor BURAKOVSKY***

Economic transformation is a complex socioeconomic phenomenon in which it is far from easy to identify a clear-cut and unequivocal cause-and-effect relationship between specific events, actions of individual economic players, and their consequences. For this reason, there is a serious danger of resorting to rather broad generalizations when analyzing transformations as an economic process and thus underrating the specifics of a transition economy. On the other hand, there is a temptation to treat individual (accidental) phenomena as laws and trends characteristic of transition to a market economy as such.

*1. Strategies of Economic Transformations*

The essence of socioeconomic transformation in general comes down to changing the existing economic order (economic system) and promoting economic growth. Obviously, every society is interested in minimizing the costs of such changes. This is why a country, when choosing a certain economic strategy, in fact decides for itself how to combine transformations with the achievement of economic growth. This problem can, however, be also put another way: what kind of changes should be effected to take the path of a steady economic development? As a whole the strategies of economic transformation pursued by various countries can **/354/** be divided arbitrarily into three large groups.

1. *The transformation model of a developing country.* This strategy is usually pursued by economically backward states. Its key element is industrialization as the chief means of overcoming economic backwardness and bridging the gap with the industrially developed nations. Such a strategy (also known as the catch-up strategy) was once played successfully in the new industrial countries. This model can by and large assume two basic forms: export orientation and import substitution.

The roots of this model may be found in West European countries at the time of industrial revolutions. The Meiji restoration in Japan and industrialization in the former Soviet Union can also with certain reservations be attributed to this model.

2. *The economic reconstruction model.* This was implemented successfully in the countries *pi* Western Europe and Japan after World War II. Postwar reconstruction also took place in the former Soviet Union. The experience of East and Central European countries, where a Soviet-type economic system was established, can also be referred, to some extent, to this model. In this case reconstruction was accompanied by political and economic changes of a systemic nature.

3. *The systemic change model.* This can be treated as a certain combination of the elements of the first and second strategies. But, unlike under those strategies, system change envisions transition from an administrative command economy (based on state property and vertical hierarchical relationships) to a market economic system (based on different forms of private property and a combination of vertical and horizontal relationships). It is noteworthy that the former socialist countries did have certain market-type relationships (consumer market, distribution of resources through socalled "bureaucratic market," *etc.),* but economic activity was chiefly coordinated through vertical "state — state enterprise" links. This makes it impossible, *e.g.,* to regard the **/355/** Japanese post-war economic development as a system transformation despite the scale of economic changes that occurred in that country after World War II.1

Every country molds and pursues its own economic strategy combining elements of different approaches to economic growth. For this reason, the proposed classification fulfills rather a simple task: to identify the initial conditions which preceded the changes (economic backwardness, ruined economic potential as a result of war, crisis of the existing model of economic development). In a structural sense, the economic development of any country is characterized by the presence and quality of production factors (labor, capital, land, entrepreneurship) and the techniques of their utilization (in other words, economic policy in a broad sense of the term). Economic policy as such is worked out and pursued under the influence of the external and internal economic environment in which a national economy functions.

The character of economic policy may vary from radical measures (so-called shock therapy) to gradualism or in one way or another combine aspects of both. This is a question of the content of transformations rather than of their speed. Thus, for example, an emphasis on import substitution or export orientation may be regarded as an element of radical (shock) transformation.2

The economic policy in Ukraine may be arbitrarily divided into two stages. The first stage (1991-1994) is mainly characterized by forced moves towards the liberalization of prices and foreign economic activity taken under pressure from Russian transformations and the international community. But, as a whole, there was in fact no truly radical (in terms of a market-type transformation) or consistent policy. This was officially explained by Ukraine's intention to follow its own "special" way of reforms in order to minimize the socioeconomic costs of transition. Administrative measures dominated economic policy. Yet, a series of conceptual documents and laws were adopted which not so much regulated the economic processes as played an "enlightening" **/356/** role. This period in Ukraine saw the deepest and most rapid crisis phenomena of all the postcommunist countries, and all pre-existing financial and other resources were exhausted.

The second stage, from 1994 onwards, may be treated as an attempt to effect changes in the economy (acceleration of privatization, financial stabilization, creation of a market infrastructure, *etc.).* The economic policy of this stage is in fact a combination of monetary and administrative measures, which may be called "administrative monetarism" or "monetary administering." This is accounted for by a factual preservation of the structure of corporate interests and hence the system of corporate links typical of a "bureaucratic market" as well as by a dynamic renewal of geopolitical strategies of the world's leading states.

Like all the postcommunist countries (China is the unique case in history of economic reforms under a communist regime), Ukraine launched the process of economic transformations in a state of systemic crisis. Yet, the scale of this crisis (drop in output, inflation rate, *etc.)* turned out to be by far the widest as compared to other transition economies.

Moreover, Ukraine was late in identifying its strategic course of reform and take practical steps in this direction, and this lateness is largely responsible for the present economic hardships.

In a relatively short period of time Ukraine also had a few powerful outside shocks: withdrawal from the rouble zone (having no system of payments with other former Soviet republics) and introduction of a new system for procuring oil, gas, and other resources (new supply channels and making the transition to world prices). The economic situation in Ukraine was further worsened by an abrupt change in the mode of economic (mostly intra-sector) links between enterprises, *i.e.,* transforming these domestic economic links into foreign ones.

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the inherent system of inter-enterprise links, the Ukrainian **/357/** economy came under the powerful influence of international economic competition. Many, if not most, enterprises found themselves unable to compete on the international market.

Finally, the Ukrainian political and economic elite lack a deep analysis of not only the international experience but also of their own mistakes, they fail to realistically assess present and future opportunities and tendencies. Certain strategic decisions seem to be made by intuition or under the influence of outside circumstances.

*2. The Starting Conditions of a Transformation Process*

Obviously, an economic policy should be based on detailed analysis of the initial economic conditions which identify the starting point of economic transformation. These conditions differ in various countries and largely determine a strategic direction of transformations, placing, so to speak, "natural" limits on the utility of foreign experience.

In per capita gross domestic product (GDP), Ukraine was 8th in the former Soviet Union, $5200 (US) in 1990.3 This shows that Ukraine, with its considerable industrial potential, was inferior to other republics in planning its utilization.

Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union only a part of an economic complex with all the results flowing from it. This meant in practice that the layout of production capacities and their patterns of reciprocal ties did not coincide with the existing administrative and territorial borders. Moreover, Soviet industrial strategy was based on the idea maximizing economies of scale and did not take into account national and territorial boundaries.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet economy encountered considerable difficulties back in the 1970s could then alleviate them through a large-scale export of raw materials (especially oil and gas). The hard currency earned was primarily used to increase the import of the consumer and intermediate goods, which postponed any resolute action to over-**/358/**come the faults of the command administrative economic system.

The critical condition of the economy was further aggravated because a large part of industrial capacity was obsolescent and outdated, and various elements of production capital were being replaced or modernized on a far from adequate scale. After World War II Kremlin economic policy denied Ukraine sufficient investments to improve and develop its industrial infrastructure. For this reason independent Ukraine has inherited an antiquated logistical base and enejgy/resource-consuming production technologies which are the main cause of environmental pollution.

In addition, Ukraine has limited oil and gas deposits of its own which do not meet its energy and petrochemical requirements in industry. And, as noted above, the Ukrainian economy traditionally rested on resource- and energy-consuming technologies.

A conclusion can be made on this basis that Ukraine, like other postcommunist states, badly needs fundamental large-scale modernization, even reindustrialization. Today the Ukrainian industrial sector (though rather developed compared to other former republics) also needs profound structural changes to adapt to world market requirements and thus make it internationally competitive.

The postcommunist modernization in question differs greatly from processes in other countries. Transition economies face the necessity of restructuring — in the broad sense of the term — an already existing industrial base which was created and developing along the lines differing from standard concepts employed by, say, the new industrial countries.

Industrial production in the socialist-type economies was developing on a far-from-market basis (predominance of political considerations over economic ones, a distorted system of price relationships, *etc.)* and was mainly directed at achieving self-sufficiency and substituting for imports from Western countries. Of course, the administrative command **/359/** economy was not fully autarchic in the literal sense, but that economic system lacked adequate incentives for the large-scale export of industrial goods, except probably to partners in the socialist system.

Modernization in the postcommunist countries also differs essentially from the, so to speak, "primary" process of industrial development in market-economy countries. Under present conditions, restructuring objectively has to be more "foreign-oriented" than it was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the domestic market played a more important role. This is also true for Ukraine.

Thus, Ukraine faces the necessity of combining effectively two extremely complicated processes: technical modernization and introduction of market-economy principles.

*3. The Formation of a Postcommunist Economic System*

The changes since 1991 in the Ukrainian economy are of a contradictory nature. Today's Ukrainian economy is characterized by a whole series of features and tendencies which cannot be treated as only the result of mistakes and drawbacks in the economic policy. We seem to be dealing with a qualitatively new phenomenon which may rather arbitrarily be called an "under-reformed" economy or a postcommunist economic system.

This kind of economic system in Ukraine has rather clear-cut characteristics, some typical of other transition economies, others unique to Ukraine. First, the economy of Ukraine is still in the throes of a crisis characterized by a continued production slump (see *Table 1).*

The greatest danger is the drop in investments, for this only increases Ukraine's technological lag behind the industrially developed countries. Yet, it is worth noting that 1995-1996 saw the first signs of financial stabilization: in 1995 the inflation rate was 182% (10,155% in 1993, 401% in 1994).4 However, even here one still cannot speak of stability in the short and medium terms. **/360/**

Despite the industrial slump and the objective necessity for a rapid streamlining of production (caused by factory shut-downs and' workforce cuts), the unemployment level remains very low according to official data (0.46% of the able-bodied population as of late December 1995), while Ukraine's labor resources are an estimated about 29 million

*Table 1.*

*Chief macroeconomic indices for 1990-1996 (percent change from previous year)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *1990* | *1991* | *1992* | *1993* | *1994* | *1995* | *January May 1996* |
| Official GDP | -2,4 | *-* 13,5 | - 16,8 | *-* 14,2 | -23,0 | -11,8 | -9,7 |
| Gross industrial output | -0,1 | -4,8 | -6,4 | -7,6 | -27,3 | -11,5 | -5,7 |
| Gross agricultural output | -3,7 | - 13,2 | -8,3 | 1 | - 16,5 | -2,6 | — |
| Consumer goods output | -5,8 | -5,1 | -9,4 | - 15,3 | -25,0 | - 19,1 | - 16,2 |
| Investments in capital assets | 1,9 | -7,1 | -36,9 | - 10,3 | -23,0 | -35,0 | 38,0\* |

\* For January — march 1996.

(Source: *Ukraine. The Real Economy and Its Sectors.* A Quarterly Statistical Abstract. The World Bank: Kyiv, Ukraine. Volume II, Issue 2, May 1996, Table 1.1). **/361/**

people.5 Yet, according to some estimates, the potential number of the unemployed in Ukraine may reach two to five million people.

Certain changes have taken place in the structure of production. While in 1993 the state owned 96% of all capital assets, by late 1995 its share had dropped to 62%.6 It is, however, noteworthy that today new economic (non-governmental) entities (subjects of productive and commercial activities) are being formed mainly through privatization, *i.e.,* as a result of the redistribution of available assets and intensive use of state-budget funds. This shows that there are still no incentives for any process of a large-scale "self-generation" of private capital based on the accumulation of income from productive and commercial activities by non-governmental businesses and private savings. A process of "natural" import substitution goes on in Ukraine at the level of industrial sectors and specific industries. The break-up of inter-republican cooperation ties necessitated the search for new procurement sources of certain goods and resources which Ukrainian businesses had traditionally received from former Soviet republics. This problem is extremely acute for Ukraine in particular, for the latter traditionally specialized within the former Soviet economic complex in producing various intermediate products, while end products were manufactured in Russia and other republics. This is the reason why Ukrainian enterprises have started setting up closed production cycles and are trying to restore cooperation ties, particularly by forming financial-industrial groups.

The state is more actively intervening in the redistribution of financial flows. This is expressed in a growing share of budgetary funds and a decreased share of the financial resources of primary economic agents (see *Table 2).*

This indicates that the state still remains the main economic player today. A characteristic feature of the Ukrainian economy is the fact that most of financial resources are used for social needs (see *Table 3).*

The above data outline a tendency to increase the ex-**/362/**penses of the state and economic entities for social needs, while expenses for economic development steadily decline. But this reduction also to some extent reflects diminishing subsidies and privileges to producers. In general, a conclusion can be drawn that today the economy of Ukraine is more social-oriented than "economic-incentive."

As is the case with other postcommunist countries, the economy of Ukraine is composed today of three rather distinct sectors. First, it is the official economy, *i.e.,* the productive and commercial activity in compliance with legislation in force which uses money as a form of payment. Its scope can be determined more or less accurately from official statistical data.

The second sector may be arbitrarily called marginal. Economic activity within its limits is regulated by legisla-

*Table 2.*

*The structure of finances in Ukraine*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *1991* | *1992* | *1993* | *1994* | *1995* | *1996 (estim.)* |
| Budgetary funds | 26,4 | 29,0 | 30,4 | 41,3 | 46,2 | 45,2 |
| Financial resources of enterprises | 61,9 | 56,7 | 60,6 | 44,9 | 38,9 | 40,2 |
| Financial resources of centralized funds' | 11,7 | 14,3 | 9,0 | 13,8 | 15,5 | 14,6 |

\* Excluding resources of the Pension and Chernobyl Clean-Up Funds. (Source: K. V. Pavlyk, "The State' Financial Resources: Essence, Composition, and Structure," *Finansy Ukrainy,* 1996, No. 2, p. 21. in Ukrainian). **/365/**

tion only to some extent, while the main instrument of exchange is barter. The marginal sector is only partially subject to statistical estimate, meaning that its role in the economy can be assessed in relatively rough terms. Let us note that, depending on the\* economic and political situation, this sector may transform into either the official or a shadow one.

The unofficial ("shadow") economy makes up the third sector. It is mainly characterized by using money (sometimes barter) as an exchange instrument outside officially registered financial institutions. In this case only a portion of the productive and commercial activity led by the shadow economy is associated with breaching legislation in force or is of an utterly criminal nature.

The situation is specific in that the functioning of the economy is more often than not determined not so much by official decisions and actions as by a rapid development of the "shadow" sector. According to a World Bank expert estimate, the share of unofficial economic activity in Ukraine's total GDP rose from 12% in 1989 to about 65% in 1996.7

*Table 3.*

*The structure of the utilization of financial resourses, %*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *1991* | *1992* | *1993* | *1994* | *1995* | *1996* |
| Economic development expenses | 27,6 | 35,9 | 39,9 | 39,6 | 33,5 | 35,6 |
| Expenses for social needs | 33,8 | 38,3 | 31,1 | 43,1 | 41,8 | 43,6 |

(Source: K. V. Pavlyk, "The State' Financial Resources: Essence, Composition, and Structure," *Finansy Ukrainy,* 1996, No. 2, p. 23-24. in Ukrainian). **/364/**

This means that today the scale of shadow activities exceeds that of official business. Also noteworthy is the fact that the same natural and juridical persons pose as subjects in both the shadow and official economies.

Another characteristic of Ukrainian economy today is the steady and rapid growth of both domestic and foreign debt.

As of February 1, 1996, the domestic public debt was 229 trillion krb or 15.4% GDP. About 96.7% of this are state budget arrears to the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU). Yet, it should be noted, to be objective, that the NBU is trying to scale down this form of credit with some success: while in 1990 NBU credits were 28,043 billion karbovanets, in 1995 they were 3,677 billion krb.8 Meanwhile, foreign debt rose by 19.9% from 1992 to 1993, 70% from 1993 to 1994 and 22.8% from 1994 to 1995. According to some estimates, Ukraine's foreign debt at the end of 1995 was $8.8 billion US or 30.4% of GDP. B. Sobolev, Deputy Finance Minister of Ukraine, thinks that in 1997 Ukraine may approach the dangerous point when a foreign debt makes up about 80% of GDP. Russia is Ukraine's largest creditor — $3.4 billion, followed by the IMF at $2,288 million and Turkmenistan at $792 million.9

Yet another defining characteristic of the Ukrainian economy is the growth of inter-enterprise debt. Thus, in January-April 1996 creditor indebtedness between Ukrainian enterprises and the economic entities of other former republics rose by 22% and reached 230 trillion krb. in early May (debtor indebtedness grew, accordingly, by 12% and reached 69 trillion krb.).

Debtor indebtedness between Ukrainian businesses themselves in the same period grew by 51% and reached 3,359 trillion krb. in early May, while creditor indebtedness rose by 50% (4580 trillion krb.). At the same time, the gross domestic product was 2748 trillion krb.10

However, there were no bankruptcies of major enterprises. **/365/**

The volume of Ukraine's foreign trade has risen *(e.g.,* in

1995 alone exports rose by 16.4% and imports by 14.4%), though its geographical and commodity-wise structure has not changed essentially.

The main export goods remain ferrous metals and metal goods (34.2%), chemicals (12.3%), along with electrical appliances and equipment (12%). Imports are dominated by fossil fuels, oil and oil products (54.8%, including natural gas — 32.4%).11

The former Soviet republics remain Ukraine's the largest trade partners. Russia alone accounted for 43% of Ukrainian commodity exports and 52.3% of imports in 1995.12 In 1993 the "near abroad" accounted for 65.3% of Ukraine's exports and 76.9% of its imports, in 1994 55.8% and 65.7%, respectively. At the.same time, Ukraine's negative balance of trade dropped from $1,828 billion in 1993 to $1.2 billion in 1995.13 This tendency changed little in the first months of 1996: trade with the near abroad was $4,138 billion or 53.4%, with the "far abroad" $3.6 billion (46.6%).14

Note should also be taken of the fact that output continued to drop even in export-oriented sectors. This means that foreign economic activity of businesses, despite its growing scope, does not yet influence the dynamics of production.

In the period 1992-1995 Ukraine received $750 million in foreign investments, while, one expert estimates that Ukrainian industry can absorb annually $2-2.5 billion in foreign. investments.15 In addition, capital outflow from Ukraine in 1991-1995 has been estimated as high as $15 billion.16 This means the chances of modernizing production capacity with foreign technology and know-how are still slim.

The macroeconomic situation in Ukraine now largely depends on the scale of foreign funding. For example, the

1996 budget expects foreign loans to cover 44.3% of the of deficit.17 **/366/**

Ukraine's current financial capabilities directly depend on how it manages to reschedule its foreign debt. In 19941995 Ukraine, supported by international financial institutions, successfully negotiated a deferred payment schedule to its largest creditors, Russia and Turkmenistan. Moreover, it is only with funds from these institutions that Ukraine can pay for much of its critical imports. Yet, despite the crucial importance of foreign funding, no specific mechanisms of repaying Ukraine's foreign debt are being considered today.

These and other characteristics indicate that Ukraine is still in the condition of economic "drift" with unforeseen consequences to its statehood.

1 This classification is similar to the one suggested by John Dunning: John H. Dunning, "The Prospects for Foreign Directs Investment in **/420/** Eastern Europe" in: *Foreign Investment in Central and Eastern Europe,* (New York, 1993), pp. 16-33.

2 Major components of each kind of economic policy are rather clearly, in our opinion, formulated in: Tibor Vasco, "A Global View: Types of Transformation Models" in: *Reasearch Report. The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies,* No. 206, May 1994.

3 *Ukraine. EIU Country Report,* 1st quarter 1995, p.31.

4 *Ukraine. The Real Economy and Its Sectors: A Quarterly Statistical Abstract. The World Bank,* (Kyiv, May 1996), VoL II, Issue 2, Table 1.1.

5 *Uryadovy Kurier,* Feb. 8, 1996.

6 *Derzhavnyi Biuleten' pro Pryvatyzatsiyu,* No. 2, 1996, p. 16 (in Ukrainian).

7 *Ukraine. The Real Economy and Its Sectors,* (Kyiv, May 1996), Vol. II, Issue 2, Fig. 2.4.

8 A.Volkov, "800 Trillion Squandered Karbovanets", *Finansovaya Ukraina,* Feb. 13, 1996 (in Russian).

9 A. Volkov, "Ukraine's Foreign Debt Is and Will Be Growing,". *Finansovaya Ukraina,* Jan. 30, 1996 (in Russian).

10 *Uryadovy Kurier,* June 29, 1996.

11 *Uryadovy Kurier,* Feb. 8, 1996.

12 *Ibid.*

13 The data are taken from: *Ukraine. The Real Economy and Its Sectors: A Quarterly Statistical Abstract. The World Bank,* (Kyiv, May 1996), Vol. II, Issue 2, Table 1.6.

14 The data are taken from: *Uryadovy Kurier,* June 29, 1996.

15 Roman Shpek, "Foreign Investments in Ukraine", *Uryadovy Kurier,* April 2, 19% (in Ukrainian).

16 V.Koshchiy, "Parallel Economic Worlds", *Finansovaya Ukraina,* Feb. 20, 1996 (in Russian).

17 *Hobs Ukrainy,* April 6, 1996.

Post-Soviet Forms of Social Changes

## *Andriy FEDOROV*

In order to better understand the sociopolitical changes in Ukraine in the first half of the 1990s, it is worth looking deeper into such transistorical social forms as *guild* and *fratry.*

That the human being had radically changed in the years of Soviet power was known back in the so-called days of "stagnation." Not so many years later, with the onset of "perestroika," he began to change beyond recognition. In the mirror of what social configurations can one discern his contemporary visage? It became common practice to assert that this image is highly blurred because postcommunist society itself seems to be scattered and unstructured. It only seems so because we still describe the masses in the categories of "class," "stratum," "occupation," *etc.,* without noticing that this category-setting network is far from covering the reallife human individual in his relationship with the social whole. To be fully aware of the fact that modern society is actually well-structured, one should enlarge the scale of observation. In order to describe postcommunist societal transformations we will employ the concepts of "guild" and "fratry" as universal ideal types of structural organization of society. This requires us to think about the processes of further exchange, interrelationships of individuals and groups on a "microphysical" (Michel Foucault) level, that is, in Foucault's terms, the "microphysics of power" and the speci-**/368/**ficity of "micropolitics." It concerns, above all, the in-depth social medium which brings about business cooperation of people and thus sets conditions for their mobility, realizes their vital interests, and claims for social success.

*1. Homo Corporaticus*

Any social institution as a means of maintaining social relationships is an order, a set of rules and norms, which have to be effected by a group of selected people. In order to inscribe something on this institutional matrix, a group must consequently distribute among its members the benefits and places in the hierarchy offered by the institution. In its turn, in order to bring the subjective interests of members of an institutional group into close correspondence with the interests of the institution as a whole, the group must organize and act within the framework of institutional rules and norms and create a micropolitical environment. Such an environment may be extremely harsh *(e.g.,* an environment formed by unlawful practices in the army). It may not be created to a reasonable extent by its own agents alone, but it is always in existence. No social practice, no social exchange can be carried out without concomitant micropolicies.

What are these micropolitical environments? No individual involved in a practical activity is free of his professional environment. His reward and place in the hierarchy depend on how correctly he behaves toward his superiors, subordinates, colleagues, business partners, *etc.* This behavior also determines the work climate in which the individual finds himself and the degree of his personal freedom or dependence. The nature of relationships in a professional circle is very diverse: orders, mutual obligations, patronage, rivalry, solidarity, *etc.* Implementing these tactics in communicative action is the everyday life of a micropolicy. Its strategy, however, is different, namely, to set a pattern of relations with the institution in question best for a given human collective. **/369/**

A stable active group with a micropolitical relationship may be called corporation. This word conveys vividly the plasticity of interactions described here.. On the microphysical level, a socium is a complex set of interacting corporativistic units. Society as a totality of groups and institutions is primarily the process and result of the interaction of hundreds of thousands of corporations.

Merely by being involved in a corporate relationship, an individual comes to the intersection of the domination/subordination lines and the lines of socioeconomlc construction. Here power-seeking impulses, technologies, ideological ensembles, and ethnocultural customs unite and create centers of power around which all possible discursive practices pivot. A corporation is merely an arrangement of individuals around these centers, a method to capillarize the relations of domination. A person inhabits a family, a certain ethnocultural environment; he may be a member of a religious microcommunity and subject to a political regime, always acting in the framework of ownership and power. But he only lives in his own corporation. Here the individual, influenced by the mechanics of micropolitics, is really drawn into power relations. It is, here that he is introduced to the notions of culture in general and ethic culture in particular. Being in the hearth of power, he accepts (or rejects) one or another ensemble of social values adapted to specific needs by the corporative experience of his professional environment. In this case micropolicies open the channels of social mobility for individuals and groups.

A corporation is not the only possible microphysical form of power distribution among people. Nevertheless, man remains corporative par excellence. Another question is: what type of corporation is dominant under a given social system and, in particular, in the surrounding postcommunist world? **/370/**

*2. The Soviet Guild*

We live in the ruins of the Soviet institutional system and are moving toward a corporative order which is anything but communist. Homo sovieticus becomes extinct in "inconvenient" social conditions. It would be virtually impossible to reproduce him or to revive the social order to which he was accustomed (and which had been created for him).1 To understand the metamorphoses of corporative relationships in our society in the postcommunist period, one has to briefly describe the main features of communist professional cooperation. The latter have the character of a guild.

In ancient times, the Italian urban commune gave an example of political self-organization of the free citizens based on professional cooperation. As in those distant times of city-states, under Soviet communism the corporative (micropolitical) liaisons of the groups of people who in fact did not have at their disposal the means of production gradually became the basis (nerve plexus) of the whole social life to a much higher degree.

The communist guild consisted of a corporation of hirelings whose access to societal goods depended on their proximity to the centralized distributors of material values and services. This was achieved, above all, by virtue of one's position in the institutional hierarchy. An advantageous position in the distribution structure allowed an individual (and his corporate environment) to redistribute values secondarily *(i.e.,* outside a given societal institution). To make one's career in Soviet society meant to obtain broader access to a secondary corporative redistribution of various benefits and resources rather than to get promoted and increase one's own welfare. In this connection the main idea of micropolicies under communism was always the struggle for a key to the doors of distribution, regardless of whether it was a question of cut-price holiday accommodations or granting **/371/** an enterprise something outside the official framework. Therefore, official life, rules, and legal norms were pushed into the background in the minds of its agents. Talent, professional qualities, and skills played a secondary role as compared to a micropolitical power, knowledge of how "to get along with people" and pursue "one's own interests" in any situation. This led to the distortion of the whole system of social mobility. Society, in essence, lost control over the process by which it evaluated the work efficiency and ethical norms of people at various levels of the social hierarchy. A regime took shape in which social success was determined first of all by interpersonal corporative alliances.

Throughout Soviet history the communist institutions did their best to fight the economically destructive elements of the corporativistic microphysics of power, but without success. Neither the system of control and economic incentives, nor severe ideological manipulation, gave stable results. The corporatist structure reacted to new institutional policies, adapted to them, and continued to live by its own rules. As time went on, consumer values became dominant in corporative life at all social levels. Party structures were given the task of overseeing how work collectives fulfilled their functional responsibilities. Yet, these very structures in the final analysis became the main source of secondary redistribution.

From this point of view, the sociopolitical practices of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are a classical example of the development of the Soviet guild structure. Ukraine observed a distinct tendency toward corporative separatism, which was testified to by the activities of Petro Shelest, the author of the book *Ukraino Nasha Radianska* (Ukraine, Our Soviet Land), which appeared in the early 1970s. The publication, in fact, affirmed the ideal of the republic's *nomenklatura* to control access to retail establishments closed to those not members of the nomenklatura. It cost the author his position as CPU First Secretary, which represented the victory of guild over society, of the domi-**/372/**nant corporation, the Central, Committee of the CPSU, over a provincial corporation. But ever further, the Soviet guild in Ukraine continued to exist under the influence of contradictions between the centrifugal interest and the rules of the Communist party *nomenklatura* corporation. Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, one of the last Communist Party leaders in Ukraine, said of the regional corporative stronghold that "in Ukraine we have a very strong Party organization," and this became a vivid symbol of that ambivalence.

In the history of the Soviet guild, the period in question may be seen as a milestone and signifies in its own way the crisis of the CPSU *nomenklatura* corporation.

In the Stalinist period the state tried to make people work by means of repression, which caused a fit of social aggression on a gigantic scale thus bringing the whole system of official institutions to the verge of collapse. The authorities continuously applied ideological pressure to which corporations responded with ideological sabotage, turning aggressive discourses into formal rituals of loyalty to the communist institutions. As late as the 1970s the faith in communist ideals was already identified with naivete and even mental deficiency.

By the 1980s this *modus vivendi* at last coincided with the discourse of power. Society went internally out of control despite the lack of any significant social protest. *Perestroika* began at the very moment when the fourth "selected" generation of *homo sovieticus,* who ensured survival of corporations through their complete mastery of the rituals of loyalty, came to the fore. Foucault had the pithy thought that plebs as a social institution do not exist, but society, its social groups, and individuals themselves possess a plebeian dark side, *i.e.,* an energy of resistance, attempts to evade their official duties. "This plebeianism places itself not in the field of power relationships but rather on the edge of it and is itself the reverse and ricochet of wielding power; this means that any governmental action provokes resistance. By the same token this motivates further expansion of the **/373/** sphere of domination."2 In the last decade of the USSR's existence plebeianism moved from the sociopolitical shadows closer to the kilns of power, gradually paralyzing the nerve centers of the social organism and giving birth in the long run to a new style of corporative interaction.

*3. The Post-Soviet Fratry*

Perestroika, in essence, thus included within itself a destructive force which shook the very foundations of communist society, *i.e.,* its guild-like order. As soon as the old foundation of existence of corporations was touched, communism found itself in its death throes. Within its institutions a new type of corporate interaction began to form, specifically expressing the cardinal changes which perestroika society was undergoing on a basic level, where the modes of redistribution and use of social benefits were brought into correspondence with the principles of cooperation among individuals. This new ethos of corporation was formed as a counterweight to the Soviet guild-based plebeianism of the last decade. Today this has in fact become dominant and molds a deep social order, making possible, in the final analysis, the existence of the postcommunist state as such, in spite, total nihilism, a shameful criminal revolution, and economic crisis.

This form of corporation dates back to such an archaic social structure as fratry.

"Fratry" is a special genus of professional alliance whose members always orient their activity toward a single longterm objective — appropriating from a position of strength the fruits of other people's labor. This type of alliance is customarily associated with archaic paramilitary communities which predated the establishment of the Roman republic. "Fratries" may emerge at any point of a socium, provided that access to material values is sufficiently simple and relatively risk-free. Their essence is that they are forms of parasitism on social relations. From a "fratry's" perspective, **/374/** an institution is only an instrument to restructure social linkages for more effective exploitation by the parasite. The internal organization of a "fratry" tends to establish the closest possible "bodily" contact (and verbal unity) of its members ("fraternity"). This includes an austere mechanism to initiate and identify a member in the power hierarchy, strict (sometimes ritualized) subordination; it implies "transparency" of the individual for the environment and the existence of a protoideology (collective myth to rationalize away the mode of organization and manner of activity). A "fratry" has a militant, aggressive nature and its activities always entail a certain risk. But, by imposing on its members a rigid set of mutual obligations, the "fratry" simultaneously defends them (this is not to be confused with the guild's equal protection of all members) and finally separates them from other corporative (and even whole social) groups and from obligations to the latter. At its most mature, a "fratry" constitutes within the structure of society a hermetic asocial niche where official laws do not function. A special ethical climate is created which is radically different from enunciated public morals; the social and professional status of an individual (acquired in temporal world) loses all real significance.

This characterization, of course, has the nature of an ideal type. Together with this, the notion of "mafia" as a designation for this phenomenon has penetrated the consciousness of society. Precisely for this reason "mafia" comes to simultaneously mean both in-groups at the summit of state power and abstract criminal clans. Meanwhile, the whole societal body is today literally infiltrated, permeated, and infested with "mafias," and "mafias" are not concentrated only in the privileged, special spaces of public activity. The fratry in a postcommunist epoch — both in rigid mature forms and in an unclear initial shape — always dominates and becomes indispensable for human survival.

A considerable role is played here by the ongoing mass pauperization of society in Ukraine. Despite the legislative **/375/** and normative activities of various state structures and outbursts of verbosity, especially on the part of many political parties, the people's impoverishment becomes here a natural companion and stimulant of anomie.

The stratification of the present *Verkhovna Rada* (Parliament) of Ukraine in a situation of the absolute social unstructured quality of society and, hence, impossibility of a full-fledged representative democracy, testify to the domination of fratry in the process of organizing group interests.

The ethos of fratry is deeply rooted in ancient times. Jose Ortega-y-Gasset saw in it a "sportive" embryo of statehood as such.3 The "fratry" always exists, even on the margins of society under both capitalism and communism. This "remnant" usually catches its second wind where people are forcibly united in such corporations as the army on the basis of legal coercion and the penitentiary system or where patriarchal traditions remain vigorous. The "fratry" also casts its shadow on the actions of political elites.4 The "fratry" is a primary "barbaric" type of concentrating human beings around the kilns of power; it arises not on the basis of cooperation in production and exchange and not on the basis of market relationships but on the basis of a forced alienation of values from the producer or merchant. Only when a society begins to assume structure on the basis of democratic legislation, "fratry" moves into the shadow of politics and is force to the margins of economic life.

We ultimately connect the rapid rise of the new "fratry" ethos to at least three lethal processes going on in the body of communist society and continuing to exert a powerful influence on the life of the postcommunist world. They are 1) the institutional strengthening of the personal interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, 2) privatization (latent and official appropriation) of the "socialist property of the whole people" by groups of the population, and 3) a fundamental change in the character of social mobility.

Perestroika began, was carried out, and brought to victorious end not by the enemies of the USSR, not by dissi-**/376/**dents, but by the common Soviet people whose consumerist consciousness warped by double standards regarded the national wealth (including not only material resources but also symbolic capital) as kind of an open-sesame, only without the magic word. It seemed that incantations about the spirit of free competition, market relationships, and private property would automatically open before the people horizons of a bright consumerist future.

Perestroika did not and could not end up in a New Economic Policy (NEP) which the communist state could end at an auspicious moment,5 there was and could be no escape from perestroika: in a few years (a radical difference from the 1920s) communism was deprived of its main and essentially only protector, the guild-based functionary whose own life within a materialized Utopia convinced him in the uselessness for him of communist ideology.

Demonstrations of capitalist wealth, attacks on Stalinism, and the creation of formal conditions for a multilevel economy failed to call forth any mass labor enthusiasm. The economy as a system responded to the incantations of the free market and to government opportunism with deepening disorganization. The populace took to speculative capitalism after it became aware that wage/salary raises in fact meant cuts in living standards. The main thing however, is that the very agents of institutional practices (government, economic, and Party functionaries) were mature enough to use the archaic social form of fratry on the basis of their previous social and economic experience. NEP as a social phenomenon came to naught largely because the most mobile part of the empire's population remained indifferent to it. And, conversely, in the late 1980s the mobile part of society concentrated under the old regime near the centers of power and consumer resources applied every effort to destroy the Soviet institutional machine and exploit emerging sinecures for personal ends.

The *chinovnik* (including those of the Party) was secularized with amazing rapidity, and this seemed one of the **/377/** reasons for a "miraculous" destruction of the seemingly unshakable edifice of the CPSU. Having lost the capacity to create a system of institutional rules and norms as well as to supervise corporative practice on all levels of Soviet society, the institution of the Party outlived its usefulness. The communist state came crashing down in a thunder of purely communist-sounding demands for social justice. The collapse of totalitarianism gave the inhabitant of the USSR the freedom not to participate in spontaneous mass organizations, be it in politics, economy, or culture. He already (and for a long time) regarded the guild-based foundations of communism merely as a tiresome ritual, and now that all forms of social creativity seemed accessible, he channeled his efforts in only one direction: adopting the essentially negative rhetoric of "acceleration" as merely one more rite of loyalty, he began by word and deed to demolish what had hitherto at least slightly restrained the appetites of both the functionaries and criminal spontaneity, what had kept corporative practice under a measure of control and made social processes generally manageable; in fact, he demolished the institutional order of the Soviet state. It was only natural that the objectives of in-groups of functionaries disinterested in any control over their actions fully corresponded to the prevailing mood of the population. The Soviet Union died in a spasm of social envy. This was probably the only time when the interests of a plebeianized guild and an ever-strengthening fratry paradoxically coincided.

The global collapse of institutions, which had completely lost their regulative functions during perestroika, became the scourge of postcommunist society despite fits of law-making and bureaucratic tradition (recall Gorbachev's acute verbosity). The very language of law ceased to express and structure the ensemble of available social practices and degenerated into a mere jargon of power. This tendency to assert the ethos of fratry still remains all too obvious.

Communism died before the social models of modern capitalist society had formed. The ideology of reforms was **/378/** thus deprived, as it were, of any real-life social basis. Behind the civil facade both the codes of practical ethics6 and patterns of social identification and corporative relationship which otherwise impart positive sense to the institutions of Western democracy and economy, cease to function and lose all positive sense. And the naïvé conviction that law-making and norm-setting will at the end of the day make the masses of people live in a "civilized" manner is in fact utterly groundless. The great difficulties of postcommunist society are rooted in the fact that the destruction of guild-type structures, their devaluation in the eyes of all mobile individuals developed from mass disgust with institutional practice as such. And the more a society is infatuated by ideas of a *cherny peredel* (an apocalyptic, total redistribution from "haves" to "have-nots"), the more the archaic "fratry," riding a wave of mass plebianism, fills the pores of the societal skin and fills the cavities of the social body.

From this it does not follow that times of "anarchy" and "lawlessness" are in the offing. The paradox lies in the fact that the forge of guild power has vanished into thin air; in fact, it is essentially due to the "criminal revolution" and "special" parasitic interest pursued by "fratry" bands that the postcommunist elite has continued to reproduce a mythology of "functioning" societal institutions (structures, laws, *etc.)* and transform it in an imaginary "democratic capitalist" direction on all levels of the social edifice. It was entrepreneurial activity that governed the dynamics of fratry relationships from the very start of the Gorbachev reforms.

The liberal rhetoric supplementary to entrepreneurship presents the Entrepreneur himself as an innovator, the locomotive of universal prosperity and technological progress. This overlooks completely the fact that a society which places the figure of the entrepreneur at the crossroads of any socioeconomic and political practice and has not set itself the task to prepare an appropriate institutional and corporative groundwork reaps the wind of a speculative capitalist boom. The crash in which such booms inevitably end **/379/** brings no relief because then the crisis of "innovation" will merely generate social uncertainty. And so on *ad infinitum.*

However, for those who enter the world of commerce, the fratry becomes the only possible form of business cooperation. To demonstrate, suffice it to trace how the state apparatus has been transforming the new "economic mode" into a gigantic machine for the appropriation of national wealth and, in particular, latent privatization of the nation's immovable property. While *Homo Sovieticus* shuddered with hatred for the communist *nomenklatura,* the USSR's mobile citizens created a brotherhood, forgetting forever who had been a Party functionary, currency speculator, possessed privilege, and who had totally disassociated himself from all prospects connected with socialism.

Ukrainians also witnessed Comsomol and Communist Party functionaries turning into bankers, engineers into customs officers, scholars and scientists into shuttle traders, and "those who misappropriate of socialist property" into shadow economy bosses, respectable wheelers-dealers and official national economic advisors.

Thus, the entrepreneurial "fratry" does not suffer at all from, for example, the "building-up of an independent Ukrainian state." On the contrary, it derives from it a real benefit: profits are redistributed between those who derive them on the market and those who regulate the latter's activity. "Fratry" becomes a stable and system-creating social form, which in essence suppresses the necessity for other ways of social self-organization. "Fratry" steps forward as the main entrepreneurial "innovation" in the organization of society in the postcommunist period.

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We have witnessed a tectonic shift in the bowels of the system of the microphysics of power, in other words, in the power-knowledge complex which had ensured the unity and stability of the social totality through decades of totalitarianism. And it is too early to forecast the consequences of **/380/** this shift. The Soviet people were relieved of the communist "straitjacket" in ways completely different from those envisaged by postcommunist liberal "therapists."

No wonder that the culture of the pre-industrial era in its micropolitical manifestations makes itself felt on occasion in the postcommunist period in perfect harmony with Potemkin-village democracy in the guise of fashionable economic jargon, discussion of reform, precipitous contraction in industry, education, and the unemployment of the communist "Guild" (which was destroyed not at all to ensure industrial prosperity, scientific progress, civil peace, equality, and fraternity). The powerful "Fratry" and the sickly "Guild," the latter gradually becoming a mass refuge and homeless shelter for losers, coexist and oppose each other. The split between them is no longer at the level of ideological, class, group, property, or ethnic rivalries. It originates in the depths of the human condition, acquiring the basic nature of a "friend-foe" dichotomy.

The "business" elite of the postcommunist world does not identify itself as "bourgeoisie." And understandably so. If the "bourgeois" Enlightenment was marked by the fact that, in addition to the power vertical of lords living off serfs, artisans and merchants created then an effective horizontal of social exchange, the "twilight" of communism was marked by the chimerical *nomenklatura* businesses and ubiquitous asociality... The post-Soviet fratry has won out over the communist guild, and this immeasurably complicates the forming of democratic institutions in the near future.

1 See, specifically: A. Zinoviev, *Kommunizm kak Realnost'* (1980; in Russian).

2 See: A. Gluckmann, *Les maotres penseurs,* (Paris, 1977), p.321.

3 J. Ortega-y-Gasset, "The Sporting Origin of the State," *Filosofskaya i Sotsiologicheskaya Mysl',* (Kiev, 1990), No. 6, pp. 38-48 (Russian translation).

4 See, specifically: O.Bily, V.Burlachuk, "We, Philologists", *Suchasnist',* 1992, No.7, pp. 73-81 (in Ukrainian).

5 The true plans of the Gorbachev team are even now difficult for us to realize. However, behind torrents of official rhetoric (about "civil peace," "class partnership") as well as their actions on the whole one can see a certain general scheme. "Vouchers" for the Komsomol leaders to commercial structures, attempts to create an analog of "people's enterprises after Goering", etc. testify to efforts to transform communism into a "corporativist state."

6 For various types of collectivism and corporation, see: R. Sainsaulieu, *L'identite au travail: Les effets culturels de I'organisation* (Paris, 1988); A.A.Zinoviev, *Zapad. Fenomen Zapadnizma* (Moscow, 1995; in Russian).

The Uninvented Fifth World

## *Serhiy MAKEYEV, Nataliya KOSTENKO*

The previous sections have sought to present the constants and regularities which have already taken shape and the growth of the institutions of the Ukrainian state as a result of the incessant activity or excessive inactivity of the various political and social subjects. Simultaneously, the aptness of the subject matter, inflated for some and undoubted for others, is capable of obscuring what may be termed, to use bureaucratese, the "context of state-building," which is for Ukrainian citizens primarily their everyday life. The illusion that the discourse on everyday life is of secondary importance is deceptive, for the theme itself, far from being the focus of social debates in the time of intensive nation-building, allows for a certain measure of freedom in description, for they are brought beyond the bounds of the binary juxtaposition of primary vs. secondary importance. One such possible perspective is offered below.

*1. On the Non-Problematic Nature of the Fifth World*

We read in *Tlön. Ukbar. Orbis Tertius* by Jorge Luis Borges:

...We found an article on Upsala on the last pages of Volume 26, an article on the Ural-Altaic languages on the first pages of Volume 27, but not a single word on Ukbar. Bioy, slightly embarrassed, took the index volumes. In vain did he check all conceivable spellings like **/382/** Ukbar, Ugbar, Ookbar, Oukbar... Before leaving, he told me it was an area in Iraq or in Asia Minor. I confess that I nodded with a certain feeling of awkwardness.1

Associations can lead anywhere. Let's imagine that the only encyclopedia where a friend of the writer's found the article on Ukbar also contained an article starting "Ukr..." which was also missing from all other editions. Do these places really exist, and are they like their descriptions? Are they on the edge of reality or the edge of fiction?

Leaving apart disputes over the borders, nobody can be said to doubt the long-established existence of the land called Ukraine as well as that of a large aggregate of individuals organized symbolically or directly in groups, strata, and categories acting individually or together in accordance with or contrary to the structures of the social order, *i.e.,* a society filling the given territory. This is exactly what we say today: Ukrainian society. It is the latter that all controversies of the "metaphysics of presence" seem to pivot around. In terms of the gnoseological and cultural practices of deconstructivism, we have to try to overcome this metaphysics, which is quite within the capabilities of intellectuals and artists. But it is beyond the capabilities of mass consciousness rooted in everyday routine and busy with other fascinating, if most often painful, attempts to remove the spell from its strange symbols, cues, and strict statements. Certainly, everyday routine can also work out the samples and precedents of reaction to a literally "squalid existence." However, the social presence of an individual, outside which any statement about an existing society becomes problematic, requires inevitable coordination with its subjective reality. The point is not so much that the intentions of subjects to distinguish positions in social space, and to attach others or themselves to them now so often fail. Social scientists explain what is happening to the identity of subjects in terms of transformations, loss and seeking, throwing off ana taking up, or any other concepts which indicate the extraordinary nature of the process. Being extraordinary is not in itself **/383/** necessarily identical to deep crisis or catastrophe. Transformations of identities are also observed in quite stable social systems; they accompany migrations and social mobility. The revision of traditional or conventional cultural values also makes it difficult for a modern person to identify his belonging to a certain common sociocultural context which clearly displays the seams joining together individual ethno-cultural traditions.2 It is something quite different that in relatively quiet and partly balanced social environments the permanent confirmation and reproduction of subjective identities are carried out more often imperceptibly, following the natural tendency of individual consciousness to accept the world as something given and everyday public reality as a streamlined system which presupposes always and with certainty his or her place. Pre-theoretical thinking and common sense handle this procedure without effort, while "identity remains indistinct as long as it holds no place in the world."3 In a disturbed socium, processes of identification become all the more urgent and topical, being subjected to reflection and emotional rethinking. The subjects are involved in gleaning the irrefutable evidence of their social presence, their presence "here and now," in the social space and time where they exist. Moreover, the futility of this operation seems not to embarrass anyone at all. Attempts are either easily abandoned or made over and over again, while appeals to urgency are not accepted as strict and imperative. Of course, one must also consider the chance of a decisive transformation of the reality within which identity is affirmed beyond the current one. A person may be considered, as the existentialists did, the sum of his capabilities, *i.e.,* his projection into the future time and, in our scenario, into a different or altered socium. Perhaps, conversely, recording the traces of what has already happened should be considered a privileged socio-cultural activity. But in any case, such a transformation of the time and space of identity will require (albeit imperceptibly) a correlaf n with the present either by means of the subject's own monocentric **/384/** acts vulnerable to "blinded self-preservation" (Jürgen Habermas) motivated by his fear of losing his identity, or through discursive practices suggesting the communicative or symbolic reproduction of his own social position. To make this successful requires not only acceptable definitions of spatial and temporal realities but also their most accurate and unambiguous demarcation.

Today the world still lacks any such definitions and demarcations. Those offered by politicians and journalists, inspired by the magic force of a legitimate status to produce all kinds of symbolic classifications for social life, remain by and large mere symbols without any relationship to adequate definitions of the situation. As a result, social subjects seem to be uncertain in which world they can, must, or will assert themselves. Hence the metaphor of a "fifth world."

*2. Orbis Quintus*

This metaphor's source is in the long-established description of the world order where the numeration of common structural elements did not have at first any differentiating significance suggesting the "first world" — the politically, economically and culturally self-sufficient West — and all the others ("West and the Rest").4 By the end of the twentieth century, the ranking of worlds becomes of fundamental importance, although it does not require any strict sequence of numbers. The "second world" of socialist countries proved to be rather an illusory opposition to the "first" one and survives today only in part. The "third" world, on the contrary, is getting rid of a third-rate complex and acquiring the reputation of a potential source of new political and cultural movements. A "fourth" world came into being recently, localized on the expanses of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and some CIS countries and characterized by an intention to look like the "first" one and make up for lost historical time. And, finally, the "fifth world" implying a quaint combination of all the above orders and capable of **/385/** materializing anywhere — on vast territories or a limited locality — as historical fate would have it.

The fifth world is by no means a Utopia from the past or future. This is a world of the present which has gained an unheard-of privilege (Jacques Derridas) compared to other time modes, a world in which the fields of the real, imaginary and symbolic are so mutually absorbing that they can only be distinguished under the electron microscope of an analyst or the penetrating look of a master, which due to various existing deficits cannot now be dreamt of.

*3. Space and Time*

That citizens of the fifth world permanently find themselves in a given physical space is by and large self-evident. An unyielding physical reality continually reminds them that they belong to a certain territory. The experience of reckless or highly pragmatic excursions beyond its borders confirms this to the very few that they live "there" rather than "here." Efforts to identify and familiarize with the physical medium seem to be rewarded with better results than a search for self-definitions in the social and political contexts. This is quite clear because it is the human body that remains, within the present limits, the unshakable essence of the physical world, a bulwark of presence, a visible point in an agitated and at the same time viscous space against the background of a glaring and fading play of socio-cultural identities.5

However, corporeal reactions to the products of uncertainty-laden sense perception are simple enough. The point is that the environment's plurality of significations perplexes the perceiving subject from time to time, preventing him from improving his physical ability to absorb the signs and translate them into various symbols and definitions. The population, quite sure of being on their own physical territory, *i.e.,* "at home," often sense that home's unrecognizability: unknown things around, people changed, and therefore **/386/**unknown, under unclear circumstances. The exterior of many cities and towns abounds in the instances of utter neglect, dim colors of a worn-out physical environment which depress one's mind and are especially discernible next to a gaudy rainbow of bright, if not necessarily fresh, objects from other words. The fact of the unsteady physical framework of space has been evidenced directly or indirectly in various discourses of the fifth world inhabitants, be it political debates, public "roundtables" or everyday communication actively involving the physical metaphors of construction, collapse, or sickness.

"Of ever greater interpretive importance in this connection is the cosmological legend about the emergence of the fifth world. According to some not-so-new ideas, the new formation under observation is the product of an explosion which broke up a hyperdense (totalitarian, in the political science sense) body. This disintegration, like any other serious disintegration, caused the emission of physical, intellectual, and emotional energy, as well as the energy of economic, political and social claims, desires, or temptations. The whirlpool of powerful energy flows, in its turn, brought about the constellation of vast "vacuum zones," "torsion fields" as well as "high tension" areas. The pressure drop made the fifth world's outer surface highly permeable, causing it to draw in material and ideal things accumulated on the periphery of other words, which is still being held up by the inertia of previous movements."

Tangible physical reality by no means disintegrates into clearly-discriminated segments of the "proper" and "foreign" but leads to double perception. The mechanisms of an unmistakable discrimination between the proper and alien types within one's own dwelling place seem to have gone wrong. Material objects, which were unambiguously marked as "alien" only recently, are now being appropriated both compulsively and naturally and used for describing one's own space, while things we were long used to are lost sight of. This applies equally to geographical regions, aircraft, ships, pipelines, state emblems, flags, goods, food, advertising logos, and school textbooks. However, that which was ours is not completely being replaced by the so recently foreign, **/387/** and the material world is being expanded, while its individual and loose fragments are already being rejected as a real field for asserting identity or are not yet accepted as such.

The body reacts to these complexities of perception, above all, with muscular involuntary reflexes, movements aimed at setting distance, acquiring and enclosing one's own space, keeping out foreign physical objects, or, on the contrary, at expanding one's territory by occupying the neighboring spaces with all their accessories. At the same time, more regularity is achieved in inhaling new smells, coming to know unknown tastes, and removing the audial irritation once caused by the sounds of foreign speech. Hence, surprise at fresh opportunities to achieve physical comfort by consuming things can also precede the identification of a subject in their field.

A specific temporal order of the fifth world also promotes the absolutization of space (to overcome the latter requires purely muscular effort). Time seems to have shaken off its clumsy linear imagination, and the principle of a strict succession of the past, present, and future has lost its fundamental importance. Logic, memory, and hopes of inevitable progress are in a certain turmoil because they have now lost their traditional capacity to master time. However, the new temporality can only be understood by means of muscular efforts, physical strain, and will. It turned out, for example, that a not-so-distant past could be resolutely forgotten through an intrepid act of will-power.

In a world populated in the main spatially only the present has real meaning. A dim historical retrospective and a blurry future are taken for granted, treated as a kind of necessity creating conditions for a thorough cultivation and mastering of everything available at the moment. The past rushes in on the present in selected and corrected episodes, but the former's advice is not at all categorical, while the future totally fails to make imperative its purposes. The present, which draws in its whirlpool the previous and forthcoming layers, may seem to be able to effectively colonize **/388/** them and assert its complete sway. But in reality, the privilege of the present generally turns out to be the energy time trap.

The sociological discourse about the social sense-laden space and time is bound to develop in the terms of sociality irrespective of these terms being accented upon or belonging to a context known to and shared by the participants. It does not mean at all that the ideas of a chromotopic structure common to all people of the world should in this case be reduced to such notions as "social space" and "social time." The physical and the social are divided here rather analytically, even if this work is done by mass consciousness. The topological and temporal oppositions can be regarded, after P. Bourdieu, as the embodiment of social structures and social distances of a hierarchic society, which is achieved by means of "naturalization causing the social realities to steadily move into the physical world."6

The space and time of the fifth, as well as any other, world are quite interpretable in this key. Its inhabitants, like the citizens of the other words, surely have an acute (even perhaps all the more acute by virtue of the on-going transformations of status networks) "taste" for the social: this P. Bourdieu calls the feeling of an individual social orientation based on the acquired experience to distinguish the dominating and the subservient social positions.7 The symbolic classifications of the previous and newly-created social strata, circles and groups, which are wide-spread in our public rhetoric and everyday language and point out the main positive or negative characteristics from the viewpoint of the assessing group, are an unambiguous testimony to this. Meanwhile, notice should be taken of the parallel existence of a different mechanism of perceiving space and time which supplants the sociality of the latter by physical factuality, rather than levels it off, as J. Baudrillard8 might have suggested. The "social eye" of everyday routine often fails to get engaged because the physical one is weak. In other words, the interpretation of, *eg.,* social writings as claims discerned in the self-confident body movements and lengthy speech of the numerous special status-laden anonymous individuals to somebody's space and time is being postponed without actualizing, if colliding with a lot of punctuation marks, due to the relevance of purely physical overcoming of such encroachments on the identity. The social construction of reality acquires a lagging profile.

The catch-up rhythm, originally declared preferable because the fifth world is trying to make up for lost time in its development (exactly like in the fourth world), is not **/389/** felt. On the contrary, a tendency to slow down the dynamics of various processes, such as a gradual slow-down in economic slump and inflation rate or the unhurried progress of market reforms, escapes no one's notice. Obviously, the very notion of speed as a ratio between the distance passed by a body and the unit of time is being essentially modified and supplanted by a problematic tendency to express distance in terms of directional movement. Sociologists no longer fear that they will have no time to record and preserve for future generations the facts of today because nothing is happening. Units of time, however, are also liable to revision, for it is more effective and easier to measure time by the units of space to be occupied, in the units of nervous and physical efforts or their compensation (the "spare time" of the past), financial losses, and acquisitions.

Thus, it is difficult to determine the "timeliness" of an act like the introduction of a national currency or the payment of wages. Loosened time regularly embraces those who wait for trams, buses, and even the subway trains which used to run in a steady and impeccable rhythm. "Work time," deprived of legitimate limits and receiving no commensurate, extends or flows into a different space that guarantees acceptable exchange or disappears altogether in the shape of long vacations and holidays. The relationship between the fifth world generations is not confined to their perennial conflict, which also testifies to age-related, *i.e.,* temporal, gaps. The perception of a present pregnant with collapse governs the emergence of primarily situational identifications in time ( "*I* *am waiting*"),while the concurrent notions of a comically expanding present only intensify this practice. Thus, the creation of projects vital in the long run loses its urgency.

*4. The Factual Nature of Citizenship*

The relationship between the spatial and the temporal is best represented by world-wide communications. A social **/390/** subject — power — is clearly discernible in the constituting of communications. The presence of this subject can no longer be ousted into a speech-free context. Railways and electricity are known to have once formed radically new aspects of the time and power relationship, which had an essential influence over the social order.9 The mainstreams of contacts in a stable society never go out of governmental supervision. However, in the fifth world, the control over mutual interpretation of space and time by means of communication is not as crucial as the designers of other worlds think.

"A so-called fast train covered the distance of 450 km in ten hours in the late 1980s, now it does it in twelve hours at an average speed of 37.5 km. per hour. What a surprise would it have been for, say, H. G. Wells who thought in 1920 that the train carrying him from Petrograd to Moscow at a speed of 25 miles (40 km) per hour was only "dragging on." It takes a letter one and a half weeks to go to a point 450 km away, and one and a half months to a point 1000 km eastwards."

Traditional communication facilities, remaining functionally underused, can hardly lay claim to the metaphor of "human expansion" (Marshall McLuhan). What we see is rather the narrowing of the achieved and return to original dimensions (for many reasons, it is more effective to deliver money to someone personally, *i.e.,* physically, than by postal order). Traditional communications, no longer burdened with everyday governmental oversight, are more and more fulfilling their designated purpose of providing for an interworld link-up, presenting themselves not so much as a function of the social contract but as attributes of peace rather than the function of a social contract. Incidentally, some forgotten institutions of movement in space are being restored, *e.g.,* "going places," whose original Russian meaning incorporates the idea of interconnection between the physical and social environments.

By contrast, the newest communications based on computer technology and electronic networks *(E-mail, Internet)* **/391/** "miraculously" overcome space and time. The air space where they go out and about is not yet large, and this method of communication by no means has mass accessibility. However, even they obviously demonstrate their worldly nature, creating entirely new areas completely free from government control, areas within which communities of what is known as "virtual democracy" are being set up. On the other hand, air trails blazed by television and wellknown to the majority also delineate areas of relative freedom for the inhabitants of our territories, despite the state's natural wish to closely watch, preserve, and expand the "information space." Naturally, we mean neither the freedom of television or other mass media of the fifth world, which are inevitably dependent on the institutions of power and capital, nor the freedom of appropriating symbols and meanings disseminated in huge quantities (*e.g.,* TV serials, one of the cultural products the viewers love, are offered as a choice between the North and Latin American specimens). We mean that TV communication constitutes one of the few spheres of life where the identities of individuals and groups being formed in the space and time of cultural products are permanently backed up with real, and not fictional, activity, as is the case with the emerging but often unconfirmed identities in the market of things and other cultural benefits. Audiences seem to have withstood an onslaught of previously unheard-of variety, not only identifying, but asserting continually their own tastes and preferences.

The procedure of correlation with quite a specific authority is most likely to be part of the public transport passengers' everyday experience. The possession of a car requires a clearly recorded presence of the state in the subjectivity of an individual in the shape of a driving license. A driving license, Baudrillard says in this connection, is "sort of a testimony to citizenship," it "serves as a title deed for the newest motorized nobility whose coat of arms has inscribed on it the compression of gases and top speed. Forfeiture of a driving license is today a kind of ex-communication..."10 **/392/**

Incidentally, even accidental or newly-converted car users in the fifth world become more and more fascinated with the car's simplest functional truth, viz., the comfort of movement through space and time capable of defusing almost completely the atmosphere of power at least for short distances between the traffic police posts. The presence of the state is also felt by air passengers deprived of the anonymity of a personal intention to transform a space-time interval. But here, too, allowance is to be made for an essentially narrowing scope of domestic air communications in the fifth world. This method of confirming identity with the state is practiced by 5% of our citizens at most.

It is not surprising that fifth world inhabitants face the problems of their national (state) identification. A world is always larger than a state and not measurable on the latter's scale. In our case, the point of discourse arises only because the borderlines of the fifth world's symbolic maps and those of a state coincide. Public opinion poll data repeatedly show the differentiation of the population into groups which do or do not confirm their identity with the modern state entity on their territory. This differentiation is spatially oriented, for the identities are being delimited along the "east-west" axis.

In a way, this should convince those who do not believe in the reason why the entity under discussion claims the status of a world trying, in its self-sufficiency, to reproduce a micromodel of a populated sociocultural universum, *i.e.,* a large world where the aforesaid axis is always tense. In plain terms, the fifth world has its own East and West with all that this statement implies. The former persists in evading the declaration of an unconditional subjection, while the latter accepts it almost without hesitation. However, there is also the South demonstrating with more assurance its regional identity and the Center which does not hesitate much in presenting itself as part of a legalized totality. As for the North, the sociological operational findings and electoral behavior pattern testify that it most often falls out of and dims the overall picture. **/393/**

"The choice of belonging is limited and of unequal value, if treated in terms of the real and the imaginary. However, the presence of this choice itself seems to spell out the problem of citizenship even before the forthcoming discussion of it in the context of the "citizenship — national identity" dilemma put forward by universalism and communitarianism. For we do not touch here on the active forms of the manifestation of civic loyalty or, conversely, rejection of it, but come across the fact of the coexistence of different state identities in a single geographical space. This fact is not accidental or some sort of deviation but quite a stable fact of life."

Identifications with the previous state most typical for the inhabitants of eastern and southern regions may seem to reflect the actualization of the past. But the point is in space rather than in time. The past time is certainly represented, as always and everywhere, in a symbolic and imaginary reality. However, the past does not replenish the stock of social knowledge required for being in reality because the present renounces natural continuity and is tired of breaking into it illegally. Lamentations of the many about the complications of adjusting to the new forms of order testify to their life in the present rather than in the past, the latter no longer protecting anyone. The language, capable of transcendence, effortlessly opens an outlet from the present to this side or that. In practice, this causes a sense of discomfort or apparent suffering from the inability to glance at a once accessible space, *i.e.,* what is known as nostalgia. It is the longing for a certain organized space, for integrity which is so much easier to imagine than accord any kind of discreteness, especially if one's consciousness is not prepared to replace one totality with another.

The present provides conditions for a simultaneous firmness and frailty of identification with the still unreconstructed space. Stability is ensured by the existence of vast enclaves of the socium's former organizations. Unsteadiness is caused by the absence of expected objectivications of the old order or by their existence in radically transformed shape. Identifications with the imaginary and symbolic "former" **/394/** world still respond to the political calls for restorative public works. But the fact that, within the field of an isolated individual, they avoid full-scale conflict with other existing, in fact contradictory, spatial identities testifies to their "survivability" rather than vital power. The overwhelming majority of the population upholds the right to own some property, *i.e.,* primarily to possess their own physical, and hence social, space, which was not in fact envisaged by the previous identity in a space usually treated as collectively occupied.

Identification with the state is no doubt closely connected with the setting of identity by the state itself. Obviously, any objectivizations of statehood play an essential role here, as most probably do various influences on the normative sphere of mass consciousness capable of producing both a rationally mediated reaction and suggestive effect.

There are instances of a pompous correlation of our territory with that of a large European country as well as examples of the overemphasized self-centeredness of the national TV and press foreign news which does not match low interest in our state in the world mass media. All this may be regarded as the mechanism of provincial consciousness to assert one's identity through persistent attempts to enclose one's space as self-valued and self-sufficient in the foreseeable and controllable future.

However, recognition of the independence and sovereignty of a new state remains problematic for a considerable part of the population irrespective of their region of residence. It is something else again that a rather critical assessment of the achieved degree of independence nevertheless goes hand in hand with confirmed identification in the west and the capital, and a virtually mass-scale rejection in the south and east. The indistinct markings of a selected and occupied space inevitably affect the incidence of situational identities in a given sphere, which is evidenced by the obvious unwillingness of many residents in the east, south, and partly the center (but by no means in the west) to support the declaration of national sovereignty as they once did on December 1, 1991. **/395/**

Meanwhile, the population's attitude to the state is not so simple as to be described satisfactorily in terms of a dichotic scale of assessments. It is no secret that the fifth world is rather an unsafe place rn which to live. Safety of various kinds — from the physical (life) and ecological (the environment and food) to the social (a social position ensuring an acceptable standard of living) — is perhaps the highest benefit in most acute shortage among us. Despite their absence of identification with the state, they appeal to it in search of the material and status guarantees without much confidence in a positive result. This demonstrates what may be called the phenomenon of "deferred citizenship" oriented towards arbitrary prospects. But this arbitrariness means a discursive practice scheme equally acceptable by the "demos" and the state in their relationship, rather than a transfer to the future. In a fifth world absorbed in the preservation and redistribution of energy resources, the identification of the inhabitants and the authorities is neither binding nor imperative, on which the optimists and pessimists of both liberal and conservative views look as an object for interpretation.

The factuality of citizenship as belonging to the fifth world brings to life specific forms of mechanistic and social solidarity or competition, special methods of producing cultural specimens, legitimizes multi- and transcultural symbols and meanings. But the fifth world's social structure and culture is the topic of a special discussion, which can take time because the fifth world is still living in and by the present.

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Index of Names

Acheson, Dean, 254

Adenauer, Konrad, 243

Antonenkho-Davydovych, Borys, 95

Antonesku, Ion, 199, 233

Aristotle, 323

Bachynsky, Yullan, 9

Badzio, Yuriy, 104

Baker, James, 263, 264

Bandera, Stepan, 50, 99, 240, 241-243

Baran, S., 208

Baudrillard, Jacques, 388, 391

Benes, Edvard, 171, 172, 175, 184

Berdlaev, Nikolai, 277

Berdnyk, Oles, 107

Beschloss, Michael, 262

Biddle, Dreksel, 253

Bilynsky, Andriy, 47

Blouet, B., 128

Bobrynsky, G., 271

Bolbochan, Petro, 25

Borges, Jorge Luis, 381

Bormann, Martin, 234

Bourdieu, Pierre, 388

Bretianu, George, 199

Briukhovetsky, Viacheslav, 116

Brack, Karl von, 128

Brzezinski, Sbigniew, 260, 265

Budzynovsky, Viacheslav, 9

Burian, S., 225

Burlachuk, Foka, 116

Bush, George, 260, 262-264

Carr, Edward H., 37

Ceausescu, Nicolae, 201, 202

Cetin, Kh., 215

Chechel, Mykola, 36

Cherniak, Volodymyr, 116

Chicherin, Georgy, 282, 287

Chmyr, Valery, 116

Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 107

Churchill, Winston, 128, 254

Chyzhevsky, Dmytro, 62

Clinton, Bill, 265

Cristea, Miron, 198

Danylovych, Severyn, 9

Dasiv, Kuzma, 101

Delbraeck, Hans, 6, 129, 134

Denikin, Anton, 22, 24, 127, 284

Derridas, Jacques, 385

Dmovsky, Roman, 143

Dnistriansky, Stanislav, 175

Dobriansky.Lev, 257, 258

Dontsov, Dmytro, 3, 42-47, 50, 51, 101, 110, 121,324

Douglas, Paul, 258

Drach, Ivan, 116

Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 6,7, 9,12, 72-78, 84, 121, 135, 136

Dukhynskyi, Francisk, 121

Dulles, John Foster, 256, 258

Dziuba, Ivan, 103, 104

Eisenhower, Dwight, 255

Ellan-Blakytny, Vasyl, 29

Eltchenko, Viktor, 114

Enver Pasha, 208

Flondor, Jancu, 195

Foucault, Michel, 323, 367, 372

Franko, Ivan, 8, 9, 73, 138

Frantz, Constantin, 129, 132

Frunze, Mikhail, 32, 212

Fukuyama, Francis, 71, 72

Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 263

Gedrojc, Jerzy, 152, 153

Gellner, Ernest, 55, 60

Genscher, Hans, 245

Gorbatchov, Mikhail, 16, 115, 117, 118, 260-264, 293

Goremykin, Ivan, 268

Gorin, Pavel, 37

Grabski, Stanislaw, 147

Guirescu, Constantin, 193

Guypel, H., 245

Hankevych, Mykola, 9

Hartmann, Edward von, 43, 123

Havel, Vaclav, 190

Hegel, Georg, 327

Hel, Ivan, 107

Henderson, L, 253

Himmler, Heinrich, 233, 237

Hitler, Adolf, 199, 229-240, 252

Hoover, Herbert, 256

Hornovy (Diakiv), Yosyp, 96, 97

Horthy, Miklos, 14, 160

Hörtsh, Otto, 219, 220

Hrebinka, Yevhen, 84

Hrushevsky Mykhailo, 15, 17-24, 36, 84, 86, 91, 92, 138

Hryhorovych, Hryhory, 195

Huntington, Samuel, 340

Iorga, Nicolae, 193, 196

Isopesku-Grecul, C, 194

Javits, Jacob, 258

Kaganovich, Lazar, 35

Kamenev, Lev, 283, 289

Kandyba, Ivan, 107

Kant, Iramanuel, 75

Karol II, 198

Karolyi, H., 159

Kemal-pasha, Mustapha, 212

Kennan, George, 257

Kerensky, Aleksandr, 274

Khmelnytsky, Bohdan, 58, 59, 91

Khrystiuk, Pavlo, 36

Khvyliovy, Mykola, 36, 38

Kinkel, Klaus, 246, 247

Kistiakivsky, Bohdan, 73, 74, 76, 77

Kistiakivsky, Oleksandr, 73

Kjellen, Rudolf, 122-124

Kliamkin, Ihor, 321

Koch, Erich, 234, 235, 239

Konovalets, Yevhen, 47

Kosior, Stanislav, 23

Kosma, Miklos, 166

Kossut, Lajos, 157

Kostomarov, Mykola, 121

Kovach, Mihal,

Kozakiewicz, Jerzy, 155

Kozyrev, Andrey, 293

Krasivsky, Zinoviy, 100

Kravchuk, Leonid, 49, 80, 113, 117, 215

Khrushchev, Nikita, 100, 243, 319

Krymsky, Ahatanhel, 74, 77, 214

Kuchma, Leonid, 190, 340

Kun, Bela, 14, 159

Kvetsko, Dmytro, 100

Kviring, Emmanuil, 30, 33, 35

Lanovyi, Volodymyr, 80

Lapchinsky, Georg, 29

Lawrynenko, Jury, 153

Lebed, Dmitri, 34,

Lenin, Vladimir, 5, 7, 11, 14, 22, 23, 27, 29, 33, 37, 277, 279, 280, 284, 285, 288-290

Lenkavsky, S., 45

Levytsky, A., 287

Levytsky, K., 224

Levytsky, Modest, 177, 211

Levytsky, Yevhen, 9, 227

Lisovy, Vasyl, 106

List, Friedrich, 128

Lukyanenko, Levko, 102, 103, 107

Lypa, Yury, 84-88, 92, 121

Lypynsky, Vyacheslav, 3, 53-69, 90, 91, 121

Lysiak-Rudnytsky, Ivan, 7, 46, 73, 78

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 322

Mackinder, Halford John, 124-128

Manuïlsky, Dmytro, 11

Margolin, Arnold, 249

Marx, Karl, 8, 12, 56, 317, 319, 320

Masaryk, Tomas, 17, 138, 172-174, 176

Matthews, Herbert, 254

Mazepa, Isaak, 285

Mazepa, Ivan, 121

McDonald, Harry, 256

McLuhan, Marshall, 390

Meinecke, Friedrich, 129

Melescanu, Teodor, 203

Meshko, Oksana, 107

Messersmith, G., 252

Meyer, Henry Cord, 134, 135

Michels, Robert, 56

Mikhnovsky, Mykola, 4, 39-41, 121

Miliukov, Pavel, 270, 273

Moczulski, Leszek, 153, 155

Mommsen, Wolfgang, 136

Monnais, Jean, 244

Moroz, Valentyn, 101

Moska, Gaetano, 56

Mukhtar-Bey, Akhmed, 211

Naumann, Friedrich, 127, 129, 130-132, 134, 138

Nemyrych, Yury, 121

Nicholas I, 333

Nicholas II, 268, 271

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 43, 45, 324

Nistor, Ion, 193, 196, 199

Okhrymovych, Volodymyr, 9

Olesnytsky, Yevhen, 224

Ordzhonikidze, Sergo, 279

Orlyk, Pylyp, 84, 121

Ortega-y-Gasset, Jose, 375

Ozal, Turgut, 214

Pareto, Wilfredo, 56

Pavlyk, Mykhailo, 6, 8, 9, 73

Pelensky, Yaroslav, 150, 256

Petliura, Symon, 23, 24, 26, 121, 172, 285

Petrushevych, Yevhen, 177

Pilsudski, Jozef,45, 43, 91, 147, 148

Pinochet, Augusta, 321

Pizyur, Yevhen, 69

Plato, 67

Podllsky, Kazimierz, 153

Podolynsky, Serhiy, 6

Poltava, Petro, 96, 99

Poole, D., 253

Popovych, Myroslav, 116

Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 7

Proniuk, Yevhen, 105

Purishkevich, Vladimir, 269-270

Pynzenyk, Viktor, 80

Rakovsky, Khristian, 282, 284

Renner, Karl, 14-15

Revai, Fedir, 165

Richytsky, Andriy, 31

Rohrbach, Paul, 129

Roosevelt,. Franklin, 254

Rosenbegr, Alfred, 234

Rousseau, Jean-Jeaques, 325

Rudenko, Mykola, 107

Rudnytsky, Stepan, 83, 87, 88, 92, 99

Savytsky, S., 283

Schulze-Gevernitz, G., 129

Schopenhauer, Arthur, 43

Scowcroft, 264

Seton-Watson, Robert William, 138, 139

Shakhai, D., 97, 98

Shakhrai, Vasyl, 29,

Shapoval, 5,

Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 113

Shelukin, S., 287

Sheptytsky, Andriy, 138

Shevchenko, Taras, 269

Shrah, Mykola, 36

Shumsky, Oleksandr, 29, 31, 3,

Skoropadsky, Pavlo, 23, 24, 43, 58

Skoropys-Yeltukhovsky, A., 210

Skrypnyk, Mykola, 30, 32, 35-38

Slavynsky, Maksym, 178

Sorensen, Theodor, 259

Sosnovsky, Maxym, 74

Stalin, Joseph, 37, 38, 99, 277, 288, 289, 333

Stamboliyski, Alexander, 140

Starukh (Yarlan), Yaroslav, 97

Stolypin, Pyotr, 268

Stsiborsky, Mykola, 47-49

Stus, Vasyl, 108

Syniavsky, A., 85, 90, 92

Talaat Bey, 208, 224

Talbott, Strobe, 262

Telniuk, Stanislav, 116

Trotsky, Lev, 10,11

Tiltman, Hessel, 140-142

Tnianov, Yuri 226

Tiutchev, Fiodor, 333

Tiutiunyk,Yuriy, 36

Tomaszewski, Jerzy, 148

Trumen, Harry, 254

Tsehelsky, L., 208, 224

Tuhan-Baranovsky, Mykhailo, 74

Tykhy, Oleksiy, 107

Urbas, Hoyos, 222

Valuyev, Pyotr, 5, 17,

Vasylenko, Mykola, 74

Vernadsky, Volodymyr, 74, 77, 78

Volobuyev, Mykhailo, 31, 36

Volodymyr, The Great, 271

Vyhovskyi, Ivan, 121

Vynnychenko, Volodymyr, 5, 24, 25, 172

Voloshin, Avgustin, 165

Vynnychenko, Volodymyr, 5, 8, 25, 251

Walesa, Lech. 156

Weber, Max, 129, 134-137, 319

Wells, Herbert, 390

Wilson, Woodrow, 96, 194, 250-252

Xenopol, A., 193

Yavorsky, Matvyi, 37, 38

Yaremenko, Vasyl, 116

Yaroslav, The Wise, 271

Yelchenko, Yuri, 116

Yeltsin, Boris, 264, 339

Yurkevych, Lev, 9-11, 26,

Yurynets, Volodymyr, 38

Zatonsky, Volodymyr, 33, 34

Zhuk, O., 93

Zoellick, Robert, 261